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2ABSTRACT
Certain recent studies of South Asian entrepreneurial acti­
vity have suggested that customary social and cultural const­
raints have prevented positive response to economic develop­
ment programmes. Constraints including the conservative 
mentality of the traditional merchant castes, over-attention 
to custom, ritual and status and the prevalence of the joint 
family in management structures have been regarded as the 
main inhibitors of rational economic behaviour, leading to 
the conclusion that externally-directed development pro­
grammes cannot be successful without changes in ideology and 
behaviour.
A focus upon the indigenous concepts of the traditional 
merchant castes of a market town in Rajasthan and their 
role in organising business behaviour, suggests that the 
social and cultural factors inhibiting positivejto a presen­
ted economic opportunity, stimulated in part by external, 
public sector agencies, are conversely responsible for the 
dynamism of private enterprise which attracted the attention 
of the concerned authorities. Thus traditional ideology is 
negative towards externally directed change> not economic 
change as such.
The entrepreneurial acumen of the private sector indicates 
a resourceful, adaptive community and externally perceived 
structural weaknesses in managerial traditions are organi­
sational strengths when viewed in the context of a known 
social environment where the attitudes of the people are 
ascertainable. The ambiguity of indigenous concepts permits 
certain interpretations to prevail at any particular time. 
This depends upon both internal and external factors and is 
related to the encapsulating politico-administrative 
framework.
3The development of small-scale industry has been 
accompanied by partial reinterpretation of ideology and 
the emergence of a new elite entrepreneurial group 
connected with external political processes. The proble­
matic issues of parallel systems of prestige and status 
has implications in local systems of leadership, which is 
reflected in marriage alliances. Concerted, community 
decision-making is precluded because the interests and 
independence of the Mahajan family is perceived as 
endangered.
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FOR BRIAN
In a private debate, the scholar Salih Awami said 
to Sufi Rahimi:
"What you have just said lacks references and 
proofs through quotations from ancient authority".
"Not at all", said Rahimi, "for I have them all here, 
chapter and verse".
The scholar went away, saying, "That was what I 
wanted to know".
The next day he made his famous speech on Rahimi 
which began:
"The lecture which you are about to hear from 
Sheikh Rahimi lacks conviction. Why, he is so unsure of 
himself that he has actually adducted (sic) written 
proofs and authorities to what he says".
IDRIES SHAH
9PREFACE
When research was initiated, I had envisaged a period of one 
year's fieldwork in Madhya Pradesh studying indigenous res­
ponse to economic development, particularly with regard to 
migration trends. However, soon after arrival in Delhi in 
late summer, 1974, various events (including widespread riot­
ing in Madhya Pradesh) conspired to alter the focus. Contacts 
suggested the Shekhawati area of Rajasthan as a more suitable 
field locale. The region has been characterised by extensive 
migration movements for many years. The State Government was 
planning a variety of schemes to attract the Marwaris back 
to Marwar. The relative scarcity of anthropological research 
in Rajasthan suggested challenging ethnographic possibilities. 
Visits to Shekhawati uncovered mercantile out-migration so 
extensive that certain small towns and villages consist of 
large empty mansions, guarded by watchmen, and no people. 
However, in one small market town, not far away from Jaipur, 
the State Capital, there had been in recent years a sizeable 
increase in population accompanied by .the development of 
small scale industries, which the State Government hoped to 
stimulate. This proved more suitable than anywhere else visi­
ted in preliminary investigations, which included field trips 
to the south of Rajasthan in the vicinity of Udaipur and 
Kotah. It was compact, relatively isolated and with a pleas­
ant atmosphere.
'Mandi1 is not the real name of the settlement and it 
means a market place, especially for food grains. A small 
town possesses neither the anonymity of the villages nor of 
the big cities therefore its name has been changed, as have 
the names of informants and family firms, in order to shield 
them from possible embarrassment. Administrative and other 
place names have also been altered in certain circumstances 
for the same reason. Nonetheless the identity of the town
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and of key informants can be discovered by determined sleuths. 
Therefore I have excluded much data which could prove damag­
ing to local people's interests and included nothing which 
was not common knowledge. If the consequence is that the 
social unity of the Mahajan (merchant) population acquires 
an unwarranted precedence as a theme this is regrettable but 
unavoidable. Perusal of Fox's studies of the Banias of Tezi- 
bazar (especially Fox, 1969, chapters six and ten) may pro­
vide necessary correctives upon small town politics.
Fieldwork was not easy. The climate is harsh and water 
was always in short supply. Rajasthan at that time was a 
declared famine area. Food was monotonous, unpalatable,and ,■ 
scarce. In order to be socially acceptable, my diet could 
not be supplemented by preserved food of any kind. I returned 
to England suffering from muscular wastage and an acute, 
persistent chest infection associated with nutritional dep­
rivation. Living in the field was as gruelling psychologic­
ally as it was physically. The problems of the female anthro­
pologist in a purdha society require their own book. There 
is no concept in such a society of the 'lone woman1. Several 
months elapsed before I was judged sufficiently respectable 
to meet any Mahajan women. The mental stress and anxiety 
involved in returning to one's own society and culture and 
re-adjusting to ordinary life after an intense experience 
arei actually worse than the initial 'culture shock' in the 
field . I mention these considerations because I fully agree 
with Lewis (1976, p. 27) that in this type of work the re­
searcher's personality bulks large. Not enough is known, he 
argues, about the complex interaction between the field- 
worker and the fieldwork situation, which ought to be taken 
into account in evaluating reports. Akbar S. Ahmed (1980, 
p. 18) makes a similar plea, and describes in some detail 
the difficulties he faced in Waziristan.
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Quite early in fieldwork.it became apparent that carry­
ing out a formal survey by means of a questionnaire and a 
statistically representative sample would-be prejudicial 
to longer term interests. Two kinds of arguments are gener­
ally put forward to show why social anthropologists have not 
made much use of statistical and quantitative methods in 
collecting fieldwork material. These are: i) lack of time, 
absence of adequate documentation, and the need to establish 
and maintain rapport; ii) the unsuitability of much anthro­
pological material for statistical analysis. Both the diffi­
culty of obtaining the data and the question of its relevance 
were important.
I collected quantitative.data wherever I had access to 
it. Direct questions about business affairs invariably drew 
a blank. Towards the end of fieldwork when the cooperation 
of some if not most of the.business community had been gained, 
it was possible to attempt a survey of permanent commercial 
activities: every shop with a street frontage, every barrow, 
teastall and so on which had a regular basis. Some concerns 
must necessarily have been overlooked because of impermanency 
of site or infrequency of appearance. Out of 273 commercial 
concerns identified, there were 13 outright refusals to 
answer any questions,.and 15 evasive sets of answers which 
amounted in the end to refusal, making approximately 10% of 
the total.
Hence the survey of town commerce and the social and 
economic data drawn from it are less than ideal and a signi­
ficant minority is not represented, i.e. the non-commercial 
population. I did not take a preliminary population census on 
a house to house basis, because a single anthropologist cannot 
hope to visit some 1,861 houses and. interview some 1,923 
people (heads of households) or even a large fraction of 
these figures in order to obtain a general picture of the
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community. To do so would require a team of interviewers.- 
and assistants, and several years1 fieldwork. At the same 
time, my position as an outsider armed with a questionnaire 
would have encouraged suspicions about motives which would 
have precluded gaining equally important qualitative data.
It was widely believed that I was a spy, perhaps working for 
the Pakistan Government or even the Americans. Others thought 
that I was employed by the Indian Government as an Income 
Tax or Customs Officer.
Accordingly I focussed on an intensive study of represen­
tative families, though not necessarily representative in the 
statistical sense. The problems of gaining acceptance were 
such that I could not afford to takd a statistical sample and 
subsequently find that it would not be followed through. I 
had to ask questions where I could most readily gain rapport. 
After my acceptance had been facilitated via the kindness and 
interest of certain merchant families, I manag-ed - to gather 
sufficient data to be able to feel with some confidence that 
the aspects of social life.presented below are representative 
of the social institutions which characterise the Mahajan 
community of Mandi. For comparative material I followed 
informants' ties outside Mandi, and obtained data on families 
belonging to the traditional merchant castes in Jaipur, Delhi 
and Kotah.
However, in a sense, detailed observations of both social 
and economic organisation.date from the time when informal 
interviews and discussions, and recording events that were 
observed or recounted, e t c c o u l d  be achieved amongst the 
women as well as the men. This was about four months after 
entry into the field. Participation in the life of the Mahajan 
community was at the very best restricted and partial. Unfor­
tunately, it was not as pleasant an experience as described 
by other anthropologists (see, for example, E.S. Bowen's
13
Return to Laughter), but mutual understanding and apprecia­
tion were reached and I was sorry to leave when the time came.
Interviews were conducted In Marwari and, as my Hindi was 
not sufficiently flexible.enough to cope with the changes in 
grammcar, vocabulary and pronunciation entailed, I initially 
made use of an interpreter, who became later research assis­
tant, housekeeper and friend. In the text, non-English words 
are underlined or put in the upper case, unless they are 
sufficiently commonplace to have passed into the English 
language. Plurals are formed by the addition of the English 
letter s. Formal transliteration of words has been avoided 
so that readers without training in linguistics will not 
encounter difficulties. Place names which are more familiarly 
known by their English forms are given that way (thus Ganges, 
not Ganga). At various points in the text sayings, proverbs 
and informants' statements are also given directly in English 
and not formally transliterated.
A final difficulty which needs mentioning has been comple­
ting the task of 'writing up' in a new university in a develop­
ing country which, though possessing good facilities, cannot 
measure up to the research facilities available in London. 
Therefore what follows is partially encapsulated in time. 
Common sense dictates that over the last couple of years 
there must have been numerous studies on entrepreneurs and 
South Asia which are for one reason or another unavailable 
here. This would apply particularly to research undertaken 
from a Marxist perspective and also works on psychological 
anthropology.
The number of people-Who have helped directly or indirectly 
is huge and it is impossible, to.name more than.a few individu­
als. At SOAS (London University) Professor David ..Parkin first 
introduced me.to anthropology a s .a graduate student from
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quite a different discipline. Professor Adrian Mayer was 
my supervisor for several years including fieldwork, which 
was supported by a Social Science Research Council Award.
Dr. Lionel Caplan very kindly assisted with supervising 
the final version of this thesis. Professor Abner Cohen 
offered sensitive criticism in a series of seminars which I 
gave--shortly after returning.from the field. Dr. Rodney 
Clark thoughtfully commented on drafts of chapter six. 
Professor Kenneth Ballhatchet and Mr. John Harrison brought 
relevant historical, data to my attention and invited me to 
give several papers in their History Department Seminars. 
Doctors Ronald Ng and Harvey Demaine discussed the geogra­
phical data whilst Simon Weightman taught me Hindi and commen­
ted on drafts of chapter five. Deepest thanks are due to all 
these. Needless to say responsibility for errors and eomiss- 
ions is mine alone.
Had it not been for Professor Scarlett Epstein and 
Mrs. Rosemary Watt at Sussex University, however, this thesis 
could not have been finished. Their concern and encouragement 
have helped me through dark days.. My dear friends Beryl and 
Amarjit Singh Dhanjal had faith in.me when I did not and 
Dr. Nici Nelson, too, has provided unfailing moral support. 
Grateful mention must be made of Bob Shaw, formerly Ford 
Foundation Representative in Islamabad, Pakistan, whose orga­
nisation funded the Visiting Fellowship at Quaid-i-Azam 
University which has sustained me for the last two years. 
Professor M.A. Rauf and Ms.. Naveed-i-Rahat Jaffri of the 
Anthropology Department at that institution kindly ensured 
that teaching duties have not intruded too much.. Other, friends 
in Islamabad to whom thanks are due include Dr. Doris Budden- 
berg, Donald Holder and Shona Falconer, who have helped in a 
variety of ways, despite their own. busy lives. Mr. Muhammad 
Saeed Mughal did the typing, and :Muhammada:Sharafbul-fHaq':.Grewal 
anad’e;arrangement’s, for the cartographic work, with endless 
patience.
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As for my time in. India, I must acknowledge the advice 
of Doctors Shyam5 and Leela Dube who advised on fieldwork 
at the Indian Council of Social Science Research, under 
whose aegis research was conducted. Professors M.S.A. Rao 
and Andre Beteille found time to discuss my ideas on several 
occasions at Delhi University. Mrs. Ratna Datta-Pande was 
my Research Assistant, who shared the regours of life in 
Mandi with scarcely any complaint and much good humour.
When poor health forced her to return to Jaipur her sister, 
Annuradha Datta, assumed her role as helper, confidante and 
friend. In Jaipur their parents, Mr. and Mrs. P.C. Datta, 
provided a home away from home. In Mandi itself, special 
mention must be made of Sital Prasad and his mother Dhandi 
Devi, Bajrang Lai, Padam Chand and Madhu Devi, Asha Devi, 
Gujar Mai, Brij Raj Pareekh, Sunder Lai, Gauri Kumari 
and Roopa. Again many thanks are due.
Greatest thanks of all are due to my parents and grand­
parents whose sacrifices in the cause of education over the 
years have been awe-inspiring.
C.Pl.C. COTTAM 
ISLAMABAD/ AUGUST 1982
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INTRODUCTION
THE PROBLEM: CULTURAL CONSTRAINTS ON PLANNED 
ECONOMIC CHANGE
This thesis deals with the cultural constraints upon exter­
nally directed economic development in a market town in 
Northern Rajasthan. As Bailey has pointed out, most economi­
sts prefer to focus their attention on those values which 
can be quantified. They are sometimes tempted to say that 
a farmer who has an eye on his immortal soul, or prefers to 
keep his family together, rather than growing more potatoes 
at less cost is not behaving rationally, he is being super­
stitious or sentimental. He has not realised that 'business 
is business'. This usually means that the observer cannot 
understand value hierarchies other than his own, or
else cannot quantify them and hence decides that such values 
can be ignored (Bailey, 1973, p. 8). In this thesis I shall 
be reversing the economists' procedure and specifically focuss­
ing on the social and cultural features which I think are
2
explanations for the acceptance or rejection of change.
Kluckhohn has defined a value as "A conception, explicit 
or implicit, distinctive of the individual or characteristic 
of a group, of the desirable, which influences selection from 
the available modes, means and ends of action" (Kluckhohn, 1959, 
p. 396 ). I am not attempting however to build up a theory of 
values from first principles. Values more or less as defined 
by Kluckhohn will be taken as given. I think it is more use­
ful to ask to what extent do socially sustained concepts and 
therefore for the sake of analysis steady categories of values 
control individual perception and inhibit innovation?
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Innovation is not new in Mandi. It is an essential part 
of the growth and development of business families as I shall 
argue below; but more tangible innovation can be seen in the 
recent development of small-scale industry run by local fami­
lies. These families fall under Barth's definition of entre­
preneurs: "To the extent that persons take the initiative and 
in the pursuit of profit in some discernible form manipulate 
other people and resources, they are acting as entrepreneurs" 
He adds: "Furthermore, entrepreneurship is associated with 
management, innovation and enterprise and with differentia­
tion of economic roles within the entrepreneurs' community 
of operation. It is associated with situations of social 
change and economic growth and consequently with risk-taking, 
(Barth, 1963, p. 6).
In Rajasthan, Mandi is regarded as an enterprising sort 
of place. It is even the situation of a famous Marwari joke
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about the pursuit of profit to the bitter end. If any one 
place could be said to provide a culture for innovation,
Mandi would probably be that place. Anything that can be 
bought or sold is available, or can be procured— at a price 
concomitant with the risk involved. Shops offer smuggled 
Japanese brushed nylon saris in winter, American synthetic 
georgette saris in the summer, as well as run-of-the-mill 
goods on the black market such as transistor radios and 
portable cassette tape recorders. One government officer 
sported an American air-conditioner, procured through 
'friends of friends'. There is no lack of profit motive here, 
nor of initiative, nor of risk-taking orientation and 'busi­
ness is business'.
It is this propensity to innovate which is the principal 
reason why the Rajasthan Development Corporation (R.D.C.) 
became interested in Mandi, with the hope of stimulating the 
industrial development which has taken place so far. There
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are now 13 oil mills which.process, vegetable oils, four flour 
mills, a soap factory, a candle factory, and an ice plant, all 
run by local families. However local entrepreneurs have shown 
little interest in the projected programme of grass roots 
development and plans for setting up an industrial area appear 
to have failed altogether.
The development programme involved attending meetings, 
agreeing on schedules, and ..negotiating with external politi­
cal processes for sizeable State Grants to industry. I shall 
call these decisions and actions the public sphere of 
decision-making, distinguishing them from purely familial 
decisions on investment and the use of capital, which will 
be termed the private sphere or sector. Two questions now 
emerge: why is it that the entrepreneurs of Mandi are innova­
ting successfully in the private sector whilst proposed inno­
vation in the public sector has experienced such difficul­
ties? And why is it that some of the wealthiest families in 
Rajasthan (if not in India) are so chary of investment in 
development, given their innovation orientation, expressed as 
a profit motive?
This lack of response to a presented economic opportunity 
is a most interesting and very complex problem, with impor­
tant implications for planned economic change. Dealing with 
peasant response to change Belshaw has argued: "...common 
is the condition in which altered ways of life appear to 
be so far beyond practical possibility or the means to reach 
them are so little understood, or the costs of achievement 
are so great that inaction results... the relevance of the 
little stages on the way to the great goal are not seen or 
are judged to be too costly or even to be retrograde if there 
is much insecurity that, despite a beginning, the ultimate 
goal may not be achieved" (Belshaw, 1965, p. 41).
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In Mandi, none of this is true. Altered ways of life 
are not far beyond practical possibility, nor are the means 
to reach them misunderstood, nor are the little stages on 
the way to the great goal glossed over. What impedes a 
favourable response to the R.D.C.'s projected programme of 
industrial development is that the costs of achievement are
thought to be too great and the stages on the way are per-. __
ceived to be retrograde. For to participate in the develop­
ment scheme is regarded to be a dangerously compromising 
activity, even immoral. Why should this be the case?
INDIGENOUS CONCEPTS OF: BUSINESS BEHAVIOUR
This thesis attempts to make intelligible and to interpret 
the economic organisation of a merchant community, with 
special reference to indigenous ideas about the way in which 
business ought to be run.. The problem thus before me is to 
present several indigenous concepts, to explain how these 
are used to construct indigenous models of business behaviour 
and to show how these models are used as competing justifi­
cations for making specific decisions. The concepts in 
question are those of labh and dharma, which for now can be 
translated as profit and duty. Chapter six deals with these 
concepts in their fullest meanings. They are not in any sense 
binary oppositions of thought categories but nonetheless these 
socially sustained concepts do give rise to two opposing 
models of possible behaviour. The wise merchant avoids both 
of these, presenting himself as neither a nawab (profligate) 
nor kanju (miser) but as something else, which is however 
unstated. Herein lies a difficulty, how to interpret a 
concept of right action which is not expliciti Merchants 
refer to one another as halki (lightweight, shoddy,, not the 
genuine article) as opposed td aSli (pure, unadulterated, 
the real thing). But to my knowledge there is no single word, 
or even phrase, to say what 'the real thing' is.
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Traditionally however, a model of appropriate conduct 
was given by the seth. This again poses problems in transla­
tion for the literal meaning is 'a rich man’, but probably 
the term 'elder* is more helpful in this regard. As is the 
case in many traditional ideologies, wealthiness in Mandi is 
regarded as a God given quality. As Gellner has pointed out 
with regard to North African data, such emergent leaders are 
regarded to have been chosen and rewarded by God, but in fact 
they are chosen by the people themselves through lengthy pro­
cesses of social interaction (Gellner, 1979, p. 43). The 
seths in fact are the living embodiment of indigenous con­
ceptualising about appropriate conduct and in turn by their 
leadership help to mould popular opinion and beliefs concern­
ing *the right thing to do*. Their advice is sought on a 
wide variety of matters and not to abide by their decisions 
is shameful.
The extreme wealthiness of the Seths (which is one of 
the primary criteria for their, selection as pillars of the 
community) is believed to be the outcome of morally consis­
tent behaviour, specifically action in concordance with the 
implications of labh and dharma. In practice this means the 
association of the Seth and hence of his family business 
in long-standing transactions through time with other respec­
table merchant families, emphasis being always upon stability, 
continuity and mutual prosperity. Thus reputation rests upon 
wealth gained in an appropriate and prescribed manner, access 
to which in turn, rests upon, reputation.
In recent years, however, a challenge to traditional 
ways of conducting business has come from development of 
small-scale industries. Here immense amounts of money have 
been made, very quickly by certain entrepreneurial families. 
Despite their wealth these people are not called seths but- 
are referred to by the derogatory word uncha ('big shot')
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implying their parvenu status. A new theme now emerges: to 
what extent does this pose a challenge also to traditional 
ideology and how is this being manifested? That is, to what 
extent is economic differentiation being matched by differen­
tiation in other dimensions of community life such as kinship 
and marriage patterns or religious and political affiliations?
This is a fairly standard sociological/anthropological 
perspective on economic-cum-social change and indeed it might 
be argued that we should expect it. However a special interest 
is provided by the study of a merchant community in a small 
town in South Asia, studies of both of which are remarkably 
lacking. The situation in Mandi is fundamentally different 
from that of peasants, who have provided the bulk of the 
fieldwork data so far on economic development and social 
change, and who have little to bargain with but their land 
and lack many necessary skills for coping with the outside 
world. To begin with all male merchants (and a good number of 
the women) can read and write and perform complex arithmetical 
calculations, no mean skill in Rajasthan where, at the time 
of. fieldwork, 91% of men and 98% of women were illiterate. 
(Times .of India, 27.2.75). Children from merchant families 
start work in their family businesses at a. very early age 
and shoulder responsibility as fast as they are able. This 
is most important in a society where it is believed that 
vocational training can only be acquired in. childhood. In 
the acute competition of the bazaars these previously learned 
skills, not to mention a wide net of credit relations, cus­
tomers, clients, and the intangibles of 'custom' and
'goodwill' are essential for survival.
Thus we are not dealing with people who worry about the
threat of individual profit-making to public morality 
(Parkin, 1972) and for whom public morality takes undisputed 
preference over private gain. Nor are they of the opinion
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that the world outside the little community is a jungle 
where morality does not hold good (Bailey, 1973; Foster,
1965) or is held less strongly than in their own community. 
Therefore, we should not expect economic change to pose any 
moral questions, particularly, regarding the nature of new 
economic relations in a mercantile community.
To sum up the main points so far, in attempting the 
descriptive analysis of the economic organisation of the 
merchant community of a small town in Rajasthan, I shall be 
attempting to make intelligible their own theories of econom­
ic ‘behaviour, that is "to interpret just what, the concepts 
in question mean to them" (Gellner, 1979, p. 19) and how they 
are used in thinking about change. I think it is both useful 
and interesting to bring the thinking recipients of exter­
nally directed change back into focus and to try to under­
stand negative response to economic opportunity from their 
perspectives. Of course, there are both theoretical and 
methodological implications which require an airing in this 
regard. This will form the substance of the subsequent 
section, of this chapter.
SOME THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS
I have called this section."some theoretical implications" 
in order to underline the fact that they are potentially both 
many and complex, and it would range far beyond the scope of 
this thesis to deal with them all, even on a perfunctory . 
level. For in choosing the task of interpreting indigenous 
concepts and explaining how they influence the selection of 
available modes, means and ends of action, there is the risk 
of straying ever deeper into the thickets of ontology, 
epistemology and hermeneutics.
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Cohen has suggested that a major lesson to be learned 
from the older sciences is to cut down the number of variables 
under analysis (Cohen, 1969a). Whilst not everyone would 
agree that the central theoretical interest in social anthro­
pology today must therefore be the analysis of the symbolism 
of power relations, criticisms of his approach must be pri­
marily on the grounds of over-rigidly defining the field 
and not the central message.
Bearing in mind Cohen's advice, I intend to restrict 
myself to several, issues arising from approaches to the study 
of entrepreneurs in social anthropology, with particular 
regard to the question of ideology and to discuss briefly 
the implications of trends in current analyses for economic 
development and social change in South Asia.^
Generally speaking there have been two types of analyses 
dealing with entrepreneurs, reflecting the continuing dia­
logue between holism and methodological individualism in 
social anthropology. The holistic approach, concentrating 
as it does upon social structure considers the impact of a 
limited number of specific social institutions like religion 
or kinship for example upon entrepreneurial activity. Key 
figures in this regard would be Geertz (1963), Benedict (1968) 
and Mines (1972). -The methodological individualists on the 
other hand are predictably addressing entrepreneurs from 
the perspective of maximising individuals, who by their 
egocentric transactions may generate new social forms. The 
main figures here would be Barth (1963), Paine (1971), and 
Belshaw (1965) .
However, as usual, theoretical perspectives are princi­
pally a matter of emphasis and there are several conceptual
7
frameworks for analysing the same empirical data. In recent 
years the question of ideology has again achieved prominence,
24
with the revival of Marxist anthropology. From the Marxist 
perspective, ideology (values, beliefs, religion and so on) 
is considered as a set of mystifying properties accruing 
to economic factors. There are not many studies of entre­
preneurs from this perspective. Parkin (1972), Caplan (1970) 
and Bailey (1957), for example, all consider shifts in 
institutional arrangements brought about by changing ecolo­
gical factors or other extraneous circumstances. But whilst 
in very general terms they would appear to be arguing that 
changes in the means of production lead to changes in social 
relations, none of them could in any way be said to be 
Marxist anthropologists. Epstein's studies (1962/1973) again 
have been concerned with the inter-relationship between 
changing economic conditions and social institutions. : She 
has found that the Hindu, system of values as particularly 
manifested by the social structure was perpetuated by a 
change in technology. This is quite the converse of the 
principal thesis of historical materialism, that a change 
in the mode of production will lead to a change in social 
relations and a change in .ideology.
WEBER, IDEOLOGY AND RATIONAL CAPITALISM
The question of the role of ideology in the development of 
economic rationality and the growth of modern, western capi­
talism is, of course, indissolubly linked to the name of Max 
Weber and has been highly influential in the development of 
social theory. Studying the differential accumulation of 
inherited wealth over time with regard to Catholics and 
Protestants in Europe, Weber concluded that the principal 
explanation for their divergent development must be sought 
in the intrinsic character of their religious beliefs (Weber, 
1962a, p. 40). Amongst the- Calvinists of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, for example, two key concepts streng­
thened the incentives to work and save, and hence accumulate
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capital. These are (a) the belief in predestination— that 
some were predestined to be the Elect of God whilst others 
were doomed to eternal damnation; and (b) the idea of a 
calling— that success in a chosen vocation was a sign of 
being chosen for the Elect. Together, these ideas encouraged 
hard work directed towards achieving success and therefore 
being assured of salvation. Saving was also promoted by the 
puritanical code of asceticism, thrift, frugality, abstenious- 
ries.s and individual responsibility.
This set of beliefs, according to Weber, is.'1 bound", to 
lead to the accumulation of wealth and control over the pro-
O
ductive assets upon which rational capitalism rests. For 
Weber, ’rational* capitalism "...•is organised with a view 
to market opportunities, hence to economic objectives in the 
real sense of the word, and the more rational it is the more 
closely it relates to mass demands and the provision of mass 
needs" (Weber, 1927, p. 334). It is quite different from 
'pariah* capitalism, which Weber explains by reference to the 
role of the Jews in mediaeval commerce, finding the same 
features characteristic also of the traditional merchants 
of I n d i a J e w i s h  pariah capitalism, like that of the Hindu 
trader castes, felt at home in the very forms of state and 
booty capitalism along with pure money usury and trade, 
precisely what Puritanism abhorred" (Weber, 1952, p. 345)..
The concentration of the Hindu merchants and the Jews in tax 
farming, exchange dealings, political financing and other 
'irrational* economic affairs was because of similar ritua­
listic considerations. "...The (Indian) traders...in their 
ritual seclusion remained in the shackles of the typical 
oriental merchant class, which by itself has never created 
a modern capitalist organisation of labour. The situation is 
as if none but different guest peoples like the Jews, ritua­
lly exclusive towards one another and towards third parties 
were to follow their trades in one economic area" (Weber,
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1962, p. 112). This ritual exclusivity maintained dualistic 
standards of morality regarding transactions with insiders 
and outsiders. It also hampered the organisational rationa­
lity of modern entrepreneurial capitalism, since it prevented 
viable industrial institutions being formed.
There are several strands to Weber's inter-related
9arguments— the rationality of Calvinism as an ideology; 
that Calvinism generated the kind of rational economic conduct 
upon which Western capitalism rests; and more importantly in 
the context of the present study, that its absence in other 
cultures meant that rational capitalism was inhibited and 
hence economic growth not generated. But firstly, assuming 
that there is indeed a causal relationship of some sort 
between them, did the ethoses of Calvinism create the necess­
ary preconditions for the emergence of capitalistic economic 
growth or might it possibly have been the other way round?
For example it is possible to argue that changes in thinking 
as manifested by changes in law and philosophy, leading up 
to the enlightened socio-economic policy making of the Age 
of Reform were not only encouraged" by the changes in science 
and technology responsible for the development, of the indust­
rial revolution, but also permitted greater toleration of 
non-conformist religious beliefs generally; a process accel­
erated over two centuries. Secondly, the emergence of Pro­
testant entrepreneurs could have been due to other reasons 
than the intrinsic character of religious beliefs. For 
example there is a definite propensity for some minorities 
to turn to entrepreneurial activities because they are 
debarred from institutionalised economics. Weber was greatly) 
interested in the process whereby an entire community could - 
be transformed into a landless and socio-politically under­
privileged unit within a wider society, so that it formed a 
community closed in upon itself (Weber, 1952). It seems odd 
that he did not make the connection between the emergence of
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"guest peoples like the Jews" and the widespread and well 
documented discrimination against non-conformism, generally 
throughout these same centuries. In fact, many of the more 
successful Calvinistic entrepreneurs in the Protestant 
countries of Europe were refugees. The difference between 
'insiders' and 'outsiders' is crucial, because the insider 
has many more problems of manoeuvring.
Commenting on the widespread pattern of outsider- 
entrepreneurs, Das Gupta remarks: "No doubt religion may j 
help to preserve the morale or cohesion of a minority group; j 
for this purpose almost any religion will do, however".
(Das Gupta, 1974, p. 8). So, for example, in Cohen's study j 
of the rise of the Tijaniya sect of Islam amongst Hausa 
entrepreneurs in Ibadan (Cohen, 1969b) the same two variables 
are being analysed— (a) the changing distribution of economic 
and political power over time and (b) the efficacy of one 
system of religious beliefs in organising this over another. 
In connectionv.with the strongly moralistic stances of the 
Protestant sects against capitalism, it is perhaps worth 
mentioning the often debated opposition of Islam to profit 
and interest, the point being surely that religious beliefs 
have a tendency to contain within themselves quite disparate 
and even conflicting elements. Some ideas predominate at one 
time and others at another, and which predominates at any 
particular time will depend upon a variety of internal and 
external factors, most notably the nature of the encapsulat­
ing political and administrative structures.
Weber, in his introduction to Collected Essays in. the 
Sociology of Religion, points out an important drawback to 
his attempts to show the influence of certain religious ideas 
or concepts on the development of the ethos of an economic 
system, and to find points of comparison between the world's 
most important religions with reference to this task. This
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is the fact that ethnographic material had not been utilised 
to anything like its full potential, especially in respect 
of the section on the Asiatic religions. This was not only 
because of limitations of time and space, but also because 
he was necessarily dealing with the religious ethos of the 
culture bearers. The influence which these ethics had on 
actual conduct could only be ascertained when the facts from 
ethnography and folklore were.compared with it (Weber, 1966). 
M.S.A. Rao (1973) argues that Weber would have had a different 
view had he taken into account the non-conformity of the 
Hindu traders, their puritan ethic, and so on, instead of 
treating Hinduism as homogeneous.
THE MENTALITY OF NON-ACHIEVEMENT
Weber was not trying to argue that oriental traders were 
any less 'motivated1 or any less 'achieving' than their 
western counterparts. Capitalism, in the sense of enterpris­
ing individuals amassing fortunes through control over finan­
cial resources and making huge profits through speculation
in war, state loans and.hoarding is probably as old as
. . 10civilization itself. However, although Weber was aware
of these limitations, many later scholars have ignored his 
strictures and taken it as axiomatic that only through 
changes of mental states, and only through the growth of 
a spirit of enterprise or the development of an innovating 
personality will the underdeveloped world be modernised.
"In this, view, the commercial practitioners of the non­
industrial present are atavisms, weighed down by old, 
outmoded pre-capitalist mentality— leaden of mind as well 
as commercial techniques" (Fox, 1976, p. 17). The absence 
among non-western peoples of certain qualities of inventive­
ness, dynamism, rationality and achievement motivation is 
held to be a prime cause of their lack of technological and 
economic advance (McClelland, 1961? Hagen, 1962; Hoselitz,
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196 0 et al) .
According to several recent versions of this approach,
not only does the 'non-rational' nature of people and society
account for underdevelopment, it also makes economic analysis 
11inapplicable. This view is seriously misleading, even 
dangerous, for the assumed predominance of certain cultural 
traits in non-western lifestyles— fatalism, limited aspira­
tions, regard for custom,, ritual or status, rather than gain, 
all lumped together under the rubric 'lack of rationality'—  
therefore makes transfer of technology inapplicable. The 
debate on this question has centred on the issue of rationa­
lity in traditional agriculture, mostly. Since by definition 
peasants are hidebound by tradition and therefore not res­
ponsive to rational incentives, attempts to ameliorate their 
lifestyles are doomed to failure and should no longer be 
attempted. Such views are often incompatible with empirical 
evidence.
Mines draws attention to three types of argument, in a 
similar vein, which have been put forward to explain and 
predict merchants' behaviour in the South Asian context.
These are: (a) that the other-worldly orientation of Hindu­
ism limits expectations and discourages seeking worldly wealth 
and that every religious community in India is influenced' by 
this dominant ideology; (b) that the prevalence of caste 
amongst Jews, Christians, Jains and Muslims illustrates 
this predominance, and the caste system discourages rational 
economic behaviour by inhibiting response to new economic 
opportunities; (c) that the joint family reacts conservatively 
to change, since leadership is in the hands of an elder, 
and this also prevents rational handling of management 
problems and allocation of resources (Mines, 1972, p. 2).
It is assumed that these social and ideological phenomena 
are the main causes deterring economic development in India
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since they are asserted to predispose Indians to have limi­
ted aspirations, narrow horizons and little or no fore­
sight.
On the opposite tack, in a series of studies, (most 
recently 1976) Milton Singer has; expertly made the case 
against Weber's estimation of Indian civilization as non- 
ratlonal and anti-capitalist. Singer draws our attention to 
the fact that entrepreneurial businessmen in Madras have 
successfully translated the principles and practices of the 
joint household into industry. He shows that the authority 
structure of the traditional merchant family is compatible 
with modern industrial management, indeed the management 
structure of many large-scale industrial enterprises in 
Madras is based upon it (Singer, 1968).
In an earlier study also based in Madras, Singer found 
that whilst Hindu entrepreneurs did adhere to concepts such 
as karma which frequently have been held to inhibit rational 
entrepreneurial behaviour, such beliefs-did not interfere 
with their pursuit of economic gain, for they were success­
ful in business. Singer suggests that the significance of 
beliefs, values and motives can only be successfully deter­
mined in particular social and cultural contexts where the 
attitudes of the people are known (Singer, 1966, pp. 500-504).
Singer's stress on context is rather important for it 
is precisely this which is lacking. Other than Singer, 
anthropological studies of the traditional merchant commu­
nities in South Asia can be numbered on the fingers of one 
12hand. Furthermore I am inclined to agree with Fox (1976, 
p. 19) when he suggests that "Weber's conceptions are the 
conscious or unconscious underpinnings of the theories of 
Hagen, McClelland and (as we shall see below) Geertz".
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Fox, moreover, finds his earlier study of the Banias ; 
of Tezibazar (1969) guilty of the same ideological bias and 
implies that Hazlehurst (1968) may have been similarly 
affected.
The fact is ;that ~froin/Bari±nigi('1^ 47) onwafdS| antipathy 
towards Indian merchants has tended to fudge the issue, to 
the extent that objectivity has been obfuscated. The contempt 
in which the traditional merchant communities of the non­
western world are held by western theorists (and others) 
undoubtedly has its roots in centuries of prejudice, deriv­
ing first from the doctrines of early Christianity (Das Gupta, 
1974, pp. 8-9) and later reinforced by the sociological tra­
dition itself. This is today compounded by the competing 
political ideologies of right and left. Berated by the 
former for inefficient exploitation of resources and by the 
latter for relentless exploitation of the people, they are 
despised by both for being unproductive parasites (e.g. Alavi, 
1975; Banaji, 1975). As Streeten observes "It is a strange 
fact that social scientists, whose special interest is 
social reality, are exceedingly naive when it comes to 
examining the social origins of their own theories and 
models" (Streeten, 1967, p. 65).
LIMITED ASPIRATIONS IN DEVELOPMENT
The consequences for development have been considerable.
The 1960's were years of optimism when the transference of 
western technology, through a variety of planned agricul­
tural and industrial development projects seemed both 
necessary and feasible. When problems were encountered, the 
answer was sought in attempted transfers of western manage­
ment concepts, coupled with programmes of evaluative research, 
to identify the social and cultural constraints which impeded 
planned economic change. The published results of these
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exercises have tended to dampen 196 0's-style optimism and 
have coincided with a world-wide economic depression from 
which neither donor agencies nor aid receivers have been 
exempt. The 1970's, therefore, have seen a pessimism towards 
the future of development and a questioning of the desir­
ability of even attempting to transfer western management 
concepts and technology programmes to the non-western world.
In study after study, the results indicate that it is 
'the system' itself, which is the problem capable of render­
ing practically any externally introduced innovation in- 
1 3effective. Since independence the Indian Government has 
tried a variety of manoeuvres to deal with 'the system' from 
bypassing the indigenous mercantile population as much as 
possible by means of socialist-modelled, state-controlled, 
heavy industrialisation, to local incentive schemes designed 
to encourage the growth of small- scale industries run by 
merchants (and others) on the lines of the R.D.C. Both 
'stick*and1carrot' approaches have failed and the impasse 
of mutual incomprehension, and mistrust, remains. (For a 
clear exposition of this and related matters, see The 
Economist, 23 March-3 April 1981, pp. 60-65).
Rushing to conclude that the problem has no solution, 
which is tantamount to saying that Africanisation or Indiani- 
sation of national economies should never have been attemp­
ted and possibly should be reversed, has a certain vogue 
at present. But it might be possible that the patterns of ' 
customary behaviour which are viewed as hindrances to change 
by external theorists— from their own standpoint within the 
western managerial tradition— in fact may be organisational 
strengths. An understanding of these may provide insights 
into the amazing ability of traditional business firms to 
survive, even in the most difficult of encapsulating milieu. 
Perhaps a more relevant question might be the transferability,
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not of western managerial concepts to South Asia et al, 
but the transferability of, say, Swatownese or Gujerati 
managerial concepts to such diverse places as East Africa, 
the United Kingdom or the Caribbean countries.
Commenting on the difficulties of transferring western 
managerial innovations into non-western situations, with 
particular reference to East Africa, Moris (1981, p. 83) 
remarks "we should realise that these 'irrational weaknesses' 
have, paradoxically, rational causes subject to analysis and 
informal action. At a minimum, a comprehensive understanding 
from the inside of how these systems appear to work would 
seem to be an essential starting point for future attempts 
at managerial innovation in the Fourth World'!. As things 
stand at the moment we have little idea what indigenous 
concepts consist of and how they are used in moulding 
actual behaviour.
SUMMARY
Looking again at the main points covered in these theoreti­
cal debates, an essential difficulty would appear to be 
that the amount of attention that can be given to basic 
matters has been very much reduced. Samuelsson asserts 
"the impossibility, in the last resort, of correlating con­
cepts as broad and vague as those in question" (Samuelsson, 
1961, p. 153) by which he seems to mean the sociological 
concepts concerning Protestantism, capitalism and so on.
There would appear to be more than a grain of truth in this. 
Nonetheless, Weber's perspectives on ethnic-specific ethoses 
have passed into general parlance in studies of economic 
development and social change more or less as 'given'.
However I am not trying to quarrel with Weber's theoretical 
distinction between 'pariah' and 'rational' capitalism, for 
indeed these terms aptly capture the moral spirit, or ethos,
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of differing types of mercantile behaviour. Nor am I trying 
to argue that attitudes favourable to diligence and thrift 
are unimportant for economic growth. It is clearly axiomatic 
that motivation and ideology are powerful factors in economic 
development viz. the agricultural transformation of Communist 
China.
Where I do differ from Weber, and his disciples, is over
the idea that organisational ability is functionally related
to and varies directly with the ethnic dimension, that new
types of enterprise must therefore await new ideologies and
that the nature of encapsulating economic and political
structures is of much lesser relevance. The crux of the
matter is surely that, with few exceptions, the widespread I
phenomenon of family firms, which is the first rung in I
economic development, has been generally neglected. And
whilst it may not be difficult to enumerate a number of
structural weaknesses in this type of economic organisa- 
14tion, the fact remains that they exhibit an astonishing 
ability to adapt to all kinds of adverse circumstances.
From the insiders' perspective, the outsiders' idea 
that all investment outside of factories is economically 
irrational has little relevance for the daily business of 
getting a living and coping with crises. What their neighbours 
and business associates think however is vital for survival, 
and the systematised organisation of these ideas into con­
cepts is what makes social life possible, since they are 
correlates of all the institutions of a society. Nevertheless 
concepts are as likely to mask reality as to reveal it and 
masking it may be part of their function (Gellner, 1979, 
p. 18), hence the necessity for interpreting assertions 
in the context of a known social environment. To do so is 
to present an ethnographic analysis of Mandi's traditional 
merchant community.  ^^
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The outline of the study is as follows— the first chapter 
attempts to place the bazaar in its regional economic setting 
and to show how recent economic changes derive in part from 
an ancient tradition of trade and commerce. Mercantile acti­
vity is the principal raison d'etre for such a desert settle­
ment and to a great extent dominates the social organisation 
of the bazaar. The social context of business behaviour is 
the theme of the second chapter. Present day social configura­
tions are examined in order to illustrate the spatial asser­
tion of economic dominance and the social stratification 
system, that is the caste system as locally practised. The 
third chapter outlines the general characteristics of business 
in the bazaar, underlining the predominance of certain mer­
chant families through time and the difficulty of estab­
lishing new businesses outside the pale of the moral commu­
nity. Chapter four examines the boundaries of the merchant 
castes. It defines the extent to which they constitute a 
moral community through phenomena such as shared myths of 
origin and lifestyles, which provide a strong sense of 
identity and common purpose. Chapter five portrays the 
indigenous traditional ideas concerning the organisation of 
business, stressing in particular the ritual dimension to 
the arrangement of the shop and the books.
The emphasis on enduring relationships over time which 
is sustained through the ritualisation of business has been 
challenged by the growth of innovatory activities and in 
chapter six it will be suggested that modern, pragmatic 
considerations are causing a rethinking of ideology.
Chapter seven shows that the emergence of two parallel 
systems of achieving prestige and status is the result, 
which is being worked out in the most central of merchants1 
social institutions, the family. The firm is the family, 
and differing strategies of marriage alliances both reflect 
and affect the split between the old style leaders and the
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'new men'. Chapter eight deals principally with the failure 
of the R.D.C. industrial development programme and relates 
this to the problematic issue of leadership. Negative res­
ponse to the proposed economic changes, it will be argued, 
provides a test case for examining the effectiveness of 
traditional models of appropriate behaviour regarding per­
ception and action,. It therefore permits an assessment of 
the validity of socially sustained concepts as explanations 
for the acceptance or rejection of change, which along with 
a summing up of the main themes of this thesis, forms the 
basis of the concluding chapter.
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CHAPTER ONE 
MANDI AND ITS REGION
INTRODUCTION
This chapter endeavours to place Mandi in its regional sett­
ing and to show how locational factors have influenced the 
growth and development of a typical desert settlement. The 
chapter commences with a discussion of the general ecologi­
cal features of the region, and shows how trade and commerce 
are basic to its economy. The history of the settlement is 
traced from a conjectural past, substantiated by documented 
evidence for later periods, through to the present day. The 
aim is to demonstrate the impact of a sequence of encapsu­
lating political frameworks. This leads into an examination 
of the current administrative structures prevalent in the 
region. A discussion of communications and transport systems 
reveals the paradoxical nature of geographical isolation and 
socio-economic interdependence with the wider world. The 
focus narrows in the latter parts of the chapter towards the 
salient aspects of the bazaars, wards, and neighbourhoods 
within the Notified Area of the town.
GENERAL ECOLOGICAL FEATURES
Mandi is a market town located in the Jaipur region of Rajas­
than, a state in North West India bordering on\ . Pakistan. 
Rajasthan was created in 1948/49 following the independence 
and partition of the subcontinent of South Asia. It had no 
previous existence as a political entity and was composed
out of 21 former princely states collectively known as 
1
Rajputana. Jaipur, the famous 'pink city' and capital of 
the former princely state of the same name became the new
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capital of the State of Rajasthan. Mandi lies about 100 km.
2
distance from Jaipur in what is now Tonk District.
The Aravalli Hills divide Rajasthan into two quite dis- 
tinct ecological zones and cut across the state from north 
east to south west. North of them lie the flat arid plains 
of Marwar which gradually merge into the Thar Desert, and 
straddles the border into.the province of Sind in Pakistan. 
South of the Aravallis the.terrain is rugged— a confused 
mass of ridges and ravines. These topographic features have 
influenced the history of Rajputana considerably. The area 
to the north of the hills offers no natural barrier to spa­
tial mobility except climate. This had demonstrably failed 
to discourage wandering marauders or conquering armies and
3
has actually encouraged trade. Unimpeded, communications 
have encouraged the development of similar social and politi-
4
cal institutions throughout the area. To the south however, 
the broken, relief has encouraged the survival of divergent 
social and political institutions and provided a base from 
which lawless elements can harass the plains at intervals.- 
Banditry continues to be a.feature of Rajasthani life even
5
today, particularly in Tonk District.
Marwar traditionally comprises the northern part of Jaipur 
State (as Shekhawati and Sikarwati) and the desert states of 
Bikaner, Jodhpur and Jaisalmer. According to Tod the term 
"Marwar is a corruption of Maroo-war, the region of death" 
(Tod, 1914, p. 1). Webb remarks "I do not know who first 
gave the name 'Deadlands' to those parts of Rajasthan which 
lie north of the Aravalli Hills, but the name is apt" (Webb, 
1935, p. 1). Maruwar is also popularly associated with Meru, 
the legendary mountain of gold which, appears and disappears 
in the. desert to tempt the unwary.^ Nitya Nand classifies 
the vegetation around Mandi as "semi-arid steppe" that is, 
short sparse turf, interspersed with bare earth, salt flats,
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rocky patches and sand .(Nand, 1966). The local name for it 
is j^hgal meaning empty, barren,.hostile, desert.
The climate is transitional .'Hot Desert' with extremes of 
temperature typical-of continental mid-latitudes. Heat is 
intense in the summer months preceding the monsoon, when after­
noon temperatures, regularly exceed 45°C and sometimes reach 
49°C. Winters are cold and the temperature falls below zero 
at night. Wind and rain are equally extreme. There are dust 
storms throughout the hot weather, accompanied by electric 
storms of terrifying ferocity. Icy winds particularly in 
February make, life unpleasant in the cool season. The absence 
of vegetation encourages flash floods during the unreliable
monsoon, rains, which appear out of nowhere and sweep every-
7thing away in their path.
The.Marwar region as a whole.has a warmer maximum, cooler 
minimum.and less precipitation than anywhere else in India 
except the desert proper. The Jaipur area itself, however, 
occupies an intermediate position between the aridity of the 
north west of the state and the milder more tropical climate 
of the south, and east which, merge into the Deccan. . Consequen­
tly, whilst the Jaipur, area.has more, dust storms than the rest 
of Rajasthan,. including the desert areas, .as a bonus it has 
the highest rainfall.and the greatest number of rainy days 
outside Udaipur, and the wetter south. In addition, it receives 
the benefit.of a marked diurnal lapse rate, an influence of 
the semi-desert climatic.status, which means that summer nights 
may be so chilly as to require a blanket if one sleeps outside. 
It is this relative clemency in a region of general inclemency 
which makes the inhabitants of Mandi believe that they inhabit 
a locality excelling all-others in habitat, economy and society. 
The reasons most frequently.given for adherence to the town, 
even in the face of economic adversity sometimes, are expre­
ssions of attachment to the locality. Its peacefulness and
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religious atmosphere are usually remarked on as is its pros­
perity, all of which are perceived as dependent on the 
weather.
The significance of the climate is its impact on the 
economy of the region. Average rainfall is insufficient to 
support the large-scale cultivation of arable crops without 
irrigation and both surface and subsurface water are in short 
supply. In the absence of irrigation, therefore, both natural 
and cultivated vegetation must be xerophytic, that is, adap­
ted to an arid/semi-arid climatic.regime. Spices and aromatic 
herbs, narcotic plants and cotton were grown pre-independence, 
but only in the southern part of Jaipur State and neighbour­
ing Tonk and where local conditions are amenable. Hence food 
grains must be, imported and this is important in the context 
of trade. The greater part of regional trade lies in food 
grains. Practically all the food staples consumed regionally 
must be produced in other areas, though locally produced bar­
ley sometimes produces a marketable surplus. Until the advent 
of the groundnut and thereafter other oilseeds, the food grain 
trade dominated the market in Mandi and. its. most prosperous 
merchants were dealers and brokers in this business . (Table 1.1).
TABLE 1.1
TRADE, COMMERCE, INDUSTRY BY RANKING
Imported . . .
t
J Exported. 
1
i
Manufactured
i
i
J Ranked
i
Cloth Jira (cummin) Edible oils 1st
Sugar/gur
(jaggery)
Groundnuts Stone slabs and grinding 
wheels
2nd
Grocery items Foodgrains Agricultural tools 3rd
Source: Rajasthan District Gazetteers (new series) 1978.
'Tonk District1 p7 4b.
* as regional entrepot
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Millman remarks: "aside from moneylending, the main economic 
activities of the Marwari prior to the middle of the nine­
teenth century were concentrated in the opium trade and in 
the buying and selling of grain, ghee, cloth, gold and 
silver. Their main objectives was to buy in areas of plenty 
and then have the merchandise transported to areas of scar­
city" (Millman, 1954, p. 11). There seems every reason to 
believe that this generalisation may be applicable to the 
unit of study.
The bazaar nestles against the south east slope of an 
isolated rocky ridge,-which is an outlier of the Aravallis 
and follows the prevailing Caledonian, trend. It rises to a 
height of about 700 m., approximately 300 m. higher than the 
surrounding plain and is a major landmark. A stream springs 
out of the north west side of - the ridge, bends round the 
northern spur and flows south east, gradually diminishing 
until it disappears in the sand.. Its total length is no more 
than one kos (about two miles). The high water table in this 
particular locality makes available a permanent water supply 
to which the origin of the settlement can be readily attri­
buted. The importance of a permanent water supply in relation 
to a settlement cannot be overestimated,, particularly in a 
desert environment and the bazaar concomitantly has long 
been a parao and caravanserai, that is, a resting place for 
long distance traders and travellers.
As far as the stream extends, the land is green and fer­
tile, and there is a limited amount of cultivation (Map 1.1). 
Vegetables are grown in individual, small plots by the agri­
culturalists who give their name to one of the mOhallas (wards) 
to the south of the town. Typical crops are onions, mustard, 
carrots, cabbage, cauliflower, radish and peas in the winter 
and eggplant,, okra, melons, cucumbers and various types of 
squashes and gourds in the summer. Tomatoes and peppers are
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cultivated for most of the year and Mandi produces a super­
ior type of red chilli for which the district is renowned. 
Surplus horticultural products are offered for sale in the 
bazaar on market days but the trade— apart from chillis— is 
not significant enough for organised export. Frequently, 
particularly in the hot weather,, there is no •. surplus for 
sale, and local diet tends to be rather restricted, consis­
ting principally of bajra ki roti (flat unleavened barley 
bread) onions and roasted chillis.
Local ecological advantages of a relatively wetter micro­
climate and a permanent water supply means that certain crops 
can be cultivated in the immediate vicinity and sheep and 
goats herded. Last century, cotton was grown as a cash crop,
g
ousting the nomadic pastoralistsr and very recently ground­
nuts have been introduced, replacing cotton. This has had 
a revolutionary effect upon the local economy and the social 
and economic structure of the bazaar. Over time, the focus 
of the economy has shifted from essentially.trading and 
commerce (though there was some early small-scale industry—  
wool and cotton cloth production) to include a greater pro­
portion of processing and manufacturing industries, in the 
shape of vegetable oil mills.and, in the last decade, soap, 
candle and ice factories. The presence of local raw materials 
and locational advantages of situation near a major railway 
line and on a major highway, plus a renowned entrepreneurial 
ability would therefore appear to make Mandi an advantageous 
site for government sponsored stimulation of small industries. 
Later chapters will discuss why this programme failed. The 
main point here is that a.unique relationship between envi­
ronment, economy and society, combines to make Mandi a thriv­
ing commercial centre with good prospects for future growth.
On the whole however, the region surrounding the bazaar 
consists of barren and inhospitable plains, largely uninhabi­
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ted and therefore supporting one of the lowest population 
densities.in Rajasthan and possibly in the subcontinent. The 
average density for.. Northern Rajasthan as a whole (including 
the relevant portions of the Thar Desert) is 75 ppsk. (peri? ■ 
sons per square kilometre). This compares favourably with 
the average for Tonk District, 69 ppsk., and the milder 
Mandi tehsil can only bear 73 ppsk. Furthermore, even this 
low figure masks reality on the ground— an emptiness which 
is uncanny in the thronging.subcontinent. The population is 
highly urbanised distributed in fortified market towns at 
approximately 50 km. intervals wherever*local ecological 
conditions are encouraging (or at least not too discouraging). 
Mandi is a fairly typical desert settlement, and apart from 
the specific, nature of the direction which its entrepreneurial 
talent has recently undertaken, could be one of many: small 
towns in the arid zone.
HISTORY OF THE SETTLEMENT
Mandi is a place of great antiquity and therefore in the 
South Asian context venerable. According to Hemchand Jain, 
there is documentary evidence.to show that it was existing 
in the sixth century AD, but nothing to ascertain its origi­
nal foundation. From the sixth century onwards, it was ruled 
by the Guhilas,. who were originally Brahmans but assumed 
Kshatriya (kingly) status. It may then have come under the 
Chauhans (a clan of Rajputs) as Hamuradeva, ruler of Rath- 
ambor, is recorded as passing through Champavati (the nearby
kingdom of. Chatsu) in 1283 AD.. After that it. was seized by
9the Muslims in 1381 AD. Persian inscriptions show that the 
Khiljis of Malwa passed through it in T481 AD during the 
reign of Ghiyasa Shah. It was taken by Maharana Khumbhakana, 
a Sisodia Rajput from Mewar (Udaipur State) some time after 
1433 and during the reign of Maharana Samdramasinha, Ravala 
Ramchandra Solanki (another clan of Rajputs) governed from
45
Todaraisingh (Jain, 1972, p. 203).
Local tradition has it that the ancient city of Mandi 
used to be situated on the other side of the ridge near the 
Jagannath Temple (see Map 1.2). When the present age began, 
the Age of Destruction, the saddhus who dwelt in the caves 
beneath the mountain, now incorporated.into the monastery, 
destroyed the city for its wickedness by means of a sand­
storm. Pieces of broken pottery may be collected in the 
river bed at the alleged site so perhaps there may be some 
basis in the story. Mandi, was; reputedly; rebuilt on the 
present site by Raja Naruka, who excavated the wells near 
the Shiva Temple to ensure a safe water supply. The wells are 
supposed to have miraculous curing powers and attract many 
pilgrims. Naruka imported Brahmans and Mahajans to serve him 
and the Sudras (service castes) to serve everybody.
Naruka is one of the clan names of the Rajputs and it is 
therefore tempting to speculate that Mandi was built (or re­
built) when the Rajputs were subjugating the Minas, indige­
nous tribal rulers. Naruka is also the clan of the present 
Thakur of Mandi. The ruined palace is an obvious military 
design, though less so than the fort crowning the ridge, a 
Moghul conception. As Martindale. points out, all the large 
seats of commerce and trade in India and most of the small 
ones were fortified, and the presence.of a fortress and a 
local militia were powerful factors in establishing a nuc­
leus around which a town or city could appear (Martindale, 
in Weber, 1962c, p. 6 0)..The kasbah, the fortified camp of 
the warriors, was spatially separate from the bazaar and 
this dual division reveals the Islamic nature of such cities 
(Weber, 1962c, p. 78). Much of the history of town formation 
therefore is to do with a local raja, nawab or zamlndar who 
created a bazaar and ensured peace so that trade might 
prosper (Fox, 1969, pp. 69-70). Mandi is an excellent example
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of this type of urban development.
The presence in the locale of military-political powers 
different from the local inhabitants had the consequence, 
however, that at any time they chose the Indian princes 
could— and did— crush these towns and cities. Mandi has 
suffered a particularly stormy history, being incorporated 
into the princely states of Jaipur, Bharatpur, Dholpur and 
Tonk by turns, and sometimes fortified by tribal bandit-rajas 
from the Chambal ravines who were Minas or Bhils. Its loca­
tion is unfortunate in that it lies at the crossroads of two 
important routeways, where four princely states and two chief- 
doms formerly met and frequently fought. Thus the predations 
of brigands were exacerbated by fourfold customs and excise 
dues. From time to time, the Hindu merchants were forbidden 
to practise their religion by the Pathan Nawab of Tonk and 
contingents of Muslim officials were sent to enforce his 
decrees. Their descendants still live in the town today in 
the Mussulman mohalla.
Bernier is explicit about the insecurity of merchants' 
lives in seventeenth century Delhi: the rich hid their wealth 
and goldsmiths were whipped through the streets to make them 
confess the whereabouts of their stocks by the nobles 
(Bernier, 1830, pp. 149, 221-26, 311-12, 319). Abbe Dubois 
paints a similar picture of Mysore: everything movable, inc­
luding chattels, was liable to be removed from merchants' 
houses by force, apparently at the whim of nobility 
(Dubois, 1906, I, pp. 34-35, II, pp. 659 ff.). This was not 
solely a feature of Moghul government however. Fox (1969) 
describes how the Banias (shopkeepers) of Tezibazar perceive 
all non-Banias as a ravening mob, ready to shed blood and 
loot at the slightest opportunity and Carstairs (1961) and 
Hazlehurst (1966) supply evidence of their timidity and pass­
ivity even in the face of extreme provocation. Presumably,
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for this reason merchants have tended to form hidden commu­
nities. Keeping to themselves in the towns, often the only 
persons in the villages to have contact with the outside 
world, they are "the wanderer who came today and stayed 
tomorrow" (Simmel n.d.).
At the time of Sir John Malcolm's settlement in 1818, 
Rajasthan "presented the appearance of a. sea suddenly petri­
fied while in a condition of stormy unrest and disquietude" 
(Erskine, 1908, p. 70). Though immediately before the settle­
ment Mandi had fallen to the Nawab of Tonk as his share of 
the spoils in the Malwa campaigns of the Holkars, it was 
formally included into Jaipur State. As a gift of the Maha­
raja of Jaipur, it continued to oscillate between the tikkanas 
or demesnes of Jhillai, Lawa and Diggi. Occasionally it had 
its own thakur according to the pleasure of the Maharaja and 
the practice of dispersing cadet branches of the royal Rajput 
lineages to the periphery of the state (Fox, 1971; Das, 1975, 
esp. pp. 74-76; Stern, 1977). In practice, apart from the 
imposition of customs duties on goods in transit along the 
interstate highway.and on goods entering or leaving the town 
and the provision of the police outpost at the border, admi­
nistration seems, to have been minimal. Collection of house 
tax by the patwari and land tax by the tehsildar were spora­
dic in their affliction. The lack of any recognisable admini­
stration encouraged the author of the Imperial Gazetteer 
reference on Tonk to quote approvingly Tod's description of 
the princely states as "alternate malevolence and benevolence, 
benumbed by apathy" and to point out that whereas, religious 
misdemeanours were punished by death, rapists, abductors of 
women, thugs*-. thieves and murderers were not even pursued 
and police harassed travellers■as much as the dacoits (Ers­
kine, 1908, p. 72). This presumably accounts for the fact 
that, despite the nearer presence of the Nawab of Tonk, mer­
chants living in Mandi have tended to feel that their loyal-
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ties lie with the Jaipur Rajputs via allegiance to local 
Hindu thakurs. Disputes and conflicts which could not be 
settled locally under the guidance of the seths were taken 
to the thakurs or maliks and ultimately to the Maharaja of 
Jaipur. The idea that Jaipur is more accessible and far less 
dangerous has hindered the growth of trade and other connec­
tions with Tonk. Even today very little business of any kind 
is transacted there, despite the administrative zoning of 
Mandi into Tonk District.
Though the total dominance of the Rajputs in Rajputana 
was broken by the two Jat kingdoms of Bharatpur and Dholpur 
and the two Muslim states of Ajmir and Tonk, their traditional 
political system was organised along broadly similar lines.
In general "Hinduism was dominant throughout as were the 
ancient claims to authority contained within its system of 
beliefs. Each state had a court system composed of the ruler 
and his immediate,family, attended by the aristocracy which 
was granted control over the collection of land revenue in 
designated areas in return for,loyal support to their respec­
tive rulers (in theory at least), the provision of a speci­
fied number of armed men, and the performance of other duties 
of a semi-judicial and administrative nature" (Shrader, 1968, 
p. 23-24).. The royal courts supported and encouraged the devel­
opment of the arts of painting (especially miniatures) music, 
dancing and poetry. A s .cultural centres, the princely states 
fostered the growth of social customs focussed upon a courtly 
style of life, thus augmenting the sense of regional identity 
deriving from the Rajputs as a dominant caste.
Before the British came to India, each kingdom, however 
small had its own coinage, which.created considerable difficul­
ty and confusion for tradesmen and others. Since the Marwaris 
travelled widely they soon learned that it was to their advan­
tage to buy coins in various.places they visited and exchange
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them in areas where they were legal tender. They charged 
bata (commission) for this money-changing but of course when 
the coinage was standardised they lost this source of income 
(Gadgil, 1959; Jain, 1929; Lamb, 1955; Anstey, 1929). Colonel 
Tod comments: "nine-tenths of the bankers and commercial men 
of India are natives of Maroodes and these chiefly of the 
Jain faith....All these claim Rajput descent, a fact entirely 
unknown to the enquirer into the peculiarities of Hindu 
manners" (Tod, 1914, p. 227).
Hence, Marwar, and particularly the.Jaipur portions of it, 
became known as Baniaraj— the kingdom of the merchants.
The nickname, however,, has a sharp twist, hinting at the 
mutually lucrative benefits of speculation in war and state 
loans. The ties between them were symbolised in the annual 
Dasehra darbar, a ceremony in which the Maharaja of Jaipur 
gave audience to the seths at the City Palace. The ruler tied 
turbans round the heads of the leading merchants, who pre­
sented a tribute of gold, silver and precious, stones. Ruler 
and ruled then discussed matters of mutual interest such as 
law and order, the state of the countryside, trade and tax­
ation etc. This was repeated in all the local courts of the 
thakurs and maliks, ceasing only with the death of Maharaja 
Jai Singh and the integration of Jaipur into the Federal Union 
of India (personal communication HRH Maharani Gayatri Devi 
of Jaipur). It is interesting to note that Dasehra (October/ 
November) traditionally- opened the season of war which was 
terminated by the spring festival of Holi.
The ruling family of Jaipur regularly intermarried with 
the Moghuls, in Delhi and Moghul influence of Jaipur became 
pronounced. Persian became the court language and was used 
for transacting official business.,Marwari as the local dia­
lect of Rajasthani absorbed many Persian words. In brief, a 
whole host of foreign items were integrated from the imperial
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courts in Delhi and contributed greatly to the development 
of a cultural style which is— paradoxically— thought to be 
distinctly and essentially 'Rajasthani1 in India. It is 
this Jaipuri version of being Rajasthani which the inhabi­
tants of Mandi, like the inhabitants of Malwa, feel when 
they are "conscious of being inhabitants of a specific region 
of India which they consider to be superior to all others in 
climate and culture" (Mayer, 1960, p. 31).
With the exception of Ajmir and Tonk, where a resident 
Political Agent and Collector backed up by a small garrison 
advised the ruler, no area of the present state of Rajasthan 
experienced direct British rule, which had had important rep­
ercussions in the mercantile sphere. Westernised models of 
business behaviour made few inroads and in small towns like 
Mandi trade and commerce are carried out in markedly tradi­
tional ways. This has not been, the case with those Marwari 
merchants who migrated to Calcutta, at the turn of the cen­
tury (Coren, 1967; Millman, 1954; Timberg, 1978; Kling, 1969). 
The Persian script is still used by some of the older mer­
chants in Mandi, for. example, and only a few have commenced 
keeping their ledgers in the modern, western style. This is 
possibly responsible for the commonly held belief that Marwari 
merchants use a secret language.for commercial.transactions 
(Erskine, 1908; Crooke, 1896; Ibbetson, 1883). In terms of 
social mobility, westernisation, has scarcely begun to make 
itself felt. From the perspective of the present study, the 
debate about 'Sanskritisation' and 'Westernisation' as alter­
native and opposing models of upward mobility is not appli­
cable. Choice of strategy depends upon indigenous binary 
oppositions of ideal behaviour, based on Rajput and Mahajan 
models. In Marriott's terms these.are maximal and minimal 
transactional strategies, deriving from Kshatriya and Vaisya 
varna categories. In terms of local interactions the symbio­
sis between merchant and prince is an uneasy one. Rajputs
52
consider merchants to be kanjus (misers) who in turn perceive 
the former as badmash (hooligans), slow-witted and hot temp­
ered, a dangerous and undisciplined mob.
There are two final points to be made here. A most impor­
tant consideration is that because Rajputana was outside 
British India, it was and still is a backwater far removed 
from the centres of political power in the subcontinent. There 
was little public anti-British sentiment and actual confron­
tations were practically non-existent. Rajputana in general, 
therefore, was relatively inexperienced at political manoe­
uvring when it became part of the newly independent India and 
had no tradition of political party democracy and impartial
bureaucracy as in the towns of British India. Such as there$
were, local government officials, tended not to be regarded 
as public servants but as Crown Agents. Post-independence, 
the need for administrative continuity meant that many of the 
same faces lingered on in public service. This perpetuated 
local perceptions of divorce from decision-making and engen­
dered cynicism as to their motivation. In Mandi, this uncer­
tainty and ambivalence delayed merchant participation in 
politics for over a decade. A second point is that the fluc­
tuating attitudes of the Indian Government towards the busi­
ness community since independence (and perhaps even before), 
have done little to strengthen their confidence (Gupta, 1976; 
Erdman, 1975). The raids on affluent residences in India's 
big cities by the police during the Emergency received wide 
attention in the press and increased the mistrust of politics 
and politicians in Mandi. to no small degree. Incentives to 
perform well in a mixed economy were offset by the crackdowns 
on 'black money'. Empirical evidence of actual hardship or 
victimisation locally is difficult to adduce in support of 
this assertion. However, the nature of the encapsulating 
political environment as perceived may be more important than 
it 'really' is here. The consequences can be seen in the
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failure of the development programme which is discussed at 
length in chapter eight.
THE ADMINISTRATIVE FRAMEWORK
Mandi today as a small urban locality is a unit of local
government and as such occupies, a position in a complex ad-
1 0ministrative hierarchy. The first level is that of the 
revenue village, a statutorily recognised village with a 
defined boundary and separate land records office. This reve­
nue village, is known as the mauza.. and the officer of the
11revenue department is known as the .patwari. As well as 
keeping land records as an adjunct for taxation, he is 
nowadays responsible for the registration of births, deaths 
and marriages. The second level is that of the tehsil, which 
generally consists of somewhere between 50 and 200 villages, 
plus a small town which is the headquarters of the tehsildar. 
In the case of Mandi tehsil there are 186 'villages' Mandi 
being the tehsil headquarters. Dp to 15 tehslls (sometimes 
called talukas) form a district, and these again are grouped 
into the states. The head of revenue collection at the tehsil 
level is called the tehsildar. and at the district level, the 
Collector. They have the additional responsibility of pre­
paring lists of voters, supervising the. boundaries of consti­
tuencies,, both rural.and urban, and administering the local 
and state elections. They are also, responsible for adjudica­
ting property disputes which is a most important feature of 
their powers in the context of this study.
Superimposed upon the hierarchy.of revenue.collection is 
the apparatus of rural self-government, sometimes called 
panchayati. raj. Each revenue village elects a council and 
a representative or.sarpanch to vote, on its behalf at the 
monthly meetings of all the village representatives at the 
panehayat semiti, located at the. tehsil headquarters. From
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amongst themselves they elect a chairman, known as the 
pradhan. This is a key position in local government and elec­
tions are fiercely contested. The chairmen of these committees 
meet infrequently at the district headquarters with the 
Collector, and this meeting is called the zilla parishafL 
Thus the district coincides, with, the boundaries of the zilla 
parishad and the tehsil with the pariChayat Samiti.
The purpose of this hierarchy is to increase the pace of
1 2rural development. Under the Rural Development Act of 1953^ 
tehsils were made equivalent to one or more blocks for the 
administration of block development grants, each block having 
a Block Development Officer. His task is to promote rural 
development in consultation with the sarpanches. The panchayat 
samiti meets on the first Monday of every month and in contrast 
to the zilla parishad does, have extensive executive powers. 
Nonetheless,, the sarpanches .are guided by the panchayat samiti 
bureaucrats, partly because, they do not possess the financial 
powers to execute decisions without the approval of the Block 
Development.Officer (Vikas Adhikhari or BDO) who administers 
the funds available for development. These come from a variety 
of sources, principally funds from the tehsildar which amount 
to 20% of the revenue raised, from the tehsil and grants from 
higher authorities. Another, reason for the sarpanches reluc­
tance to initiate debates is because of their suspicion of 
officialdom. They are unsure of their grounding in dealings 
with officials and the possible.consequences of confrontation.
The officials of the.panchayat samiti are in theory the
servants of local government.and.subordinate to local leaders.
However, their superior and dominating attitudes towards
1 3villagers exhibit a persistent inertia. Again, m  contrast 
to the honorific nature of local leaders’ positions, the 
officials are professional civil servants and receive monthly 
salaries, housing and travel allowances and a dearness allow-
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ance to cover cost of living expenses which is paid through 
the municipal authorities. The BDO patwari and tehsildar are 
members of the state administrative services and are respon­
sible to the Chief Executive Officer in Tonk who is a member 
of the Indian Administrative Service, equivalent in rank to 
the Collector. The heads of the various departments associa­
ted with the block, such as the power station, water board, 
and the irrigation department are equivalent in rank to the 
BDO and like him, responsible to the state services. Not sur­
prisingly these officials owe their loyalty to the external 
political processes.
Thus a plethora of administrative and executive functions 
are gathered together in one locality (see Map 1.3). Mandi 
has both a patwari and a tehsildar. It elects a sarpanch to 
the panchayat samiti and a member of the legislative assembly 
to represent the tehsil at the state legislature in the capi­
tal, Jaipur. Mandi as a municipality also elects a municipal 
board to deal with town affairs. Since 1944 Mandi has been 
a Notified Area, a designation conferring municipal status 
on the bazaar and, requiring it to elect a governing body. The 
board is responsible for administering sanitation and water 
supply, roads and lighting and the general condition of the 
town, which includes the provision and supervision of the 
schools, hospitals, dispensary and the maintenance of public 
works.
The municipal board is guided and advised by an executive 
officer belonging to the.;state administrative service and res­
ponsible to the Chief Executive Officer in Tonk. The board 
presently consists of 13 directly elected members one from 
each of the wards into which the Notified Area is divided who 
must be residents of the wards which they represent. The board 
is chaired by an elected member and there is also a vice chair­
man. Both of these are chosen,by the board which in practice
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means selection by the majority political party.
Municipal officers.are specifically excluded from comper 
ting in the rural political arena, not that they would be 
specially interested in doing so, for political leadership 
in rural development offers few prizes for townsmen as such. 
However, members of the board who belong to the farming and 
cultivating castes find the presence of the panchayat samiti 
in the town useful since this gives them access to a signi­
ficant political resource. For merchants too the monthly meet­
ings are useful, first because of the increased volume of 
trade on those days and second because of the increased cir­
culation of information which it brings. The village headmen 
are often commissioned to buy goods in bulk by their rural 
neighbours, as they are believed to have more acumen in deal­
ing with the merchants' tricky ways. These customers are par­
ticularly valued b y .merchants for their influence, knowledge 
and custom. Merchants therefore compete to secure the sarpan­
ches as clients by offering credit at very favourable rates 
and in turn are assured that forward buying of crops will be 
on equally favourable terms.
Mandi then is a sort of.middle ground.where rural and urban 
interests meet and mingle. Such small bazaars act as nexes in 
the urban-rural flow of information, which, as I have argued 
elsewhere (Cottam, 1980) is by no means one way. In fact it 
might be argued that, instead of the urbanisation of rural 
India, possibly the post-independence period has experienced 
a contra-indication, the ruralisation of urban India. The con­
tinual presence in the bazaars of a variety of animal life 
certainly gives this impression. It may be mentioned in this 
context that a supreme act of ritual piety is for merchants 
to keep a cow in.their havelis, or failing that to support 
one at the gaushalla.
58
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSPORT
Mandi is a nodal point for several metalled and unmetalled 
roads. The metalled road between Jaipur and the district 
capital bypasses the bazaar. It bears a heavy traffic of 
buses and trucks and is one of the major highways from Delhi 
through the Deccan to South India. The former highway passes 
through one of the two main streets of the bazaar and is 
paved. It stretches from the.police station and customs post 
at the northern edge of the town to the Grain Market (see 
Map 1.4). Here it intersects with the other main street, 
running eastwards to Jhillai, about ten miles away. From 
Jhillai the road goes on.to Bonli, another small urban centre 
similar to Mandi but not as prosperous. The customs post on 
this route used to be sited where the road crosses what is 
now the highway but was moved in 1954 when the municipal 
boundaries were extended. Both the.highway and the Bonli road 
are served by public transport, the highway carrying an aver­
age of 45 buses per day, approximately half of these being 
express buses through to Kotah. The third customs post lies 
well to the south of the built over area, near the veterinary 
hospital.
The surrounding hamlets are linked to the bazaar by a net­
work of unpaved bridleways and footpaths, the more important 
of which have been indicated. For local transportation of 
goods and people camel or bullock carts are used and in the 
high season the main streets are crowded with them. Camel 
caravans, still pass through the bazaars on their way from
Afghanistan (at the time of fieldwork) to Central India carry-
14ing spices and salt. In the cool weather there is more 
often than not a caravan in town, camping under the huge trees 
by the Block Development Office. Just to the south of the 
Bondi:', road is the truck stop and across the road are the 
offices of Mandi's four transport businesses. Trucks are used
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to carry commodities to a maximum of about 250 miles. Further 
than that, rail transport is used. Mandi Junction is slight­
ly under five miles to the north east of Mandi proper, about 
two miles via , the bridleway marked Jaisinghpura. Two passen­
ger trains and several freight trains stop here per day, link­
ing the bazaar with Jaipur the state capital, four hours away, 
and Delhi, about 12 hours, via Madhopur. Connections can be 
made here to Indore and Gwalior though the journey is compli­
cated and most people prefer.to travel by bus.
No one in the bazaar posseses a motor- car, although eight 
merchants have motorcycles/scooters which they use for busi­
ness— such as delivering messages to Jaipur, or debt collec­
tion in the nearby settlements. There is a post office in 
the Siklingaran mohalla. (see Map 1.3) with both mail and 
telegraphic services, but sometimes exigencies require grea­
ter confidentiality. Four families possess telephone connec­
tions at home. This is not deemed essential by the.merchant 
community. Indeed, the 78 other telephone connections are all 
at the place of business. This.figure of approximately eight 
telephones per 1000 people may be compared with the national 
average of three telephones per 1000 people in 1972/3 (The 
World in Figures, Economist Newspapers Ltd., 1976). Possess­
ion of a bicycle is a status symbol amongst villagers, though 
not with the merchant community. This is true also for tran­
sistor radios. Bicycles may be hired from one of the two 
bicycle repair shops by Gandibagh and are used principally 
by villagers for conveying goods home.
68 daily newspapers are on order from the paanwallah 
(tobacconist) near the truckstop, of which 11 are in English 
and with a national distribution. The pa:a:nwa:llah keeps an 
additional stock of two dozen dailies to sell to truck drive­
rs, bus passengers, and passing trade. At certain times of day 
a small crowd collects to drink tea in the nearby dhabbas
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and someone is prevailed upon to read aloud from the Hindi 
newspapers.
Hence although spatially compact and geographically iso­
lated, the bazaar nonetheless is tied into a regional, nation­
al, and international communication system. Mandi as a settle­
ment may occupy a less than central position in a remote and 
peripheral region, but extensive trade connections of a 
supra-local and supra-regional nature keep the local commu­
nity in touch with a wider world. Most merchants leave Mandi 
at least once a year, though on average about half a dozen 
times for business trips. They go as far afield as Gwalior 
and Delhi (about 200 miles) Indore or even Ahmedabad (about 
300 miles). Various individuals have been on pilgrimage to 
Hardwar and during the rainy season small outings are arran­
ged to pilgrimage,sites such as Chatsu or Padampura. More 
controversially, one son from each of the four scooter/ 
telephone families has been sent out for higher education in 
Jaipur University. This is emphasised, since it is important 
to realise that the social isolation of the merchant commu­
nity does not depend upon geographical isolation, lack of 
sophistication and ignorance of a.wider world. In endeavour­
ing to understand the negative response to planned economic 
change other answers must be sought.
THE BAZAARS
Tiny shops are packed tightly together along the two bazaars, 
offering an immense variety of goods and services. According 
to the time of year, the shopkeepers appear grossly over- or 
underemployed. In the cool weather there is enough trade to 
satisfy everybody but in the hot.weather shopkeepers lounge 
day after day by their moneyboxes on the chance that a cus­
tomer might wander in. The truth of the matter lies somewhere 
in between. The idleness of the shopkeepers in the summer
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months and the complete disappearance of petty traders then 
underlines the dependence of the bazaars on a rural time 
scale. It also illustrates the severe competition operating 
at the bottom end of the market. Hawking and petty trading 
requires a very small capital investment, therefore there 
is no shortage of personnel trying to exploit this economic 
niche.
At the height of the season, between October and early 
March, the town is full of people. Along the Chauhati Bazaar 
camels, ox carts, trucks and pedestrians compete for access. 
Occasionally circulation comes to a standstill, particularly 
round the Sabzi Mandi where ox carts bearing vegetables for 
sale meet up with camel carts bringing in the oil seeds and 
food grains for auction on the Bakra Mandi and trucks bearing 
away the auctioned grains to the big cities. On busy days 
hawkers line the street on both sides adding to the acute 
congestion by thrusting into the. faces of passers-by bunches 
of onions and strings of chillies. These hawkers represent 
the lowest rung on the economic ladder. They are almost never 
from the traditional merchant castes nor from Mandi and its 
environs. These people are transitory visitors, whose economic 
existence is so impermanent that they cannot (or will not) 
pay the very small fee of Rs. 0.5 per day for a regular stand 
at the Vegetable Market or by the Bus Stand. Mostly they deal 
in vegetables but other comestibles are offered such as namkin 
(savoury snacks) and spices. Although they add immensely to 
the clutter, actually they - form a small part, of the economic 
life of the town both by value of trade and numbers involved.
The next rung on the business hierarchy is occupied by the 
semi-permanent traders or. rehriwa!llahs - who have a regular 
pitch along the bazaars. In contrast, these people do tend 
to come from Mandi or the adjacent hamlets but they too do 
not usually belong to the merchant castes. Compared with the
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hawkers, the petty traders carry out a greater variety of 
economic functions. At the junction of Chauhati Bazaar and 
Chaturbhuj Bazaar a group of Chamar (shoemaker) boys perform 
on the spot shoe repairs. Further along by the Sabzi Mandi 
there are snack-sellers and tea-makers who cater for the 
vegetable sellers and their customers from home-made bicycle 
barrows. At the corner of the post office gulli Chamar women 
sell ready made Rajasthani shoes. Still further along the 
Chauhati Bazaar there are colonies of Lakharias (banglemakers) 
who periodically come to blows with the jewellers (sonars) 
upon whose trade they impinge and in front of whose shops 
they pitch their stalls. By the entrance to the Siklingaran 
gulli is a small mohalla of. the Chipas who make the tie-and- 
dye saris and turban cloths which are the speciality of this 
region. Finally, at the end of this bazaar, at the intersection 
with the Kumharari gulli there are more vegetable sellers pil­
ing up heaps of carrots, cabbage and horseradish around"the 
rim of a well. These are all winter crops and the sellers, 
like the vegetables, disappear, in the hot weather.
The second concentration of semi-permanent traders centres 
upon the Bus Stand but overspills along the highway. It caters 
largely for travellers on the interstate bus services or long­
distance truck drivers. Typical commodities include aspirin 
and magnesia tablets, homeopathic remedies, books and maga­
zines, ice cream and sweetmeats, soft drinks,, and illicit 
beer and wine. Haircuts.and laundering can also.be obtained 
'while you wait'.
Like their counterparts in the Chauhati Bazaar, these 
rehriwallahs or barrow boys often have an arrangement with 
neighbouring merchants. The latter will usually supply rudi­
mentary banking facilities such as giving change and provid­
ing overnight storage of valuables for a few rupees per month, 
sometimes offering credit facilities. Through time the rela­
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tionship may become fairly reciprocal, though asymmetrical, 
with the merchants providing protection from harassment by 
the police and municipal authorities, who periodically clear 
the area, and the barrow boys providing a security force 
against thieves. The use of private gangs from the Bus Stand 
area instead of the usual forces of law and order is an occa­
sional feature of quarrels amongst the merchant community.
The dividing line between,, the. hawkers, petty traders and
the shopkeepers is thus both social and economic in nature.
Status differentiation based on patron-client relations is
dynamically reinforced by caste difference. Unsuccessful
shopkeepers may be aa financially insecure as semi-permanent
traders and hawkers and in turn be in a similar relationship
of dependency upon the credit of successful shopkeepers.
However, they do not experience.the same sense of social
inferiority and economic.marginality. Every merchant, no inatr
ter how humble, feels that with luck he could become a
1 5lakhpatti (millionaire). This is because he has access to 
specialised, knowledge and the web of credit relations where 
"dthe’rs are excluded. It is also his birthright, and success 
is .'in his blood*.
The shops are open-fronted and raised high off the street. 
Potential customers climb up four or five steps, kicking off 
their shoes at the bottom, and pause on the verandah before 
being invited to 'come and sit* inside. The interior of the 
shops matches Fox's description, of Tezibazar:.' (Fox, 1969).
A white cloth is spread on the floor and this is called the 
gaddi. White padded mattresses.are arranged along the side 
walls, facing the foot high counter,. . behind which the shop­
keeper sits with his cashbox. In some shops low benches have 
replaced the mattresses but these are also covered with a 
clean white sheet. Inside, the atmosphere is serene and tran­
quil and surprisingly cool,, even in the hot weather. Partly 
this is due to gently rotating overhead fans and partly the
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effect is psychological, induced by the sweet smell of 
incense, or the heady perfume of mahua flowers garlanding 
religious pictures, and the dimness and quiet after the glare 
and noise of the streets. The effect is similar to entering 
an Oxford quadrangle on a hot summer's day: a sudden drop in 
psychic energy, quite hypnotic in its intensity. Thus just 
a metre or so away from the hustle and bustle of the two 
main bazaars is a separate world of peace and calm, contrast­
ing sharply with the aggressive hard sell techniques of the 
hawkers. It is also a secret world, where men dressed in 
immaculate white dhoti-kurta and pink turbans discuss dis­
creetly together the affairs of far distant places. Wearing 
white (safed poshnaa) has connotations of religious learning 
and high ritual, status in North. West Hindustan, and this re­
inforces the impression of a .para-ethnic strategy for mana­
ging separate— and superior— identity. This will be discussed 
in more detail in chapter four.
WARDS AND NEIGHBOURHOODS
1 6The District Handbook demarcates eight wards in Mandi. These 
are local government constituencies and are not named. Except 
for elections, they have no significance for the inhabitants. 
Sometimes they'coincide with socially recognised mohallas 
(neighbourhoods) but.mostly they do not (see Table 1.2 and 
Map 1 .4l) . Frequently the neighbourhoods and boundaries de­
marcated by the Notified Area.differ from local usage, which 
tends to link mohallas with traditional occupational catego­
ries and therefore a caste-based spatial hierarchy. With the 
exception of the ethnic subsections for the Sindhi immigrants, 
and the religious subsection for the Muslims, all the socially 
recognised neighbourhoods have an occupational basis. There­
fore, where more than one occupation is linked to a locality 
its designation may vary. In general, though, the more pres­
tigious mohallap are located in the centre of the bazaar area
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TABLE 1.2
WARDS AND MOHALLAHS
Ward \ Town Mohallahs I Rural MohallahsI Official I Non Official I Official INon Official
One Maliyan None Govindpura
Kariya
Gudha
Anandpura
Chak 
Vijaipura
Barthal
Bishanpura
None
None
None
None
None
None
Two Joshiyan Pareekhan c 
Kyasthan d 
Mahajan a
Khandewat None
Three Gujaran Gujaran b Jhujhar-
pura None
Sikligaran Mahajan a
Four Reguran
Pandan
Reguran 1 
Pindaran m
Chorpura Chorpura
Five Kumharan
Khatikan
Joshiyan
Kumharan h
Khatikan i 
Joshiyan j 
Bhangiyan k
Jaisingh-
pura
Jaisingh-
pura
Six Chamaran None
Chiparan g
Sindhi 
Colony f
Jagalpura
Kalan None
Mussulman e
Seven None Mussulman e 
Kyasthan d
Gopinath-
pura
Gopinath-
pura
Eight None Maliyan h Hameedpura
.Ramsingh- 
pura
None
Ramsingh-
pura
N.B. The character after the place name refers to their 
respective fo-ohallahs.
MAP 1 .A MANDI NOTIFIED ARE A,SHOWING WARDS & MOHALLAS
a. MAHAJAN
b. GUJARAN
c. PAREEKHAN
d. KYASTHAN
e. MUSSALMAN
f. SINDHI
g. CH1PARAN
h. KUMHARAN
i. KHATrKAN  
j. JOSHIYAN
K. BHANGIYAN 
I. REGURAN 
m.PlNDARAN 
n. MALIYAN
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and the less prestigious toward the periphery. The Notified 
Area also recognises certain mohallas within its boundaries 
which the urban inhabitants do not. These are the villages 
of Jaisinghpura and Ramsinghpura, as well as the artificial 
rural mohallas principally within Ward One. The most impor­
tant socially designated mohallas are:
a) Mahajan mohalla
This neighbourhood occupies the highest status locality, 
centering around the Grain Market, the largest Hindu temple, 
and extending along the two principal bazaars. Its name means 
'the merchants' mohalla'. Mostly it is synonymous with Ward 
Three, but spreads across the electoral boundaries into adja­
cent parts of Wards Two and Seven. This mohalla contains the 
most profitable business and the largest and newest mansions 
of the merchants (havelis) which, with their massive wooden 
doors and strongly barred windows^testify to the affluence 
of their inmates. Popularly designated sub-sections include 
the Sabzi Mandi or vegetable market, Chauhati Bazaar a mixed 
shopping area, and the Chaturbhuj Bazaar, where the grain 
auctions are held. The moha:lla also includes two temple 
schools offering traditional instruction, all three banks, 
and the Post Office.
b) Gujaran mohalla
This backs on to the Mahajan mohalla. Formerly this was 
the market for sheep and goats (Bakra Mandi) and a camping 
ground for pastoral nomads— such as the Gujars— during the 
winter months. Travelling singers and dancers, tinkers and 
the infamous male prostitutes of Rajasthan camp on the open 
space by the two tanks built by Naruka. There is a dharam- 
shalla, a Ramlila ground and a house of female prostitution, 
the oldest mosque and a very ancient Hindu temple. By the 
side of the tanks are. the grave of a Muslim saint and a memo­
rial to the suttee of a Rajput princess in the fifteenth 
century.
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0.) Pareekhan mohalla
This is the oldest and previously most prestigious neigh­
bourhood, a closely developed labyrinth of lanes south of the 
Mahajan m'ohalla and adjacent to Naruka's Palace. The main 
activity is the pursuit of religion, though there is a con­
centration of small kirana stores along the lane leading from 
the Chaturbhuj Bazaar t o .the old Jain temple. These sell ban­
gles, cosmetics, cheap jewellery, combs and mirrors to the 
many women who pass that way. It is still a high caste loca­
lity and its ritual connotation (Pareekhs are the traditional 
Brahman priests for the Naruka clan of Rajputs) make it att­
ractive to the religious minded merchants. Many of the local 
government officials are housed in the area. However, the 
merchant population is moving outwards, and its status is 
declining.
d ) Kyasthan mohalla
Like the Pareekhs, the Kyasths (scribes) and Siklingars 
(weapon-makers) have vanished with the disappearance of the 
thikanna-.., The place name has a diminishing value, maintained 
only by the continued association of the locality with poli­
tical power. The Kayasthan mohaila.houses the tehsildar1 s 
office and court, the Municipal Board office, the Public 
Works Department, the Library and Reading Room and the Bus 
Station. Across the highway are the Hospital and Dispensary, 
the Women's Hospital and.the panchayat samiti. Sandwiched 
between the Higher Secondary School (for boys) and the Sindhi 
colony is a dharamshalla. Mixed in with these administrative 
functions are sizeable pakka. houses and a few small businesses, 
though these decrease rapidly.in size and prosperity away from 
the main thoroughfares.
e.) Mussulman mohalla:.
This forms an enclave, in the Kyasthan fiohalla and extends
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across the Chaturbhuj Bazaar to cover most of Ward Six. The 
larger of the two mosques is located here (the other-being 
by Naruka's kunds) along with, the patwari's.office (the old 
octroi post) the Central Cooperative Bank and the Telephone 
Exchange. The Municipal Gardens have been built over the site 
of the old caravanserai and its walls incorporate part of the 
ancient fortifications. Practically all the bazaar's Muslim 
population.live here. It is a curious mixture of tenement 
slums and the spacious havelis of those rich people unable 
to find space nearer the centre. These hug the boundary of 
the Mahajan mohalla as closely as possible in order to mini­
mise loss of prestige. The neighbourhood includes sizeable 
communities of Sindhis and a. small, outpost of scavengers 
(Bhangis) who live in a clump of mud huts behind the patwari 
ghar.
f1) Kumharan mohalla
As well as the potters, for whom it is named, this neigh­
bourhood includes the homes.of a variety of artisan castes. 
These give their names to subsections of the locality such 
as the Khatikan mohalla (carpenters) the Chiparan mohalla 
(dyers) and Joshiyan.mohalla (astrologers). Here, in close 
proximity live barbers, blacksmiths, butchers, weavers, bangle' 
makers, silversmiths, stonemasons, and so on. The highway 
separates the artisan castes from the major settlement of the 
scavengers, the Muslim graveyard, the Hindu cremation ground 
and the rubbish dump.
To the north of the Kumharan gulli (potters’ street) is 
the Jhillai Bagh, previously the mustering ground for the 
thakur's feudatory army and now sheltering the new Jain temple 
in one corner. North again is the Police Station, on the site 
of the old thana, the Dak Bungalow and the thakur1s palace. 
Over the river is the gauShalla (shelter for cows) and one 
of the three orchards left to. the Thakur. This is a most holy
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area, with seven sacred springs (three hot, four cold.) , three 
exceedingly ancient temples and a monastery. By the side of 
the monastery is a large tank filled with sand, which possibly 
gives credence to the legend that Mandi was destroyed by a 
sandstorm in its old location.
g) Reghuran mohalla
This mohalla, like the Kumharan mohalla is a mixture. It 
contains Minas and Bhils (tribal people, the autochthonous 
inhabitants of Mandi) some poor Muslims and Sindhis, in 
addition to the leatherworkers wh o .give their name to the 
neighbourhood. This is the abode of the very low castes, the 
untouchables, and the poverty stricken, such as stonebreakers, 
drummers and woolcarders (Pindaras). The Pindaras historically 
were a caste of thieves and robbers, whose connotation per­
sists in the designation Chorpura (thieves' village) for the 
rural portion of Ward Four. Looking down over the mohalla is 
the fortified encampment of a legendary dacoit called Dadu 
Kor, who was so strong that he could shoot an arrow all the 
way to Jhillai. It is reached by a track which eventually 
leads to the big fort on top of the mountain.
Between the Ragunath. Temple and the Reghuran mohalla 
proper is an industrial, zone, where the soap factory, the 
candle factory, six of the 13 oil mills and all four of the 
flour mills are situated. For the most.part, however, it con­
sists of formless masses of one, two or three, roomed houses 
without electricity, or sanitation. This, too, is the only 
neighbourhood-without paved roads, merely spaces between the 
houses where rubbish is. discarded and pigs and dogs wander 
at will. Not surprisingly it has a bad reputation.
h) Maliyan mohalla
This outer zone is not permanently built over or inhabited 
and for large tracts is not even named.. It is an area rather
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than a neighbourhood, and such a name as it has derives from 
the gardener caste, who have also fallen on hard times with 
the diminution of influence of former feudal patrons. Within 
its limits are the Forest Post, the Veterinary Hospital and 
seven oil mills. There is another dharaitishalla, four temples 
and innumerable sacred-trees and springs. These are the pre­
serve of local deities, reinforcing the impression that this 
is primarily a rural place and only recently incorporated into 
the Notified. Area. Making the place even, more desolate are 
half a dozen ruined havelis which are believed to contain 
hidden treasure guarded by ghosts.
Thus, the importance of Mandi as a trading centre is sub­
stantiated by the distribution of the various castes through 
the mohallas of the town. Unlike western towns and cities, the 
separation of the prestigious residential areas from the comm­
ercial areas is by no means clear cut in Asia, yet the social 
factor is crucial. The inner zone of Indian cities is charac­
terised by a high density of. population and high income and 
high status communities, whereas western cities exhibit a low 
density of population and low income and low status groups 
resident in the core area (Singh, K.N., 1961; Singh, R.L.,
1955 & 1957). It is easy to deduce that the Mahajan (merchant) 
community not only dominate business generally but also pre­
dominate in the most profitable businesses. In fact, they 
comprise if not the largest, certainly the most influential 
and wealthiest segment.of the. population. They almost mono­
polise the trade, commerce and industry of the bazaar. To 
describe their social organisation is to all intents and 
purposes to depict the social organisation of Mandi.
SUMMARY
In the foregoing pages the locational characteristics of Mandi 
have been described. The natural possibilities of the environ­
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ment have resulted in an historic pattern of long distance 
trade typical of arid/semi-arid zones, augmented recently by 
the development of small-scale industry. Location on a major 
highway and proximity to the railway, coupled with an ack­
nowledged entrepreneurial ability deriving from a tradition 
of mercantile activities have encouraged the State Government 
to offer inducements towards further industrialisation. The 
failure of externally directed planned economic change will 
be discussed in chapter eight. A third consequence of its 
regional situation has been a disturbed political history 
and initial unfamiliarity with the electoral processes of 
a modern democratic state at the time of independence. 
Merchants uncertainty with and hence mistrust of politics 
and politicians, it was argued, has been increased by the 
ambivalent economic policies of the Central Government, 
exacerbated by the publicity given to tax raids and so 
on during the Emergency. Discussion of the administrative 
framework revealed a complex intersection of rural and urban 
political functions centralised in the town. Introduction 
of the theme of economic dominance in the bazaars suggested 
that separate and superior identity for the traditional mer­
chant castes resembles ethnic exclusivity, a major theme 
which will be pursued in chapter four. Lastly, the depiction 
of the residential divisions or neighbourhoods of the Noti­
fied Area and their link with traditional occupational spec­
ialists reveals the concentration of merchants in the pres­
tigious central area and the exclusion of less dominant 
groups to the periphery of the settled area.
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE SOCIAL CONTOURS
INTRODUCTION
In the introductory chapter the necessity for a contextual 
approach in the analysis of ideas and concepts wa>sl stressed. 
The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to outline the 
social contours of the town in order to provide a social 
setting for later chapters. The title 'social contours' is 
intended to imply that the attempt to construct the outlines 
of the demographic characteristics of the town is like the 
cartographer's task in reducing the topographical features 
of the land into a series of marks on paper. In doing so a 
model of reality is attempted, which necessarily sacrifices 
detail for clarity. Hence the chapter is divided into three 
sections which have been chosen to illustrate the essential 
characteristics of social life in the urban settlement. These 
are the basic demographic features, the urban caste frame­
work and lastly the changing patterns of patron-client 
relations.
BASIC DEMOGRAPHIC FEATURES
The population of Mandi stood in 1971 at just over ten
thousand people (10,198) composed of 5,48.4 males and 4,714
females, living in the 0.42 sq. kms. which form the Notified
*1
Area of the town. This skewed sex ratio is typical of the 
district as a whole which is 910 per 1,:000. The population 
is distributed into 1,861 occupied residential houses, making 
an average of just over six persons per household. The over­
all total includes 2,265 persons classified as belonging to 
Scheduled Castes and 118 persons belonging to Scheduled 
Tribes, together forming about 25% of the whole. By religion,
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74% of the town is Hindu (7,471), while Jains form 14%
(1,386) and Muslims 13% (1,339).
The rapid growth of the town, which has doubled within
30 years, is shown by Table 2.1 below. This gives decadal
variations in population totals which may be compared with a
national growth.rate of 2.5% on average since independence
(Economist Publications, 1976). Clearly growth rates of
36.22% and 22.62% locally far exceed what might be reasonably
anticipated by natural means and illustrates the significance
2
of migration as a basic demographic feature of the town.
TABLE 2.1
DECADAL. VARIATION IN POPULATION 
SINCE 1901
Year
i
J Total .
t
i
J Decadal Variation (%)
■ ...
1901 4,432
1911 4,730 + 6.72
1921 4,042 - 14.55
1931 4,834 + 19.59
1941 5,586 + 15.56
1951 5,079 + 8.83
1961 8,317 + 36.82
1971 10,198 + 22.62
Source: Figures.based oh Rajasthan District
Gazetteers (New Series)} Town Handbooks
According to the 1951 Census the number of displaced per- 
sons in the district was 2,936, all of whom came from (then) 
West Pakistan, Of these, the majority, to be precise 41.1%, 
were traders and the impact of this migration into Mandi is 
to be found in the.group of traders known as 1Sindhi1. No
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official figures are available on urban ethnicity, although 
field surveys revealed 23 Sindhi households, possibly totall­
ing about 140 individuals. Other than this major population 
movement it seems likely that the bulk of other migrants 
originate in Rajasthan itself or adjacent districts *of neigh­
bouring states.
The expansion of the urban population has resulted in an 
excess of population over available- housing which is numera­
ted in Table 2.2. This may be compared with Map 2.1 which 
gives the ward-wise density of population.
TABLE 2.2
WARD-WISE DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSES: AND 
HOUSEHOLDS
Rank
No.
Ward
No.
I Occupied 
IResiden- 
I tial
{Occupying{Excess of 
{House- {Households 
{holds {over houses
{houses f I
1 Eight 418 440 22
2 Four 372 375 3
3 Three 230 231 1
4 Seven 208 217 9
5 Two 183 200 17
6 One 164 169 5
7 Six 157 159 2
8 Five 129 132 3
Total 1 ,8.61 1,923 62
Source: Figures based on Rajasthan District 
Gazetteers (New Series), Town 
Handbooks
76
The excess of households over occupied residential houses 
is 62, greatest in Wards Eight (a low status area) Ward Seven 
and Ward Two (mixed status). The latter two wards abut onto 
Chaturbhuj Bazaar and lie south of the prestigious residen­
tial area. It is possible therefore that multioccupancy in 
these zones is due to the movement of the more affluent 
Mahajan population northwards into Ward T.hree (a trend most 
marked, as discussed above,- from Ward Two) leaving behind 
their old havelis for occupation on rent or by lease. Other 
wards reveal much less multioccupancy, the lowest ratio being 
Ward Three.
Landlords are an influential social and economic category, 
and property ownership is a critical criteria in the transi­
tion to socially recognised status as an elder of the merchant 
community. However, we may add.that concentration of property 
ownership in the hands of the merchant community is beyond 
doubt higher than these general figures reveal. A common stra­
tegy amongst the wealthiest and largest families is to divide 
property for taxation purposes between the names of nuclear 
families within the co-resident minimal patrilineage, as if 
the ’joint family1 no longer, existed as one unit. This effec­
tively masks the extent of individual patrilineages': holdings 
within the Notified Area and only in a few instances were 
merchants prepared to reveal the amount of property they 
possessed. Examples will be given in the subsequent chapter 
which deals with the theme of economic dominance in more 
detail.
The impact of long distance trade and the recent immigra­
tion into the town is reflected in the variety of languages 
and dialects spoken in Mandi. No figures are available on 
linguistic affiliation in the Notified Area. However, the 
principal languages spoken, in the district are Hindi, Urdu 
and Rajasthani, which sub-divides into at least 16 major
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dialects, which can be grouped into Marwari, Jaipuri, Mewati 
and Malwi. In Mandi the impact of Gujerati on Marwari as a 
spoken language is noticeable (Marwari also has a written 
language possessing its own script and is sometimes written 
in Persian). Other languages spoken in the district include 
Afghani, Sindhi and Punjabi— in sizeable numbers— and of very 
minor significance are Malwi, Marathi, Nepali, Bihari, Tamil 
and Telugu. The number of speakers. of these is no more than 
one or two. Language is critically important as an indicator ~J 
of group identity and the association of merchants with Marwari] 
is a distinguishing feature both inside and outside Rajasthan. ! 
The significance of this in the process of identity formation 
will be discussed in greater detail in chapter four. —
Though ruled by Muslim (Pathan) Nawabs the majority of 
the inhabitants of Tonk State were Hindus. According to the 
1941 Census, in towns the Hindus formed about 45% of the 
total population, but in the areas of Jaipur State (essenti­
ally Mandi pargana) now forming part of the district the 
Hindus were in an overwhelming majority.
The Muslims in Mandi belong entirely to the Sunni sect, 
as far as can be ascertained. The Imperial Gazetteer states 
that "if in matters of creed they are Muhammedans, in matters 
of form they are Hindus" since "local saints and deities are 
worshipped and amongst Muslim converts the Brahman officiated 
side by side with the Mussulman priest" (Erskine, 1908, p. 115) 
If so in the past, this is not the case today as the influence 
of the Wahhabis (a fundamentalist sect of Islam) has been 
pronounced. The Muslims of Mandi,; at the time of fieldwork 
at least, have taken on something of the quality of a minority 
group. There is a selfconscious unity amongst them, which 
finds its expression in the use of Urdu and the denial that 
caste exists within the Muslim community. This is exaggera­
ted by their proximity to 'caste-ridden', Hindi-speaking
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Hindus and can be seen as an attempt to preserve group 
identity.
The Jains are an essentially urban population, two-thirds 
(66%) of the Jains in Mandi tehsil residing within the Noti­
fied Area of the town. This may be compared with less than 
one-third (31%) of the,Muslims and just over one-tenth (12%) 
of the Hindus. At district level the proportion of urban 
Jains to total Jains slips to approximately 4 0%, whereas the 
proportion of urban Muslims to total Muslims increases to 
64%, and the proportion of urban, Hindus to total Hindus re­
main approximately constant at 13%. This illustrates the pre­
dominantly Muslim character of the City of Tonk, capital of 
the former princely state, and the association of Hinduism, 
in the main, with the rural population and hence with agri­
culture. The slightly higher proportion of rural-dwelling 
Jains at district level can be explained by their role as 
village shopkeepers and travelling salesmen, conducting 
their trade from bullock carts. In subsequent discussion, 
these people will be referred to as village Mahajans.
The main Jain sects in Mandi consist of the Digambara 
whose images of Mahavira are unclothed, whose ascetics are 
naked, and who assert that women cannot attain salvation and 
the Swetambara, who hold the opposite view regarding women's 
status and drape their images in white. The Dhundia are an 
offshoot of the latter, though carry the common doctrine
ahimsa (non-violence) to extremes, and follow the teach­
ing of gurus, who may be female. No figures are available on 
the breakdown of sectarian affiliation amongst the Jains, but 
informants asserted that the three sects were approximately 
equally divided in their followers. Jainism is a renunciatory 
sect, closely akin to Buddhism, but more extreme with regard
3
to ascetic behaviour and the preservation of animal life. 
Unlike Buddism and other renunciatory sects, the model for
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the monk, or guru, is also applicable to the layman. Jains 
are enjoined not only to vegetarianism but.also to a detailed 
and fastidious taxonomy, of appropriate behaviour, too complex 
to reproduce here, though examples of dietary restrictions 
in operation locally are given in chapter four.
Other than a small monastery of Buddhist monks (107) on 
the periphery of the Notified Area, the rest of the popula- 
tion is Hindu. As elsewhere, Hinduism covers a variety of 
sectarian divisions, varying from beliefs in sacred places, 
trees and rocks, in matajis (female spirits) such as the 
'seven sisters' responsible for cholera, smallpox and cattle 
diseases, in magic, witchcraft and spirit possession, to the 
orthodox traditions of scriptural Hinduism. As in Gujerat 
(Pocock, 1976) the trading community is associated with the 
Great Tradition and in particular with Vallabhacharya Vai- 
shnavism. This is a bhakti.cult, devoted to the practice and 
development of the love of the deity, in this case Vishnu 
incarnated as the infant Krishna..As Dumont points out (1972, 
p. 236) the Jain influence "would account for the vegetari­
anism", and also for the aspect of renunciation (or 'non- 
attachment'). Again, like the Jains, Vaishnava worshippers 
form groupings attached to a spiritual guide or guru, who 
visits them occasionally and whom they financially support.
Although, in theory, caste and sect operate on quite 
different levels, there is a tendency for the sect to appear 
caste-like, so that each of the merchant castes tends to sub­
divide into sect-based segments,, some but not all forbidding 
intermarriage, with other divisions and hence mutating to 
resemble subcastes. Thus there are Khandelwal Vaishnavas and 
Khandelwal Jains (prohibiting.intermarriage) and Agrawal Vai­
shnavas and Agrawal Jains (permitting intermarriage). The 
sect itself is not a basic endogamous unit.
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CASTES IN AN URBAN CONTEXT
At this point it seems relevant to define what is meant by 
'caste1. According to Hunter and Whitten (1976, p. 68): "This 
term refers to a hereditary endogamous group of people (or a 
collection of such groups) bearing a common name and having 
the same traditional occupation". In strict usage, they assert, 
the term only applies "to the traditional closed system of 
social stratification in India, where all status distinctions 
are ascribed according to circumstances of birth, where the 
castes are arranged hierarchically, and where the entire 
system is interwoven with and legitimated by the Hindu reli­
gion". It is worth comparing, this with Davies (1972, p. 45) 
who notes that the term was first used by the Portuguese in 
Goa in the sixteenth century and "refers particularly to the 
Indian social organisation based on the religious beliefs 
in the supremacy of the Brahmin with rigid ranking according 
to birth, leading to restrictions on occupation and marriage."
I have deliberately chosen two non-specialist definitions 
of caste as a basis from which to discuss the caste system in 
Mandi, since the proliferation of definitions by South Asian 
specialists is such that it is extremely difficult to dis­
cover any generally accepted terminology. Since my topic 
is not primarily concerned with caste or the caste system, 
it seems justifiable to restrict comment, especially in view 
of the voluminous literature on the subject (see, for example, 
the bibliographies of Kanitkar, J.M., et al, 1960; E. Von 
FVfret-Haimendorf , 1964),. However, it would be overambitious 
to attempt a study based in India which avoided the terms 
altogether. Hence the discussion which follows is consciously 
limited to the bare minimum in its scope.
As a working definition, looking again at the main points 
covered, it may be asserted that a caste is an endogamous,
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hereditary social group, which has a name and a particular 
combination of social, economic or religious practices that 
award each caste a relatively static position in the social 
hierarchy. This would appear to approximate to those social 
units which in Mandi are called ‘ jati (usually translated as 
caste), whilst avoiding the rigorous identification of caste 
with Hinduism which poses problems in dealing with Jain and 
Muslim jatis.
No one knows how many castes there are in Mandi and esti­
mates run to about 40 or 50. Table 2.3 gives a list of all 
jatis with whom I came into contact during fieldwork 
and who were residents of the Notified Area. It would have 
been impossible to attempt a complete census of all the 
mohallas in the time available. Some of them are represented 
by no more than a few households altogether and the most 
significant groups according to the town directory are (in 
descending order) Mahajans, Jats, Chamars, Minas, Gujars,
4
Bhils, Shaikhs and Pathans. The traditional occupational 
speciality of each caste, or its customary association with 
an occupation locally are indicated. Where more than one 
occupation is listed it is to be understood that the last 
is the current occupation. This applies especially to the 
tribals.
At the top of the Hindu hierarchy, traditionally, are the 
Brahmans who officiate in all ceremonies and are recompensed 
kY dakshina (alms). In the past the land owned by them was 
exempt from taxes. The Brahmans have a working knowledge of 
Sanskrit and are consulted for auspicious dates for marriages, 
journeys, business transactions and so on. Associated with 
them occupationally are Joshis and Vedhs, who also are acquai­
nted with scriptural knowledge, diagnose problems on the super 
natural plane and prescribe spells and amulets, and the genea­
logists, though they are not Brahmans and form separate endo­
gamous units.
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TABLE 2.3
CASTES AND TRIBES RESIDENT IN THE 
NOTIFIED AREA
RITUAL SPECIALISTS 
(and allied castes)
Hindu Jain Muslim
Brahman (priest) 
Vedh (apothecary) 
Joshi (astrologer)
Syed
Sheikh
Qureshi^
Descendants 
v of the Prophit 
or his origi­
nal followers
Bhat (genealogist) . . . Fakir (wandering mendi­
cant)
LANDOWNERS
Hindu Jain ' Muslim
Rajput (thakur) Pathan (khan)
Jat (farmer)
MERCHANTS
Hindu Jain Muslim
Agrawal Agrawal Sarafa (bullion dealer)
Khandelwal \ Mahajan / Khandelwal Bohra (financier)
Maheshwari 1 . ■ ■ JOswal
TRADESMEN/CRAFTSMEN
Hindu
Sonar (goldsmith) 
Lakharia (banglemaker) 
Lohar (blacksmith) 
Halwai (confectioner) 
Darzi (tailor)
Kyasth (scribe)
Teli (oil presser)
Jain Muslim
Sunhar (goldsmith)
Manihar (banglemaker)
Lohar (blacksmith)
Halwai (confectioner)
Darzi (tailor)
Siklinghar (armourer/ 
knife sharpener)
Patthar (stonemason)
(Contd. .
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TABLE 2.3 .... Contd
TRADESMEN/CRAFTSMEN
Hindu Jain Muslim
Kumhar (potter) Kumhar (potter)
Khati (carpenter) Khati (carpenter)
Chipa (dyer) Bharbhunja 
(grainparcher)
Balai (weaver) Barai (weaver)
Khatik (butcher) Qasai (butcher)
SERVICE CASTES
Hindu Jain Muslim
Nai (barber)
Dhobi (washerman)
Mali (gardener)
Bhand (singer)
Reghur (leatherworker) Paldar/Kalal
(wineseller)
Chamar (shoemaker) Mochi (leatherworker)
Bhangi (sweeper/,. \ . 
scavenger).
TRIBAL
Hindu Jain Muslim
Gujar (herdsman/ 
farmer)
Meo/Mewati (Muslim.
Mina)
Mina (robber/farmer)
Bhil (witchfinder/ 
distiller/farmer)
Pindara (robber/ 
wooi.carder /ropemaker)
Koli (basketmaker)
Nat (acrobat/prosti­
tute/ tattooist)
Kanjar (basketmaker/ 
birdcatcher/labourer)
Katuga (beggar/scavenger)
(Contd. . . .)
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TABLE 2.3 .... Contd.
OTHERS
Sindhi ('business*) 
Maratha ('business') 
Gujerati ('business') 
Bengali ('business')
N.B. The ordering of categories in the above Table is not 
meant to represent a fixed status hierarchy. However 
caste in Mandi, as elsewhere, denotes an allocation 
of status ranking which, although not entirely static, 
reflects a tendency towards a paradigmatic model of 
social stratification which is stochastic. That is, 
with exceptions noted below, recruitment is by birth 
into an hereditary, endogamous, occupational unit, 
effectively setting probabilistic limits upon social 
mobility.
Next come the landowners (zamindars) who in the Jaipur 
region as a whole are still the dominant caste by virtue of 
their actual or fictive agnatic relations with the central 
ruling lineage, or their position as landed nobility, or as 
the kinsmen of ruling chiefs. The Rajputs, though landowners, 
are not cultivators and prefer pastoral to agricultural acti­
vities, looking upon manual labour as humiliating. Nowadays 
all the Rajputs of Mandi and its environs have lost their 
land and the Thakur works as a night-watchman for the pan- 
chayat samiti. Neither they nor the Brahmans are well- 
represented in the town, as residents or in business, and 
many have left the area in recent years. The Jats are agri­
culturalists and are in fact proud of being tillers of the 
soil. Socially, they are very similar to the Rajputs, with 
whom they will eat and drink, although occupying a slightly 
lower position on the caste hierarchy and occasionally inter­
marry. They are politically important, both at local and 
State level which has thrust them into prominence in recent 
decades.
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The merchants or Mahajans are for the most part traders 
and bankers, some having business connections all over India 
and others having entered.State service historically and at 
the present time. The jatis living locally are Agrawal, Khan­
delwal, Oswal and Maheshwari. The former two are divided more 
or less equally by sectarian affiliation as described above, 
but together comprise the wealthiest and most powerful castes 
in Mandi, with a controlling interest in the business and 
property-markets and hence wielding a preponderant amount of 
influence over town affairs. Mahajans usually deny Rajputs 
and Jats a superior social status on the grounds that they 
consume tobacco, meat and alcohol, keep mistresses or are 
polygamous, and in the case of the Jats take brideprice 
instead of dowry and permit widow re-marriage, frequently 
leviratically. They often deny the superior status of Brahmans 
since they work for other people, and accept food at feasts 
and temple offerings from the hands of low castes which is 
polluting. This is especially true of Jains, whose priests 
officiate for the members of the Dhundia and Swetambera 
sects as the Brahmans do for the Hindus, and hence supersede 
them, but do not form an endogamous sub-caste because of 
their celibacy.
The craftsmen are a. mixed bag, some like the Sonar,
Lakharia, Craftsmen, Lohar and Halwai being relatively weal­
thy and are placed quite high in social status and some like 
the Chipa, Balai and Khatik being so poor that they are classi­
fied as Scheduled Castes, which means that they are entitled 
to reserved places in government jobs and education. The cru- 
cial difference in. terms of status is that Sonars, Halwais 
and so on either own their place of business or are able to 
afford the high rents along the main bazaars and hence can 
call themselves and be referred to as dukaandar (shopkeeper) 
instead of mazdur. (labourer) and nokar (servant), both of 
which carry clear connotations of inferiority. This, as Giri
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Chand commented, "makes them almost a Mahajan" .
Towards the bottom end of the scale are the service castes 
and the tribals. Here again there are marked differences in 
wealth and status. However, it is in this category that the 
concept of pollution becomes of especial significance. In 
one sense, pollution is inescapable sincerit”.derives from orga­
nic processes which are facts of life, such as birth and 
death, sexual intercourse and menstruation, and nutrition
and excretion. This is removed by bathing in ritually pres-
5
cribed manners which include prayer. However there are cer­
tain occupations which are specifically concerned or associa­
ted with organic processes and the performers of disgusting 
tasks such as cleaning latrines and working with stinking 
hides take the lowest status of all. This kind of work is not 
only degrading and polluting to the individual concerned, but 
also makes him defiling to anyone with whom he comes into 
contact. The designation of certain castes and tribes as 
'Scheduled' has associated traditional occupational specia­
lists who were free from the stigma of pollution with occupa­
tional specialists who are defiling and hence untouchable. 
Apart from certain exceptions, all are poor and in the eyes 
of other jatis ignorant, unclean, uncivilised and semi-human. 
Other occupations such as birdcatching, tatooing or rope- 
making are regarded as ridiculous or 'children's work'. These 
too take a low status but are not polluting.
Leaving aside for the moment this fairly typical pattern 
of caste ranking amongst Hindus and.turning now to the Muslim 
social strata we find that Muslims in Mandi denied that they 
had jati, substituting the terms 'zat, guom or biradari "since 
only Hindus have caste". Here zat refers primarily to an in­
herited occupation, whereas guom has religious connotations 
of Islam in contradistinction to Hinduism. Biradari means 
either a localised patrilineage (khandan) of 'blood' relatives
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or an extended patrilineage covering all males who can trace 
descent to a common ancestor (Eglar, 1960, p. 29 ff.). Two 
common themes emerge however: first, recruitment by birth 
into a hereditary occupational.group and second, the principal 
of endogamy and exclusivity. Whilst pollution is less of a 
central theme in status ranking, nonetheless a similar pattern 
can be detected, with sweepers, leatherworkers and winesellers 
I taking the lowerst socio-economic status and Sayeds, Sheikhs 
and Qureshis taking the highest by virtue of their ritual 
status. The Pathan landholder mirrors the Rajput thakur, the 
Sarafa and Bohra reflect the Mahajan, and the Muslim crafts­
men almost duplicate the Hindus artisans, in most cases taking 
the same name. There is also a tendency to explain social 
differentiation in terms ,of purity and impurity, in this 
instance of 'blood1 (by which is meant descent line), which 
is highlighted by the preference for patrilateral parallel 
cousin marriage amongst Sayed families in particular.
There is thus, no single ritual idiom in practice by which 
all jatis are ranked in an exhaustive and rigid hierarchy but 
nonetheless hierarchy is accepted by all as an ideal order of 
society and as a principle for interaction, whatever their 
religious affiliation. In the majority of cases, the j'aiti 
name and the specialist skills it possesses or pursues are 
synonymous. Even where this is not the case it is customarily 
associated with specific occupations in this locality. Differ­
ent kinds of work are associated-with different social status­
es, landowning or farming taking a high status and polluting 
tasks such as carrying rubbish or washing clothes taking a 
low status. In the instance-of the Jain jatis and also of the 
Vallabhacharya Vaishnavas we find that they are without excep­
tion clustered in the merchant category. However, although 
hierarchy is accepted in principle, signalled by caste endo­
gamy (which is in effect a refusal to contract affinal rela­
tions with persons of lower status) and restrictions on commen-
88
sality, in practice there are limited occasions when this 
can be given full rein. The picture which emerges from obser­
ved social interactions is complex and there are various cri­
teria by which the relative status of individuals from differ­
ent social categories may be sketched out.
Sometimes wealth is used as a key indicator of relative 
status and sometimes political power. One Mina is a grain 
broker and owns his dukaan which occupies a good location on 
the Grain Market. The Chairman of the panchayat Samiti is a 
Gujar and is also a grain broker and shop-owner. The Chairman 
of the Municipal Board is a Chamar who owns two shops selling 
Rajasthani jhutia (embroidered slippers). These are important 
people in the town and the lack of correspondence between 
inherited caste and actual occupation poses contradictions 
which have not yet been satisfactorily resolved. Prem Chand 
(a Jain) remarked sourly "You take these Gujars and Jats who 
have opened up shops, we know them for what they are. They 
might do reasonably well in business, but they will never be V 
Mahajans because their.fathers worked with their hands. Also 
they are unclean. They never take a bath, they eat meat and 
smoke cigarettes and have filthy feasts for Bhairuji in the 
sand dunes". Here menial labour, descent, dietary habits and 
religious affiliation are.mixed together with lack of clean­
liness as negative signals of status. Yet the same individuals 
will be accorded more respect by him than a Brahman who keeps 
a tea stall and handles the dirty dishes of strangers or a 
Rajput who works as a police constable and therefore receives 
wages like a labourer.
The ambivalent position of socially mobile, individuals 
is brought especially to the fore in Municipal politics. The 
offering and acceptance of hospitality is a customary techni­
que in Rajasthan of demonstrating political alliances and 
refusal to accept at least a token is insulting. Custom
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dictates that after political meetings at the Municipal Board 
hospitality should be offered in the name of the person presi­
ding. The Chairman.,, however, is an untouchable and high caste 
Hindus and Jains endanger not only their social standing in 
their own communities by accepting food from a low status 
individual, but also their immortal souls by eating in the 
presence of polluting persons. As a compromise after meetings 
or when a visiting dignitary arrives, rtaitikin and tea are served 
in the Municipal Board Office. Namkin consists of crisp:.f.r.ied 
savoury noodles and is purchased from a Halwai who swerves it 
in individually wrapped paper.bags. It is not conceptualised 
as food, merely an accompaniment to tea which is brought in 
and served by a Brahman tea-stall owner. Pan sometimes is 
handed out as an alternative. The Mahajans always throw away 
the filling unless they are sure that it contains no tobacco.
In the face of political necessity the general exclusivity 
of commensal rules can be bent a little. But the uniqueness 
of these occasions when persons from different social statuses 
meet together as equivalents and the necessity of devising 
circumvential commensality emphasises the basic separation of 
caste from caste. Traditional caste values are being adapted 
to ameliorate modern contradictions; it would be a gross 
over-simplification to suggest that they are under attack.
Other than these exceptional gatherings, as stated earlier, 
social relations between— say— banglemakers and knife- 
sharpeners or even Hindu and Muslim potters are limited unless 
they are neighbours, and diminished further by the fact that 
each feels superior to the other. Lack of consensus over rela­
tive status emphasises further their alienation.
Except for the castes which are represented in sizeable 
numbers in the Notified Area, jatis do not form corporate 
groups. Those that have caste associations, for example, or 
organise themselves for any other communal activities tend to
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be oriented towards a rural catchment area. The Jat domina­
ted Kisan Sabha (Farmers' Association) to take one example 
is a political interest group whose power base lies in the 
areas of Northern and Eastern Rajasthan corresponding to 
former Jat States and the adjacent areas of Punjab and Uttar 
Pradesh. Castes therefore are not on the whole communities 
and only the Mahajans possess significant urban-based associ­
ations. Their role as integrators of a mobile population will 
be discussed in more detail in chapter four.
Summarising the preceding points, it can be seen that 
the caste system in Mandi exhibits many familiar. - features 
of the orthodox stratification system. The major difference 
appears in the challenge of the Mahajans to the Brahmans and 
the Rajputs, in the religious and secular domains. These two 
categories are small in number and relatively poor as compared 
with the economically powerful Mahajan community. By virtue 
of their size and wealth the merchants have become the larg­
est employers of labour, both in their places of business 
and in their homes. This has brought about significant changes 
in patron-client relations.
CHANGING PATTERNS OF PATRON-CLIENT RELATIONS
In South Asian agricultural villages the total population 
can be divided into two generalised economic categories. On 
the one hand are the zamindars who are the owners of the land 
and on the. other are the kammis who perform tasks for the land­
owners according to their, traditional specialist occupations. 
Thus the landowners control the means of production and the 
kammis gain access to the productive capacity of the land 
through labour of various kinds (Alavi, 1971). Customary 
services include ritual and ceremonial obligations in certain 
cases. Payment is customarily in the form of an annual dan 
(gift) of grain or produce at harvest time, sometimes augmen-
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ted by or replaced with gifts of clothing or cash nowadays 
(Eglar, 196 0) .
The various jatis of a village therefore reciprocate goods 
and services between families according to specialised roles 
in a structure of hereditary alliances. Families of different 
jatis make prestations and counter-prestations through time, 
symbolising the "totality of co-operation within the village" 
(Wiser, 1958). Dumont has criticised this approach as an 
idyllic picture of village life (Dumont, 1972, p. 144 esp.). 
Breman has gone further.and asserted that the system rests 
on two principles, patronage and exploitation (Breman, 1974) . 
Epstein however has noted that where the mutual obligations 
of the hereditary attachment are no longer observed, an eco­
nomic prop has been removed from the landless during times 
of scarcity (Epstein, 1967). Theoretical differences apart, 
this system of exchanging gifts and services has been widely 
noted in village studies, from the extreme South East of India 
(Beck, 1973) to Bangladesh (Arens and van Beurden, 1977) and 
the North West of Pakistan (Barth, 1970; Ahmad, 1980). Local 
nomenclature correspondingly varies, but it is generally known 
as the jajmani of sepi system.
Table 2.4 summarises the traditional occupations of 11 
jatis customarily recognised as traditional service special­
ists in Mandi and their present functional status. It can be 
seen that, with one notable exception the annual or bi-annual 
share of grain or produce.has disappeared. Gifts of clothing 
and/or cash on festivals or during rituals are made only in 
four instances. Otherwise payment is made in cash, on request, 
for services performed, as they are required. In other words 
balanced reciprocity has been replaced by economic transac­
tion. This sort of process has been noted in village studies 
as consequent upon the introduction of cash into the local 
economy. The basic difference here is the re-organisation
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of specialised labour on a commercialised basis. Thus, the 
blacksmiths have become retailers of factory-made hardware, 
barbers operate from booths near the Bus Stand to capture 
itinerant trade, washermen have opened laundry shops to which 
clothes^ are brought by clients (though.ritual washing is 
still performed in situ), potters rent yards to display cro­
ckery and earthenware and there is even an ayurvedic advice 
centre, run by a Brahman, where travellers can purchase pre­
dictions.
TABLE 2.4
TRADITIONAL OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALISTS, 
CUSTOMARY PAYMENTS AND PRESENT STATUS
i i
Specialist J.......Services. . . . . .   Payments
___________________ i___________________________ i______________
PUROHIT Performing life crisis
(Brahman priest) rituals (birth, first
hair cut, sacred thread 
marriage, death and 
death.anniversary);. 
officiating at pujas 
for Dasehra, Diwali and 
Navratri in shops and 
offices and homes; cas­
ting horoscopes for the 
newborn and prospective 
spouses; determining 
astrologically the 
mahurat (auspicious 
time) for commencing 
journeys, business tra­
nsactions and ceremon­
ies; dispensing advice 
and remedies.for health 
and business problems 
(dietary prescriptions, 
medicines and amulets).
(Contd. . .),'V
Annual grain 
share, now being 
replaced by cash * 
gifts and payments 
for ritual servi­
ces, usually 
Rs.21 or Rs.51 
according to sig­
nificance. Grain 
share about 2 
sacks of wheat 
or 1 sack of 
pulse per house­
hold served.
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TABLE 2.4  Contd.
Specialist J Services ) Payments
JAIN PANDIT 
(Priest)
JOSHI
(Astrologer)
NAI
(Barber)
NAIN 
(Barber’s wife)
As above, plus reli­
gious instruction for 
children.
Casting horoscopes, 
determining mahurats 
as above; astrological 
diagnosis and prognosis; 
palmistry; some educa­
tional instruction 
(3 ’ r ' s) .
Cutting toenails and 
fingernails twice- 
monthly, hair monthly, 
body hair plucking/ 
shaving twice weekly; 
massage and leg-f-. * 
pressing for clients 
during illness and to 
relieve fatigue; carry­
ing messages,... invita­
tions to ceremonies and 
news of births and 
deaths; accompanying 
bride's representatives 
to betrothal ceremonies 
and presenting fruit, 
flowers etc. to groom. 
Bathing and laying out 
the dead,.carrying the 
flame for the funeral 
pyre and collecting the 
ashes for disposal..
Preparing the bride by 
bathing her, massaging 
with oil and turmeric, 
applying bridal make 
up, assisting the bride 
in numerous changes of 
sari, providing guid­
ance and moral support 
during rituals, accomp­
anying bride to marital
Gifts of cash 
and payment 
for services 
on request.
Cash payment 
for services on 
request.
Annual grain 
share, now comp­
letely replaced 
by a cash payment 
of Rs.5/- for one 
day1s work. Cash 
gifts during 
rituals.
Cash payment by 
piece rate as 
above; new sari 
(value Rs.21 and 
above) on major 
festivals, or 
cash equivalent.
(Contd. . .)
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TABLE 2.4 .... Contd.
Specialist Services. Payments
NAIN 
(Barber1 s wife)
DHOBI
(Washerman)
DHOBIN 
(Washerman’s 
wife)
MALI
(Gardener)
DARZI
(Tailor)
KHATIK
(Carpenter)
home for first three 
days; massaging legs 
and stomach of pregnant 
women with oil, deliver­
ing babies and providing 
post-natal care until 
post-parturition pollu­
tion removed, vital 
guest on 4 0th day puri­
fication ceremony; carry­
ing messages and helping 
in domestic tasks on 
request.
Washing clothes for the 
household— in situ— nbw 
largely defunct— except 
for clothing worn dur­
ing delivery and 12 
days after birth; occa­
sional guest at wedd­
ings.
As above. Carrying 
messages and helping in 
domestic tasks on 
request.
Tending gardens, supply­
ing fruit and. vegetables 
for daily consumption 
and flowers for rituals, 
now defunct; ploughing 
and breaking new ground, 
preferred as agricultu­
ral tenants.
Sewing clothes for the 
household at the house, 
now defunct.
Rs.1l for one 
day 1s ritual 
washing, or two 
handfuls of 
wheatflour or 
one of pulse 
flour; otherwise 
by piece rate.
As above. Occa­
sional cash 
gifts.
Rs.5 for one 
day's work, glean­
ing privileges.
Cash payment by 
piece rate only, 
on request.
Making furniture and As above,
repairing doors, windows 
etc. for the household, 
making and mending local 
agricultural tools, now 
largely defunct.
(Contd...)V
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TABLE 2.4 ___  Contd.
Specialist . . .Services Payments
LOHAR
(Blacksmith)
KUMHAR
(Potter)
CHAMAR/REGHUR 
(Leatherworker)
BHANGI 
(Sweeper)
Traditionally, making and As above, 
mending metal utensils 
for the household and agri­
cultural tools, now de­
funct? vehicle and machine 
maintenance and repairs.
Making earthenware dishes 
and water pots, for gen­
eral sale and for cooking 
food for weddings; chaakh- 
baat? occasional wedding 
guest.
Making and repairing 
shoes and sandals and 
agricultural leatherwork.
Washing floors and clean­
ing latrines; carrying 
away rubbish? sweeping 
streets and removing dead 
bodies of animals; help­
ing in various domestic 
tasks on daily payment 
in cash. Giving blessing 
for commencement of 
journeys.
As above, and 
additionally a 
full set of clothes 
for self and wife 
at weddings.
As above.
Rs.2/3 per day, 
paid on pufnima 
(each new moon) or 
on request. Rec­
eives leftover 
food and cast off 
clothing as a 
right. Full set 
of clothes and 
sard for wife 
on major festi­
vals . First refu­
sal of spoiled 
goods.
* Accepting a customary reward (dan) for services means accep­
ting the impurity associated.with the gift, especially that 
of death pollution. Thus dakshina (alms) are also given as 
a free gift,.to recompense the Brahman for accepting the 
impurity of dan.
96
The traditional specialist occupations which have fared 
best are connected with personal attentions, the removal of 
dirt and pollution, ritual and the supernatural and above 
all centering upon marriage and childbirth. Thus in contrast 
to other kammis, only the sweeper, the barber and the potter 
can expect to receive gifts in addition to wages. The washer­
men are a special case. Some years ago the biradari decided 
to abandon washing in an effort to uplift their social status.
Many moved to Jaipur, some built houses near their newly
6allotted fields and some moved to work in the oil mills. 
Replacements came from Chatsu but, hereditary ties being 
broken, they demanded a piece rate payment instead of dan.
The merchants made a counter bid of a monthly, flat rate 
retainer and when this was refused, dispensed with their 
services. Many merchant households continue to send only rugs 
and silk saris for dry cleaning and to do their own daily 
washing. However, the washerman is summoned to the house for 
washing in connection with a birth and for this is given a 
fixed sum in cash or grain. Some washermen are invited to 
weddings but they are not essential guests.
Life crisis rituals can be performed solely by the Brahman 
purohit or Jain pandit. No one else possesses the prerequisite 
religious knowledge or socially sanctioned authority. If the 
customary purohit/pandit cannot officiate for some reason 
then he must send a replacement, who receives half shares of 
the cash or grain. At this juncture the proportional predomi­
nance of ritual specialists over other traditional occupations 
requires special mention. It reflects merchants self-perception 
as especially vulnerable to mystical attack. This is responsi­
ble for the need to acquire the sweeper's blessing for commen­
cing journeys, since her good wishes are one of the strongest 
forms of magic.
Thus the attachment between patron household and client 
specialists is strongest where supported by the belief system
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and weakest where the supernatural connection does not apply 
or is less relevant. That the carpenter or blacksmith patro­
nised by a Hindu household could be Muslim supports this 
assertion. However, where the customary attachment is indeed 
cohesive, the relationship consists of long-standing mutual 
identification, deriving from the needs of high castes for 
religious and economic services, which they are unable or 
unwilling to perform themselves. Kammis could not expect 
employer households to stand as security for loans of money 
(cf. Blunt, 1931, p. 260). Employers could not assume automa­
tic political support from their kammis (cf. Lewis, 1958).
The quality of mutual support is lost.
Many older.kammis bemoan the passing of an era when their 
patrons took a personal interest in their affairs. Sunder, a
i
potter, complained: "In the old days if my daughter got married 
the thakur would give me a buffalo. If I needed anything I 
would go to him with some pots and say 'These are for you.
I am giving you something so now do something for me' and he 
would say 'Give me the pots and I'll make you a happy man' 
and then deal with all the arrangements". They blame the 
meanness and the social remoteness of the business community 
for the decline of patronage and contrast this with the suppo­
sed open-handedness and accessibility of the zamindars in 
past times. Their frustration with the impersonality and 
anonymity of social life in an urban setting finds its expre­
ssion in occasional ugly incidents with Mahajans as the tar­
gets, as shown by the following example.
One morning a village headman arrived with a Jat farmer 
who had bought a dozen lengths of handwoven cloth the previ­
ous day. Several of these were badly spoiled down the middle. 
The farmer did not know which shop had sold the obviously 
second rate goods so the headman asked directions to a 
well-known cloth merchant's from bystanders at the Vegetable
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Market. He explained the object of his visit; quite a crowd 
of interested spectators gathered and accompanied them to 
the shop. The headman put the case for the farmer, the shop­
keeper listened politely then asked where was proof of pur­
chase? As the farmer had no receipt, the shopkeeper had no 
legal obligations but offered to replace the spoiled lengths 
and make further enquiries. Being a specialist in rural tastes, 
he was reluctant to alienate customers by appearing crooked, 
albeit wrongfully accused. Questioned later, he affirmed that 
he had recovered his losses from the guilty party but refused 
to name the shop "because the.farmers don't really want to 
know, being Jats they just want t o emake a big show". The head­
man acquiesced with the shopkeeper's interpretation and said 
that since most farmers purchase new clothing just once per 
year there was every chance that they would forget about the 
incident. He was satisfied that his acquaintance with influ­
ential people had been demonstrated; the shopkeeper was pleased 
that violence was avoided. The incident also shows the inter­
connectedness of the merchant community since the shopkeeper 
was willing to replace the goods, confident that he would be 
reimbursed later.
SUMMARY
The impersonalisation of life in Mandi is recognised as 
economic in origin but perceived nonetheless as being connec­
ted to the secretiveness of the Mahajan population. Whilst 
in India there is a tendency to use the title of any sort 
of activity instead of proper names, amongst Mahajans, this 
is a widespread characteristic. As the Times of India 
commented: "Only amongst the business community would a man 
known as Nathwarlal Kanji Dayalal be also known as Dayal Nal 
Vakil" (Times of India, 16/6/75). People say that the business 
community has no interest in their problems and traditional 
patterns of reciprocity have declined because of the growth
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of trade and commerce. In a way they are right to focus on 
the merchants' dominance of life in the town. They have assu­
med the role of the Rajputs or Brahmans as patrons without
A
assuming their function as protectors or ritual specialists.
They have moulded the rules of commensality and provided 
their own model of acceptable intercaste food.
Because of their over-arching orientation towards Jainism, 
the Mahajan community challenges Brahmanical authority in the 
religious sphere. Their relationship with caste ideology via 
the jajmani system reveals that the benevolent paternalism 
traditionally imbued into Indian patron-client relations 
has been replaced by a cash nexus philosophy. This has forced 
many artisans to become themselves businessmen and only in 
occupational specialities primarily concerned with ritual do 
the customary jajmani ties prevail. With these exceptions, 
relations between Mahajans and members of other castes are 
reduced to the economic relations of shopkeeper and customer 
or employer and employee. As will be shown in the next chapter, ^ 
the economic organisation of the bazaars in a manifestation 
of these implications of the caste framework of the Notified 
Area.
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE ECONOMIC CONTOURS
INTRODUCTION
This chapter attempts to show the general characteristics 
of business in the bazaars and to substantiate the suggestion 
of Mahajan dominance mentioned above. The predominance of 
Mahajans in the more profitable types of businesses, the 
concentration of property holdings in their hands, and the 
difficulty of establishing new commercial enterprises will be 
demonstrated. The manoeuvres which take place in locational 
strategising will be indicated in order to show the effect 
of Mahajan economic power upon market forces. The implications 
of the caste framework introduced above for employment oppor­
tunities will be indicated. It will be seen that Mahajans are 
not only the biggest employers of labour but also as employees 
have greater access to better economic opportunities. To begin 
with I summarise the economic outlines set forward in earlier 
chapters.
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BAZAAR AREA
To the newcomer, the first impression of Mandi's bazaars .is 
one of bustling commercial activity. Almost every day of the 
year there is some kind of business being transacted. Even 
when the shops are closed.for business, someone may be doing 
the books or stocktaking. This is as characteristic of the 
hot weather as it is of the cool, though during the summer 
rains, when- the unmetalled.roads become miry much, slackening 
off in the amount of traffic in the town may be discerned.
In the winter months during daylight hours the streets are 
crowded with villagers, camels and bullock-carts and the 
buses to and from the town.are packed to the doors. Mandi's
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function as a market centre, for distributing consumer goods 
and collecting agricultural produce is readily perceivable.
Indeed it is the raison d 1 etre. For centuries Mandi 
collected and distributed the produce which arrived by desert 
carvans: gem stones, silk, gold and silver ornaments and 
spices from Central and Southern India on their way to Afghan­
istan and points west? in return came saffron and, not so 
glamorous but equally lucrative, hides and salt. When long 
distance travellers stopped at Mandi they needed to be housed, 
fed and entertained and the origins of the settlement can thus 
be traced to its functions as a Parao or resting place. Even 
today caravans stop at Mandi, on their journeys from Afgha­
nistan to Central India and so do their twentieth century 
counterparts, the long distance truck drivers, travelling 
from Punjab to Madras.
In addition to long distance trading, Mandi has acted as 
a market for the surrounding plain, collecting indigo, wool 
and cotton for despatch to Jaipur and Sanganer, surplus food 
grains and the red chillies, cumin seeds and coriander seeds 
for which the district is famous. Although wool and cotton 
are no longer exported in the same quantities, their former 
importance is reflected clearly in the very large number of 
caste, names associated with textiles (see for example Table 
2 .1) .
The decline of cotton growing was accompanied by the com­
pensatory acceleration of groundnut cultivation, which repla­
ced it. The innovation of groundnuts appears to have been 
rather apocryphal. The brother of the present Secretary of 
the Municipal Board (a Muslim) bought some peanuts to eat at 
Jhaura in Madhya Pradesh, did not like them, so brought them 
home for his family. They did not like them either so Qureshi 
threw them away. The seed germinated and flourished, and
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several merchants expressed interest in the crop. One who 
has a farm started to grow them and other farmers followed 
suit. At first the groundnuts were resold in the bazaar as 
roasted peanuts for eating, but later groundnuts were sent out 
to mills in Jaipur. Later still local merchants discovered 
where the best markets were and sent out consignments to Agra, 
Bharatpur and Bhavani. From Mandi, groundnut cultivation 
spread gradually outwards. Whereas the last cotton crop was 
grown in Mandi pargana in 1945, peanuts and cotton were grown 
side by side elsewhere in the district and cotton was being 
sent for auctioning in.Mandi as late as 1955.
The key factor here was profitability. At a time when world 
markets had been slumping continuously for cotton, the bottom 
finally falling out of the market in the mid-fifties, the 
huge and continued increases in India's population raised 
home demands for cheap vegetable cooking oil (to replace clari­
fied butter). As early as the 1950's, the experimental ground­
nut crops were proving twice as profitable as cotton had been, 
even at the peak of profitability. Groundnuts are ideally sui­
ted to the climate, seem to be disease-resilient so far, and 
being nitrogenous have the side effect of growing well on 
those very soils which cotton had exhausted, whilst rotating 
well with wheat and barley. Once their commercial value as a 
source of vegetable oil (dalda) was realised, they ousted 
cotton completely. The money thus engendered led to a great 
expansion of economic activity: farmers with money in their 
pockets had a larger purchasing power for consumer goods and 
more ability to consume a variety of things.(In the height 
of the groundnut season it seems as if every bullock-cart 
has a transistor radio, each tuned to a different radio 
station). Concomitantly, this led to a growth of services, 
such as cloth shops, grocery stores and general merchants, 
and manufacturing industries.
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Oil mills, and. the agricultural processing industry, 
favour a raw material-orientated location rather than a 
consumer-orientated location. It is cheaper to process raw 
materials like groundnuts at source, rather than at the market 
for the oil, for groundnuts lose a great deal of bulk in pro­
cessing. Obviously, it is cheaper to transport vegetable oil 
in liquid form in one oil tanker than to transport groundnuts 
still in the shell in three or four trucks. Once the decision 
to shell the groundnuts had been taken, it was a small step 
to deciding to crush the nuts for oil, obtaining cattlecake 
as a by-product in a single process.
Although groundnuts have been grown since the 1930's, it 
was not until the early 196 0's that oil processing plants 
began to proliferate. The first was the Kekri Oil Mill in 
1963, followed by the Swastik Mill in 1964, Narender Mill in 
1966, Jain Oil Mill and Agrawal Oil Mill in 196 9 and lastly 
Durga Oil Products in 19 71. There are now 13 vegetable oil 
mills altogether. The vegetable oil business experienced a 
false start with cotton seed oil in the late 1950's, which 
seems to have been a last ditch stand to grow cotton in 
the region. In 1958 the Modi Ginning Factory was started, 
followed by the Ganesh Ginning Mill in 1959. Neither were 
successful, the Ganesh Mill closed down altogether until re- 
emerging as the Ganesh Oil Mill in 1967 and the Modi Factory 
limped along in the guise of the Modi Dal Mill, cleaning and 
grinding pulses, until after the inauguration and assured 
continuity of the Kekri Mill, in 1965. The failure of the 
cotton seed oil extraction plant in the 1950's, at a time 
when world demand for cotton was falling and farmers were 
turning to groundnuts instead, was a great disincentive for 
investment in agricultural processing. The speed with which 
oil mills grew up as groundnut production increased under­
lines the entrepreneurial characteristics of the business 
community.
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While the service industry has been concentrated within 
the bazaars, all manufacturing activity has been located 
around the periphery, where land is plentiful and cheap 
(see Map 3.1). Heavy investment in capital goods (building 
and machinery) and extensive storage space preclude them 
from competing for land along the bazaars. In any case, the 
advantages of agglomeration do not accrue in their case, 
quite the converse, and location towards the south of the 
town has other benefits e.g. cheaper labour.
> Today, the settlement chiefly functions as a 'central 
place' and as an industrial centre for the surrounding 
countryside. However, it would be wrong to assume that 
Mandi no longer caters for long-distance trade, as the 
proliferation of small restaurants, tea-stalls and soft 
drink sellers along the Main Road shows. Many tea-stalls 
and dhabbas are open 24 hours a day to cater for the long­
distance truck-drivers and interstate bus-passengers. 
Interestingly, the truck-drivers stop almost in the same 
spot as the camel caravans. (The camel caravans have always 
stopped under a tree, just by the panchayat Sainiti, where 
there is a well). The commercial establishments on the Main 
Road chiefly cater for long-distance travellers. In cont­
rast, the bazaar areas cater for the needs of the surround­
ing plain. It is to the bazaars that the vegetable sellers 
 ^A from the countryside come in everydayifsell their produce.
It is also in the bazaars that the bulk of the commercial 
establishments are located.
However, Mandi neither has a Central Business District 
(CBD) as in western towns and cities, nor does it display 
their typical spatial economic contours of concentric rings 
or stellate patterns of business location. Rather, it dis­
plays a linear development along the two main streets. Urban 
geographers have often differentiated 'frh'e oriental city from 
the western city, (Singh, R.L., 1955). Western towns and cities
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are hypothesised to have a CBD composed of offices and banks, 
with retail businesses situated along prestigious routes lead­
ing from it. Whereas retail shops, as a whole, tend to clump 
together in certain streets, the shops in a particular street 
deal in different commodities. In Indian towns and cities, 
by contrast, an entire street may consist of wholesale and 
retail shops dealing in a single commodity.
Although Mandi is too small for such intensive concentra­
tions, certain locations are set aside for specific services 
or types of merchandise. The cloth merchants, .kirana stores, 
tailors and jewellers are almost entirely concentrated on the 
upper part of Chauhati Bazaar; whereas dispensaries, trinket 
shops, metal dealers are towards the bottom end, near the 
Sabzi Mandi. On the Main Road, where long-distance travellers 
stop, are the service industries: tea-stalls and restaurants; 
motor repairs and mechanics; barbers shops and laundxies;; 
and the heavy commodity dealers: stonemasons and timber- 
merchants. Halwais cluster round the two major intersections 
in Mandi: one near the Sabzi Mandi and the other where the 
'Street of the Jats1 intersects with the Chaturbhuj Bazaar. 
Potters display their- wares along the Kumharan.^ gulli, which 
connects the far end of the Chauhati Bazaar with the Main 
Road. There are two flour- mills on the Kumharan- gulli and 
two along the Chauhati Bazaar, whereas the oil mills are 
scattered around the periphery of the town, particularly to 
the south. The Chaturbhuj Bazaar is the principal location 
for wholesalers and retailers of grains, gur and spices 
as well as for commission agents in oilseeds, grain and 
spices. This is the most congested part of the bazaar and 
in the height of the season from October to March bullock- 
carts and camel-carts queue as far back as the Main Road ■.;> 
for their .contents to be auctioned.
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Hence, although the superficial image is one of higgledy-' 
piggledy confusion, there is a discernible order to it. Busi­
ness activity is organised around foci, into agglomerations 
of varying sizes and constitutions. This nodality is linear 
in character, like beads on a string, rather than concentric, 
stellate or sectorial as in western cities. The underlying 
socio-economic logic is revealed by an examination of the 
inter-relationship between land values and rents, locational 
preferences and the concentration of economic power, which 
is the subject of the following section.
BUSINESS LOCATION AND ECONOMIC POWER
These categories cannot be divorced from each other and are 
inexorably linked to the questions of business rationality 
and constraints upon economic activity. The picture that 
emerges in Mandi is a complex one, where the operation of 
the free market in land values and the price of renting a 
business- site is limited by the concentration of property into 
the hands of a small number of business families. The result­
ant spatial distribution of certain types of business and 
their gradual relocation reflects this.
All economic systems are faced with the problems of allo­
cating scarce resources. In this case there is insufficient 
land to accommodate all the businesses in the optimum loca­
tion. Competition for the best sites in terms of future 
estimated profitability determines locational preferences and 
the value of land is decided by the price system. Wholesalers, 
retailers and commodity brokers alike look for the same site 
advantages i.e. centrality and accessibility. The locational 
cost of a business (that is, the price of the site) is fixed 
by competition amongst the several firms wishing to locate 
in that particular area. The price paid for rent or purchase 
of the site fixes at the highest amount which the most eager
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firm is ready to pay. It follows that the firm which will 
pay the most is the one which values the advantages of that 
site higher than the advantages of land elsewhere. Thus, in 
the 1930's all the cloth merchants of Mandi (four out of four) 
were located along the Chaturbhuj Bazaar. Today, most of the 
cloth merchants (12 out of 16) are located in the upper part 
of the Chauhati Bazaar. Cloth merchants would still prefer 
to be located on the Chaturbhuj Bazaar, but wholesale dealers 
and brokers are prepared to pay extra for the advantages of 
proximity to the grain auctions. For cloth merchants, the 
extra cost of a site on Chaturbhuj Bazaar is greater than 
any disadvantage of location in the Chauhati Bazaar. Accord­
ingly, wholesale traders and brokers (sometimes called commi­
ssion agents) have settled along the Chaturbhuj Bazaar while 
cloth merchants (and allied.traders) have settled in the 
Chauhati Bazaar,
TABLE 3.1
LAND VALUES AND RENTS IN MANDI
I
1...... . . . .  1
1
. Value 
(Rs.psm.)
Rent ** 
[ (shop psm.)
Chaturbhuj Bazaar
Temple end 250 300
Main Road end 200 150
Chauhati Bazaar
Gandhi Chowk 225 200
Kumharan mohalla end 200 100
•k
Mahajan mohalla 50 -
Bus Stand area 150 50
Gujaran mohalla etc. 10 —
* Except Chaturbhuj Bazaar and Chauhati Bazaar.
** An average shop has a shop front of three metres; bigger 
shops command higher rents.
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Table 3.1 shows that differences in land values (based 
on last-time sales) appear marginal as compared to the vary­
ing size of rents. This is because land at the Temple end of 
Chaturbhuj Bazaar is rarely— if ever— sold at this prime 
location and values are thus in fact artificial. Comparison 
of rents here with those obtaining at the Main Road end sugg­
est that the value of land should be at least Rs.400 psm. , 
which would be the very minimum. Land prices by the Bus Stand 
and the Kumharan mohalla end demonstrate the impact of recent 
land speculation and the lower rents obtainable at these sites 
show a truer value of their desirability as business locations. 
Actually, the ratio between the values of land and rent at 
Gandhi Chowk and the Main Road would appear to be the most 
realistic and to represent an equilibrium. Hence the most 
desirable localities command, the highest rents if not the 
highest land values and what emerges most clearly from this 
table is the lineality of locational preferences. This is 
because the opportunity cost of location off the '.main bazaars 
expressed in terms of invisibility to customers awaiting their 
turn for grain auction is higher than the amount saved through 
lower rents.
Hence those businesses which cannot be preferentially 
accommodated must choose and decide where they will locate 
as an alternative. The allocation of business premises at any 
point in time is the outcome of independent decisions taken 
by businessmen, acting through the mechanism of the 'free1 
market. Location and relocation of business premises is, 
however, a continuous process. Even though some businesses 
appear to be 'permanent1, arguably they are merely relocating 
more slowly than others. As more and more wholesale traders 
and commission agents have competed for land along the Chatur­
bhuj Bazaar, the price has risen continuously. As the price 
of land has risen, businessmen have been forced to reconsider 
their decisions to locate along the main bazaars. Accordingly,
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wholesale dealers and commission agents have spread down the 
Chaturbhuj Bazaar towards the Main Road, perpetuating lineal­
ity. Others, however, have moved round the corner into the 
Chauhati Bazaar (not backwards into the Mahajan mohalla as 
might have been expected). So far, only six commission agents 
have relocated but, apart from one whose business failed, they 
all asserted that they experienced a higher turnover than 
they had on the Chaturbhuj Bazaar. In theory, since centrality 
no longer obtains, they should, not be doing so well. To under­
stand this, a brief explanation of how oilseeds, spices and 
other commodities are marketed is needed. A more detailed 
description will be given in chapter six.
There are in fact two separate auctions: one at the 
Chaturbhuj Bazaar where it broadens into a square and the 
other on the open ground in the Gujaran mohalla known as the 
Bakra Mandi. The former is official and the latter unofficial. 
Farmers generally prefer the official auction, but since it 
involves waiting for hours through the hottest part of the 
day they often attend the unofficial one. This has the added 
attraction of greater proximity to the upper Chauhati Bazaar, 
where they can purchase consumer goods from the kirana stores, 
banglemakers, cloth merchants and so on.
From the point of view of the majority of commission 
agents, there are always more farmers wanting to sell their 
produce in the Chaturbhuj Bazaar, therefore it is best to be 
located there. However, a few years ago, certain commission 
agents realised that the ratio of wholesale traders and 
commission agents to farmers was increasing; while turnover 
remained constant, costs were increasing and profits declin­
ing. In contrast, there were no commission agents on the 
Chauhati Bazaar and land values, were far lower. So, they let k 
their shops on the Chaturbhuj Bazaar and moved to Chauhati 
Bazaar. Once there, they could not only be assured of the
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custom of long-standing clients, specially those tied to them 
by credit relations, but could also tap some of the traffic 
coming along the Chauhati Bazaar and some of the overspill 
from the Chaturbhuj Bazaar at the unofficial auction.
Of the six relocated businesses, three were Mahajans with 
oil mills, two were Mahajans who did not own oil mills and 
the last was a Brahman commission agent.. The three mill-owners 
pioneered the move out of the Chaturbhuj Bazaar, the other 
two Mahajans followed and the Brahman commission agent was 
unable to find premises at the rent he was prepared to pay on 
the Chaturbhuj Bazaar. In a microcosm, this indicates how 
economic stratification‘functions at the operational level.
The mill-owners showed the initiative because they had the 
greatest financial flexibility (as well as risk-taking ori­
entation). and could afford.' to. gamble on the risk paying off.
If the innovatory location failed they would lose some money, 
but if it succeeded they would entrench their position. By 
contrast, businessmen from other castes who do not have their 
financial strength cannot afford to gamble. If the move fail­
ed, they would lose all their, money; if it succeeded they 
might arouse hostility from vested interests— which could 
and would force them out of business. Not many months after 
moving to the Chauhati Bazaar the Brahman was forced out of X, 
business by cash flow problems. He was unable to get credit, 
and now works as an accountant (munim) for a Mahajan firm.
So far, we have discussed this aspect of Mandi's economy 
as if the numbers of buyers and sellers are both large and 
evenly matched, and-as if a situation resembling perfect 
competition exists. However, such ideal conditions do not 
truly operate because two of the three factors of production 
(land and capital) are largely controlled by one sector of 
the communityr -the Mahajans* and in particular by specific 
established families. This is clearly illustrated if we
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turn to the marketing of property, or real estate. With reg­
ard to rented property, one man's money is as good as another's 
and the property falls to the highest bidder. In the buying 
situation, many people are disqualified by income from pur­
chasing property (though they may be able to rent). Others 
are refused credit, or may be offered credit at such a high 
rate of interest (for example 3 0-40% per annum) that they are 
discouraged. Again, much property changes hands without per- 
ceivably coming on to the market, as security for loans or 
payment for debts. Perhaps the most important way of keeping 
property under Mahajan control is the '20% concession system', 
under which Khandelwals and Agrawals give a discount of 20% 
for cash payment to each other. Thus, when a site comes up 
for auction, interested members of these jatis can afford 
to bid above the market price and beat down their competitors, 
because they know that the 'final price' will be reduced.
Table 3.2 shows the net result of this pricing system, the 
evolution of a small property-owning elite.
TABLE 3.2
CHARACTERISTICS OF BUSINESS PROPERTY 
MARKET
i
', Number
i
i
I Per cent
i
Let property to others 50 20%
Do not let property to others 195 80%
Total 245
Rent property from others 179 73%
Do not rent property from others 66 27%
Total 245
Do not rent from others 66 27%
Let property to others 50 20%
N.B. It was felt necessary to ask separate sets of questions 
about renting and letting property to eliminate the 
possibility of evasive answers.
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Thus, 73% of business families have to rent their busin­
ess premises and only 27% own their own shop. Of these 7% do 
not have surplus property to let, leaving 20% or 50 families 
to control the property market. To put this another way, 93% 
of property in the bazaars is owned by merely 50 families. 
But who are these people?
TABLE 3.3
PROPERTY-LETTERS BY CASTE
Caste
i
. . JNumber
i
i
I Per cent
i
Mahajan 32 64%
Sonar 1 2%
Brahman 5 10%
Muslim 7 14%
Rajput 2 4%
Sindhi 1 2%
Reghur 1 2%
. Mali ............. 1 ■ ...... 2%
Total 50
Table 3.3 shows clearly that the majority(64%)of those who 
admitted to having property to let were Mahajans. The word 
'admitted' is used deliberately, as most Mahajans, particularly 
Khandelwals, were extremely reluctant to give details about 
their real estate holding. Nevertheless, the general picture 
of Mahajan control over the. property market is evident.
The question now arises of the extent to which this small 
propertied class erects direct or indirect economic barriers 
against penetration. Table 3.4 sets out the resultant differen-
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tial control of property as between newcomers and established 
residents, and Table 3.5 shows the castes of the newcomers. 
(For the sake of analysis, residents were defined as business 
families whose malik was born within the boundaries of the
i
Notified Area, whereas newcomers were defined as business 
families whose malik was not born in Mandi). Table 3.4 shows 
that newcomers are ten times less likely than established 
families to be in a position to let property to others and 
twice as likely to rent property from others. The proportion­
ately higher number of newcomers neither letting nor renting 
their business premises suggests that, for them, to purchase 
business premises is an urgent priority. Newcomers find it 
extremely hard to get credit from other businessmen, except 
at high interest rates. The only other alternative is to 
borrow from the bank— which will not lend without some sort 
of property as security.
TABLE 3.4
DIFFERENTIAL CONTROL OF PROPERTY 
BETWEEN NEWCOMERS & RESIDENTS
i
INewcomers
i
i
J Residents 
1
i
I Total
i
Let property to others 4 (6%) 46 (26%) 50
Rent property from others 57 (85%) 122 (68%) 179
Neither let nor rent 6 (9%) 10 (6%) 16
Total 67 1 78 245
Mahajan families with- a. .lon:g pedigree:\:±no the \town ..are 
somewhat at a loss to explain the phenomenon of migration. 
Whereas,- on the one hand, they are aware of the difficulties 
facing newcomers, who have to build up credit relations from
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scratch; on the other hand the success of certain Mahajan 
families who are recent immigrants cannot be dismissed light­
ly (two of the 13 oil mills are owned by newcomers). The 
local model divides migrants into two categories: aanewallah 
and jaanewallah (those who come and those who go) . It is 
believed that aanewallahs are always outsiders i.e. non- 
Mahajans, who have been attracted by the possibilities of 
business and have failed because of faulty judgements in 
business transactions; whereas aanewallahs are those Mahajans 
who have stayed and succeeded in the face of heavy odds, by 
virtue of their superior business acumen. By extension, the 
indigenous Mahajans neither come nor go, succeed nor fail 
enough to cause remark. The point will be elaborated in the 
chapters on business ideology.
There are, therefore, two kinds of newcomers-; - those who 
possess or can manufacture the necessary contacts, credit 
relations and customer networks which ensure the viability 
of the concern in a new environment and those who do not.
Table 3.5 breaks down the castes of newcomers and shows that 
the Mahajans constitute the largest number of recently-settled 
families, followed by the Sindhis. Within the Mahajan category 
of castes, moreover, the Khandelwals assert that Agrawals, 
particularly Agrawal Jains, are newcomers to Mandi, whom 
they frequently accuse of 'spoiling* the business of the 
town by their misguided and ill-conceived policies of invit­
ing kin from nearby towns and villages to share in the mass­
ive profits being made.
However, it would be wrong to read this resentment as 
hostility, accompanied by social or religious barriers such 
as they collectively erect against other newcomers, witness 
the 2 0% discount system mentioned above. How are these oppos­
ing points of view reconciled? It can be best explained by 
analogy with the business tactics of the multinational
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corporations/ which compete amongst themselves, but which
2join ranks against outsiders or newcomers.
TABLE 3.5
CASTES OF NEWCOMERS
Caste
i
Number
i
JTotal families 
I of the caste
i
I Per cent
i
Mahajan 26 (108) .25
Sindhi 13 (23) 57
Muslim 9 (39) 23
Brahman 7 (24) 29
Mali 4 (8) 50
Dhobi 3 (3) 100
Jat 3 (3) 100
Khati 1 (1) 100
Sonar 1 (3) 33
Total 6.7
Similarly, in Mandi, just as the social system discourages 
newcomers, as a whole, it encourages certain types of new­
comer more than others. The Jats, the Minas and the Gujars 
who have broken into the brokerage business can benefit huge­
ly from the fact that they are not Mahajans, once they have 
broken through the credit barrier. Caste fellows and others 
from their natal villages prefer to seek them out on their 
occasional visits to M.andi because they feel less likely
3
to be cheated. Furthermore, whilst Mahajans feel that they 
have a common caste heritage which gives them the edge over 
other castes in business, this heritage directs them towards 
certain types of business activity and precludes them from 
others (which they consider not to be business at all).
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CASTE, COMMUNITY AND OCCUPATION
Having dealt with the relation of economic power and func­
tional factors to the distribution of business we now come 
to the characteristics of the businesses themselves. Table 
3.6 reveals 4 0 different types of business enterprise. These 
vary in scope, professionalism and profitability, as symbo­
lised by their location in the bazaars discussed above and 
the concomitant price of land. Xt also shows that there is 
a close link between type of business and caste. It is easy 
to deduce that Mahajans not only predominate in business, but 
predominate: in the most profitable business. As the table 
also reveals, no fewer than 25 castes are employed in business 
activities, however Mahajans have a near monopoly of the 
parchooni businesses,. commission agencies, cloth, halwai and 
kirana stores. They completely monopolise timber merchants, 
transport agents and, most importantly, have the government 
contract to deal in cement. Thus they control not only the 
most profitable businesses but have the whip hand over the 
distributive infrastructure.
TABLE 3.6
PERMANENT BUSINESSES IN MANDI
Type of Business jNum-J Description of ,'ber Business____ J Caste of Proprietor
Parchooni 56 Wholesale and re- Mahajan (68%) 
tail dealer in 
gur, grain,spices 
and ghi
Cloth merchant 23 Textile retailer Mahajan (78%) 
and/or wholesaler
Tea-stalls and 
restaurants
Halwai
18 Brahman (50%)
15 Confectioner and 
caterer
Halwai (37%) 
Brahman (31%)
(Contd...P/
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Table 3.6 .... Contd.
Types of Business ^ ^ B u s i n e s s  °£ j Caste of Proprietor
Tailor 
Aar et
General store 
Kirana store
Barber
Paanwallah
Cycle shop
Flour mill
Bangle shop
Blacksmith
Dispensary
Subcontractor
Motorshop
Stonemason
Goldsmith
Timber merchant 
Butcher
14
12
12
10
Broker of grain, 
oilseeds and 
spices
Retailer of gro­
cery and miscell­
aneous goods
Retailer of femi­
nine commodities 
e.g. narrow fab­
rics
Seller of pan, 
bidis, tobacco
Buyer, seller, 
repairer and 
renter of cycles
Maker and retail­
er of bangles
Supplier of Eng­
lish and/or Ayur­
vedic medicine
Civil engineer
Machinery and 
spares supplier; 
motor repairer
Wholesale stone 
dealer
Maker and retail­
er of gold and 
silver jewellery
Muslim (57%) Darzi 
Hindu (21%)
Mahajan (87^) 
Brahman (13%)
Sindhi (67%) 
Mahajan (33%)
Mahajan (90%) 
Muslim (10%)
Nai (100%) 
Brahman (42%)
Mahajan (42%)
Muslim (57%) 
Mahajan (28%)
Mahajan (40%) 
Muslim (40%)
Muslim (100%)
Brahman, Mahajan, 
Sindhi, Muslim
Muslim (75%), 
Mahajan (25%)
Muslim (75%), 
Mahajan (25%)
Muslim, Kumhar, 
Mahajan
Mahajan, Sonar, 
Sunhar
Mahajan
Muslim
(Contd. . .)'
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Table 3.6 .... Contd.
Types of Business j Num- ' Jber
J Description of |
I Business | Caste of Proprietor
Dhobi 2 Launderers and 
dry cleaners
Dhobi
Oilpresser 1 Small-scale manu­
facturer, whole­
saler and retail­
er of vegetable 
oil
Teli
Oil mill 1 - Mahajan
Hardware 2 Wholesaler and 
retailer of 
pots and pans
Mah j an, B rahman
Transport agent 2 - Mahajan
Carpenter 1 - Khati
Housepainter 1 _ Muslim
Shoeshop 1 - Reghur
Bookseller 1- - Mahajan
Fodder merchant 1 - Muslim
Cinema 1 - Mahajan
Icecream factory 1 - Sindhi
Electrical goods 1 - Muslim
Watchmaker 1 - Muslim
Photographic studio 1 - Mahajan
Purohit 1 Dispenser of 
'Ayurvedic ad­
vice1 e.g. 
horoscopes
Brahman
Cement dealer 1 - Mahajan
Embroidery 1 - Sindhi
Radio and Loud­
speakers 1 - Mahajan
Total 245
N.B. Muslim proprietors refused to reveal their caste for 
the purposes of the business survey.
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Monopoly manifests itself in other businesses and the 
business survey revealed that a total of eight types of comm­
ercial enterprise which are monopolised by a single caste:
TABLE 3.7
CASTE MONOPOLY OF BUSINESSES
Types of Business JNumber of - J businesses
i
J Caste of proprietor
V
Barber 8 Nai
Tailor 8 Darzi (50% Hindu, 
50% Muslim)
Blacksmith 4 Lohar (Muslim)
Butcher 3 Qasai (Muslim)
Purohit 1 Brahman (Ayurvedic 
Advice Centre)
Carpenter 1 Khati (Muslim)
Shoeshop 1 Reghur
Oilpresser 1 Teli
Total . 27
Though the number of families involved is small, this 
does demonstrate the trend towards the commercialisation of 
customary or traditional.caste professions. It is interesting 
to note that whereas the more profitable businesses are being 
penetrated by non-Mahajans, the Mahajans, as a whole, leave 
these smaller types of business family alone. Whilst one or 
two have purchased tailoring businesses, run as an adjunct 
to their own cloth shops, they do not work as tailors them­
selves and the caste of the proprietor is given as darzi.
Why should this be so?
Part of the reason why these businesses are avoided is 
their lesser profitability. However, as will be explained
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below, the fact that some Mahajans are forced to work for 
others out of economic necessity, suggests that they might have 
tried their talents in enterprises requiring lesser initial 
capital expenditure. Mainly it is because of the polluting 
nature of activities such as taking life, touching the car­
cases of dead animals, coming into contact with the waste pro­
ducts of human beings and religiously-supported prescriptions 
against high status people working with their hands.
In addition, there is a marked correlation between the 
relative purity of objects and their value as objects of trade. 
Therefore, silk is purer and more expensive than cotton, gold 
is more pure and more expensive than silver, and so on; conse­
quently traders in valued commodities take a higher status in 
both ritual and economic terms. Again the more abstract the 
* nature of theexchange, the more pure and honorific the occupa- 
y y  tion. Thus banking and insurance take the highest status (for 
Mahajans at least) whereas selling goods directly— as opposed 
to acting as middlemen— takes the lowest status in commercial 
^^ terms. This fortunate coincidence between material profiit 
and ritual purity is striking.
The prevalence of Muslim castes as artisan-tradesmen is
particularly interesting. They are supposed to have special 
aptitude for things involving machinery., presumably a legacy of 
their work as armourers and an indirect result of their control 
of blacksmithy work. Accordingly Muslim tailors' shops were the 
first to introduce treadle sewing machines and now are the 
first to introduce electric sewing machines. Muslims own almost
all the motorshops and subcontractors and half of the flour mills.
This association of caste or religious community with occu­
pation extends into the realm of employees. Only 30% of busi­
nesses permanently employ other - persons in the business besides 
family members. For our purposes here, though this will be ex­
panded in a later chapter, we hhv&Ideffried family members as
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patrilineally related kin residing in a common house (or 
running a common business whilst residing separately?. As a 
general rule Mahajans do not like to employ people from out­
side the house, because they feel that this prejudices security. 
However, families which own multi-businesses or frequently re­
quire manual labour (e.g. wholesale dealers and commission 
agents) are forced to augment family labour. For one thing, 
balancing the books becomes a full time occupation requiring 
professional expertise and for another, manual labour is degrading.
Two types of employee can be distinguished: the mazdur, or 
the labourer and the munim, or accountant, occasionally called 
the.gomashtah or manager. Though both are referred to as nokar, 
servants, the important relationship is between the family and 
the munim. For many families he is the key tie outside the 
house. He is more of a trusty family retainer than a mere 
manager and frequently lives within the Mahajan household.
The relationship of employer-employee thus becomes transformed 
into social relations; the munim is rewarded for his loyalty 
by being encouraged to set up his own concern and aided to 
accumulate sufficient reserves.of capital and credit, being * 
allowed to use the family name in his own transactions and 
given financial backing on 'family1 terms. As a malik himself 
he confers his own 'credit' on the patron family and contri­
butes to its viability as a continuous concern.
Many stories circulate in North India, amongst the busi­
ness community, which show the integral role of the munim in 
the continuity of the family, and r;o.fi other valuable family 
connections such as the vakil or lawyer. Here is a stereotype 
of such a story: the father dies and the good-for-nothing 
sons dismiss the faithful, but elderly munim. The business 
goes from bad to worse and finally there arrives a credit 
note for payment at sight, amounting to a small fortune.
The sons panic and remember their father's warnings, but the
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mother sends a note to the munim, begging him to help Itherji. 
In return for reinstatement, he organises his dead patron's 
friends (neglected by the sons) to honour the credit note 
and provide a bridging loan. Such stories constantly re­
inforce anxiety about the continuity of the family as a firm
and stress the need for trusted agents in the event of the
4death of adult males,. It also underlines the consequence 
of spendthrift behaviour and the greater wisdom of the 
elders.
Such a relationship is thus qualitatively different from 
the relationship of the family with the mazdur and is ref­
lected in the amount of quantitative remuneration as well as 
other favours. A munim can expect to receive upwards of 
Rs.4 50 per month (1975 prices), about the same as a univer­
sity lecturer in India. A mazdur can expect to receive at 
most Rs. 150 per month. A mazdur would not live with the 
Mahajan household, nor take his meals with them. If the 
relationship were long standing, he might be invited to 
weddings, but would be served food separately and eat after 
other guests had finished, a n i n d i c a t i o n  of social inferi­
ority. Occasionally, he might be offered a glass of tea 
(especially if he had been sent to fetch it). Again, the 
munim plays an important part in the ritual aspects of 
business, especially at Diwali. For families who perform 
DUrgapuja (dedication of the pens, inkpots and sand shaker 
to Durga) his presence is essential. The mazdur plays no 
part at all beyond fetching and carrying and cleaning up 
afterwards.
Hence, there is a definite pattern to the employment 
of servants. Munims are usually of the same religious commu­
nity as their employers and frequently belong to the same 
gachha (sectarian division). Thus, Jains ideally prefer to 
employ Jains and Vaishnavas to employ Vaishnavas, though
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they have no aversion to employing each other. They feel 
that someone from their own community is more likely to be 
honest and responsible in the event of the malik1s temporary 
absence. All businessmen think that employing someone of a 
different religion is "bad for the luck of the shop", because 
he will be unable to perform ritual obligations fully. Fina­
lly, cultural homogeneity between employer and employee deri­
ving from membership of the same gachha or jati is believed 
to promote feelings of identity with the firm and hence imp­
rove job performance.
All Mahajans take this to extremes and wherever possible, 
prefer to employ, a matrilateral relative as a mUnim e.g. 
mother's brother's sons, mother's sister's sons, mother's 
brother's wife's brother's sons and so forth. Whilst these 
are not 'of the house' and unlike close patrilineal kin are 
not regarded as pakke rishtedar (proper relatives) there is 
a sense of mutual identity and obligation, though necessarily 
of an asymmetric nature. The duty of patrilateral kin is to 
provide and sustain; in.other words to 'patronise1. The obli­
gation of the inferior, matrilateral kin is to obey and be 
grateful for a privileged start in life. This is clearly 
reflected in conversational styles, the latter using always 
indirect and honorific terms of address and being addressed 
in turn with familiarity. For Mahajans absolute loyalty from 
the munim is regarded as indispensible. They think that no-one 
outside the house can be trusted, unless there is some sort 
of hold upon them, in this case emotional blackmail. The 
employment of cognatic kin also avoids the possibility of 
pollution, because families which intermarry must by defini­
tion be able to take food from each other.
The concern with pollution extends to the employment of 
labourers. On a general level Jains and Hindus attempt to avoid 
employing Muslims, because they could not fetch tea for their
125
employers or important Hindu customers. Some Hindu customers 
might object if their purchases were handed to them by a 
Muslim, particularly food purchases. This is unavoidable since 
fetching and carrying constitute his duties, (tfhe malik must 
never leave the cash box). It has been already indicated 
that manual work is regarded as demeaning (if not actually 
polluting) for higher castes. On the other side of the coin, 
Hindus prefer not to work for Muslims, because it degrades 
them and there is the constant danger of pollution through 
contact. Hindus, then tend.towards employing Hindus and 
Muslims to employ Muslims.
Thus both skilled and unskilled employees show a marked 
uniformity of caste and status. Fox argues that "this is 
because of indirect selection for which castes enter the 
field rather than purposeful selection on the part of the 
employer" (Fox, 1969, p. 141). On the contrary, in Mandi, 
caste and religion play a conscious and direct role in deter­
mining access to jobs, particularly with regard to contact 
and commensality which condition the usefulness of an employee. 
Where customary disabilities are lacking, kinship and caste 
preferences preempt non-Mahajans from the more lucrative end 
of the labour market..Whether they have business acumen or 
not, they are precluded from proving how industrious and 
profitable they could be as munims. The Mahajans dominate 
the market for this, like everything else.
SUMMARY
The last ;f ewry ears.-'? halves seen an influx of business and a 
rapid expansion of population. The root cause has been the 
transition from cotton and spice growing to groundnuts. This 
increased spending power in the surrounding countryside and 
the economy has taken off. Farmers had more money to spend 
on non-essentials such as transistor radios, relatively ex­
pensive items of food and clothing, soap and toilet items
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which benefitted shopkeepers. Commission agents expanded 
their business, confirmed each other's transactions, provided 
finance and insurance and lent money to farmers. Recently 
local industry has started.up with every possibility of 
complete take-off into, sustained economic growth.
However, whilst newcomers have set up businesses in the 
same way as their caste fellows who have long been resident 
in Mandi, not all have prospered equally. The intensification 
of competition and the general shortage of credit has meant 
that, without good connections, the viability of the family 
firm as a going concern is tricky. In addition, the limita­
tions on the property market due to the concentrations of 
property holdings into the hands of the Mahajans, their 
discount system, their, domination of business as a whole 
and the most profitable businesses in particular has height­
ened the difficulties of non-Mahajans trying to compete against 
established concerns. At the same time, Mahajan cultural homo­
geneity strengthens the boundaries against outsiders as shown 
by their avoidance o f .non-Mahajans as business employers.
This type of economic strategy— minimising competition among­
st themselves whilst loading the economic dice against others 
means that Mandi’s economy, therefore, neither has perfect 
competition nor monopolistic competition but competition among 
the few: an oligopoly. Oligopoly is the market situation in 
which a product is supplied by a small number of firms whose 
activities and policies are determined by the expected re­
actions of one another. The essence of oligopoly is thus 
mutual interdependence between firms. Since each firm knows 
that a decision about its price or output will affect others, 
it must judge its policy by their likely reaction to it. In 
perfect competition and monopoly, it is possible to anticipate 
from first principles what are likely decisions but oligopoly 
creates special problems of analysis. As each firm acts with 
reference to expected reaction and subsequent interaction,
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there is much uncertainty . At the theoretical level, then, 
oligopolistic competition is like a game of cards, a diplo­
matic battle or a contest in strategy. However, in the real
world, the uncertainties of oligopoly encourage policies
5
of seeking a quiet life rather than maximizing profit 
(Pred, 1969; Simon, 1957, 1959). I shall return to this 
point in a later chapter.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE MERCHANT COMMUNITY
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to define the boundaries of 
the traditional merchant castes and investigate to what extent 
they constitute a moral community. So far, to reduce unnece­
ssary complexity, the terms 'Mahajan', 'merchant castes' and 
'business community' have been used without precise defini­
tion. It was pointed out that there are many more castes 
participating in trade and commerce than those castes which 
traditionally are collectively styled by the term ?'Bahia' *i&As 
Fox has indicated, Banias are not a real caste but a status 
category and it would be wrong to treat them analytically 
otherwise. (Fox, 1967, p. 298). Millman makes the point in 
a slightly different way when he asserts that expatriate 
Marwaris tend to have more in common with their Bania counter­
parts in the region in which they are currently residing than 
they do with people from their own jati residing in different 
regions (Millman, 1954, p. 13). Is it possible therefore to 
speak meaningfully of a merchant community coterminous with 
a category of traditional merchant castes? If there is indeed 
a merchant community, where are the boundaries and how is 
membership decided and proclaimed in an urban multi-caste 
context? In a situation of rapid population growth due to 
migration, how does a newcomer household become integrated 
into the community? What, if any, institutions exist to 
reconcile the fact that merchant households simultaneously 
cooperate and compete with each other? Are there any patterns 
of leadership whose function is to resolve quarrels and pro­
vide authoritative models for upward mobility? These and 
other relevant questions will be asked in the present 
chapter.
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1
THE MERCHANT CASTE CATEGORY
Belonging to the traditionally authenticated category of 
castes which go under the name of 'Mahajan* implies recruit­
ment by birth into one of a small number of named, endoga- 
mous social units called jatis. In Mandi there are four of 
these: Agrawal, Khandelwal, Oswal and Maheshwari, though 
altogether the Marwari Mahajan jatis total about a dozen.
Jati is used interchangeably with biradari locally (as else­
where in North India) though there are certain differences
3in implicit meanings. In addition, each jati possesses an 
individual combination of economic and religious character­
istics which designate a particular rank in the local status 
system. In the case of the Mahajans this status ranking is 
shared, or common, hence their designation here as a caste 
category i.e. a collectivity of similar jatis, or castes.
In the majority of village studies, the hierarchical 
dimension of caste has been emphasised to the exclusion of 
horizontal spread. Hence stress in research has been on deli­
miting interactional and/or attributional criteria for iden-
4tifying castes. However, "Only in relations with other castes 
is the caste a significant unit" (Mayer, 1960, pp. 5-6).
Though perceived as unitary by other jatis, each is sub­
divided into a number of sub-castes and sub-sub-castes, seg­
mentation tending to proliferate in accordance with the 
spatial context of the social relations studied. Dumont
comments: "If one asks someone. 'What is your caste?' (jati)
he may indicate either which of the four varna he belongs 
to...or a caste title, or his caste, or his sub-caste, or
even to the exogamous section (clan) to which he belongs"
(Dumont, 1972, p. 101). Identity is situational, therefore 
a respondent in Mandi might reply to the above question that 
he is Wesh (i.e. Vaisya varna) or Mahajan (caste title) or 
Agrawal (caste or jati) or Khandelwal Vaishnu (sub-caste)
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or Todwal (exogamous section). Another possible response is
to give gachcha (sectarian affiliation), thus 49 respondents
gave Jaina as their jati and 29 Vaishnu (Vallabhacharya
Vaishnava). In an African society the process of nesting
segmentation might be termed 'fission and fusion'. Nici
5Nelson, one of the few Africanists to have studied South 
Asian society complains that anthropologists have been "mes­
merized" by the India caste or ritual systems (Nelson, 1980, 
p. 19). This insistence on referring everything to the varnas 
and the Vedas has been responsible for futile searches for 
the 'true' or 'real' caste, when in reality socially sustained 
categories are far more fluid.
If identity is situational, what are the situations? Table 
4.1 attempts to summarise nesting degrees of segmentation.
Thus commencing with the caste category of Mahajan we find 
that this is a caste title, in fact, the hereditary occupa­
tion being designated by 'Bania' (from the Sanskrit Vanij, 
trader). In common parlance 'Bania' means anyone who is in 
business regardless of caste, and it sometimes carries the 
connotation of being sharp with money or involved in shady 
financial dealings. In some.parts of India the terms 'Marwari' 
and 'Bania' are synonymous with international smuggling and 
black marketeering of imported luxuries. From this reason 
merchants in Mandi, as in other places, are uncomfortable 
with this appellation, since it suggests a lowlier status 
than they would prefer. Consequently, whilst they are not 
ashamed of their occupation, in the way that a scavenger or 
shoemaker would be, they generally use a different term of 
reference for themselves. This term is 'Mahajan' and out of 
deference to their sensibilities this is the name given 
to the caste category here.
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TABLE 4.1
CASTE SEGMENTATION AMONGST 
MAHAJANS IN MANDI
MAHAJAN (BANIA)
AGRAWAL KHANDELWAL MAHESHWARI OSWAL (1)
KohwarVisa Pancha DinduDesa
Jaina Vaishnu Jaina Vaishnu >
Many Shekha- Mew- 
wati ati
Many Many Many
(2)
(3)
(4)
---- i----------- f
Todwal Mehta S o g a n i  etc. (5)
Within the caste category, the first order of division is 
primarily on the basis of place. According to Hemchand Jain, 
several castes among the Vaisyas are known (my italics) to 
have come into existence after the seventh century AD, taking 
their identity from ancient towns and cities. Thus "the Jaina 
saint, Ratnaprabha Suri is known to have visited Osia, Srimala 
and Pali where he converted the people to Jainism, and formed 
the castes of Osavalas, Srimalis and Palivalas respectively 
after them" (Jain, 1972, pp. 566 ff). Thus, he argues, the 
Khandelavala, and Baaheravala caste would appear to have 
originated from Khandela and Baghera respectively and the 
Maheshwaris from Didwana— the caste being known by the dimi-
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nutive Dindu in early times, this presently referring to one 
• •
of the next levels of segmentation which will be discussed 
below. The Jaisavala caste of Jains came into existence after 
the twelfth century AD, when Jaisalmer was founded, and so on. 
Badlu Ram Gupta similarly asserts that the Aggarwals "get 
their name from the Agragan State founded by the Maharaja 
Agrasen some 5,000 years ago, near the time of the Mahabha- 
rata...Agroha which is now in ruins and forms part of Hissar 
District of Haryana was its capital" (Gupta, 1976, p. 2).
He argues that the name of the jati could therefore be Agra-wal, 
and this, indeed, is how it is pronounced in Mandi.
This type of subdivision is also found among Brahmans 
(Shah, 1978) and ideally each division of the latter is anti­
cipated to work for the corresponding division of Banias. 
Therefore, Paliwal Mahajans are jajmans to Paliwal Brahmans, 
Khairawal Brahmans officiate as priests for Khairawal Mahajans 
and so forth. In reality, corresponding divisions tend not 
to be found in the same vicinity (for example there were 
Paliwal Brahmans in Mandi but not Paliwal Mahajans) and even 
when they are, the ideal patron-client relations may not be 
found. So, for example Jains call pandits to perform life 
crisis rituals who are not Brahmans or even ex-Brahman by 
jati. These men (and women? )^  are individuals with a knowledge 
of the scriptures and of priestly duties, born into families/ 
lineages regarded as learned. Informants were emphatic that 
being a guru or sidha (spiritual guide) rested upon achieved 
rather than ascribed criteria. There can be little doubt, 
however, that accident of birth into an appropriate lineage 
was not insignificant. The point here is that Brahmans and 
Banias are both very largely urbanites, resident side by 
side, subdivided into many jatis, all of which are endogamous, 
each having halls or temples for meetings and marrying, and 
supported by funds supervised by councils of elders. At the 
ideological level the supposed correspondence of jatis is an
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attempt to come to terms with urban complexity and spatial 
mobility. It also reflects the necessity which the more pro- 
gressive and outward-looking of the bazaar population feel 
for finding a similar nationwide organisation in 'modern1 
terms. This has found expression in the development of caste 
associations, which will be discussed in a subsequent section 
of this chapter.
The second level of segmentation is division into endo- 
gamous units called visa (20) dasa (10) and pancha (5). But 
what are these twenty, ten and five? Discussing the segmenta­
tion of castes into numbered rather than named units Dumont 
cites Blunt's account (1931) of the Agarwals of Punjab and 
Gujerat "who have the 'twenty' C-arid ;superior) and the 'ten' 
(inferior)" (Dumont, 1972, p. 164). The two divisions are 
endogamous but "it is not surprising to find the same exo- 
gamous groups represented within the two divisions". Field­
work data suggests that while the terms appear to imply hyper- 
gamy (and therefore asymmetrical exogamy), and the triplefold 
aggregation of exogamous maximal lineages, in practice their 
meaning is uncertain and confused, even irrelevant. Lack of 
a name would apparently signify lack of fixed meaning in terms 
of social organisation. At the level of theory, these unnamed 
categories Could possibly be relegated to the concept of 
'sub^casfe*— as indeed Dumont does— but it is difficult to 
substantiate this assertion and he fails to do so. Perhaps 
this can best be perceived as indicative of indigenous recog­
nition of the fissiparious nature of the Mahajan caste cate­
gory and possibly with especial regard to differences of 
standing within the jati? Gupta argues that being engaged 
in trade and commerce, AggarWals,’ are generally perceived as 
moneyed people whereas in fact, barring a small percentage 
of rich businessmen and industrialists, the hard core of the 
community consists of ordinary shopkeepers and tradesmen. At 
the bottom of the ladder, Aggarwals are scarcely differen-
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tiated economically from their counterparts in other commu-
7nities, some tilling the land joining the army and entering 
the Administrative Services. (Gupta, 1976, p. 8). The point 
here is that the internal logic of hierarchical inter-caste 
relations argues towards equivalence regarding intra-caste 
relations, which is patently not the case where status 
differentiation is pronounced on economic grounds.
The third level of segmentation is into ekdas or gols 
(units or circles). This corresponds to an even smaller unit 
of endogamy. Each of these is associated with distinct myths 
of origin (see Millman,. 19 54, for an exhaustive narration of 
these) coupled with individual tutelary deities and separate 
puranas. Usually they are governed by different marriage rules 
corresponding to differences concerning diet, commensality 
and contact. Shah (1978) has argued that since in Ahmedabad 
ekdas inhabit different streets, the compartmentalisation of 
caste among the Banias instead of hierarchy is therefore 
emphasised. Separate residence of-ekdas and gols was not 
observed in Mandi, presumably because the lesser population 
of the bazaar as compared with one of India’s great cities 
has not permitted full rein to this spatial assertion of 
exclusiveness, or at least not in a visible way.
Division into ekdas is principally on gachcha lines: thus 
as pointed out earlier there are Khandelwal Vaishnus and 
Khandelwal Jains and Agrawal,Vaishnus and Agrawal Jains, all 
of which are again endogamous. Sometimes marriages are arra­
nged in contravention of the rules of vaniakapta (i.e. those 
with whom there are commensal relations). Thus Agrawal Vaishnus 
may on occasion marry Agrawal Jains. Six examples of such 
marriages were discovered during fieldwork. However the rules 
governing permission to break the rules vary according to 
distance between levels of segmentation. Prohibition of marri­
age is much more severe at the first level of segmentation,
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for example between Khandelwals and Agrawals, than at these 
1 lower1 or 'smaller' caste subdivisions. This is not, though, 
readily explainable in terms of bifurcation, since Khandelwal 
Vaishnus and Khandelwal Jains clearly refrained from inter­
marrying. Here, again, therefore there are several units of 
endogamy, not just the one, and more overlapping of social 
relationships at lower orders of the caste. Presumably, 
further fragmentation is possible or conversely two ekdas 
could combine? This has been documented for other jatis 
(for example: Karve, 1953, pp. 157-8).
The last level of segmentation above the exogamous line­
ages is the tat (third). Thus two, three or more tats combine 
to constitute one ekda of one jati. An alternative meaning 
for tat is 'faction1 suggesting that they result from con­
flicts between ekda or possibly jati leaders. Difference, 
rather than status, is emphasised amongst these splinter 
groups and it may be asserted as a general rule that the 
greater the segmentation,, the less the stress upon hierarchy 
as a principle in social interaction, (excluding, of course 
the socially sustained differentiation between parties to a 
marriage alliance, such that wife-givers are inferior to 
wife-receivers, this being signified by a refusal to return 
daughters in exchange for daughters-in-law). Every household 
head is therefore the head of the minimal patrilineage,.or 
khandan and so is a petty chief or malik, equal in status 
in structural terms to all other Mahajan maliks. Only on an 
individual basis can leadership extend across the mercantile 
community resident in the bazaar. This is, however, antici­
pating a question best discussed in a subsequent section.
The subject is mentioned in this context simply to round out
the picture of situational identity categories.
Thus the cognitive map of any individual Mahajan can be
depicted in terms of five levels of integration:
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1) with his lineage (khandan)
2) with his marriage circle (ekda/tat)
3) with his caste (jati/gachcha)
4) with other Mahajans in Mandi
5) with Mahajans elsewhere including overseas
Looking at the world from the perspective of Sital Prasad, 
a local merchant, this is the pattern of relationships which 
emerges:
1) Sital Prasad Todwal (as opposed to Sogani, Jhalauna 
etc.)
2) Shekhawati (as opposed to Mewati)
3) Khandelwal Vaishnu (as opposed to Jaina)
4) Mahajan (as opposed to Bania)
5) Marwari/Rajasthani Vani (as opposed to Gujerati,
Bengali etc. and firengi: foreigners)
By way of concluding this section it may be said that a 
mixture of orders is typical of small towns and cities. This 
is functional insofar as Mahajans are seldom rural and the 
proliferation of segmentation within the caste category 
(a) provides a kinship framework into which lineages can be 
inserted at the conceptual level; (b) permits the fluidity 
of marriage alliances within the over-riding ordinance of 
caste endogamy;and (c) accordingly legitimises both spatial 
and social mobility. Hence in view of the foregoing it may 
be suggested that a focus on the horizontal dimension of caste 
demonstrates the principle of compartmentalisation or separa­
tion and exclusivity, as opposed to the principle of hierar­
chy as a basis for social interaction. The difference between 
this and Dumont's approach is summarised diagrammatically as 
follows, using the binary oppositional method:
HIERARCHY \ HYPERGAMY INCLUSIVENESS
__________________ i____________________ i_________________________
s e p a r a t i o n ; e n d o g a m y  ; e x c l u s i v e n e s s
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FROM CASTE CATEGORY TO MERCHANT COMMUNITY
Though geographically isolated, as a trading settlement 
Mandi has never been a closed community in the sense in which 
this is applicable to a remote and isolated tribe. Many 
Mahajans, being relatively recent migrants, retain a basic 
extra-bazaar orientation and all maintain links of some sort 
with individuals and groups outside the locale. These links 
can be with other businessmen, belonging to the same or 
different castes, both inside and outside the bazaar, or 
with non-businessmen, again both local and extra-local 
(Cottam, 1980). The construction of boundaries is a primary 
requirement for any anthropological study but the problem of 
community delimitation is made acute, in studying merchants 
and traders. A second problem, is that the population is 
never constant. Periodically, in the past, large numbers of 
merchants have left the area in search of a more favourable 
milieu particularly in times of famine and pestilence. Most 
businessmen make trips to the big cities several times per 
year in order to replenish stocks, pay bills and discuss 
business affairs. To what extent therefore is the category 
of castes described above representative of social unity?
The proliferation of segmentation within the caste cate­
gory provides a conceptual framework into which a newcomer 
household can be placed. Even so it will not be immediately 
accepted as Mahajan unless certain other behavioural charac­
teristics of the household, are perceived as conformable with 
socially sustained norms of appropriate lifestyles. The most 
important of these are language, diet, and dress.
a) Language
The use of secret language for business transactions and 
among themselves by Marwaris is a firm belief across Northern 
India. Certain colonial administrators also subscribed to this
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idea (e.g. Crooke, 1896, who likens it to the secret "thieves 
language"). G.A. Grierson (1909, pp. 367-68) mentions that 
Marwari is "written in a peculiar character, the aspect of 
which is familiar to every Indian official who has had occa­
sion to inspect the accounts of native bankers". The use of 
Marwari language and script by traders from the Shekhawati 
region in for example Calcutta, wherein Bengali (which has 
a distinct script and vocabulary) was the dominant mode of 
expression in business other than English, may have fostered 
this idea. In any event, Marwari is now intrinsic to the cul­
tural tradition which the expatriate Mahajan claims as his 
birthright and distinguishes him as a cultural isolate within 
the larger business world.
Back at home, the greater literacy of Mahajans, promoted 
by the needs of trade and commerce, appears to have encoura­
ged the stabilisation of a fairly group-specific dialect into 
a more rigid linguistic form. The proliferation.of dialects 
tends to be inhibited with the decline of illiteracy as a 
general rule. In this context the influence of Persian upon 
courtly communications.within Jaipur State has been already 
noted. The Mahajans of Mandi thus pride themselves on being 
a haven of elegant language in an ocean of uncouth speech 
and upon being 'learned'. It is a fact that by judicious 
choice of words Mahajans can become unintelligible to TOnkra 
(Tonk State) customers, whilst continuing to understand them, 
which amazes the unsophisticated villagers..This is similar 
to the Sanskritisation of Indian Radio and Television broad­
casts and the Persianisation of the Pakistani services and 
its purpose is similar. Language is a symbol of group/ethnic 
identity and both separates and enfolds, hence it is instru­
mental in strengthening group boundaries.
In helping to eliminate regional cultural differences in 
migrant Mahajan families to Mandi the sense of a common shared
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language has been vital. It has also helped to minimise 
social differentiation based on caste and lineage differen­
ces within the status category. The literacy of Mahajans, 
in Marwari or otherwise, has another important consequence, 
in that it has helped the growth of regional and national 
caste associations which .'promote1 a sense of shared iden­
tity. Lastly the feeling of superiority engendered by 
'cultured' speech and access to the copious, writings in 
Marwari script of a literary and religious nature erects 
a barrier against assimilation by a wider society sharing 
similar linguistic characteristics. In this way the Mahajans 
of Mandi resemble the 'learned families' in the Lebanese 
village studied by Peters (1977).
b) Dress
Dress is an immediately obvious distinguishing feature 
by which Mahajans separate themselves from their neighbours 
and recognise each other as culturally homogenous. This is 
also linked to the status of women. Mahajan women observe■ 
strict purdah (seclusion, also veiling) as do the .Brahmans, 
Rajputs and Muslim women of the market.town. This means that 
they rarely leave the house after puberty and life is lived 
indoors. On the streets, however, Muslim women wear a biirqa 
(tent-like, enveloping outer garment). In contrast, whilst 
veiling is also observed by Mahajan women out of doors, the 
garment chosen is an orhni, similar to the chadar (sheet) 
worn by lower status Muslim.women but worn completely over 
the face and therefore less opaque. Seclusion of women is a 
general, culturally-recognised status strategy throughout 
Northern India, but total 'invisible' veiling is negatively 
associated by Hindus with Islam. The problem therefore in 
managing secluded status is to avoid negative stereotypi- 
fication into an alien religious grouping whilst at the same 
time asserting privileged demarcation vis-a-vis villagers 
and others whose women do not cover their faces.
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The problem is complicated by the fact that the sari is 
adversely associated by Mahajans with Brahmans and filmstars 
and that Rajput dress (mid-calf length flared and gathered 
skirt or ghagra, veil and backless bodice) is thought to be 
indecent because the legs are.revealed. It is also associated 
with village life, since, freedom of movement is necessitated 
by work in the fields, and Rajasthani village women often 
wear relatively brief skirts. The solution of Mahajan women 
is a modified version of Rajput dress, wearing churidars 
(rather like jodhpurs) under the ghagra and a knee-length 
smock-like blouse instead of the backless bodice, thus ensur­
ing that the body is decently covered.
The self-consciousness with which dress is worn as an 
indicator of difference and insubordination extends also to 
the male sex. Mahajan men (and women) avoid synthetic fibres, 
for example, since these are connected with the west and there­
fore with m^o.r.a?I. depravity. , "Just the feel of silky cloth 
makes you think of sin" said Phul Chand, one of the most 
extreme of Mandi's conservative merchants. Preferred dress 
consists of an embroidered.white muslin kurta (tunic) and 
dhoti (sarong) and pale pink turban worn mop-like .in Afghani 
fashion. It emphasises freedom.from manual labour and suggests 
spirituality, ritual purity, and again scriptural learning.
Thus a barrier is erected against lower status castes and 
reinforces claims for a higher status than castes which are 
customarily accorded an.equivalent or superior ranking, in 
an all-India framework-^-though it may be added that for other 
castes this style of dress has connotations of., effeminacy, 
particularly the skirt-like arrangement of Mahajans' dhotis.
c) Diet
Diet is another important criteria in establishing and 
maintaining identity. All Mahajans are vegetarian and consume 
neither alcohol nor tobacco. Though meat eating is not common
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in rural India, in Rajasthan it is associated with the Raj­
puts as a high status item of consumption. Thus 'not being 
a Rajput1 once more takes on critical importance as a deter­
minant of social identity. Vegetarianism is taken to extreme 
degrees due to the stress upon ahimsa (avoiding violence) 
and to an extent perceived by other castes in the vicinity 
as eccentric.
TABLE 4.2
PROHIBITED, PERMITTED, AND PRE­
FERRED FOOD ITEMS
Prohibited Permitted Preferred
Meat and Meat-type
Meat H/L/P 
Fish H/L 
Eggs H/L/P
Food grains 
None
Pulses
Kesari dal Po 
Kabuli channa H/P
None
Rye
Wheat
Barley
Oats
Millet H
Munq C 
Moth H 
Mash C 
Masur H 
Malak H 
Gram H 
Red beans H 
Black eye beans 
Peas H
None
Rice C
White flour C
Channa H 
Channa-dal C
H
Leafy vegetables
Cauliflower L 
Leeks L
Kariphulia H 
Spinach 
Mustard H 
*Cabbage
Coriander leaves C 
Mint C
Contd.
TABLE 4.2 ___  Contd.
Prohibited
Root vegetables
Carrots S 
Turnips S 
Onions S/P
Seed bearers
Aubergines H/P 
Paw-paws H/P 
Pomegranates H/P
Dried fruits
Dates H 
Figs H/L
Nuts and Seeds
Walnuts H/P 
Pine nuts H
Spices
Garlic H/L 
Ginger H/L 
Chillies
Preserved food
Bottled 
industrially D 
Tinned 
industrially D
Vinegar D 
Honey H/L/D/P
Permitted
Potatoes H 
*Radishes C
*Tomatoes H 
Capsicum C 
Melons C 
Cucumbers C 
Squashes C 
Mango H 
*Guava L
Apricots H/P 
Peaches H/P 
Raisins H
Coconut H/R 
^Groundnuts H 
PoPpy seed C 
Ajwain C 
*Sunflower H 
Sesame C 
Cashew H
Coriander C 
Cumin C 
Cardamom C 
Cinnamon H 
Nutmeg H 
Cloves H 
Tamarind H 
Turmeric H
Home prepared 
pickle chutney 
and preserves - 
Dried milk H 
^Vegetable oil H/D
Brown Sugar H
Preferred
Sweet potatoes H
Bananas C 
Apples C 
Grapes C 
Oranges C 
Lemons C
Sultanas C
Almonds- C
Saffron H 
Black cardamom C
Clarified butter
White sugar C 
Contd.... P/
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TABLE 4.2 .... Contd.
Prohibited
i
I Permitted
i
■tii
Preferred
Stimulants and drugs
Alcohol H Bhang R/C Kulfi C
Coffee H Tea? C Sherbet C
Tobacco H
Milk Products
Cheese H/D Yoghurt C All of these
Non-cows milk H/P o Buttermilk H (except butter­
Milk C milk)
Cream C
Butter H
Lassi C
KEY:
H= Hot/heating
C= Cold/Cooling
L= Life bearing
D~ Decaying
P= Passion-inducting
Po= Poisonous/bitter
R= Ritual use only
NOTES:1. All preferred foods are permitted, therefore to
avoid repetition, items have been included only
once in the table.
2. Some items such as honey, sugar and clarified
butter are not strictly preserved foods as such,
but because of their preservative function have
been allocated to that category •
3. Items marked with an asterisk are not consumed
by Jains, though they are eaten by Vaishnavas.
Table 4.2 summarises prohibited, permitted and preferred 
food items amongst the Mahajans and it will be noticed that 
certain fruits and vegetables are avoided in addition to meat. 
Leafy vegetables such as cauliflowers and cabbage, and root 
vegetables such as potatoes and carrots are avoided because 
they harbour tiny grubs which might be eaten unawares. Every­
thing comestible is therefore washed and dried very carefully
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before further culinary preparation so that minute animal 
life is not cut by the knife and life taken. The water itself 
is strained through muslin to remove little insects and worms
O
which might otherwise be accidentally consumed and destroyed. 
The stress on avoiding taking life extends to the non-consump- 
-tion of onions, ginger and garlic and other plants which 
germinate if left in dark places sancfr of vegetables and fruits 
which contain lots of seeds such as aubergines, tomatoes and 
chillies. Seed bearing fruits, furthermore, along with most 
palatable spices, have the added danger of exciting the pass­
ions, causing the dreaded sins of lust and anger.
Sectarian differences place different emphases on the 
explanations underpinning these dietary prescriptions. Jains 
argue that food which has not had the benefit of sunlight is 
harmful, hence they must also prepare and consume meals after 
dawn and before dusk, saying.that they wash food items to 
avoid mistakenly taking life. Vaishnavas assert that food 
which has been washed is also 'purified'. However it is 
fairly clear that they intersect on the central theme of avoid­
ing accidental killing. It is the similarities.rather than the 
differences which are apparent (though there are some). Hence 
intermarriage between Agrawal.Jains and Agrawal Vaishnavas 
does not pose a problem regarding culinary preferences and 
the new daughter-in-law usually minimises strife by acquies­
cing in prevalent patterns of food preparation and consumption.
It can readily be deduced from these culinary restrictions 
that the Mahajan diet is.a limited one, hence their popular 
nickname dhalbattis, for rice and lentils are more or less 
the sole preferred staple foods and. least controversial con­
sumption item. But are these- not also life-bearing seeds?
Most Mahajans prefer not to face up to this contradiction 
though it does cause mental anguish for thinking individuals 
who perceive the dilemma. Hence Gyan Chand could assert, feel-
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ing foolish, that "Food is the cause of all sin and disease 
in this life. The only way to achieve good health in mind 
and body is not to eat". Not surprisingly, the supreme act 
of ritual piety for Jains, who are even more extreme in this 
regard than the Vaishnavas, is to fast unto death!
The rigidity and comprehensivity o f .behavioural prohibi­
tions affecting Mahajans can only be superficially indicated 
here. Suffice it to say that, in a subcontinent which has 
demonstrated, over the years, a great capacity for toleration 
of a variety of beliefs, the pernickety behaviour of Mahajans 
is more than most can readily stomach. Austerity, asceticism 
and what Nehru has called "touch-me-not-ism" coupled with a 
high degree of entrepreneurial ability is an uneasy combina­
tion. Throughout the world, social, ethnic or religious dis­
tinctions separate the trading community from the rest of 
society and whoever undertakes business and therefore the 
taking of a profit has to accept some degree of social ostra­
cism. By taking money for supplying goods and services the 
reciprocal ties of mutual obligations, which are at the basis 
of social life, are implicitly denied. Merchants and traders 
are therefore regarded as dangerous in many societies, exacer­
bated by the mystery surrounding the creation of wealth. Harris 
asserts (1977, p. 100) apropos of millenarian cults in the 
South Pacific "there really is a cargo mystery and the natives 
are justified in trying to solve it". This is not just confined 
to primitive people; were wealth not a mystery, the 'permanent' 
state of financial crisis affecting the western world would 
not exist. There is a widespread belief that businessmen are 
consummate rogues, preying upon the ignorance, greed and 
gullibility of their fellow men. The logical incompatibility 
of ritual piety and overt materialism augments this social 
ostracism.
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Hence Mahajans are nicknamed kanjus (misers) and makkijus 
(fly-suckers)• They are ridiculed for their extreme passivity 
and peaceloving natures, thought to be the result of overtax- 
ing the brain with mathematical calculations and diverting 
shakti (energy, force) from the muscles. They are denigrated 
for being unsociable and antisocial. These social traits 
comprise the traditional stereotype of the Bania reported 
elsewhere in India (e.g. Fox, 1969; Hazlehurst, 1966; Lamb,
1959 et ad.). Humorous stories abound, depicting the typical 
merchant as aging, fat, lecherous, slippery and ugly. Non- 
Banias are not being polite when they say that the Banias 
(i.e. Mahajans) have a knack for business, that it is "in 
their blood".
Dislike is mutual. "A shopkeeper" said Ratan Lai Jain, 
himself a petty shopkeeper, "is frequently dirtied, having to 
deal with such things as grains, spices, salts, sugar, jaggery 
and oils. Besides, in his business, he has to deal with custo­
mers belonging to all castes and ranks and to accept money 
touched by them" (quoted in Mathur, 1964, p. 154). The erec­
tion of a boundary based on mutual negative stereotypifica- 
tion and the inevitability therefore of self-sustaining 
exclusiveness is reminiscent of racial/ethnic barriers else­
where. In this instance, Mahajans resemble marginal or minor­
ity groups who are commonly excluded from the mainstream of 
social activities whilst associated with a particular economic 
niche.
Barth (1970) and Gist and Wright (1973) have isolated speci­
fic aspects of group marginality: the existence between groups 
of customary or legal barriers which disqualify members of one 
group from inclusion in the other, despite the fact that they 
are in some sort of functional interdependence, and the per­
ception by one group that the other is an object of emulation 
or identification. These barriers are maintained by discr.imi-
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nation on the one hand and pressures against betrayal by 
assimilating on the other. In the Mahajan case, the attitude of 
non-Banias towards business, which they consider to be para­
sitic, anti-social and degrading has undoubtedly contributed 
to their monopoly of a privileged economic position. At the 
same time, exclusivity frees. Mahajans from the demands of 
friends and acquaintances for 'special concessions' which,
Leach argues (1961, pp. 130-131) prevents a man from running 
a successful business in his own village. Thus marginality 
becomes an asset in the business context.
RITUAL AND VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS
There is nothing however comparable to the institution of 
Friday prayers amongst, the Tijjaniya sect of the I-Iausa in 
Ibadan (Cohen, 1969b) which is expressive of community iden­
tity in Mandi. Nor is life, as it is for the Goan Christians 
in Karachi (Haward, 1980, p. 313) "lived to the sound of 
church bells". Collective religious fervour is in fact notice­
ably lacking. Most Mahajans prefer to perform puja in their 
shops and offices instead of. in the temples. This will be 
described in more detail in chapter five. Temple-going, like 
arti (morning and evening household prayer) is regarded as 
essentially a feminine preoccupation and, except for the 
visits of Vaishnava and Jaina gurus during the cold weather 
and the monsoon periods, tends to be either avoided or neglec­
ted by men. Worship is meditational not congregational.
Nonetheless, religion does play an important part in deter­
mining identity and demonstrating community membership as well 
as providing socially approved avenues in which leadership 
can be displayed. This takes the form of. committees and asso­
ciations for maintaining schools, temples and dharamshallas, 
organising outings and picnics, giving alms to ..the gaushalla, 
executing the accounts of temples, widows and orphans, subs­
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cribing to festivals and performances of mystery plays . There 
are committees and associations performing other community 
services such as supporting the maternity home, and also 
caste and business associations which are more self-interested. 
The integrative role and expressive function of these ritual 
and voluntary associations and committees is the subject of 
the following section.
a) The Ramlila Committee
Ramiila consists of a week-long series of plays, based on 
the Ramayana, held every year as part of the festivities asso­
ciated with Dasehra. In the past the plays were the responsi­
bility of the local thakur but now, as elsewhere in Rajasthan, 
the abolition of the jagirda:ri system has made this impossible. 
Troupes of actors are now maintained by Ramlila Associations 
in most of the district headquarters of Shekhawati region so 
that the plays can continue to be performed. These are commi­
ttees of rich Mahajans whose avowed intention is "to bring 
the Hindu scriptures to the villages" and they have a central 
headquarters in Jaipur. There is a competitive spirit amongst 
them to maintain good troupes and new. branches are continually 
being established throughout Rajasthan. In addition to the 
plays the Ramlila Committee also arranges the bonfire in 
which the effigy of the demon king Ravan, abductor of Sita, 
and of Ram and Hanuman are consumed, after procession through 
the bazaars and out to the Dasehra Ground (see Map 2.1) as a 
climax to the proceedings.
The Committee is a self-selected association drawn from 
the young adult males of the wealthier Mahajan families of 
Mandi. This group meets regularly every evening in the tea- 
stalls by the Bus Stand, occasionally making an expedition 
to the cinema at Tonk on their motorcycles, sometimes accomp­
anied by a few young married men. Mostly, however, it is 
composed of boys who have left Higher Secondary School and
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are not yet married. A disparaging name for this group could 
be "the motorcycle gang". It is expected to be modern in out­
look and energetic. Arrangements are flexible— in 1974/75 the 
troupe came from Jaipur and performed on the thikana; in 
previous years actors have come from Nagaur and Pilani and 
performed in the Chaturbhuj Temple forecourt. They are paid 
by a seth who acts as a banker for the funds which the commi­
ttee collects and a grant from the Municipal Board. Funds 
are collected mostly from Hindu Mahajans (although many Jain 
families do contribute) and are donated by a wide spectrum 
of families. The names of subscribers are recorded and announ­
ced publicly at the start of every play.
b) The Gaushalla Committee
Another important ritual association is the Gaushalla.
This is a santuary for cows at which owners may board their 
barren and decrepit animals free of charge. The police also 
round up stray cattle from the bazaars which have fallen ill. 
Sheds and pastureland are provided so that they may be nursed 
back to health. An annual subscription is raised to supply 
supplementary fodder in the winter months, to pay for the 
services of cowherds to attend to their welfare and milk them 
and to contribute to the upkeep of the stables within a small 
compound.
Supported as it is by public subscription, this is another 
way in which membership of the community of merchants can be 
advertised and religious merit acquired. Historically the 
cows appear to have been associated with the Jagganath Temple, 
under whose walls the Gaushalla now stands. The impetus for a 
communally supported herd seems to have derived from the pro­
hibition of cow-keeping in houses as an anti-plague measure 
in the early years of this century. Cow protection and venera­
tion is primarily associated with Hindus, but, again, Jains 
do make contributions for cow maintenance.
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Once a year in Kartika (Nov/Dec) which is the holiest 
month for Hindus, there is a Gavastami when the boarders are 
adorned with garlands and tassels and purohits make a puja 
of gram for them. In the afternoon prominent members of the 
Committee make speeches concerned with the purity of the 
panchgavya (five sacred products of the cow: milk, butter, 
curds, dung and urine). A programme is circulated with the 
names of the subscribers, their business interests and the 
amount given. Finally there is another collection of money and 
the name and amount announced to the audience.
Such an occasion is an opportunity for Mahajans to play 
at the politics of respect with State and National politici­
ans. And so, guests of honour during fieldwork consisted of 
the Chairman of the Municipal Board (an untouchable), the Jain 
pandit, the Block Development Officer and the Home Minister 
of Rajasthan from the Legislative Assembly in.Jaipur. There­
fore, although membership of the Gaushalla and more importantly 
its Committee is loose and by self-appointment, it is subject 
to the approval of peers and drawn from the leading families 
of the bazaar. It is infinitely more serious in scope and 
spirit than the Ramlila Committee (which is a committee in 
name only) and essentially the hard core consists of the 
elders of the community, the two to three dozen or so maliks 
around whom the economic organisation of the market revolves. 
Consequently, at their meetings, matters of greater importance 
than the state of the cowsheds.may be discussed, as the oppor­
tunity when all are gathered together, in one place presents 
itself.
c) The Temple Committee
There are three temples principally patronised by the mer­
chant community: the Vaishnava Hindu Temple at the head of the 
Chathurbhuj Bazaar (from which the latter derives its name) and 
two Jain temples, one at the fa.r end of the Chauhati Bazaar and
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the other in the mohalla. These define the spatial boundaries 
of the Mahajan mohalla and no significant business is carried 
on beyond the boundaries of the triangle described by these 
three points. Thus, just as the religious geography of Palla- 
varam reflects the concentration of Muslim residents in the 
bazaar and their social unity (Mines, 1972, p. 40) so in Mandi 
integrated cooperation in; religious activities also is struc­
turally relevant as expressive of group identity and instru­
mental in strengthening community boundaries.
Merchants get religious merit (punya) social prestige and 
economic gain from giving financial support to these three 
and the myriad of small shrines and temples situated off the 
main bazaars,and to the three temple schools which provide 
a traditional education for their children. Each institution 
has a committee to administer the finances, six to seven 
maliks of prosperous Mahajan families. For example, the New 
Jain Temple Committee consists of Manak Chand, Kesar Chand, 
Phul Chand, Rattan Lai, Gujar Mai and Bajrang Lai, the last 
two of whom are oil mill-owning entrepreneurs. . The committee 
is chosen by the Maharaj Guru every three to four years in 
consultation with the temple congregation, that is, with 
opinion leaders, when he visits the town. As in the case of 
Vaishnava gurus, the visits are sponsored by leading families.
It was impossible to gain data on the size of temple funds 
but they must be considerable. Some indication can be gained 
from the following two examplesbearing in mind that there 
are many other occasions if not so grand. The first is 
Mahavira Jayanti (Mahavira's Birthday) held every April. Dur­
ing fieldwork, Rs.20,000 was collected by subscription among 
the Jain community to pay for the idol to be processed from 
the old Jain temple to the new Jain temple and back again.
The streets were decorated with bunting of gold and silver 
paper and specially washed and swept for the occasion. The
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festival, which included two bands with dancing 'girls' 
(actually transvestites - hinjras) cost 'more than that1 to 
stage, though 'much of this* was recouped from spectators.
A young married couple from the merchant household donating 
most money (Rs. 11,000) was paraded through the streets on 
the back of an elephant, which was sponsored by the firm of 
Gambhir Mai - Rattan Lai.
Jain informants asserted that this was a relatively minor 
affair compared with the three day mela held every third April 
Shops close from dawn to dusk for six days so that Jains can 
attend plays on the life of Mahavira at the Jaina Samaj. On 
the last occasion the Maharaj Guru had landed by helicopter on 
the forecourt of the new Jain temple whilst a light aircraft 
showered the town with rose petals. The staging of the perform 
ance cost an estimated Rs. 40,000 also raised by public subs- 
cription amongst the religious community.
Showy .. donations and theatrical ceremonies are not however 
universally applauded, as will be made clear in the following 
chapter. Nonetheless ritual and voluntary associations provide 
a stage for the newly rich to demonstrate their wealth in 
socially approved ways and they have proliferated as the town 
has gr.own in size and prosperity. Social climbers must make 
more of a show than the old wealthy families to prove them­
selves 'established'.-Making a name is additionally a clear 
priority area for men like Gambhir Mal^ . m-alik of Gambhir Mai 
Rattan Lai, who wish to appeal to a wider audience than the 
Mahajan community on account of their political ambitions.
In this case, though conservative merchants might mutter that 
he was a moneylender (which takes a low status) peasants and 
farmers watching the elephant in the parade referred to above 
would remember its sponsor thereafter in making their cloth 
purchases, if not in the voting booth.
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d) Picnics and Outings
During the monsoon season and especially on the first 
amavas (no moon) friends and neighbours from the Mahajan 
community go on outings together. Food is prepared in each 
of the participating households, and each consumes only its 
own. Sometimes it may be ordered from a Halwai who delivers 
it to the destination of the outing and shares it out so that 
merchants do not take it from each others1 hands. Mostly 
these are all-male affairs, a favourite spot being the top 
of the mountain or walking over the saddle to the Jallander- 
nath Tank. Ladies also go on purdah- picnics to the Kalikaman- 
dir, which involves no climbing, and can be reached by tonga 
by the less mobile. Very occasionally there are mixed parties 
composed of the young married couples of the more modern 
entrepreneurial families. These are considered an outrage 
by the others.
A very important occasion for a picnic are the adoption 
of a child, or a male firstborn/ or sacred thread ceremony 
of a male child. 'Everybody* is invited and arrangements made 
for conveyance and Halwais. These are actually double picnics, 
since men and women travel separately and sit separately for 
food. More organised outings are arranged by the Jaina Samaj 
to popular picnic spots near temples such as Padampura. Both 
sects participate. Garlands for Mahavira are placed around 
the necks of specially bathed idols and later auctioned for 
Rs. 500 - 2,000. Thus sizeable feasts can be provided out of 
temple funds. The management of these provides another outlet 
for community service and to demonstrate therefore community 
leadership.
e) Caste Associations
Caste associations are modern phenomena organised on a 
regional or national basis. Their function is to serve the 
general interests of the caste, improve its position in the
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status hierarchy and instigate social reforms such as rais­
ing the age of marriage. Annual conferences are organised on 
western models during which legislation of modern inspiration 
is discussed. Monthly journals, are published to popularise 
these issues and it therefore follows that a critical crite­
rion for inclusion in the sabha or sangat is use of a common 
language. Other objects tend to be raising educational levels, 
sometimes by the extension of study grants and providing help 
to widows and orphans.
Each of the four jatis of Mahajans present in Mandi has 
an association but one example, will describe their common 
features. The Kharidelwal Mahasabha according to Madan Gopal 
is "an organisation of Khandelwal Vaishnus on an All-India 
basis to help widows get re-married and to give boys an 
education". It publishes a monthly magazine, Khandelwal 
Mahasabha Patrikawhich contains. news of births,, deaths and 
marriages and advertises educational, grants for religious 
and business studies both in India and abroad. There is also 
a matrimonial column, with details of the prospective spouses' 
family background, educational qualifications, personal chara­
cteristics, (name, age, gotra etc.) and business interests 
organised on a city by city basis. A governing body for the 
Mahasabha is elected every two or three years. Names are 
proposed and seconded on prescribed.forms and members of the 
association vote by ballot paper. The committee takes members 
from both North and South India and meets in a new place every 
year, generally rotating, between Madras, Bombay and Calcutta, 
though in 1974 it met in Jaipur. 89 representatives of Khandel­
wal family firms from all over India were present, some from 
as far away as Madras. A working party was nominated to con­
sider the re-marriage of teenage widows and to collect funds 
for their dowries.
As in the case of temple committees fund-raising is 
important as an index of community commitment..Many families
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give money at weddings to caste association funds, for 
example, the Todwals gave Rs. 10,000 on the occasion of their 
youngest sonIsr marriage. Another family firm in Jaipur used 
to give overseas scholarships.of one lakh (Rs.' 100,000) per 
annum until there was difficulty with the government over 
foreign exchange dealings. As Banwari Lai expressed it: "One 
is in the caste; one has to give". Lists of benefactors are 
published in the magazine, which therefore advertises "fully 
paid-up members" of the caste.. In this way caste membership 
by birth is transformed into a semi-voluntary trade associa­
tion, like a rotary club or even a trade union. Caste associa­
tions in fact have much in. common with business associations, 
the difference being primarily one of scale.
f) Business Associations
Whereas caste associations, are organised on a regional or 
national level, business associations are much more place speci 
fic. There are organisations of businessmen in all of India's 
cities and most probably in most of its large and small towns. 
In Mandi there are four associations*Aarat Vyapar Mandal (grain 
dealers and brokers) Kapre Vyapar Mandal (cloth wholesalers'); 
Kirana Sanstha Sangh (shopkeepers) and the Tonk District Oil 
Mill Association. The latter during fieldwork was only one 
year old, and hence of much less significance in the economic 
life of the bazaar than the first two, which are very old 
indeed.
The functions of these associations are very alike. They 
make sure that labour charges are regulated, buying and sell­
ing prices are equable, commodities are properly cleaned, 
weighed and delivered in good order, and payments are made 
in the specified time and manner. They also effect commercial 
introductions and act as guarantors. None is registered with 
the government, which has a rival institution, the Krishi" Upag 
Mandi, for supervising weights and measures and so on. Each
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has a committee of three: a president (adhayaksha), a cashier 
(munim) and secretary (munshi). Funds are collected via annual 
subscriptions of approximately Rs. 50 and also on request 
which are used for mutual aid during periods of financial 
stringency or providing reports for visiting government dig­
nitaries, or conveying representations to the government in 
Jaipur.
An important feature of the associations is conflict reso­
lution. Disputes are rarely signalled openly, but if there is 
a problem, for example some party to a transaction has not paid 
for goods, or sent them or weighed them properly, the aggriev­
ed party requests a meeting of the concerned Vyapar Mandal.
A meeting is called of all the members who then 1 request 
proofs', that is, collect evidence from both .parties. If the 
difficulty cannot be resolved amicably, the committee then 
declares that the defaulter must pay within a specified period 
and failing that others will refuse to do business with him. 
Conflicts provide an opportunity for demonstrating authority 
and leadership. This is such an important aspect of merchant 
community organisation that it properly belongs to a separate 
section of this chapter.
AUTHORITY AND LEADERSHIP
In a now classic paper, Marshall Sahlins (1963) distinguishes 
two patterns of leadership: the Big Man, who achieves power 
through social and economic influence, and the Chief, who 
inherits status and therefore power. Mahajan leaders are 
essentially men of influence not men of power. LeadershipX)
is a fairly informal characteristic which does not confer 
automatic authority over others or power to coerce them in 
any way. Leadership must be constantly authenticated there­
fore in social interaction. There are few ways in which a 
person can acquire office by election and their scope is 
limited.
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The principle of gerontocracy links authority with old 
and wealthy men, esteemed for their age, which is synonymous 
with experience, and exercising influence by reason of public 
acknowledgement of their ability. Wealth as such does not 
bring influence but a large household in a good location, ex­
tensive property holdings and a successful family firm all 
go together as indicative of competence. Because every Mahajan 
household possesses some wealth, nearly every malik (as the 
word itself suggests) is a potential Big Man and can demonst­
rate leadership by initiating group action of one kind or 
another. But the basic criteria for authority is the concen­
sus of the community, or a major part of it, that the malik 
is an important person, or a seth. This is signalled by member­
ship of managing committees for temples and charities, support 
for festivals and a positive public identity based on the daily 
round of familial lifestyle.
Social importance derives partly therefore from property 
ownership and residence in a central part of the bazaar area. 
Secondly there is a certain 1likemindedness1 which distingui­
shes leaders and by which they distinguish themselves from 
others. Thirdly there is a customary habituation of friendly 
and commercial association between important personages.
"What seems to characterise the,important men more than any­
thing else is their skill in manipulating the exchange system; 
in other words the degree to which they have established ties 
with many others through the exchanges" (Heider, 1979, p. 70) . 
Substituting the Mahajans for the Grand Valley Dani, this is 
in fact a valid assessment of the situation..Possibly this 
type of leadership is characteristic of societies based on 
trading activities.
An assembly of elders is called to decide specific issues 
in case of disputes and this is called a panchayat. 1Panch
Parmeswar1 say the Mahajans (God is in the five) meaning that
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several heads are better than one. The assembly usually inter­
venes only upon the insistence of other people, sometimes not 
even parties to the dispute, and when the conflict is such 
that it starts to affect people not immediately involved.
The number is not fixed and ranges from 5-25 depending on the 
nature of the issue. Membership of the assembly is on sawal 
(request), recruited by invitations sent out to various elders 
who then constitute a council. Though membership varies, it 
is confined to the elders and some men will nearly always be 
present. Women are never members, although they exercise con­
siderable influence behind the scenes, especially in inter­
household disputes. It is considered a breach of good manners 
to refuse the request to sit with the others and scarcely any 
excuse is sufficient to plead for. exclusion otherlthah a death 
in the family. Elders assemble at someone's shop or house, 
from where they go to the houses of the parties to a dispute 
and possibly to other people's houses to ascertain the sense 
of community opinion. After some days, they call again or the 
disputants are invited to take tea in one of the mediator's 
houses or perhaps in the house of a third party. The atmos­
phere is informal and effortlessly polite; mediators sit here 
or there about the room as they choose. All are known to each 
other; anyone and everyone can speak. Decisions emerge there­
fore through informal interaction and sometimes lengthy pro­
cesses of debate.
The assembly of elders serves mainly to co-ordinate and 
express opinion, by stating and restating the traditional 
rules of conduct of the mercantile community. Men express 
their individual opinions and bring their own experience to 
bear on these occasions. However, though they attempt to bring 
the gathering around to their own way of thinking, the main 
aim is to find a convergence of views. The decisions only 
become final and binding when general agreement is reached. 
Since all maliks are equal, assembly members recognise common
159
rights and obligations in achieving agreement but they are 
reluctant to be ordered by a single, overall authority or 
even to be bound by the majority view. Unlike other castes, 
there is no hereditary chaudhuri or entitlement to head the 
panchayat. The seniormost may be given due respect for his 
age but is not the prime adjudicator as such. Although he 
may be requested to pronounce the collective decision, this 
is out of respect for his seniority and not for his intrinsic 
authority.
Nonetheless, although leadership is not inherited, present­
ly emerging leaders tend to be. the sons of leaders. Boys who 
grow up in the company of important men learn the skills of 
leadership. They also partake in the trading nexus of the 
family firm and assume some of its prestigious economic posi­
tion. Because a seth is likely to be wealthier than usual, 
his sons are likely to be involved in more inherited transac­
tional patterns than most sons, and hence have access to a 
network of influence readily available. This accounts for the 
fact that one of the criteria for recognition as a leader is 
belonging to a 'good1 lineage.
A panchayat deals with, issues requiring collective decision­
making for settling conflicts within the bazaar or sometimes 
extending outside it. An example of this kind of dispute was 
given in the second chapter. In the past it conveyed the 
sentiments of the merchant community to the State Government. 
Disputes of all intensity occur, from a minor irritation which 
is easily forgotten to major ones that are remembered for 
years. The wide range of subjects covered includes accusations 
of unfair business practices, especially the allocation of 
concerns and property on the dissolution of a former joint 
household, but also infringement of the rules of. marriage and 
consanguinity, as well as matters of general importance such 
as raising money for widows or repairing a well. Some examples
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are given below of the sort of disputes that arise and how 
they are settled.
The first example concerns a long landing dispute between 
kin. Deva Lai had four sons, of whom two, Durga Lai and Giri 
Raj, were considerably older than the others. When Deva Lai 
died, Durga Lai became the malik and suggested that he would 
manage the newly-established commission agency because it was 
risky and needed experience (which in Mandi is synonymous 
with age). The other brothers would therefore manage the 
kirana stores, cycle hire and repair shop and grocery busin­
ess, these concerns continuing to be accounted jointly. They 
agreed with alacrity, each believing that he had got the better 
bargain. As it happened, the commission agency soon became 
immensely profitable because of the groundnut boom. By compa­
rison the other shops were much less profitable and the long 
standing rivalry between the two elder brothers erupted into 
quarrels. Giri Raj felt that Durga Lai had engineered the 
whole situation for the purpose of humiliating him. Disgusted 
by the unpleasant atmosphere in the house, the two younger 
brothers requested that the businesses they managed should be 
accounted separately as a step towards division of the joint 
property. Later they moved into another property owned by the 
family and ownership was transferred to them. Though relations 
between Giri Raj and Durga Lai had reached the point of no 
return, Giri Raj refused to move, asserting that.he had already 
X  been cheated of his rightful inheritance and would notAtricked 
into losing the house as well. Subsequent quarrels between the 
contenders became a public scandal, with the elder brothers 
abusing each other in the . streets and even their wives shout­
ing on the way to the temple. Eventually Giri Raj's wife threw 
some filth from the gutter at her sister-in-law, married to 
Madan Gopal, a leading merchant, . accusing her of. siding with 
Durga Lai. Madan Gopal visited all four of his wife's brothers 
in turn and with their consent suggested that a panchayat
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should be invited to discuss the matter at his house. Four 
seths were called, who again visited all concerned, and after 
much tea had been drunk it was generally conceded that the 
house should be equably divided.and that Durga Lai should 
divert enough capital to Giri Raj for him to expand the gro­
cery business into a commission agency. The division of the 
house was accomplished within a few weeks but Durga Lai found 
excuses for not providing the capital and subsequently Madan 
Gopal came forward with a loan. The rivalry between the 
brothers still continues, however, exacerbated by the fact 
that they are both in the same line of business, and both are 
involved in Municipal politics.
In the second example,.Vimal Kumar and Gaj Anand were 
wholesale grocers in Chauhati Bazaar and their shops were 
adjacent. Whereas Gaj Anand acted primarily as wholesaler to 
grocery and provision shops in, Mandi, Vimal Kumar had built 
up extensive credit relations with Mahajans running general 
stores in nearby villages and also with village headmen, who 
often purchase goods in bulk on commission for their caste 
fellows. In an oligopolistic situation where goods are iden­
tical or very similar, customers are as willing to purchase 
goods from one shop as another. Hence shopkeepers are con­
cerned more with turnover and customer-sales than with pro­
fitability or 'mark up' and the 'stealing' of customers or 
clients is regarded as a serious problem. Vimal Kumar had 
to make a business, trip to Delhi and closed up his shop while 
he was away. On return.he discovered that Gaj Anand had 
'stolen' a number of his best clients by offering credit terms 
at rock bottom rates, thus putting the business into jeopardy. 
Vimal Kumar retaliated by informing Gaj Anand's customers 
that the latter diluted mustard oil with groundnut oil (much 
less expensive) and clarified butter with vegetable oil, and 
that even his children were engaged in sorting pebbles of 
the appropriate size and colour to mix with lentils. By sell-
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ing adulterated goods he could therefore afford to give 
credit on unrealistically cheap terms. The two came to blows 
and Gulab Chand— a neighbouring cloth merchant— requested 
Bansri Lai— a prominent wholesale grocer— to call a meeting 
of the wholesalers. It was decided that both were in the 
wrong, Vimal Kumar in particular for making such a scene.
Both were asked to apologise but Vimal Kumar refused, saying 
that he was the injured party and had done nothing wrong. 
Remonstrations proved useless and he left in a temper, after 
which the meeting quickly ended in disarray. Some days later 
Bansri Lai, in company with two other wholesalers, extracted 
a verbal statement from both Gaj Anand and Vimal Kumar that 
they regretted the incident, under threat that credit could 
not be extended to people who disturbed the .peace of the market 
place. They were reminded that both had now lost their repu­
tations and everyone would assume they were equally dishonest.
Little point would be served by recounting all the accusa­
tions and counter accusations that took place during field­
work. More relevant at this point is the fact that despite the 
emphasisyon achieving consensus, an irreconcilable divergence 
of views is a possibility. In this case the authority of una­
nimity is lost and the will of the majority becomes unenforci- 
ble. This may be because a minority of opinion believes that 
the sense of the meeting is ill-founded or misguided but more 
often because it is in their interest to side with the cul­
prit. Disputes therefore sometimes drag on for months, even 
for years. This is not necessarily due to the seths1 failure 
to determine where the guilt lies but a contest of wills 
where pride and stubbornness over-ride reasoning capacity 
and the capacity of the panchayat to mollify rivals. An^open 
split in the community is nonetheless consistently under­
played and minimised. The stress laid upon forbearance and 
compliance is expressed in such platitudes as; "be ready to 
give redress for a wrong done"; "be pleasant in your manner
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of treating others11; "speak sweetly to your friends and 
neighbours". This gives panchayat discussions the character 
of parables or beatitudes instead of a political institution.
Generally speaking then the aim is to avoid apportioning 
blame and to patch up quarrels before they get out of hand 
and drag others into the affray. A persistent feature of 
quarrels between shopkeepers, tradesmen and others is the 
presence of go-betweens, often self-appointed, who act as 
peacemakers. These intervene between the disputants remind­
ing them of the virtues of self-restraint and counselling 
compromise. The role of mediator is socially valued to the 
point that it is thought better to be;.a. peacemaker than a 
victor (assuming that there is one). In serious cases the 
panchayat can take a unanimous decision to condemn a man or 
household head and to recommend redressive action. If he 
accepts the decision and makes an apology well and good; if 
he resists avoidance is begun which starts with social segre­
gation and may extend to economic isolation also..What seems 
to be of primary importance is the concern for reconciliation 
or ^arbitration . and to limit conflict rather than to identify 
and punish the wrongdoer. Only when an individual repeatedly 
refuses to conform to approved standards of behaviour does 
a situation arise where even his own kin withdraw their support 
and the entire merchant community is against him. This seems 
to be a rare occurrence and I know of only one example, the 
expulsion of Hari Ram. In this instance, it was felt that he 
took unnecessary risks in his grain brokerage business and 
acted without consultation with his clients. Growing suspi­
cion of his veracity as an agent caused accusations of using 
money deposited with him for personal ends, The ensuing loss 
of confidence caused a flood of demands for prompt settlement 
of accounts. Not surprisingly the books failed to balance and 
Hari Ram had to request an extension of time limits to find 
the money. As no one would lend him the cash to settle with
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creditors a- crisis had clearly developed. A meeting of 
seths was called, in which it was decided that the Aarat 
Vyapar Mandal should advise other businessmen against further 
transactions with him. Less subtle pressure was also applied 
and under coercion he sold his house and business and moved 
to Jaipur where he now runs a kirana store.
Many serious crimes in Mahajans' eyes, for example using 
deposits of money held in trust for personal business transac­
tions are either not crimes in the eyes of the law or are minor 
offences. Offences involving commercial malpractices, such as 
broken contracts rarely require some sort of financial redress 
or compensation. If a malfeasant is imprisoned, cronies and 
kin would purchase his release, or so. it is believed. Thus 
Mahajans have little patience .with the official forces of law 
and order, and administrative corruption is accepted as a fact 
of life which only the insane rail against. Dan se dosti (money 
makes friends) is a standard.remark. For these reasons, they 
are thrown upon their own resources for the redress of wrong 
and more importantly— compensation. As Nathu Lai puts it:
"The main thing is to finish the business and get the money 
back. If you go to court you have to pay fees till you get 
the damages. If the money still isn't paid, then he gets six 
months in prison and you get to pick up the costs".
Thus the authority of the seths is supreme, representa­
tive as it is of community feeling. The axiom 'live and let 
live' implying that what is good for one is good for all is 
a summation of the community of interests which links Mahajans 
together. Though there is self-interest in preserving the 
stability of the market place, there is also a sense of duty 
to one's own kind. Thus when customary techniques of shaming 
wrongdoers, withdrawing credit, and ultimately using gOondas 
(hooligans) to effect physical expulsion are applied, we see 
here an escalating rejection of the culprit from the moral
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community. To challenge the authority of the seths is there­
fore to challenge the community and in doing so declare one­
self not part of it.
SUMMARY
If kinship provides a frame of reference for the process of 
community formation in a situation of rapid demographic change, 
religion provides an opportunity for Mahajans to come together 
in a variety of associations and organisations which permit 
social unity to be expressed. .Belonging to the community also 
means conforming to sets of norms of behaviour.characterised 
by sobriety: Mahajans must be vegetarian, teetotal, non-smoking 
and dress in a standard way. It is possible to break any or 
all of these norms and. nothing much will happen— -providing 
that the family business is such that, financial support from 
within the bazaar is not necessary and that actual hostility 
is not incurred. The family concerned, however, will be dis­
qualified from being a Mahajan and revert to mere Bania status, 
in the eyes of the community.
Mahajans, therefore, have a strong sense of.communal iden­
tity and of shared purpose, in life. Myths of origin result 
in a sense of continuity and provide models of being a Mahajan 
through a common heritage. However, conversely, shared traits 
do not mean that all live in total peace and harmony. Quarrels 
over unfair competition and property encroachments can and do 
occur. Nonetheless the cut and thrust of ruthless business 
practice is controlled and mediated by business associations 
and by recourse to the advice of community elders or seths. 
Belonging to the community therefore implies acceptance of 
their guidance in solving disputes and misunderstandings. By 
extension, rejection of their authority and leadership implies 
rejection of the moral community of Mahajans.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
INDIGENOUS BUSINESS IDEOLOGY
INTRODUCTION
This chapter will focus upon the business ideology of the 
traditional merchant castes. The subsequent chapter discusses 
the practical aspects of trade and commerce in the town, per­
mitting an assessment of the relationship between traditional 
ideology and business organisation and the way that it is 
changing. I commence by briefly discussing the ‘family ration­
ale1 of traditional business which, some commentators claim, 
may conflict with positive profit orientation (e.g. Coren, 
1967) and constrain dynamic growth. The ritualised nature 
of business activity for the traditional merchant community 
will be noted with especial regard to the spatial organisa­
tion of the family firm and the recording of business tran­
sactions. The family account books, enable some of the domes­
tic goals which affect decision-making to be identified. In 
particular, they record a number of interesting transactions 
which show that the goal of founding longstanding reciprocal 
credit relations, is of social as well as economic importance 
for Mahajans, In turn, this has important implications con­
cerning the structure of mercantile credit, the lending poli­
cies of traditional merchant families and means by which loan­
able funds ideally are disposed. The chapter concludes by 
reference to two conflicting models of mercantile roles 
which this indigenous ideology places before Mahajans and 
in doing so influences.aspirations.
A 'FAMILY RATIONALE1
Consideration of 'family rationale' is perhaps particularly 
appropriate at this point because of a resurrection of int-
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erest recently in basic questions about the motivation of 
economic activity, although since Europeans first came into 
contact with the Indian family business, it has been the
i
subject of comment. Highly diversified commercially, none­
theless very much an extension of the family, it clearly 
achieved (and continues to achieve) an efficiency which more 
western types of business organisation in India have found 
hard to emulate (Timber^, 1971 and 1973). Recently, a good 
deal of research has been devoted by economic historians 
to the Indian business community in the nineteenth century 
and the superior efficiency of the Marwari firm has been 
attributed to their continued use of traditional, familial 
management structures (Timberg, 1978). Commenting upon the 
Marwaris1 struggle with Bengali and Khatri competitors in 
nineteenth century Calcutta, for example, Kling suggests 
that the Bengalis more rapidly adapted to the alien western 
forms of business organisation— which they were often less 
adept in manipulating than .Europeans and thus were often 
defrauded, or outmanoeuvred (Kling, 1966 and 1969).
Even today "the firm is never conceived of as separate 
from the family..." (Bayly, 1975, p. 2). The traditional 
business, firmly centred upon the family, is the form in 
which 90% of Indian businesses operate (Coren, 1967). The 
large publicly held corporation continues to be more or less 
an adjunct of the family which is often its sole supplier 
and managing agent, thus achieving vertical integration. 
Typical examples here would be the names of Tata, Birla and 
Poddar. In its various guises the family firm has been the 
corner-stone of Indian economic development throughout the 
ages (Lamb, 1955 and 1959; Moreland, 1920 and 1923).
Because of the one-to-one relationship between family 
and management theiIndian^family-iitm has been supposed to 
be concerned with reputation, with its status in the community
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or vis-a-vis the local elite, with 'the family name' at
the expense of profits and perhaps even of viability. Bayly,
in his important historical study of Benares merchants,
suggests ways in which they.differ from the entrepreneur of
classical economic theory and asserts: "It is as difficult
to explain the rationale of the merchant family in terms
of classical economic analysis as the peasant family, and
for similar reasons" (Bayly, 19 75, p. 2). By the term
'rationale1 Bayly appears to mean the logical basis of, or
fundamental reasoning behind, the operation of the merchant
family as a viable economic concern. However, Bayly falls
into .the trap of assuming the neatness of another, opposing
model of economic behaviour which does not necessarily fit
the facts any better. Bayly*s work, like others influenced
by Chayanov's work on peasants, (for example Kessinger, 1974)
deduces a strategy aiming first at a livelihood for male
members of the family, secondly at increasing social status
2
and only incidentally at making more money.
According to Sahlins (1974, p. 91) 'Chayanov's Rule' in 
a nutshell is: "Intensity of labor in a system of domestic 
production for use varies inversely with the relative working 
capacity of the producing unit"— -that is, productive intensity 
is inversely related to.productive capacity, since the norm 
of livelihood set by the domestic mode of production cannot 
adapt to potential maximum household efficiency. Production 
fixes at a level attainable by the majority of its members 
which wastes the effectiveness of the most efficient minority. 
Let any one of these show an unusual inclination to develop 
beyond the familial norm, increasing resistance and incompa­
tibility will be experienced until internal tensions put the 
existing family organisation into jeopardy (Levinson, 1971).
It is the supposed conformity with this familial economic 
rationale, expressed as subsistence orientation for the 
family business, which has led Fox (1968) in his study of
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the Banias of Uttar Pradesh, Hazlehurst's (1966) work on 
the merchant castes of the Punjab and Geertz1s (1963) ana­
lysis of traders in Indonesia to disqualify their subjects
3
from being 'true' entrepreneurs.
Sahlins has criticised. Chayanov!s approach on three 
grounds. Firstly: "All it says statistically is what one 
would then expect logically; namely the smaller the relative 
proportion of workers the.more they must work to assure a 
given state of domestic well-being, and the greater the pro­
portion the less they work" (Sahlins, 1974, p. 89). Secondly 
he argues that domestic groups.with relatively few workers 
are especially liable to fail and this is most certainly 
the case in Mandi. (In a subsequent chapter ethnographic 
examples will be given in support of this). Lastly Sahlins 
distinguishes between production for use or livelihood (sub­
sistence production) and production for exchange, which is 
crucial, he insists, for understanding the 'irrational' res­
ponses of indigenous labour forces to prices and new tech­
nology.4
However, merchants are not peasant farmers nor for that 
matter tribal subsistence producers. The underproduction 
which Sahlins insists (1974, pp. 82-92) is characteristic of 
the domestic mode of production is not necessarily a central 
feature of their livelihood. Economic activity, for Mahajans, 
is unhampered by an orientation towards the acquisition of 
useful things, usefulness being defined in terms of custo­
marily conditioned requirements which are themselves limited 
by the exigencies of production for self-use. As exchangers 
rather than end-users, commodities are acquired for their 
exchange, value as opposed to their use value, the aim being 
the acquisition of wealth as money, jewellery or real estate. 
I shall return to this point in more detail below. It is 
raised here in order to stress that this is scarcely subsis ~
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tence orientation, in the strict sense of the word.
A major criticism of Bayly's work/ therefore, is that 
he attempts to impose a model of the behaviour of the family 
farm onto the family firm. These are facts which at second 
glance do not fit the case in question. A second criticism 
could be that because of the historical nature of his data, 
Bayly has assumed a synonymity between business organisa­
tion and family motivation which may or may not be the case 
and either way is unverifiable. Having said that, I hasten 
to add that his stress on family rationale marks a useful 
step forward towards a better understanding of the merchant 
household as an economic organisation. He has shown that 
supposed irrational, behavioural weaknesses can be subject 
to rational analysis when the focus shifts towards comprehen­
sion of the organisation from the insiders’ world-view. A 
reasoned exposition of certain basic concepts, an understand­
ing of which is crucial for comprehending this world-view, 
forms following section.
PROFIT AND DUTY
Mahajhns- share a common and accessible ideology of busin­
ess, ideology being defined earlier as a socially sustained 
and conscious set of ideas, values, attitudes, beliefs and 
so on, characteristic of a class or other social category 
within a society or of an entire community. It could equally 
be called a world view, which can be discerned amongst other 
businessmen though in a less explicit and less well-integrated 
form. Because of their strong sense of belonging to a sepa­
rate and exclusive community, Mahajans have developed and 
refined several concepts of cause and effect taken from 
popular Hinduism into a logical system of ideas, appropriate 
to their, own lifestyle and reinforcing it. This particularis­
tic ideology, like many other items of business organisation,
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seems to have diffused outwards from them. They/ indeed, 
assert that this is the case and point to many common fea­
tures shared with Muslim businessmen (who obviously do not 
operate within the Hindu or Jain value system) as evidence 
of mimesis.
A key concept is dharma, translated above as duty, which 
is frequently inscribed above the gateway of a merchant's 
mansion on the right side of a painted image of Lakshami 
(the goddess of prosperity) while labh is inscribed on the 
other. The concept of labh means rather more than just profit 
as given earlier. It is differentiated from faida (profit on 
interest) and munafa (profit on a deal) that is, profit deri­
ving from purely economic concerns. The meaning fans out to 
include welfare or prosperity, whether in terms of economic, 
social or religious advantage or. benefit. Labh and dharma 
accompany the swastika sign for Ganesh (the elephant-headed 
caretaker of auspicious beginnings and remover of obstacles) 
in wall paintings in shops. Dharma is, however, a much more 
abstract concept and occurs in a wide range of contexts bear­
ing a normative connotation throughout North India. Implicit 
meanings vary from the general to the specific in any parti­
cular context.
Surveying common usages of the word in Hindi Weightman 
(1976) suggests that dharma is used in three ways. It conveys 
the notion of religion, when used of people treated as indi­
viduals? of duty, when used of people viewed as members of
classes; and of property or nature, when used of animals and
5certain inanimates. The central concept balances out as:
"the inherent mode of behaviour proper to a(n) .." observation 
supplying the. context and inference or religious teaching 
supplying the missing meaning. By 'classes' Weightman means 
groupings of persons having some common characteristic, in 
the present context usually but not necessarily corresponding
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to a caste. Thus the appropriate behaviour for a Mahajan is 
occupationally linked to caste status in the traditional 
hierarchy but it is also a duty with all the sanctions of 
religion and somehow inherent in that category of people, 
as their nature or birth right. So in answer to the question: 
"What is the Mahajans1 dharma?" the answer in Mandi might 
variously be "they are Vaishnavas/Jains" or "they are busin­
ess people" or even "they are thieves, cheats and liars".
The three usages intersect in statements like "the dharma 
of Mahajans is business". Mahajans themselves feel that a 
merchant, merely by being in. business, performs an act of 
religious merit. Here, their stance diverges.from the majority 
of Hindus, who consider business as a dishonourable occupa­
tion and lacking in all merit. A merchant, Mahajan say, is 
following a noble profession sanctioned in the scriptures, 
which is specifically mentioned as righteous action for them. 
Mines (1972, p. 83), similarly remarks that the merchants of 
Pallavaram "feel a merchant performs a sunhath, an act of 
religious merit, sincevthe. Prophet was a businessman".
Turning now to examples we find that the dharma of the 
Mahajans is (in common with the other twice born \vama^ , a 
threefold duty: study, sacrifice and gift "that is, to study 
the sacred texts, offer sacrifices and give to the Brahmans" 
(Dumont, 1972, p. 108). However their specific dharmik live­
lihood as Vaisya is: "living from the land, commerce, grazing
and usury in modern times.mainly merchantsv j Informants
asserted that as practising businessmen their dharma was to 
avoid honey, meat, eggs, fish, and alcohol, sexual relations 
in the day time, anointing themselves with scented oil and 
perfume, and anger since, like students, they should avoid 
anything which excites the senses and upsets bodily and mental 
tranquillity. Therefore, they should also avoid physical exer­
tion, which like all of the above agitates the particles of 
7s the body and renders it impure. The body is restored fcoicind
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and maintained in a state of purity by rites de passage 
(marking the stages of life in a twice born caste such as 
first haircut, sacred thread and marriage) in addition to 
daily, personal rituals of bathing and prayer, as described 
earlier, and these are also dharma.
Righteousness, and piety can be achieved specifically by 
the following methods, but anticipating no benefit and with­
out hoping for gain, since right action does not expect 
reward. These are laid down in the Dharmashastras (classical 
religious texts) and consist of following religious teachings, 
for example the Laws of Manu; performing custom properly, for 
example marriage rituals, according to caste traditions; con­
ducting business in a proper manner; doing penance; and prac­
tising good acts and unselfish acts which are characterised 
and identifiable by anokema (absence of desire). Mahajans 
say that these are perpetual (sanatana) rules of conduct 
which are actions appropriate for everybody (sadharanaj , as 
opposed to swadharma, appropriate to oneself. From this oppo­
sition derives what Mayer has called "the universal Hindu 
philosophical panacea" (personal communication): if the out­
come of an individual1s action or series of actions is success­
ful and increases his own or the family's welfare or pros­
perity, it must have been his or her swa dharma i . e . .•'inherent, 
appropriate, individual behaviour; if the outcome is not 
successful then that mode of behaviour was man (self-asser­
tiveness) or even pap (sin). Self-assertive and sinful actions, 
like all other actions, have irrevocable consequences (karma—  
sometimes translated as fate). In these instances the cumula­
tive consequences intensify separation from moksha (freedom 
from the cycle of rebirth) whereas good acts, unselfish acts 
and penance decrease it by accumulating merit.
Prosperity is therefore believed to be the reward for 
behaviour consistent with the moral implications of following a
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prescribed livelihood according to the circumstances of 
birth, which in turn is performing an act of religious merit 
that will have beneficial results in the future. Thus a 
prosperous malik must be now a good and pious man or must 
have been some time, perhaps in a previous time and existence. 
At the same time, self-assertiveness will destroy his pros­
perity whilst selflessness will increase it. Nevertheless, 
scope is left for individual action which is, however, eva­
luated retrospectively in terms of righteousness of conduct, 
by means of accrued advantage or benefit to the individual 
and his lineage.
For Mahajans, therefore, business is not only a source 
of livelihood but also a religious duty. Some even claim that 
business-related' sins (such as theft— which popularly includes 
every form of obtaining money by deception and hoarding) are 
not "true sins" for them, since it is in their nature, which 
is a God-given quality. This position is, however, an extreme 
one, though one sometimes hears the expression."for us it is 
not a sin". Since the traditional calling of the Vaisya is 
purchase and sale as laid down in the scriptures, the inherent 
mode of behaviour appropriate to a Mahajan is (amongst other 
things) to conduct business in a proper manner. This is their 
contribution to the proper functioning of society, and indeed 
of the whole universe, as dharma is part of rita, the moral 
law governing the harmony of things generally, and the func­
tioning of the universe.
Although the proper conduct of business is implicit rather 
than explicit (except the general injunction to follow custo­
mary practices) two cautionary tales about actual occurrences 
of business misfortune in.Mandi give clear indication of what 
does not constitute conducting business in a proper way. A 
cloth merchant from Jaipur decided to rent a shop, as he 
had heard stories of the fortunes to be made nowadays. Eye­
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witnesses report that he had to hire the two horse-drawn 
rickshaws which service the station to convey his cash boxes 
into town. (This is not so improbable as it sounds. Despite 
the presence of three banks in Mandi many Mahajans still 
ignore their facilities for transferring money). He estab­
lished himself as a moneylender/ by first offering interest 
free loans to farmers, with which they could pay off their 
debts to other creditors immediately, and then take on new 
loans from him at lower than usual rates of interest. Within 
the year of his dramatic arrival he had to leave, bankrupt. 
Mahajans attribute his downfall to self-assertiveness. They 
say that he replaced the pure white gaddi on the floor of 
his shop with flowered material and even covered the walls 
with it. He also installed an electric fan and continually 
played music to attract rural customers, who were invited 
to sit inside the shop on omnibus seats. (Usually all busi­
ness is transacted in a squatting or sitting position on 
the floor). '^Making such a show"'and this ludicrous waste 
of money drove away good fortune from his shop.
Tara Chand, another moneylender, had for many years 
attracted the attention of the income tax authorities, large­
ly because of his blatant black marketeering. Somehow he had 
always managed to escape actual prosecution and had never 
been caught red handed. He took to hiding his money in vari­
ous odd places, as he mistrusted the banks, and eventually 
hid several thousand rupees worth of bank notes in the 
cistern of the western style latrine which had been recently 
installed at great expense in his house. During the monsoon 
there was an accident .and the money was soaked. The family 
spent several nights carefully washing and drying each bank 
note individually. Although they tried to keep the matter 
secret, the story soon got about and whenever paper money 
changed hands, people would sniff at the rupee notes and 
declare they had found one of Tara Chand's. Not long after-
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wards the State Police raided his home and discovered the 
hoard of money. Again for Mahajan informants the moral was 
plain: by wasting money on luxuries and polluting it by 
placing it in the latrine, Tara Chand had sinned since 
money symbolises Lakshmi.
In both these stores, deviation from custom expressed 
as sin or self-assertion is as important as bad judgement 
in explaining and indeed justifying misfortune. A final 
comment is needed here regarding the righteousness of action 
in accordance with customary behaviour, especially with re­
gard to marriage. According to Brahmanical tradition— but 
also in local ideology— kanyadan (gift of a virgin daughter) 
is an act of religious merit, on condition that no payment 
is received, or anticipated "not even a glass of water". 
Marriage customs are strictly regulated for each caste within 
the category and their strict observance, in addition to 
being a religious duty, is. also a source of prestige. The 
complicated series of prestations and counter-prestations 
which ensues is expensive, particularly for the bride's 
family, which, through the provision of dowry, translates 
fiscal profit into ritual and social advantages.6 Nonetheless 
though Mahajans, like other high castes, do not believe in 
direct exchange of women, for goods or other women, careful 
analysis of their marital institutions (see for example Das, 
1975, p. 74) shows that they do give their daughters expect­
ing in return either economic patronage or social prestige 
and status. The observance of custom is a means of achieving 
success in the mundane as well as in the life hereafter, 
provided it is unstated.
I shall return to this theme of the 'selfless gift' and 
its relation to immediate and future reward in a subsequent 
section of this chapter. The point here is that the trans­
formation of profit into ritual and social benefits through
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dowry as a dharmik Vaisya model is internally self-contra­
dictory. Provision of a lavish dowry undoubtedly increases 
a family's prestige and secures the good connections which 
are vital in a business context. However, action cannot be 
meritorious unless it is disinterested. Hence, 'too much 
of a show' can be interpreted by others as self-assertion, 
whilst the gift-giver concerned maintains that it demonstra­
tes his selflessness/non-attachment to people and things.
The implications for gossip and scandal are significant, 
as will be demonstrated in the penultimate chapter.
By way of ‘.concluding this section, it may be reasserted 
that concepts are as likely to confuse the issues as clarify 
them— which may indeed be an integral part of their usage—  
hence need for analysing concepts in the context of a speci­
fic social and economic milieu. The foregoing indicates that 
not only does the commonly perceived 'other-worldly' orien­
tation of Hinduism not discourage the accumulation of worldly 
wealth, but that in certain circumstance (especially with 
hind-sight) successful, innovatory, entrepreneurial activity 
can be elevated and sanctioned as a religious duty. This 
takes Mahajans-as-traders from the state of the 'profane' 
into the state of the 'sacred*. An analogy can be seen here 
with Dumont's scholarly resolution of the ideological dicho­
tomy between ritual status and political power. When artha 
(actions conforming to selfish interests) is encapsulated 
by dharma (action conforming to universal order) this "per­
mits the attachment and coupling together of two otherwise 
irreconcilable universes; force and the law, ideal and fact" 
(Dumont, 1972, p. 300). The point is that there is no 
conflict on the ideological plane between 'being rich' and 
'being good' as such. The religious injunction or social obli­
gation to discharge one's duties to oneself and others corre­
ctly, bears the implication that if right action is pursued 
then beneficial consequences will follow, both in this world
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and the next. Proper observance of customary practices 
achieves righteousness and.therefore it is not surprising 
that business practices are.intensely ritualised. Economics, 
ritualised behaviour and the social aspects of business are 
all tied together. This is brought to the fore more fully 
in the subsequent section, which deals with the ritual as- 
pects of business.
RITUAL ASPECTS OF BUSINESS
No matter what type of business it houses, the shop presents 
similar aspects. Spatially, where feasible it is divided into 
three parts (see diagram 5.1). At the front is the gaddi 
where the actual business of. buying and selling is transac­
ted. Behind it and to the right on entering is the storeroom 
whilst.to the left is the puja room. The places of interest 
are the puja room and the gaddi, which consists of a white 
sheet placed over the floor. Ga:ddi means 'throne1 and the 
kingly connotations are present in the term for the most 
senior male member of the family present: the malik. "This 
is a kingly job" said Bajrang Lai, in explanation of the ternn 
"One sits and does one's own work without needing to ask other 
people anything". Although the work involves long hours and 
much responsibility, it is perceived as freedom and indepen­
dence from supervision, which makes other types of occupation, 
even salaried professions, comparably less attractive. Hence 
shopkeepers follow in their fathers' footsteps as shopkeepers 
and the numb er^  of Mahajans in employment other than business 
is minimal.
For Vaishnavas the puja room is the abode of Lakshmi and 
if it can be located in the auspicious north-west corner of 
the premises this, is most fortunate for prosperity. At the 
back of the room is a low table bearing gaudy religious 
pictures of Lakshmi and Ganesh. These are necessary in all
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shops for the retention of good fortune. As might be antici­
pated amongst Vaishnavas, Vishnu the preserver is popular, 
especially incarnated as the baby Krishna. In this room, 
too, are kept the family account books and photographs of 
ancestors. Every morning begins with Lakshmipuja. Images 
are dusted and washed and decked with flowers while the 
Lakshmipuja kitab is read aloud and incense burned. A new 
page is begun in the daily cash book, with the date in the 
Hindu calendar and the holy syllable Om or dedication to 
some favourite god or goddess for example Jai Durgaji 
(victory to Durga). In addition, if new account books are 
commenced, they are sanctified with sacred symbols, such as 
the swastika sign for Ganesh being written on the cover and 
the names of deities recorded on the first left-hand page 
along with important male ancestors.
This ceremonial beginning to the day may last up to four 
hours. If business has been going badly, the malik may decide 
to recite the name of Ram a thousand times, or to pay a 
pandit to read aloud from sacred books. Morning rituals by 
men in the shops are supplemented by household rituals per­
formed by women for the kuldevi (lineage goddess(es)) and arti 
in the temples, also performed by women. A brass tray is deco­
rated with fruits and flowers and little earthenware pots 
filled with oil. The pots are lit and the tray rotated- 
slowly in front of a religious picture or image. (There may 
be resonances from traditional Rajput models, now abandoned, 
here). The purpose of these family rituals is thus partly one 
of unification, linking the present with the past and giving 
malik as current head of the family an authority deriving 
from the temporal stability and continuity of the lineage.
His received social status invests the malik with power 
greater than his. personal identity and also responsibility 
for the family's prosperity and well-being which, as incum­
bent, he must dutifully translate into appropriate actions.
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Just as ritual provides a time framework of continuity, 
the proper observance?of custom is important in conducting 
business transactions. The malik invites prestigious custom­
ers to come well into the. shop and sit upon the takhta, a 
mattress, also covered in white cloth. Bolsters are brought 
for them to lean on,, snacks are offered or tea or sherbet 
ordered. Less prestigious customers remain squatting upon 
the gaddi, the lower their status the nearer to the street. 
Farmers or peasants are permitted to sit further inside the 
shop than manual labourers, who squat at the very edge of 
the shop, not on the gaddi. None of them would be offered 
any kind of refreshment. Untouchables and Muslims are not ^ 
permitted into the shop and make their purchases from the 
street.
Nearness to the malik and the cashbox indicates social 
status. The malikT s sons or younger brothers sit in decreas­
ing order of age on his left hand. If for any reason he is 
unable to.be present, the next in seniority assumes the 
superordinate responsibility of.handling all the money which ■ 
is put into or taken out of the cashbox, which is locked 
and unlocked with each transaction. Otherwise the latter is 
responsible for recording business transactions in the daily 
cash book. Unless the client is an unusually important person, 
business transactions are.conducted by the younger members 
of the family. If the business is grand enough and the cus­
tomer of sufficiently low /status, family members sometimes- 
avoid the transaction,.which.is dealt!, with by shop assis­
tants. In this way contact with polluting persons is kept to 
a minimum. The mazdur hands,the money to one of the younger 
members, who gives it to the malik, who gives him the change 
to hand to the mazdur and thence to the customer. Where this 
is not possible, the money is placed on a marble slab so 
that it does not directly pass.from hand to hand.
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This is an uneasy compromise to preserve the purity of 
the cashbox, and its contents, which sanctifies the gaddi 
and symbolises the presence of Lakshmi. The gaddi is pavitra 
(ritually pure, 'unpolluted') and the contamination of it 
is bad for business. As Fox (1969, p. 54) points out, the 
pile of shoes outside the shop expresses the purity of the 
gaddi since shoes are made of leather and the cow is sacred 
to Hindus. In theory this extends to the impurity of consu­
mers of meat, tobacco and alcohol (Hajputs, Jats) and of 
Brahmans other than the family priest. Brahman businessmen, 
however, are permitted.entry, indeed it would be difficult 
to exclude them, and especially those with longstanding 
relationships with the family as managers orv accountants.
Muslim shopkeepers clearly do not operate within the 
value system of Hinduism, but in Muslim shops, too, some area 
is specially demarcated by a cotton rug or piece of sheeting 
as the centre of operations. Xt is also customary for shoes 
to be removed upon entering Muslim shops and for tobacco 
smoking to be prohibited. There is no conception, however, 
of the ritual purity of the gaddi as amongst Mahajans nor 
are the contents of the cashbox pure. Muslim merchants hang 
quotations from the Quran upon the shop walls echoing the 
gaudy calenders depicting religious themes of Hindus and 
Jains, and often display photographs of the founder of the 
firm in a prominent position. A final point of similarity 
is that Muslims in business also keep their books in a sepa­
rate room at the back of the shop and embellish them with 
religious inscriptions. The point at issue is that all these 
items have clear ritual significance for business and busi­
nessmen, which is brought to a peak by Mahajans. The 
traditionally-kept account books similarly exhibit a concern 
for ritual purity and preoccupation with establishing conso­
lidating and perpetuating certain valued social relations 
and avoiding others, and the intermingling of both of these
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aims or goals with prescribed economic behaviour,
THE TRADITIONAL ACCOUNT BOOKS
Accounts are still kept according to customary patterns, 
though some firms have taken to keeping ledgers in the mod­
ern style as an adjunct to the old style books. These are 
two to.three feet long and between six and twelve inches 
wide, bound together by stitching the pages at one end and 
invariably covered with red cloth. The book is folded in two 
and tied up with a black and white cord. Five books form 
each set and since most Mahajans keep two sets of books 
"one for us and.one to show" this means a formidable total 
of ten, or 11 including the modern ledger (known as the 
’register1)- Hence throughout the day the books must cons­
tantly be adjusted and tallied. The book-keeper sits cross- 
legged on the floor, resting the vahi (sometimes pronounced 
bahi or wahi) against the back of a cushion or a small wooden 
book rest.
The word vahi according to Shah and Shroff (1959, p. 46) 
has three meanings: a book.of genealogy, an account book, 
and.a book in general. They point out, however, that it is 
used primarily in the first two senses, since books of a 
particular size and binding are used almost exclusively 
ky Vahivanca Barots for writing genealogies and the merchants 
of Gujerat for book-keeping. It must be added that they are 
also used by the traditional merchants of Rajasthan.
Each book has a name and individual function..The first 
is the rokarh khata (daily cash book) in which every monetary 
transaction is noted down immediately, even money changing, 
which enables the malik to keep track of the cash flow. It 
is known variously as the rognamcha (by Muslims) or the 
kachi rokarh, the latter signifying the roughness of the copy.
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The second, is the aaret vahi (brokerage account) which cate­
gorises sales and money owieeL by others. The third is the 
kharid vahi (purchase book) which itemises purchases and 
money owed to others. This is sometimes called the kharach 
khata (expense account). Fourthly is the pakki rokarh, a 
neater and more precise version of the kachi rokarh. This 
is a combined account of the days transactions and should 
balance with the previous.three. Lastly the vahi khata rec­
ords the names of those who owe money and to whom money is 
owed and the date of the transaction.
Each page is divided by seven vertical creases into 
eight sections, the four left sections for credit and the 
four right sections for debits, whereas in modern ledgers 
debit is on the left and credit on the right. With the excep­
tion of the vahi khata, always kept by name first and then 
the amount and date, the books are kept on a calendrical 
basis by page. The first of the appropriate sets of folds 
records the amount in numbers, the next names of those to 
whom or from whom money is owed and any notes or comments 
are written in script across the next two columns. The script 
in modern ledgers is a fairly standard Hindi, though the 
numerals are different; otherwise Marwari is used. No lines 
are ruled to distinguish categories,.instead a curl or flour­
ish is drawn underneath the individual sums in rupees. At 
first sight the page is a mass of semi-encircled numerals 
and names which makes accounts difficult to follow for the 
unpractised eye. Risley (1915, p . 311) notes the proverb 
"what the Baniya writes God alone can read."
As Fox has pointed out "it is foreign to the business 
and social, thinking of most merchants... to distinguish busi­
ness expenses from household outlay and business profit 
from savings" (Fox, 1968, p. 175). Using family papers, 
histories and legends to amplify his analysis of account
185
books, Bayly (1975, pp. 3-4) has tried to identify the dom­
estic goals of six Agarwal and Khattri (sic) families during 
the last century, based on the following selected items of 
expenditure: family members’ deposits and withdrawals; tran­
sactions with dependents; expenditure on deities; outlay on 
festivals; and fictive transfers of credit.
A common criticism of the analysis of classification 
systems is that there is no way of testing the validity of 
deduced categories. Therefore it.seems useful to attempt a 
comparison of the historic categories and information thus 
adduced and the current trends in expenditure of family firms 
in Mandi. This will show how socially sustained and tempo­
rally stable these categories are, and again the inter­
connectedness of religion, kinship and economics.
1) Family members' deposits and, withdrawals
Bayly notes that any kind of expenditure recorded was a 
family act. Individual family members did not have separate 
accounts and access to family resources was determined by 
status within the family. Similarly in Mandi all expenditure 
or cash transactions are recorded as if they were family 
ones and made in the name of the malik. In Bayly's six 
firms, however, only selected exotic products (fine grains, 
certain types of mangoes, coconuts etc. 'not grown in family 
gardens1) were accounted for in the kharach khata whereas 
in Mandi even the most mundane items are minutely itemised, 
for example:"one reel of black cotton thread at 75 paise" 
(about three new pence). Another difference is expenditure 
on mistresses which 'inevitably appear1 in the nineteenth 
century books but does not in Mandi, or at least not in the 
books which I was permitted to see.
2) Transactions with dependents
Under transactions with dependents, Bayly categorises servants,
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purohits and other ritual specialists or occupational cate­
gories in quasi-jajmani relations with the family which 'were 
not really wages' but 'rewards for service' otherwise expre­
ssed in terms of food and clothing, -rent free accommodation 
etc. Account books in Mandi show very similar patron-client 
transactions especially with ritual specialists (as noted 
in the second chapter of this thesis) and again this is exp­
ressed as dan (reward).
3) Ritual.expenditure
Expenditure upon deities and outlay on ceremonies and festi­
vals, for brevity, will be conflated under the general term 
' ritual expenditure". Bayly notes careful records of expen­
diture upon puja at Dasehra and Diwali, on maintaining family 
shrines and retainers at the ghats and gifts to cows, all of 
which, with the exception of hereditary funerary specialists , 
are also listed in Mahajan accounts seen.7 Fictive transfers 
of credit can also be usefully termed ritual expenditure since 
here, too, the relationship between means and ends is not 
intrinsic, and their form both standardised and symbolic. In 
Mandi, as in the books, studied by Bayly, in some cases account 
books open with a series of fictive transfers of credit to 
other high, status trader-bankers of the locality. These are 
usually reciprocal and consist of ritually significant numbers, 
the greater the amount, the more valued the relationship.
Two major items of expenditure not mentioned by him are on 
marriages and property which, Mahajans assert, are their 
biggest single categories .'besides* commercial transactions. 
Gupta (1976, p. 12) notes the common proverb: "Bania ki kamai 
Byah aur Makaan vey Kai" (sic) which roughly translates as 
"Merchants- earnings are eaten up in weddings and houses". 
Possibly this is an example of failing to state the obvious 
or alternatively it is implicit and the cue has been missed.
But what emerges from this comparison is that a) there is
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remarkable continuity and correspondence between categories 
and b) both sets of books systematically record redistribu­
tive and ritual exchanges as well as 'purely' economic tran­
sactions as manifested in loans, commodity accounts, pur­
chases and sales etc. As Bayly puts it, the account books 
> are "a symbolic affirmation of the organic unity of the > 
family, its assets and its social economic and ritual rela­
tions in this world and the other".(1975, p. 4).
This incorporation of the material with the immaterial 
world is implicit in the performance of a special puja to 
the oldest book at Diwali, which is not only the beginning 
of the new year in the Hindu calendar but also the commence­
ment of a new accounting year. A Brahman ..or Jain Pandit is 
called who repeatedly writes Sri (i.e. Lakshmi) on the first 
page of the new account books in the form of an equilateral 
triangle. He then takes the oldest obtainable silver rupee 
and a betel leaf and places them on the first page of the 
oldest book which is then put in a brass tray. Small heaps 
of rice, supari (aromatic seeds and nuts) and turmeric are 
made beside it and a piece of mithi paan (containing no 
tobacco) offered to it as Lakshmi and also placed in the 
tray. Lastly arti is performed and the book is marked with 
turmeric or vermilion paste (see also Stevenson, 1915, 
p. 261). Noone closes it for several hours and when, they 
do so they are careful to say."a hundred and one profits". 
Printed cards are then sent by hand to selected family 
firms in the bazaar informing that Sarada-puja (ancestor 
worship) was performed at the auspicious time and wishing 
prosperity.
Termination of super-annuated books is thus(not surpris­
ingly ) dissimilar to disposing of ledgers in modern enterprises. 
Old books are respectfully immersed in rivers and tanks when 
they exceed a certain age (which varies but tends to be four
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generations). Vahivanca Barots dispose of their genealogies 
in exactly the same way. Shah and Shroff comment (1959, 
p. 52): "The precious information is destroyed in order 
that it does not fall into a rival's hands". Some merchant 
families have transported their books back to ancestral 
villages or temples in ancestral moh alias where sacred 
thread investiture is performed and stored them there. In 
Benares and Allahabad the books were thrown into the Ganges, 
f o r  sctntshare, (transformation, lit. "cooking") as the dead 
are cremated and immersed in the Ganges for denaturalising 
(Bayly, 1975, p. 5).
Thus the family-firm relationship as seen through the 
books is an enduring link through time and is transposed or 
displaced upon the supernatural plane. Whilst the develop­
mental cycle of the family firm means that the individuals 
composing it change through time and are replaced and its 
activities change direction, the patrilineage and the family 
business remain constant. The concern for constancy and 
stable, enduring relationships is shown in the titles of 
firms which juxtapose the personal name of the founder with 
the present malik (the son or grandson usually), spanning 
the generations and binding, them together. When the capital 
is transferred from one year to the next it may be entered 
in the name of the founder of the firm> not the present 
malik. Sometimes the names of deities are used for the title 
of a firm in the account books which is known commonly by 
quite a different name, for example: Ganesh Oil Products 
instead of Ram Chand-Lal Chand. Once more: "The Vahivanca 
tries to boost the status of his patrons by associating them 
fictitiously with historical figures or events" (Shah and 
Shroff, 1959, p. 51).
When a malik agrees to open the books to outsiders he 
has therefore agreed to reveal the innermost secrets of his
i
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family and to risk possible censure, and dishonour. The most 
reluctant were Jain businessmen who, significantly, have 
strong religious injunctions against revealing their reli­
gious practices to outsiders. Only one Jain agreed to show 
his books and his father's elder brother, present malik of 
the brokerage business, vetoed the request by special messen­
ger later the same day. To produce the books in open court 
is, for the Mahajan, thus unchallengeable evidence. Hazlehurst 
(1966, p. 48) remarks on "the air of finality with which the 
Bania presented his evidence in opo,n court" and adds "he in 
whose hand the account book rested was generally the victor"
^ (see also Darling, 1925); and again the reluctance of the 
)i genealogists). However, for a conservative Mahajan, to be 
forced to defend and justify his actions in open court is 
itself discredit and dishonour. As Sital-Prasad put it: 
"Business loss is not much of a problem— it's the loss of 
izzat (honour) which is the bother". Once again the indiso­
luble link between the business and patrilineage is brought 
to the fore.
What emerges clearly from the foregoing is the complex, 
self-reinforcing intertwining of kinship, economics and 
ritual. As stressed above the firm is never seen as differ­
ent from the family. .Doing business is only proper for 
business families, who are enjoined to do so by virtue of 
their patrilineal descent within a particular caste frame­
work. Just as the pursuit of profit in an appropriate manner 
is a religious duty for Mahajans, the proper following of 
which will assure short term profit in terms of individual 
or familial benefit and in the long term accumulate merit 
and release from sin; so the ritualisation of business as 
seen in the customary organisation of the shop and the 
account books reflects this running together of time scales.
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Hence the spatial segregation of customers in terms of 
their ritual purity is no more than is due to the shop as a 
source of livelihood and will bring benefit since observance 
of custom is righteous behaviour. The sanctification and dedi­
cation of the account books similarly validates the present 
by reference to both past and future times combined. This 
is a Malinowskian world, a palimpsest of mythological char­
ters providing a blueprint for appropriate action, comfort­
ing and sustaining. In the next section it will be seen how 
these considerations concerning the 'right thing to do' spill 
over into the realm of credit relations.
CREDIT AND MERIT
Mahajans say that if a man has faith then it is an incontro­
vertible fact that business will prosper. Hence Jains do well 
in business "because the Jain religion is simple and easy 
to follow", and Vaishnavas do well in business "because they 
are the followers of Vishnu". If a merchant works hard but 
fails to prosper he believes that this is due in part to sin, 
in part to lack of faith. He hopes to overcome this bad luck 
by religious practices which include financial support to 
temples, schools, rest houses, dispensaries, membership of 
ritual and voluntary associations and so on (as described in 
the previous chapter) by which he will acquire merit (punya).
There is, however, much indigenous controversy regarding 
religious gifts. Although in general the gift is a meritori­
ous act, Prakash Chand pointed out in discussion that "Jain 
religion says not to give money to temples. Instead it should 
be given to a school or maternity home. The reason behind all 
this (ostentatious donations.) is first to gain publicity and 
second to avoid income tax". Madan Gopal (a Vaishnava) commen­
ted "There are plenty of lakhpattis in Mandi and all have 
done plenty of public works. Self-sacrifice (seva) to the
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community means speaking nicely to neighbours, even when 
doing business with them, or just pulling an ant out of 
water. It does not mean building a temple for making a name 
for oneself". Millman, o n .the other hand, reports an infor­
mant as saying,"Everyone of their religious deeds has a 
price tag on it and is based on the ideas of assets and 
liabilities" (Millman, 1954, p. 47).
Mayer (1978) has dealt with the theoretical implications 
of acquiring merit through fiscal donations in a paper (un­
published?) entitled 'Public service and private gain in 
Dewas'. As I understand it, selfless actions which are sec­
retive and disinterested acquire merit and lead to power 
over people and things by means of austerity and renuncia­
tion— providing always that actions which anticipate any kind 
of profit will not receive it. This clearly poses a problem 
for Marwari/Mahajan temple builders, hostel endowers and so 
forth. Can any such actions which make the donor into an 
incontrovertible public figure therefore acquire merit? The 
fundamental unanswerability of this question leads to another 
basic contradiction: to be known as a sevadar cannot be seva; 
nonetheless leaders' actions in Dewas are contrasted with 
seva and found wanting. This is important for the customary 
consensual style of leadership amongst Mahajans discussed 
in the previous chapter and has significance in the context 
of development, as will be demonstrated in the penultimate 
chapter of this- thesis.
The essence of seva is thus the more one gives the more 
one acquires merit— if done without expectation of tangible 
or intangible gains. Seva coincides with shakti (power, energy) 
in that time, effort, and selflessness, (or lack of self- 
assertion) cause individual strength which in a business 
context gives the malik the energy to do his work and the 
power which continues the livelihood of the family. Mahavir
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Prasad said: "Strength and power are what count in business'. 
Even if two lakhs are lost we must have the strength to over­
come it. This depends on the status (izzat) and the circum­
stances (karma) of the family". Here again we see a complex 
interaction between religious concepts, kinship and economic 
behaviour. Thus if he builds ‘ten temples it gives him ten 
times the merit of one temple, providing he does so "without 
rational purpose" (that is, not anticipating any reward as 
in the pursuit of rightenousness)., ten times the power to 
do business and. ten times the success in business, again 
providing that benefit is not overtly expected from the 
action.
Hence it is incorrect to characterise religious or social 
expenditure as "charity" or "philanthropy" (as Millman does) 
since as Bayly (1975, p. 7) points out, both these words 
imply a "pious payment" to validate newly acquired wealth, 
"after the business had been done". The fact that temple 
building, financing pilgrimages to holy places and endowing 
monasteries are characteristics of newly Ar r i v e d 1 Mahajan 
families and are definite ploys to increase the number of 
clients at the shop (as in Gambhir Mai's elephant) in no way 
invalidates the fact that for all merchant families, business 
and ritual are an integrated process which maintains the 
family's well-being (whether consciously intended or other­
wise) by increasing its stock of merit. The point is that 
meritorious behaviour makes the world go round and Mahajans 
must trade off merit 'here and now' with merit 'after death'  ^
since religious merit and social merit are mutually exclusive 
categories at the conceptual level. The first (i.e. merit 
here and now) is a source of social and economic credit in 
the business community and the second merit in terms of 
karma and release from the cycle of rebirth.
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Mines has discussed the scarcity of money, credit and 
loans in a South Indian bazaar and stresses the need for 
personal contact (Mines, 1 972 , pp. 55-63) . He shows how 
merchants establish borrowing or lending relationships with 
two or more merchants in the town and draws attention to the 
fact that commonly cooperating merchants are close associates 
in other spheres as well, such as religious activities. The 
strategy of lending, in particular lending to other Mahajans, 
therefore has ramifications which reveal the social as well 
as the economic goals of the traditional merchant family.
The essence of credit is the promise to pay in the future 
at a date which may or may not be specified. Promises can be 
formal and written or can be simple book debts and loans (as 
in credit sales in the normal course of trade). The latter 
is very much in evidence in Mandi as book transfers of credit 
make time-wasting and hazardous journeys with money unnecess­
ary. Lending money is accompanied by different sorts of risks 
from extending credit. Firstly if the money is not repaid the 
family's capital has been diminished. Secondly all Mahajans 
dread a sudden run on the firm for cash (see chapter four) 
and prefer to keep reserves of cash as high as possible. 
However, as in India generally, whilst banks as public insti­
tutions have been formally constituted for over a century, 
local firms have continued to transact private banking func­
tions and achieve a high degree of elaboration in them, which 
will be demonstrated in the following chapter.
Mutual assistance between neighbouring family firms or 
groups of neighbours is an important means of preserving 
financial stability. All merchants frequently need to borrow 
small sums of money for short periods, sometimes merely for 
an hour or two, and their friends will lend without security 
or interest. Even the largest concerns run short of ready 
cash occasionally. Another type of voluntary cooperation
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consists of circulating information about customers and 
clients who are bad credit risks. Maliks of large enter­
prises also 'confirm1 that is* guarantee, transactions for 
each other, arranging insurance cover, providing finance 
and writing letters of introduction. Because these are 
mutual, such transactions take on the character of moral 
relations, despite their overriding economic content.
Though there is self-interest, in the sense that it is in 
Mahajans1' own interests to cooperate (for example, money is 
lent without security in the expectation that the favour 
will be returned sometime), there is also a sense of duty.
Loan networks, like other types of voluntary cooperation 
amongst Mahajans, are governed therefore by social and reli­
gious considerations, which are expressed in variable inter­
est rates as under:
Rates charged to Mahajan firms
These vary between 2% per annum and 2% for three months 
(8% per annum). Such low rates of interest show that the 
aim here is to increase economic.security and social credit 
rather than to maximise short run monetary profits. This 
kind of transaction ought to assure the family long term 
financial stability by generating further transactions of 
reciprocity in the business community.
Rates charged to other 'Banias1
These are usually between 6 and 12% per annum but can be as 
high as 6-12% per three months, depending upon the reputa­
tion of the borrowing firm, whether the two firms have pre­
viously had a longstanding business relationship and how 
much social or economic credit might be generated by the 
loan. Jewellers and utensil sellers for example have paid 
low rates of interest sometimes without offering any security. 
Conversely, they might be offered jewellery or brass utensils 
which had been taken from defaulted borrowers at reasonable
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prices. These kinds of favours are a reflection of long­
standing associations between the concerned families and can 
also be seen as intersecting with the dharmik model set for­
ward earlier, in that jewellers and utensil makers provide 
the essential items of dahez (dowry).
Rates charged to nori-Banias
For Mahajans these people are beyond the pale of the market
place and are low status— the days of long term lending to
the chiefs and princes has long since disappeared, although
8money is still occasionally lent to rich farmers. These 
clients are most likely to cause difficulty in repayment 
and there is a problem for Mahajans. in retrieving anything 
saleable in the case of default. In the case of peasant 
borrowers, there is the additional practical problem of non­
residence as well as anti-lending legislation affecting pea­
sants. Loans.at 12-30% interest per annum or even 12-3 0% per 
three months period (48-120% per annum) have frequently been 
interpreted as leech-like exploitation of the needy. From 
the perspective ;of Mahajans, however, returns must be good for 
a family to risk capital on persons who are unlikely to be 
anything other than problematic.
The most crucial features of credit and loan transactions 
actually ■? witnessed in Mandi were the large sums lent and 
favourability of terms to certain Mahajans, coupled with a 
general unwillingness to lend, except at high rates of inter 
est and for short periods of time, to others. The primary 
objective thus appears to be not the most rapid turnover 
of capital nor the highest returns expressed as interest, 
but the social goal of increasing social status by means of 
prestige-lending.
This impression is, however, erroneous since the family 
is limited in its lending policy both qualitatively and
quantitatively. Not only must loans be limited to a safe 
proportion of the cash reserve (the ideal is 25%) but the X 
firm must also ensure adequate security, liquidity and 
profitability for itself. Security is relatively simple; 
it will not lend if there is a suspicion of problems in re­
payment. Default on a loan represents grave errors on the 
part of the malik which will lower the firm's own credit­
worthiness in the future. Whilst security for a loan is taken 
in the form of jewellery, the deeds of a house or titles to 
land, these are not foolproof safeguards. As Nathu Lai exp­
ressed it: "If there is any serious risk of outright default 
the firm will not lend and. yet it is always possible". Liqui­
dity and profitability pull in opposite directions. The 
shorter the period of the loan the lower the profitability, 
but the greater the liquidity of the firm and vice-versa, 
yet the family firm wishes profits to be as high as possible—  
all other things being equal. The difficulty is resolved by 
spreading the risk. Loans are made over short periods of 
time at high rates of interest to people or firms regarded 
as high risk and long periods of time accompanied by low 
rates of interest to those who are low risk. This means in
effect that businessmen prefer to lend to other businessmen. *
Reviewing the lending facilities available we may note 
separation and exclusivity in economic transactions as in 
social relations. There are essentially two types: (a) lend­
ing to another Mahajan, which involves low risk, low interest 
and long terms of repayment; (b) non-Mahajani lending, which 
involves high risk, high interest rates and short repayment 
terms, which are, however, often renewed. The latter tran­
sactions are regarded with Qpprobrium and avoided. Few 
Mahajan families are involved in these transactions and 
the appellation "money-lender" is derogatory. A half dozen 
families who have this suffix attached to their names are
regarded as socially inferior. Because of their small number,
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on a town-wide scale the sums involved are inconsequential.
Credit and loans between Mahajans are differentiated 
from the profession of money-lending. The interest on credit 
sales between traditional merchants is conceptualised as 
"not receiving the 5% discount for cash". It is "convenience 
money" or "one's own money coming back to one". The low rates 
of interest (the very phrase itself in English suggests lack 
of self-assertiveness, even selfless acts) imply a high 
degree of social cohesion.between them and the need for re­
inforcing favourable social relations. However, well as 
increasing social merit the financial risk is low and the 
very large amount of cash involved in the transactions ensure 
that it is economically profitable, much more in fact than 
'•’one off' money lending.
By contrast non-Mahajans are the greater risk, but it 
Is not solely a question of risking capital. High risk non- 
Mahajan clients are regarded as defiling and.the whole process 
of transgressing social boundaries, puts the family firm's 
ritual status into jeopardy. As noted above the coincidence 
between social prestige, ritual purity and profitability of 
a transaction is striking. High risk lending or iigahi brings 
the family into contact with unrespectable, irresponsible and 
uninfluential people from low castes and may occasion the 
services of thugs to secure repayment. Hence contrary to 
inter-lending with Mahajani firms, the aim of other types 
of lending is to depersonalise the transaction. Instead of 
the malik having direct personal contact with his esteemed 
client, accompanied by much intervisiting, tea-drinking and 
discussion of affairs, servants are.sent out to collect int­
erest or distribute loans.. Alternatively the work is dele­
gated to agents of the family in the.villages thus abstract­
ing the family members from the transaction completely.
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MERCANTILE ROLES: TWO HISTORIC MODELS
Y The ritual dimension to business is thus labyrinthian. Whilst 
the complex of ritual (and social) factors might be inter­
preted as working against economic rationality at the etic 
level, in practice these do not block the pragmatism instru­
mental in structuring the disposition of loanable funds in 
reality. So far in this chapter the stratagems of the tradi­
tional family firm have been discussed in relation to an 
ideology of business. To.formulate goals, however, people 
must have a conception, implicit or explicit, .of the roles 
and statuses desired by them. Thus, we hear of certain types 
of behaviour being categorised as inappropriate or unsuitable 
for a Mahajan, which are essentially caste-based rather than 
professional injunctions. As an example, ideally businessmen 
from the traditional.merchant.castes should avoid any business 
activity which involves handling living things and are hence 
limited to dealing in inorganic commodities. Therefore deal­
ing in precious stones is not only more profitable than deal- 
ing in hides but also reflects on the ritual and social rank-
A
ing of the dealer and his aspirations. Can a model of appro­
priate customary behaviour be therefore deduced? Given the 
less than tangible nature of categories of status, can we be 
sure of the validity and stability of this model?
As demonstrated in the preceding section, lending is a 
stratagem, , an attempt to. maximise certain limited goals thr­
ough careful use of finite capital, one of the more important 
goals being the perpetuation of valued relationships. The 
marketplace is thus a social orientation, in addition to the 
source of livelihood and a location in space. The concern of 
Mahajans to perpetuate certain social relations (and not 
others) means that credit is evaluated and disposed according 
to social and ritual benefits anticipated as well as the 
economic content of the transactions. Differential rates of
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interest can thus be seen as measures of the advantage or 
disadvantage to. the pa.trilineage of involvement in entailed 
social networks. In this connection it is worth noting that 
whereas Agrawal and Khandelwal families possess detailed 
knowledge of each others' antecedents and of other families 
of the same jati in, say, Gujerat or Madhya Pradesh, and 
in very rare instances, in the UK or USA, they can say 
almost nothing about their rich neighbours of lower caste 
origins. They would not defer to them for arbitration of 
x disputes,.no matter how wealthy or influential, thus denying 
social recognition of their importance, which is essential 
in becoming a seth.
But again, to what extent are the characteristics of the 
seth in Mandi general enough to apply to a wider range of 
merchant families in India who fall under the rubric of 
Bania? As it happens, historical research has provided a 
number of profiles of merchant families (see for example 
Timberg, 1971 and 1973) which enable models of mercantile 
roles to be extracted and.compared. Bayly (1975, p. 13) 
suggests two types: 'The Frugal Merchant* and 'The Great 
Sahu'. The Frugal Merchant avoided expense and luxury, inhabi­
ted a humble house and used capital to establish 'relations 
of sobriety with learned men, priests etc.' The Great Sahu, 
however, was a spendthrift. He lived in a magnificent mansion 
with Muslim concubines and smoked a hookah. Whilst he was 
sneekingly admired, since even to conservative-minded mer­
chants he is a more attractive character than the Frugal 
Merchant, it was and is recognised that freespending is 
ultimately destructive of mercantile credit.
Several anecdotes which Bayly relates of nineteenth 
century Benares reveal the.underlying tension between these 
oppositional, models. In one story, Kashmiri Mull (sic) head 
of the Pacchaina Khattris came to visit Gopal Das dressed
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in Persian style with expensive boots. Gopal Das, an elder 
of the Agarwal community, was dressed only in a dhoti and 
cleaning his cowshed. Kashmiri Mull said scoffingly: "Look 
at your boots made of dung encrustations" to which Gopal 
Das replied "Look to your accounts" and soon after passed 
on him a massive hundi (credit note) which he was unable to 
honour.
In this story, Kashmiri Mull would represent the Great 
Sahu and Gopal Das the Frugal Merchant, who supercedes him 
on account of the Khattri's lifestyle which ignores the need 
for continuity and profit. The Frugal Merchant figure is 
interposed between the Great Sahu and the Miser, the popular 
stereotype of the Bania, who allows concern for profit to 
overwhelm social considerations, but Bayly does not make 
much of this. Field, data in fact suggests three models based 
on indigenous concepts: the nawab who corresponds closely 
to The Great Sahu— except that Bayly's merchants seem to 
have been Persianised to a greater extent^-the kanju or 
miser, who loves wealth for its own sake, shuns the company 
of his fellow men and lives in a wretched condition in order 
to save money and hoard it- and the seth, who steers a middle 
path between the two goals. He does not let attachment to 
wealth overwhelm him, for this is a sin, yet he does not 
ignore the need for profit, using capital to establish and 
perpetuate valued social and economic ties with men of stand­
ing by means of dowry and credit. Through good acts and self­
less acts and sometimes penance (for example pilgrimage) he 
follows the path of duty and so acquires merit. In doing so, 
he gains such an extent of moral influence, through the out­
comes of a. series of acts elevating him above 'the common 
man' that it is equal to a special kind of authority. This 
exists without resort to the use of physical force and with­
out formal or absolute domination (though it operates very 
weakly outside a limited social radius). With these qualifi­
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cations, the seth, broadly.speaking, appears to be an equiva­
lent of the Frugal Merchant of history and legend. As a model 
of appropriate behaviour, this would appear to be both socia­
lly sustained and steady as regards permanence, and is the 
middle path towards which all Mahajans aspire. Every malik 
would like to emulate his prestigious connections and worthy.-- 
behaviour, if only he were sufficiently wealthy, and he hopes 
that by following his dharma selflessly this could be a 
possibility.
SUMMARY
At various points in this chapter it has been necessary to 
distinguish.between market-centred activities and social or 
religious goals, i.e. the domestic or non-market ambitions 
of the family. This should not be interpreted to mean that 
economic rationality is not an over-riding feature of market 
relations in Mandi, nor that non-market relations are the 
sole dominant concern, nor that the categories are mutually 
exclusive. In fact both domestic and market centred relations 
are. part of a strategy to guarantee survival in an uncertain 
world. As noted in a previous chapter, the uncertainty of 
economic competition in an oligopolistic market encourage 
policies of seeking a quiet life.
The complex interaction of market centred activities with 
social relationships hence makes it irrelevant to argue whe­
ther Mahajans as the traditional merchant castes are primarily 
concerned with ritual status or economic power, cultural pre­
ferences or economic maximisation. The process is total: 
cumulative, self-reinforcing and self-fulfilling. The concern 
of Mahajans to perpetuate some types of relationship and not 
others is concrete enough in its cumulative effect to deter­
mine who may or may not succeed in business in the town. Hence 
the commonly heard remark: "Lallaji was a great merchant and
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there were always a good many men sitting with him"— but 
they were, of course, the right sort of men. Endeavouring 
to look from the inside outwards,, looking at the goals of 
Mahajan families from their own observed attitudes and inten­
tions rather than imposing themes of formal economics or 
for that matter very general cultural paradigms reveal that 
profit can be judged by social and ritual criteria as well 
as economic criteria. However, to label this as ’subsistence 
orientation1 is misguided, and erroneous.
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CHAPTER SIX 
BUSINESS ORGANIZATION
INTRODUCTION
This chapter discusses the organisation of business amongst 
the traditional merchant castes of Mandi. Since South Asian 
businesses tend to be multiplex, unlike western businesses, 
which tend towards specialisation, this poses difficulties 
in the presentation of data. For example, wholesale grain 
dealers frequently act as commission agents and also retailers 
of provisions, including grain. Some, additionally, provide 
the finance for others' transactions and thus enter the field 
of banking. Any one family firm can therefore be classified 
under several categories. For the sake of analysis, the 
customary multiplicity of business activities has been sepa­
rated out into the roles of shopkeepers, brokers and traders, 
and financiers and moneylenders, which are discussed in that 
order. I shall attempt to show that economic changes are 
causing a partial re-interpretation of business ideology as 
outlined above. Two parallel systems of prestige and status 
are emerging in Mandi and these are, as yet, unreconciled.
This is related to increasing interest by merchants in urban 
politics and has implications for other kinds of social re­
lations, most importantly for social control and the reso­
lution of disputes.
SHOPKEEPERS
The typical Mahajan family business engages in several types 
of trading activity. In addition to wholesaling and retailing 
commodities it also makes loams, occasionally takes deposits 
of cash or jewellery and transfers money for clients, who
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until comparatively recently might include state governments. 
A single day's transactions could include encashment of 
bills of exchange, arranging insurance, confirming transac­
tions, making purchases on commission for clients in the 
cities and administering the expenses of temples or volun­
tary organisations. Moreland's description of a Moghul era 
family firm in Gujerat could easily be applied to any one of 
the wealthier maliks in Mandi today:
"Virji Bora was eminently a Merchant, that 
is to say, a buyer and seller of commodi­
ties and his business extended to any class 
of goods in which there might be hopes of 
profit; but at the same time he freighted 
ships, he acted as a banker, he received 
deposits and arranged remittances by means 
of bills of exchange or letters of credit 
to his branch houses". (Moreland, 1923, 
p. 158)
It is as shopkeepers, however, that the traditional 
merchant castes are most 'visible'. Apart from the negative 
connotations, noted earlier, the shopkeeper would be what 
most South Asians envisage by the term 'bania'. The 245 
businesses surveyed in Mandi's bazaars range from a tea 
stall to large provision shops. Perhaps the most notable 
points are (a) the lack of division into wholesale and re­
tail functions; (b) the fact that an individual family firm 
may operate.several lines of business from a single shop;
(c) or operate related types of business from a chain of 
small shops. Only rarely does a single activity, such as 
cloth retailing, dominate a family's business affairs exclu­
sively. Among the major businesses and within each category 
specialisation is low and matched by lack of product differ­
entiation. Thus if one shop stocks a certain product, other 
shops will try to stock exactly the same, if they stock the 
product.
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The largest categories of business are the textile shops, 
of which there are 23, and the provision shops, totalling 
56. Their sales are based on bulk grocery items such as gur, 
food grains, flour, tea and sugar, along with spices and 
salt, tins of cooking oil and clarified butter. These over­
lap with two other main types of business: the 12 commission 
agencies in grain, oil seeds and spices, and the general 
merchants, also totalling 12, who stock a vast array of 
food and non-food items.
Ram Chandra's 'General Store' for example sells perfumes, 
cosmetics and toiletries, homeopathic and allopathic medi­
cines and drugs, bottled pickles and preserves, tins of 
clarified butter and vegetable cooking oils, bottled scented 
oils, such as jasmine and almond, boiled sweets and packets 
of savoury snacks, gripe water and baby food in jars, tinned 
dried milk, egg-powder and cheese, packets of biscuits, dis- 
infectany, scouring powder and detergent, sheep dip and fer­
tiliser, matches, batteries, kerosene and steel wool. In the 
grocery line there are dried fruits and nuts, pulses and food 
grains (including a dozen different types of rice and half 
a dozen different varieties of lentil), flours of varying 
natures and qualities, blocks of semi-refined sugar, as well 
as refined sugar in loose and cube form and molasses, and 
finally spices of both local and very distant origin and 
rock salt. In the winter, he sometimes sells woollen waist­
coats and blankets. His other main line of business consists 
of wholesaling gur to local provision retailers. This is 
ordered direct from the suppliers in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar 
and resold. Sometimes, however, he acts as a commission agent 
for local shopkeepers, negotiating a price between them and 
the city dealers in gur, arranging transport to Mandi and 
insurance in transit as part of the service. Lastly, he 
owns a heavy duty weighing machine, charging a few rupees for 
its use, and a camel cart, for which he charges Rs.20 per trip.
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These are used by commission agents. During the height of 
the crop season he makes between Rs.150 and Rs.3 00 daily 
from these 'minor1 activities. This is equivalent to the 
monthly salary of a school teacher.
Officially, sugar and sugar products, wheat and wheat 
products, and from time to time other food staples, can only 
be bought and sold by the State, its agents, and the co­
operatives. Two consumers' cooperatives are registered, in 
addition to the Government-operated 'Fair Price Shop1. These 
are the Mandi Sahkari Bhandar and Mandi Panchayat Karmacha- 
rigan Sahkari Bhandar, founded in 1960 and 1963. They are 
now defunct in all but name. The Government thus handles 
the retail distribution of imported wheat and other commo­
dities like refined flour and sugar. These are sold at the 
Fair Price Shop against ration cards. In 1974-75 the FPS 
retail price of sugar ranged between Rs.1.30 and Rs.1.48 
per kilogram and that of white flour between Rs.0.73 and 
Rs,0.77. This compares with Rs.3.50 and Rs.4.90 for sugar 
and Rs.2.35 to Rs,3.70 for flour in the grocers' shops.
But despite the lower prices of the FPS, a steady trade 
continues on the black market in these commodities, since
i
everyone who can afford it buys illegally. The inferior 
quality of merchandise, lack of choice and unreliability of 
supply are persistent difficulties. Informants also asserted 
that the employees are unhelpful and often absent.
Hence, a significant proportion of grocery sales are 
unauthorised. Some provisioners act as authorised traders 
distributing the ration goods but government policy, overall, 
has been to curtail the activities and profits of private 
retailers in the food business. Only 2 0 have licenses locally. 
It is believed that retailers' strategy is to advance credit 
to farmers, who become indebted because of their incompe­
tence in financial matters, and are forced to sell their 
crops are artificially low prices. It is also believed that
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provisioners withold goods in short supply during periods 
of scarcity, in order to push up prices and make fast pro­
fits. I shall return to the question of speculation below.
Credit, however, is not easy to obtain by farmers, 
unless there is a previous, long-standing relationship. 
Shopkeepers sometimes consider it worthwhile to give a few 
rupees of credit to a new customer, which they mentally dis­
card. If returned, the transaction is repeated. It is not 
usual for farmers to receive credit from more than one 
provisioner, or any other kind of shop, because of the 
problem of assessing acurately their credit-worthiness. 
Whereas the village Mahajan is closely involved in the rural 
economy, the town Mahajan is not. Shopkeepers in Mandi asser­
ted that the bulk of credit to the village is actually given 
to village Mahajans, on the basis of Rs.4 00-Rs.5 00 worth 
of goods taken at wholesale rates to be repaid at some speci­
fied time later. Credit is easier for government employees, 
since a few enquiries can discover how much a customer earns, 
how many dependents he has and. how far he will be able to 
repay. Malik Gambhir Mai, a cloth merchant, controls the 
credit accounts of all the 4 9 government officials posted 
to Mandi, such sales coming to about 4 0-50% of his turnover. 
These customers are prized because of their regular salaries 
and the fact that they can be dismissed for indebtedness 
makes them prompt to repay. Nonetheless, they do sometimes 
abscond, leaving behind sizeable debts.
Credit in the form of cash loans used to be issued through
cooperative societies but the tendency of farmers to treat
loans as gifts, plus the failure of the government and the
cooperatives to provide a service as flexible as that pro-
2vided privately have led to poor rates of re-payment. The 
lack of success of these rural credit schemes has been attri­
buted by local officials to interference by businessmen.
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Against this must be set the fact that in the area of the 
Mandi cooperatives, less than 10% of the societies' members 
are now eligible for agricultural loans due to failure to 
repay previous loans. In addition to the consumer coopera­
tives Mandi also has a cooperative marketing society, 
formed during the Second Five Year Plan, which also pro­
vides loans against pledged agricultural produce and arran­
ges for the sale of agricultural produce at favourable rates. 
The socie.ty also helps to distribute seeds, fertilisers and 
insecticides. It has constructed a godown (warehouse) for 
which it received a loan of Rs.18,750 in addition to the 
yearly subsidy of Rs.6,250 which it receives from the Govern­
ment. The working figures as of 3 0.6.65 are given below.
More recent figures are unavailable:
TABLE 6.1
MANDI COOPERATIVE: WORKING FIGURES, 
1965
Date of Registration 
Membership 
Share Capital (Rs.) 
Purchase (Rs.)
Sales (Rs.)
Commission earned (Rs.)
31.12.60
71
17,820
142,500
143,688
444
Source: Office of the Assistant Registrar 
of Co-operatives, Tonk.
Among the businessmen of Mandi there are varying attitudes 
towards giving credit. A few state that they give credit under 
no circumstances "since it would starve the business of capi-
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tal". A second group say that they give credit just to 
friends, relatives and business people well known to them.
Thus Bajrang Lai, another cloth merchant, refuses credit 
to farmers. However, he will act as a wholesaler and as an 
agent for cloth retailers in Mandi, taking 1% commission 
for negotiating the transaction with wholesalers in Gwalior, 
Kanpur and Ahmedabad. His clients then pay a further 1 % to 
take delivery of the goods and pay the balance in install­
ments. A third group do give a certain amount of credit, but 
mostly because they have no choice. This includes jewellers, 
dyers, and tailors, whose work consists largely of orders.
If the customer comes on the appointed day with a sizeable 
proportion of the cash, say 50-75%, the malik often will let 
the article go, for a promise of the balance on another speci­
fied date. Finally, there are those who regularly offer 
credit. Nafc.hu Lai, for example, deals with more than 200 
rural customers at his cloth shop on a credit basis. He 
claims to know the personal circumstances of all of them: 
whether their parents are still alive, how many children, 
acres of land and cattle they possess, if and when their 
sons and daughters are getting married and so on. This wins 
the confidence of the customer and offers a rough and ready 
cross check on the viability of credit, both with that indi­
vidual and the village from which he originates. If some­
one's buffalo died suddenly, for example, it is unlikely 
that this is an isolated incident and could presage an 
epidemic. The personalisation of business relations thus 
permits him to perform a continuous review of the regional 
position to repay and ensures successful credit dealings.
Those in the second group tend to be enterprises where 
purchases by any one client are intermittent (such as hard­
ware stores) and hence a specific credit policy is not feasi­
ble. The most numerous credit-givers are mainly the provis- 
ioners, of which four said they gave credit regularly in
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large amounts. One of them, Madan Gopal, offers credit faci­
lities to government servants, town maliks and village Maha­
jans . He does not give credit to farmers. The government 
servants settle accounts monthly. Their credit limit varies 
x according to salary, up to a maximum of Rs.500 in the case 
of superintendent of the power station. This comes to about 
Rs.2,0 00 per month out of a turnover of Rs.60,000. He also 
allows credit to the eating houses of Mandi, for buying 
onions, chillies, potatoes, spices etc. This is paid back 
every evening and totals about Rs.100 daily. Lastly he gives 
credit to village shopkeepers. There are about a dozen of 
these, who take goods once per week. Eight are small concerns, 
which take Rs.100 worth of assorted articles, bringing the 
money the next week and taking more goods. The others take 
about Rs.500 per week, making a total of Rs.9,000 per month 
out-going to village shopkeepers. Hence, in total, nearly 
25% of Madan Gopal's sales are on a credit basis, though 
for varying periods and amounts.
The other three maliks have similar policies, though 
they do give credit to farmers. Credit arrangements with 
village Mahajans are here, too, the result of long acquain­
tance, in every case being inherited. Each has his own idea 
of how much credit to allow. It is much more difficult for 
them to assess how much a farmer can repay.. Nonetheless 
all these maliks purchase local produce and if a farmer is 
a regular vendor his cash earnings can be estimated. The 
maximum credit given for the growing season is approximately 
Rs. 300, but normally much less, depending upon weather con­
ditions. During the year that I was present, the region was 
declared a famine area. One malik said that, at its height, 
his sales on credit were cut to 15% from 30% during the 
previous season. All agree that if a harvest fails there is 
no point in exerting pressure on debtors, by legal action or 
otherwise. The costs are too high, both in terms of the law-
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yer's fees and loss of reputation.
There are other types of business where credit is given, 
but the amount is not so large. A few, unofficial Mahajan 
moneylenders and some large landowners are willing to give 
cash loans to farmers but the bulk of credit comes in the 
form of goods given on trust to other shopkeepers. In a 
subsequent section of the present chapter the nature of 
merchantile credit will be discussed. It has been my aim 
to show here that the economic relations between shopkeeper 
and customer are more complex than the material drawn from 
ethnic stereotypes would suggest. The difficulties experi­
enced by the cooperatives in trying to recover loans illus­
trates the degree to which the local economy is based on 
personal contacts. Farmers, and others, feel no obligation 
to state institutions and agricultural credit is treated, 
often, as a perquisite of office. The system of credit 
between shopkeepers works because the malik is personally 
involved in asking for re-payment. It also works because it 
is part of a complex social situation involving inter­
dependency .
Thus one of the reasons why the small, unit shop has 
such a tenacity, despite the duplication of goods and ser­
vices mentioned above, is its ability to build up a clientele. 
Credit is just one factor in establishing a reputation for 
helpfulness. Customers like to be greeted by name and to 
have time for gossip. The malik is expected to give courte­
ous, leisuredly and attentive service. Frequent customers 
take it for granted that he will read and write letters 
and even casual customers expect to be able to use the 
telephone. If anticipated purchases seem substantial, glass­
es of tea should be brought. Even when purchasing the most 
mundane of articles, customers expect the malik to compare 
different qualities or draw new goods to their attention.
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When a farmer buys a new skirt length for his wife, he 
expects the cloth merchant to select becoming material and 
is prepared to pay a higher price for personal service. With 
less usual purchases customers rely greatly on the shop­
keepers advice. Most new articles would not be tried by 
villagers if there were not expert salesmen to explain 
patiently. The kind of atmosphere in which business is con­
ducted in Mandi is found across the whole sub-continent in 
varying degrees and customers would resent the absence of it.
Although the odds seem to be in favour of the larger
3
unit shop, or chain of small shops , the multiplicity of 
functions performed by the smallest shop means that there 
is always room for another. The favourable economic climate 
prevailing in the region in recent years has permitted the 
penetration of retailing and, to a much lesser extent, whole­
saling of commodities by non-Mahajans. 18 (32%) of the 56 
provisioners and 4 (22%) of the 23 cloth merchants, for 
example are now run by non-Mahajans who, as noted in chapter 
three predominate in the less honorific enterprises. Recent 
economic changes have made shopkeeping, by comparison, less 
prestigious and also less profitable than other types of 
business and this has tended to displace Mahajans upwards 
and away from their historic niche. Ascending the economic 
ladder, two trends are apparent: first, the progressive in­
visibility of transactions; and second, the increased exclu­
sion of non-Mahajans from them. Partly this is a matter of 
business acumen and acquired skills, but it is due in greater 
part to the greater need.for secrecy, and trust, which tends 
to work against outsiders. In the following section I dis­
cuss the commission agencies.
BROKERS AND TRADERS
Commission agents are brokers, that is, they act as middlemen 
between the dealers in food grains, oil seeds and spices in
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the cities and the local farmers. For this they receive a 
broker's fee or commission known as nafu (from munafa: profit 
on a deal) but occasionally heard as dasturi (customary cut). 
This is a fixed percentage of the negotiated price and is 
paid by the farmer. Occasionally it is paid by the dealer, 
who wants a certain quantity or quality of something without 
delay. In Mandi, the brokerage is expressed as so many rupees 
per hundred, and works out as 2% for food grains, 5% for oil 
seeds and.J.8% for spices. These rates are regulated by the 
government of India, though subject to state variations, 
and must be posted In every agency. In fact, they are obser­
ved strictly by the brokers, who risk losing their licenses 
for infringements.
The word mandi, as pointed out in the preface, means 
'grain market' and there are two important ones in the region, 
one being the town of Mandi itself and the other at Malpura. 
Mandi is fed by the surrounding area for up to 40 miles.
About 80% of the produce is brought to the market directly 
by the producers and the remaining 20% by village Mahajans.
In addition to the 15 commission agencies, 43 shops of whole­
salers and 20 of retailers are licensed to buy and sell grain, 
oil seeds and spices. The principal commodities handled are 
wheat, barley, maize, gram, mungr beans, mustard seed, lin­
seed, cumin, coriander, red chillies and groundnuts. Their 
total sales during 1974 were recorded as Rs.18,000,000 
(eighteen million rupees) in the office of the Secretary of 
the Krishi Upaj Mandi, the government agency which supervises 
the operation of the grain market.
The typical farmer has about 72 maunds of grain for sale,
giving a total of 20,800 maunds of wheat passing through the
4grain market per annum. He obtains just over a maund of ground­
nuts from half an acre and gets Rs. 200 per bag, each contain­
ing about 20 kilos. Of the 1,030 sq. km in the tehsil, 124
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hectares are cultivated and the rest left fallow. It is 
clear, therefore, that the market has an extensive hinter­
land. A farmer arriving in Mandi with a crop tends to go to 
a familiar commission agency. Certain agents serve whole 
villages or caste groups. For example, farmers from Jaisingh- 
pura patronise Ramesh Mai because he has land in the village, 
Jat farmers tend to go to the Jat broker, Sardar Singh,
Gujars ask the Gujar Chairman of the panchayat samiti, who 
runs an agency in Mandi, to handle their crop sales and the 
tribal cultivators deal with the Mina commission agent, Chotu. 
Where crops are sold to a village Mahajan, who conveys it to 
a broker in Mandi, the connection between a town Mahajan and 
a village actually tighter. Brokers compete for these middle­
men, and endeavour to secure their custom through favours.
Unless he buys the crop himself, the agent fixes the 
time and place of the sale, either on the official or the 
unofficial market places (see chapter three). It is his 
responsibility to engage and pay for the services of the 
town auctioneer and send runners to inform other agencies.
If necessary, he makes arrangements for the crop to be 
stored in a godown. Crops are usually cleared through the 
market each day but the farmer may be advised by his agent 
to wait for a day or so during gluts. A farmer is not obli­
ged to remain with an agency. However, the majority of 
farmers prefer to patronise specific agencies because they 
believe that the broker is consequently persuaded to gain 
good prices. For his part, a broker is not bound morally 
or legally to act consistently for any farmer. Gn the other 
hand, during scarcity, it is advantageous to have regular 
suppliers. So, whilst the arrangement is by no means man­
datory, the amount of chopping and changing is small. 
Informants said that farmers do change their agent, if they 
feel cheated or there are unreasonable delays in being 
paid, but no cases were witnessed.
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During the season, potential buyers gather together in 
someon:ec!;Si shop and gossip until they see what the morning 
offers. The basic ploy is to tease others into giving away 
information, whilst endeavouring to conceal one's own inte­
rests and concerns. Whereas, in the West, companies have 
market research, management information systems, trade 
publications, government statistics and other data to help 
them keep abreast of competitors actions, in Mandi there is 
none of this. The local information network acts as a sub­
stitute and much of the gossip and prying into others' 
affairs which seems so inexplicable to the outsider (see, 
for example, Gupta, 1974) has a sound commercial reason for 
its existence. Amongst the tea-drinkers will be merchants 
who have come solely for the gossip "to have a look and show 
our faces". Every malik deputes someone to attend, since 
absence is noted and interpreted as having something to 
hide. He will attend in person, if he cannot trust the 
temper of his sons.
When sufficient runners have announced the arrival of 
crop consignments, the buying agents decide in which lots 
they are interested and set off. 'Enough' varies from day to 
day, according to the urgency of the buyers and which crops 
are available. If different crops are on the market, the 
buyers divide into sub-groups according to commodity and 
go their separate ways. Mostly, because of the timing of the 
harvests, there is little choice. Cumin seed tends to be 
ready at one time, chillies at another and so on throughout 
the season. In this case the buyers, altogether, visit every 
broker's shop in turn along the bazaars, to inspect the crop 
and decide whether it should be auctioned. On alternate days 
they start at different ends of the Chaturbhuj Bazaar to 
give the selling agents a fair chance. If a broker is keen 
to buy, he makes an offer and, if this is accepted, there 
is no auction. The conditions which make him keen to buy,
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however, apply generally, so few sales are made without 
competition.
The selling agent should pay the farmer immediately 
after the sale, in cash, and store the crop' until the buy­
ing agent pays. Thus the agent who arranged the transaction 
for the farmer shoulders the risk at this stage. The pur­
chasing agent has access to the crop when he pays the sell­
ing agent and is then responsible for shipping the consign­
ment to its destination in the cities. Four commission agents 
are transportation specialists and will also handle the 
complicated documentation, for a fee. As asserted earlier, 
the selling agent need not arrange an auction if he wants 
to purchase the consignment himself. The farmer can insist 
upon it, if an agency agreement has been signed. But agree­
ments are largely verbal and few are prepared to be bothered 
with finding another reliable agent. Here the broker would 
be hoping to take the entire profit from the sale instead 
of the smaller commission on it.
In this capacity, he should be termed a trader since 
he is no longer acting as an agent but trading on his own 
behalf. From time to time, middlemen are tempted to branch 
out as traders, for example, during a shortage or scarcity 
of a commodity. Agents contact 'the big city dealers nearly 
every day to obtain some idea of the volume required and 
the prices acceptable. If a local malik comes to know that, 
say, saffron prices are considerably higher in the city than 
they are in Mandi, he buys a consignment of his own and 
sends it to Jaipur along with his regular dealer's commission­
ed purchases. The city dealer is then entrusted with its 
sale and receives a token cut of the takings, such as 2%. 
Equally, the reverse situation could apply, where the city 
dealer hears about the regional shortage of a commodity and 
requests the broker in Mandi. to handle local sales, deduct­
ing a similar amount as brokerage.
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As long as these transactions are infrequent/ little
trouble, and mutually beneficial, this type of trading may
strengthen the relationship between dealer and broker. Yet
it is nearly impossible for the average family business to
manage both commissioned business and large-scale trading.
The malik risks antagonising contacts in the cities, since
he is competing in their own market. Secondly, his dealers
may believe that their money and names are being used for his
personal transactions. If the deals fall through, their
fortunes and reputations will suffer. From the perspective
of the city dealer, a broker who is over-much concerned
with private trading is likely to be an untrustworthy agent.
Therefore they may also suspect him of over-invoicing
commissioned purchases, buying further goods at lower prices
himself to send to other dealers, and generally playing the 
5
local market.
An alternative for the malik is to establish a subsidiary 
agency of the family business in Jaipur which can handle 
trading in commodities as a sideline. These are the prero­
gative of the largest and wealthiest Mahajan families. It 
is essential that the family is large enough to be able to 
deputise a son or younger brother to act as manager. Mahajans 
are unwilling to trust anyone who is not a family member, as 
described above. Only the wealthiest families have the sur­
plus capital and subsequent risk-taking capacity to estab­
lish branch houses in Jaipur. They are also in greater need 
of trustworthy, city-based agents because of the volume of 
business which they transact with city dealers. There are 
several examples: Gujar Mai's son, Narender, runs a trans­
port agency in Jaipur; Madan Gopal has a brother who is a 
gem dealer in Jaipur; Kapoor Chand has two sons in the city, 
one running a factory in Jhotwara Industrial Estate; one of 
Bajrang Lai's six sons is a government officer in the Secre­
tariat in Jaipur, but runs a part-time commission agency;
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and Radha Mohan's eldest boy runs a souvenir shop in Jaipur. 
All perform useful functions by establishing new business 
contacts, gathering information and being strategically lo- 
cated to cope with problems in repayment or missing consign­
ments .
For most family businesses, however, large scale trading 
and commission work are incompatible and the malik has to 
choose between them. Frequent absence of the malik from 
Mandi endangers both the family's business interests and 
social relations. Other merchants tend to suspect him of
trying to steal their dealers, and are unwilling to help him
succeed in business where they cannot. The malik's presence 
at town auctions is no longer requested and credit facilities 
are withdrawn. Lastly, the malik's regular clients are likely 
to be enticed away. Only one family business has been able 
to combine individual trading with an agency business. This 
is discussed in more detail in the following chapter.
Mention has been made of crop buying by town shopkeepers. 
These transactions clearly overlap with the brokerage trade. 
Though food staples are regulated, with subsidiary crops 
there is less restriction on their transport and sale. Musk 
melons, for example, are sold by the acreage to local maliks 
at the rate of Rs.500 for half an acre. The actual number of
melons is not relevant. Again, a malik will pay between
Rs.40 and Rs.50 for five baskets of sag (green vegetables) 
each containing eight kilos, selling them at Rs.2 per kilo ^  
in Mandi or sending them to Jaipur. Crop buying is most 
successfully combined with the provisions business. The crops 
reach the malik in three ways: a) direct sales by farmers; 
b) via small shopkeepers in Mandi; c) from village Mahajans. 
If a farmer is a regular credit customer, he is under a moral 
obligation to sell his crops to the creditor. When a malik 
gives credit to a number of small shopkeepers, he expects
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to have first refusal of any crops they obtain. This is 
stated overtly by wholesalers as a reason for taking whole­
sale credit customers. The third system.is somewhat differ­
ent. Either the village Mahajan uses his own capital to 
buy crops, later negotiating a price with a town shopkeeper, 
or he may act as the malik1s agent, the latter advancing 
the cash to make purchases and advising the prices acceptable.
To run a successful crop-buying business about Rs.10,000 
to Rs.20,000 are needed. One malik buys entirely on bank 
overdrafts but most are suspicious of banks and use the 
banking facilities of family firms to pay loans. These will 
be discussed in the following section. The crops are sold 
to commission agents, or other town maliks or despatched 
to city dealers. The former two are preferred since the 
price is known and the risk is manageable. If the crops are 
v despatched, the price may have failed by the time the con- 
signment is sold. Furthermore, the malik must be careful 
not to over-reach himself. Most do not separate retail from 
wholesale capital, which can deprive the retail business of 
funds. If the retail business dries up, the malik may lose 
the customers who provide the wholesale business with 
merchandise.
On the whole then, a self-regulating process counteracts 
the ambitions of town merchants to become 'big time’ traders. 
Moreover, the majority of shopkeepers and commission agents 
have other business interests in addition to broking. The 
choice of migration to the big cities is rejected, since 
the uncertainty of starting a dealer's business in a new 
place hardly measures up to the certainty of a good living 
in Mandi. At times of scarcity, the temptation to make some 
fast rupees may be overwhelming and the city dealers are so 
keen to obtain grain, oil seeds or spices that they are 
prepared to change roles and take a cut from the agent's
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private consignments. The prevailing pattern is, nonetheless, 
for commission agents to make their money from a percentage 
of negotiated sales, rather than taking full responsibility 
for the goods and thus the entire profit from the deal.
FINANCIERS AND MONEYLENDERS
Some family businesses specialise in confirming and finan­
cing transactions. The involvement in fringe banking tended 
to confuse earlier commentators, who were often unsure 
whether to classify firms as commercial or financial, (see, 
for example, Anstey, 1929). Gadgi.1 (1951, p. 5) has sugges­
ted that banking was a crucial part of every successful 
business enterprise. Commenting on Moghul era firms, Moreland.:, 
remarks (1923, p. 158) "I have not noticed any record of a 
banker as distinct from a merchant or a prominent merchant 
confining his transactions to a particular line of goods".
It seems sensible therefore to conclude that banking and 
trading shade into each other and that over-rigid classifi­
cation is unhelpful.
However, deposits of money are taken very rarely, held 
for short periods of time, say three or four months, and 
in relatively small amounts, for example Rs. 30,000 or 
Rs. 40,000, which as Jain (1929) indicates, is a situation 
inexplicable to those who have regarded mahajani transac­
tions as simply banking. Returns on deposits are as low as 
^ 3-5%, a rate hardly calculated to stimulate enthusiasm. In 
certain cases a charge is made for taking care of the money. 
Considerations of security play some part here, as in mer­
chants' reluctance to change money, for to let it be known 
that the firm keeps large sums of money to hand is danger­
ous. Since deposits are, from the point of view of a banker, 
other people's money, they are necessarily his liabilities.
In addition, those requiring others takejcare of their cash
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are destitute women, such as prostitutes, who are inauspi­
cious and polluting persons. There are exceptions; it is 
an act of religious merit to administer the financial 
affairs of schools, temples, dharmshallas, ritual and volun­
tary associations and so on.
The confirming house (so-called because, by providing 
intermediate finance, the credibility of the client is con­
firmed) takes an interest of about 2% to 3% per month on 
the value of the transaction. This is, however, negotiable 
and dependent upon successful completion of the deal. In a 
sense, the confirming house acts as a stakeholder. Confirm­
ing is regarded as an honourable and prestigious economic 
activity and a loan from a confirming house is a legitimate 
source of finance. However, resorting to a moneylender for 
a loan, upon which interest is payable whether the deal goes 
through or not, is shameful. As Mines (1972, p. 61) suggests, 
borrowing from such a source is done secretly since it ref­
lects badly on the debtor's reputation for economic soli­
darity and independence. It was pointed out in the proceed­
ing chapter that families who make a living by lending money 
take the lowest status in the mercantile community. The line 
between moneylending and confirming is slim and it is possible 
that a good many maliks have used moneylenders as a source 
of finance at some point in their careers, or even borrowed 
from wealthy farmers. A critical feature would appear to be 
that, in confirming a transaction, cash does not pass from 
hand to hand, whereas in moneylending it does. But there 
is also the question of clientele again. The moneylenders 
make a full time living from advancing relatively small 
sums of money at extremely high rates of interest to barrow 
boys, hawkers, and the proprietors of small shops as well 
as villagers. By contrast, confirming associates the malik 
with high status merchants involved in established businesses, 
and this is a source of prestige. I shall return to this 
point later.
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The marginal status of moneylenders is illustrated by 
the following incident. The widowed daughter of Nikku Das, 
a moneylender, returned to live in Mandi with her natal 
family after many years. Shortly after her return, the house­
hold was invited to the wedding of a local Mahajan family. 
Unusually, the widow attended the festivities and a malik, 
who had wished to marry her some years previously, offered 
money to the eccentric son of another malik to make amorous 
advances towards her. The boy did this, whereupon her two 
brothers leapt to avenge the insult by beating him. Immedi­
ately every hand in the room was against the brothers and 
they were driven out of the house. Afterwards, they were 
condemned for hitting a "harmless lunatic". People said 
that the family would not be invited to weddings in the 
future since "they behave like animals". It was interesting 
that noone argued that the widow had been insulted beyond 
the bounds of human tolerance, according to local custom, 
and family honour jeopardised. Nikku Das was not present 
at the wedding, but nonetheless the attack upon him, though 
indirect, was effective. Since he and the malik were distant 
kinsmen through marriage, retaliation could neither be imme­
diate nor direct since kin must appear to agree. Nor could 
he even confront the malik and request him to discipline 
the boy without appearing ridiculous. Most importantly, 
being barred from future weddings meant effective social 
isolation. Weddings are the most important occasion when 
Mahajans from different jatis congregate together. Every 
family present had made use of his moneylending services in 
the past, according to one informant, and because of this 
the family were obligatory guests at weddings. Ostracism 
had thus been effected in the most public manner possible 
while simultaneously cancelling out redress.
Financiers are amongst the most secretive of all local 
businessmen, therefore detailed data concerning the organi-
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sation of financial transactions could not be collected. 
However, there are a variety of ways in which mercantile 
credit is arranged; some of these are informal and some are 
formal. Mahajan families who have banked enough social credit 
can nearly always negotiate per hath loans, that is tempo­
rary, interest free loans, from their business acquaintances. 
As Jagdish Lai explained "If two lakhs are lost the banks 
won't help because they know we are in difficulty. So we 
borrow from family members and friends who feel affection 
for us". "When friends know that we cannot,; get hold of 
the money to pay bills because of the short notice, they 
give it without questions, but they take care to get it 
back", said Chand Mai. Sometimes the debt is transferred to 
the account books, but Mahajans do not always take written 
records and as much as Rs.10,000 can be advanced on faith. 
However, maliks must be careful not to impose too much, since 
frequent resort to per hath (literally foot-hand) loans rep­
resents faulty judgement. It also puts the family in the 
position of perpetual client to the community which is dis­
astrous for its reputation in the long run.
The simplest example of formal financial support is the 
hundi^. This is a letter from one malik to another guarantee­
ing that his client will pay the money owed, providing that 
the goods or services are delivered, usually within a speci­
fied time. The clients of both maliks might be resident in 
Mandi, in which case the hundi would be used for deals bet­
ween merchants who had never, or rarely, or not on so large 
scale transacted business previously. However, it is when 
potential business associates reside in different towns 
that the hundi is most effective. The maliks transfer the 
debt by book entry; their respective clients reimburse them 
or draw upon them for cash later, as appropriate.
The hundi therefore permits trust between strangers by 
providing access to the mutual confidence of intermediaries.
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It minimises the uncertainty of doing business in an un­
familiar environment and removes the need for travelling.
It may be drafted in Hindi, if transferring the debt between 
states or across caste boundaries. It is most likely to be 
drafted in the Marwari script and dialect (sometimes called 
Mahajani). This is one aspect of the symbolism of the hundi, 
which is complex, and is underscored by the transformation 
of the letter of credit into the bill of exchange, in Marwari, 
still a hundi. Here the letter is addressed to a client or 
several clients and is underwritten by several eminent 
Mahajans. The larger the sum of money involved in the deal, 
the greater the number of signatories. Not only is the risk 
spread, though if there is much risk prestigious financiers 
will avoid the transaction, but the deal is more soundly 
guaranteed. Thus the signatories are both directly and in­
directly expressing their mutual esteem and faith as colla­
borators, in this and other transactions, both in the past 
and in the future.
Hundis also have a monetary value. They can be bought 
and sold, used instead of cash for payment and as security 
for other financial transactions. As hundis circulate amongst 
the maliks they act as a trade directory. If a family name 
has never appeared on a hundi, for example, it is improbable 
that the current malik of the family firm will be invited 
to act as a guarantor. If a regular signatory ceases to 
sign joint promissary notes other merchants will receive 
a message of instability. Again, the signatures at the foot 
of a hundi not only associate individual family firms with 
others but also rank them. Certain families by common con­
sent take higher and more prominent positions on the hundi, 
reflected in the order of signatures, which symbolises their 
higher credit rating within the community. (In a personal 
communication, Rodney Clark has pointed out that, this is 
very similar to 'tombstone' advertisements in the Western
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press which announce the underwriting of new issues).
Thus it is possible to discern a fairly fixed hierarchy 
of financiers, with an upper echelon of Mahajan magnates, 
who would correspond to the seths. Below the seths and 
partially dependent upon them are a series of cliques of 
businessmen. The cliques are not watertight circles and it 
is possible for a malik to participate in more than one 
clique. Again, where the need for secrecy is paramount, a 
malik may borrow from one clique and lend in another. This 
is especially true of the seths, whose reputation depends 
on a name for financial independence. Since membership of 
these cliques is by invitation, the less stable and credit­
worthy businesses are excluded. Because other financiers 
know the risk of being associated with them in deals of 
any sort, they are forced to transact business amongst 
themselves. Hence socio-economic standing is determined by 
association. The more reputable a clique to which a malik 
belongs, the more credit he will be given and the more legi­
timate the business that comes his way.
Legitimate financing therefore remains relatively closed 
to newcomers and for them the temptations of high profit 
but high risk and illegal transactions (such as moneylending) 
are considerable. Moreover, whenever low-ranking cliques 
experience difficulties through involvement in these activi­
ties, members of the higher ranking cliques will not assist 
them. They are unwilling to have their names associated with 
low status firms even where the pecuniary advantage is high. 
The failure of the less reliable cliques thus perpetuates the 
financial hierarchy and the supremacy within it of the seths. 
One such clique consists of Nathu Lai, Madan Gopal, Durga 
Lai, Kesar Lai, Kapoor Chand and Phool Chand, of whom three 
are Khandelwal Vaishnavas, two are Agrawal Jains and the last 
is Khandelwal Jain by jati. Another group is composed of
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Gambhir Mai, Phool Chand, Tara Chand, Satya Narayan and 
Bajrang Lai and again there is a spread of jatis: one Agrawal 
Jain, one Agrawal Vaishnava, two Khandelwal Jains and an Oswal. 
Neither caste, nor kinship therefore, would appear to be sig­
nificant in the formation of cliques, though length of resi­
dence in the town is. Generally speaking, longer length of 
residence corresponds with greater stability of the family 
firm and higher remuneration from respectable ways of 
acquiring wealth. By way of concluding this section it may 
be stressed that manipulation of unequal access to infor­
mation is general. Control of information, exclusivity and 
secrecy, for example, are important factors in the formation 
of ethnic monopolies of trade in Nigeria (Cohen, 1969b) and 
Ceylon (Leach, 1961). Because of the risks involved in busi­
ness, this results in more exclusivity, rather than less.
RISK-TAKING AND SUCCESS
All Mahajans are involved in risk-taking to a greater or 
lesser extent, depending on the type of concern. Whether he 
likes it or not the malik constantly has to part with money 
or goods on trust to clients. Without this trade would be 
impossible. The shopkeeper... has to anticipate the wants 
of a clientele which is prone to disappear and leave him 
to bear the costs of tying up capital in unwanted goods 
and credit of one sort or another, in addition to the 
costs of storage and damage. The propensity of shopkeepers 
to copy successful lines has been noted above. As a commi­
ssion agent, the malik bears prime responsibility if the 
buying agent defaults. He,in turn,is responsible for the 
grain, seeds and spices, from the time he has access to the 
selling agent's godown until the consignment reaches the 
godown of the dealer in the city. Every time a consignment 
is shipped, the agent trusts that he will be reimbursed.
Again, although the transport agent should bear loss in
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transit, the malik is held accountable by the city dealer 
and must compensate him. Commission agents acting as traders 
risk thousands of rupees every time they send a personal 
consignment to the dealer. There are associations of busi­
nessmen in the broker marts, part of whose function is to 
regulate problems in payment, but there will be an inevitable 
delay, in any case.
Thus maliks must have good connections with their custo­
mers, with other merchants in Mandi and with merchants in 
the big cities. Such contacts would be those between a shop­
keeper and his suppliers and commission agents with commodity 
dealers. The latter are particularly concerned with maintain­
ing useful contacts, for in order to bid effectively in the 
daily auctions in Mandi they must be attuned to price and 
commodity flows. Information is their business and lack of 
knowledge can cause significant losses. If a commission 
agent makes too high a bid for a already overstocked commodity, 
which his client in, say, Gwalior refuses to accept, he would 
be left to bear the loss, paying substatial warehousing 
charges and taking the risk that prices might rise in the 
near future, whilst in the meantime his capital is tied up 
completely.
Mostly a malik has one dealer in each city, frequently 
but not necessarily belonging to the same jati. Brokers 
compete for reliable contacts and therefore try to secure 
city dealers through moral obligations, for example keeping 
large sums of money in their dealer's books to demonstrate 
trust, regularly transferring small sums of money to keep 
the connection operational, and occasionally succeeding in 
the stratagem of arranging a marriage. They similarly end­
eavour to constrain local commission agents' actions through 
transfers of credit for small services. Thus a malik could 
give 3% of the value of a consignment to another for intro-
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ducing a client, or request him to arrange for the packing 
and transportation, including 1% commission in the estimates.
Though these are gifts, they are presented as business 
transactions in order to dispel the illusion of patronage. 
Both parties are, nonetheless, aware of the implict duty 
of the recipient to reciprocate. As Kajur Mai explained it,
"I give you something, now you give me something". This is 
paralleled by the practice of circulating stock between shop­
keepers. One cloth merchant, for example, offers cut lengths 
of a new design to another on a. sale or return basis. In 
terms of formal economic theory this is irrational, as the 
advantage of sole control, of a scarce resource has been 
surrendered for apparently nothing. However, the 'free offer 
either augments a pre-existing relationship or creates a new 
one. In this way the impersonal forces of the market are 
re-personalised.
Trading is not only more risky than agency business but 
merges into illegal activities, such as hoarding and black- 
marketeering. It is popularly believed that fortunes are made 
by merchants through ’hoarding', that is keeping goods off 
the market, thus creating artificial scarcities and pushing 
up prices. (Fox, 1969, p. 151; Hazlehurst, 1966, p. 63;
Mines, 1972, p. 55) As every broker must have a warehouse 
it is difficult to refute these charges. Even legitimate 
traders dread false accusations which could lead to losing 
their licenses. Mines (1972, p. 69) similarly notes that, 
in Madras, jealous and competing merchants secretly inform 
on each other to government officers concerned with the 
regulation of trade.
More reprehensible than trading, for Mahajans, is specu­
lation in futures, by which is meant contracting to buy a 
fixed quantity of a commodity at a specified price by a 
certain date, sometimes arranging to sell to a ci&y/ dealer
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on the same basis. This sounds relatively riskless, until 
it is realised that the trader is gambling that the free 
market price will rise above the contract price to the 
farmer, or fall below the price fixed by the city dealer.
<3,
Speculators have been amongst the most successful Mahajan 
families (if success is measured by rapidity of becoming 
wealthy) but speculation tends to be the prerogative of 
newcomers. The malik of a speculative firm, nearly always 
an outsider, may make high profits but does not enjoy high 
status. Invcjvement in speculation is thus the hallmark of 
families in the ascendant, in local phraseology: aanewallahs. 
It is typical for the family firm to transfer capital thus 
acquired into safer and more prestigious businesses.
Occasionally, established Mahajan families are tempted 
to speculate in scarce commodities (including soap in 1974— 
75). However, this happens when credit relations are secure, 
capital available and the risk small. It exists in opposition 
to the distaste expressed by Mahajans for speculation, which 
is categorised, along with moneylending, as. nilam (gambling 
or gaming). This does not derive from any moral qualms parti­
cularly, but from the threat which speculation poses to the 
community by endangering other families, who are involved 
in the network of financial transactions. Speculation, like 
commodity trading,is tolerated as long as it is small-scale 
and relatively risk-free. As a full-time occupation for a 
family firm it is as dishonourable as moneylending, because 
of its instability.
Briefly summarising the main points above, risk-taking 
may be an integral part of business, but the simple ability 
to take risks as such is not admired. Again, though the 
speed of amassment of capital through speculation may be 
envied, the means of acquisition is deplored. The tendency 
is for families to phase out their speculative activities,
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putting capital into a wider spread of activities which 
reduce the risk factor, with the ultimate social and economic 
goal of becoming a landlord town property. This process is 
sufficiently like the model proposed by Timberg (1973) for 
it to appear basic.
Timberg has divided migrant Marwari firms of the nine­
teenth century into three types: the great firm, character­
ised by extensive banking, trading and insurance activities; 
the banian or agency firm; and the speculative firm. The 
speculative firm, largely owned by 'new men1, operated on 
the speculative markets for commodities and securities. Ag 
speculative fortunes were made, whether in the opium trade 
of the early twentieth century or during the World Wars, 
the money was transferred into industry, landholding or 
government banking, that is more honorific forms of endea­
vour. The honour sought by migrant Marwaris is traced through 
three stages. In the first is the traditional seths1 role 
as the feeder of Brahmins (sic), builder of temples and 
financier of princes. In the second, honour is sought through 
association with the British: titles and invitations, posts 
as government bankers and agents to the larger British trad­
ing houses. Charities are now those approved by the Raj, 
such as famine relief. Lastly, there is involvement in 
nationalist and social reform movements, and the construc­
tion of indigenously-owned and sophisticated industry. Dona­
tions now go to nationalist leaders.
There are, however, some divergences which need to be 
noted. Firstly, because Rajputana was outside the aegis of 
British administration in the pre-independence period, asso­
ciation with the British was an insignificant factor in the 
management of status. The second point is allied to the first, 
in that participation in the nationalist and allied movements 
also seems to have been minimal. Thirdly, although Marwaris
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have a reputation for arriving with nothing and, within a 
few years, buying up land from their customers and making 
large fortunes from real estate transactions (Millman, 1954, 
p. 39; Timberg, 1971; p. 268? Gupta, 1974, p. 52), locally 
the acquisition of land by this method is not often pursued.
One reason is that organising cultivation is a distraction 
from the preferred profession of business. Only one malik 
has a farm, which he inherited from his father. This had 
been acquired from a debtor, who had mortgaged his land as 
security for a loan of the necessary cash to pay for a wedding. 
Gujar Mai had obtained the Thakur of Mandi1s palace and or­
chard in a similar way. However, in general, there is evi­
dence that Mahajans have tried hard not to tie up their 
capital in land. Bayly (1975, p. 14) uses the concept of 
restraints of status to explain why high prestige bankers 
did not intervene directly in land management, despite their 
considerable power at the sub-Moghlai courts. This possibly 
explains why prestigious Mahajan families today in Mandi 
continue to live in cramped conditions in their ancestral 
havelis in the central, part of the town, are unaffected in 
patterns of consumption and attitudes by the acquisition 
of urban property and do not indulge in a nawabi life-style.
SETHS AND MALIKS
In chapter four the complex process whereby a malik achieved
political influence in the Mahajan community was introduced.
It was argued that acquiring the status of seth was signalled
7by invitations to adjudicate in disputes. Important criteria 
for recognition as a seth were said to include patrilineal 
descent, age and length of residence, control over centrally 
located property, size and scope of business enterprises, 
relations with other maliks and especially with accredited 
seths. There is a gradual transformation of social identity 
during which the malik comes to regard himself as a leader
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of the community and others to interact with him on that 
basis. Nonetheless the separate statuses of seth and malik 
are clearly distinguished indigenously.
A seth is involved in a variety of relationships: with 
fellow seths, who are equals and potential competitioners; 
with a clientele of customers and associates; with the 
clienteles of other seths and maliks; and with town politi­
cians who, as I shall show below, are actual rivals, and 
their dependents and followers. A seth is constantly extend­
ing mercantile credit, thus creating obligations and depen­
dency on the part of those who come to sit in the shop. Dis­
cussing political leadership amongst Swat Pathans, Bafth 
(1970, p. 11) asserts that "Allegiance to the chief is ex­
pressed by the mere act of visiting his men's house" and 
this is true of Mandi also. That "they sit in each other's 
shops" is a manifestation of the friendly association between 
maliks and is used by Mahajans to evaluate the relative pres­
tige of business cliques. The willingness of a seth to be 
seen calling at the shop of a particular malik (as opposed 
to requesting him to call) publicises the fact that he is 
now to be regarded as an equal of the leaders of the commu­
nity.
The essence of a seth's position is economic security, 
but such security is relative and depends upon his ability 
to muster economic support. Many persons with whom the seth 
has economic relations are not obliged to support him but 
it would be a mistake to suppose that the seths are without 
power. Because of their nodal positions in the credit net­
work, without good social relations with the seths access 
to credit is difficult. A seth who witholds his name from 
a hundi indicates the withdrawal of trust. Conversely, a 
hundi bearing the name of a seth confirms that transaction 
absolutely and guarantees the integrity of his client. Hence
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t*1e seths have control over considerable economic and, by 
extension, political power. The destruction of business 
reputations and manipulation of financial collapses lie in 
their hands. This is why maliks defer to them, in part.
To be a poor seth is hence conceptually impossible.
Some newcomers have become leaders or elders of the Mahajan 
community but many more hover around the economic and social 
fringes. Without a sponsor in initial business transactions, 
penetration into the steadier, more lucrative and prestigi­
ous types of business is difficult. Even with a sponsor the 
process of initiating transactions is lengthy. Mahajans 
hesitate to do business with strangers and will do so only 
as a favour to the sponsor. Sponsors may or may not be kin, 
though the presence of kin in the town does make business 
easier. As a newcomer establishes his own reputation, invi­
tations to participate in transactions with increasingly 
prestigious merchants follow. A good reputation is based 
upon the strength and direction of business connections 
and unblemished record of trustworthiness. A merchant who 
arrives thus far is now recognised as a Mahajan. Otherwise 
he is categorised as a mere Bania, if anything, signifying 
absenceoof standing.
This category consist of merchants engaged in relatively 
unprofitable businesses, like kirana stores or bangle shops. 
The shop is rented and the malik and his family live in two 
or three small rooms above. Banias have a precarious exis­
tence, often resorting to illegal and semi-legal practices, 
such as pawn-broking, to eke out a living. As well as new­
comers, it includes residents who have failed to make a going 
concern of their business, or who lack the experience or 
capital required to set up business on their own account and 
therefore act as managers. These people are therefore not 
'well-settled' in the business community and take the lowest 
status.
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A Mahajan, by contrast, would be permanently settled 
and have extensive business interest in the town. Mahajans, 
typically, are commission agents, cloth merchants or pro­
vision wholesalers. These occupations require large amounts 
of capital and considerable experience and acumen. They also 
necessitate wide investment in credit relations with Mahajan 
customers, clients and agents, both locally and in the regio­
nal commercial centres. Because they are stable and lucrative, 
these types, of business are prestigious, in contrast to the 
unstable, unprofitable and frequently disreputable charac­
ter of Banias1 business enterprises.
The third category would be the seths, thus the merchant 
community can be seen as a series of superimposed sets, with 
the least honorific category at the bottom, the smallest and 
most honorific category at the top, and the bulk of Mahajans 
distributed in between. Social stratification is reflected 
in the spatial distribution of the categories through the 
bazaars, with the seths clustered towards the centre and 
the Banias located at the periphery. The difference between 
insiders and outsiders is therefore easily conceptualised.
The critical features of being a Mahajan are summarised 
in the following statement by Madan Gopal, one of the 
wealthier merchants.
"To be a Mahajan means to have respect and 
to be a good man. A Mahajan must be over 
forty years old and wealthy, but not too 
rich, otherwise people will ask how he made 
his money. He should have a comfortable size 
of house in the middle of town. He should 
have a large family and have made good mat­
ches for them with children from good line­
ages. He should be settled in his business 
and sit in the shops of other rich men of 
the town. Noone must say anything wrong 
against him".
The seths and those maliks who for some reason do not 
entirely conform with the mental image of the seth, but who
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are nonetheless held to be excellent credit risks, are thou­
ght to be asli (high or good quality) as opposed to halki 
(low or bad quality). The latter is often applied to specu­
lative businessmen and moneylenders. Asli Mahajans can nearly 
always negotiate a loan if they have suffered a grave loss. 
This is not the case with a halki merchant, no matter how 
wealthy, since he lacks prestige. This traditional model 
of prestige is now being challenged by the industrial entre­
preneurs, in the sense that risk-taking is patently paying 
off and undermining indigenous ideas concerning the relation­
ship between risk and success..The rapidity with which those 
families owning oil mills have become rich resembles spec­
ulation more than anything else. This would be less repre­
hensible were the benefits transformed into manageable 
criteria of status in the traditional mould.
However, for the simple reason that non-family labour 
is employed on a considerable scale (each mill hires between 
30 and 40 casual labourers),, mill-owning infringes customary 
patterns of behaviour. Employment fluctuates seasonally and 
whereas during the winter months the mills operate for 24 
hours per day, during the monsoon rains they close down. 
Because of the intermittent employment and because the busy 
periods coincide with the harvest, the majority of the labour­
ers are female. This is unacceptable to Maha.jani ideas con-
8cerning the strict segregation of the sexes noted previously. 
Apart from religious injunctions against taking life (crush­
ing oil seeds, like flour-milling, is thus possibly a pollut­
ing occupation), the situation of the oil mills in the peri­
pheral parts of the town also runs contrary to indigenous 
axioms to buy property in the prestigious, central area. 
Another, significant aspect is the involvement of the indust­
rial entrepreneurs in relationships with persons who are not 
known to the Mahajan community, in Mandi. Whilst all local 
businessmen are dependent to some extent on connections out­
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side the town, there is nonetheless a sense of community. 
Primary relations are in most cases with other Mahajan fami­
lies in the bazaars. They compete with each other, but they 
also cooperate by guaranteeing and confirming transactions 
for one another. These relationships with distant family 
firms hence contravene the assertive norm of the necessity 
to maintain and perpetuate good connections with Mahajan 
families whose social standing can be assessed positively.
The increasing heterogeneity of the urban business 
community is affecting other kinds of social relations and 
this is manifested especially in the realm of social control. 
It is axiomatic in sociological analysis to draw a distinc­
tion between conflicts which do not contradict the basic 
assumptions upon which social relations are founded and 
conflicts in which the contenders no longer share the basic 
values upon which the legitimacy of the social system rests. 
It is, of course, the former type of situation which was 
described in a previous chapter; that is to say, although 
disputes occur, the question of how they are to be settled 
is not an issue. As the following example show, the authority 
and leadership of the seths is under attack, in that the 
disputes were solved without recourse the customary pattern 
of conciliation through intermediaries and ultimately an 
assembly of elders.
Control over property is control over a crucial economic 
factor in the organisation of town commerce, as described in 
chapter three. Because of the permanent scarcity of accomo­
dation in the Mahajan mohalla, intense competition has 
developed between wealthy merchant families. As soon as 
property comes on to the market it is purchased, within a 
few hours or even minutes of being offered for sale. Not 
surprisingly, many disputes concern property. Scarcely a 
fortnight passes without some quarrel over boundaries.
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A few years ago a Jat zamindar sold a house site on the 
Chaturbhuj Bazaar. It was bought jointly by two Khandelwal 
Jain families, who were neighbours and wanted to extend 
their adjoining havelis to accomodate growing families. 
Trouble commenced soon after construction began on Ramesh 
Lai's house. Gujar Mai accused him of encroaching beyond his 
allotted share, and work was stopped whilst the situation 
was discussed. This took many months. When construction 
recommenced without agreement being reached, Gujar Mai 
threatened to obtain a court order for demolition. Ramesh 
Lai disbelieved him and carried on with the extension, but 
broke off all relations between the households. As the work 
neared completion, Gujar Mai organised a gang of barrow 
boys to kidnap Ramesh Lai's two daughters, who went every 
day to fheirrgrandfather's house in the Gujaran moha11a. When 
Ramesh heard what had happened, he sent servants to the Bus 
Stand to raise another gang, who broke into Gujar Mai's house 
to abduct his wife and daughters. In the ensuing fight,
Ramesh Lai was stabbed and severely wounded. He was taken 
to hospital in Jaipur where, allegedly, an attempt was made 
on his life. The town was filled with speculations. One was 
that Gujar Mai tried to arrange for Ramesh Lai to be suffo­
cated by a nurse; another rumour had it that a lethal dose 
of adrenalin should have been administered. It is impossible 
to assess the veracity of the stories. However, Gujar Mai 
did arrange for Ramesh Lai to be transferred to Ghhattisgarh, 
a remote tribal area in Madhya Pradesh. This effectively 
meant the end of his career as a doctor. Though trained in 
allopathic medicine, he had established a profitable private 
practice in homeopathy and ayurvedic techniques. Six months 
later, Ramesh Lai volunteered to join an Indian medical team 
to Iran. His father, a Jain pandit, said that Ramesh Lai had 
left because of the scandal,, though there can be no doubt 
that he feared for his life. Gujar Mai has a reputation for 
being a dadaji {'fixer' lit. grandfather) and his nickname
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'Bhayanker' means 'dangerous'.
Two points arise from this example. The first is the 
lack of internal redressive mechanisms for coping with 
violent conflicts. The second concerns Gujar Mai's access 
to external political resources. As a Member of the Munici­
pal Board, he has contacts in the State Administrative 
Services, who effected the transfer of Ramesh Lai on his 
behalf. In doing so he demonstrated insubordination to the 
traditional conciliation and arbitration services of the 
seths. It is this circumvention of customary authority 
which represents such a challenge to their leadership. The 
second example concerns the oil mill strike of May/June 
1975.
On the morning of 30 May handbills were circulated in 
Mandi, announcing a hunger strike because of the shortage 
of electricity. The Hindi and English language newspapers 
were telegraphed with details of the dispute. Later the 
same day, 4 00 male and female labourers 'gharaoed' (demons­
trated against) th.e Chief Engineer at the Electricity Board 
office. The hunger strike began later the same evening with 
four young men: Padam Chand, Rameshwar Todwal, Mahavir 
Saraf and Hemant Patni sitting outside the office and threat­
ening to fast to death. The strike in fact lasted three 
days.
Intermittent electricity had been a problem throughout 
the hot weather but reached a nadir in May, due tg>:a burnt-out 
transformer at Mandi subr-station. Hemant expressed the prob­
lem this way': "We must have electricity guaranteed for the 
hours of 9 pm. to 6 pm. At the moment we get it sporadi­
cally through 24 hours but that's useless. Every time we 
stop production we have to clean the machines and it takes 
two hours to get them going properly again", on average,
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Hemant Oil Mill produces 25-20 barrels per day but output 
had fallen to 3 barrels per day in May, causing a loss of 
Rs.5,000 in the fortnight previous to the strike. Other oil 
mills were similarly affected. On 5 May the millowners asso­
ciation had sent a registered letter to the Rajasthan State 
Electricity Board asking for help and on 9 May wrote to 
Rajasthan Vyapar Udhyong Mandal (the representative body of 
trade and industry centred in Jaipur), to which 75% of busi­
nessmen in Mandi belong. However, they did not consult the 
other business associations in Mandi before doing so, nor 
were the latter informed of the millowers’ intention to hold 
a hunger strike. This was decided at a meeting held in the 
Agrawal Oil Mill on 26 May, to which only members of the 
Tonk-Mandi Udhyogic Sanstha Sangh (to give the oil mill­
owners ’ association its full title) were invited. Though two 
millowners were against the decision the vote was carried, 
again a departure from the customary practice of consensus, 
and the RVUM was informed of the decision. The RVUM accord­
ingly contacted various ministers in the State Government 
and the matter was debated in the Legislative Assembly. The 
strike now became a major issue in the state. The district 
collector and superintendent of police from Tonk visited the 
town to try to dissuade the hunger strikers, to no avail. 
Electricity was fully restored on 2 June via Chatsu power 
station and the faulty transformer in Mandi was replaced 
on 4 June. Local opinion was tersely summarised in Kapur 
Chand's comment "At least one of the four should have been 
a seth", by which he meant that lack of consultation with 
the customarily recognised leaders of public opinion was 
an unnecessarily provocative action. Like many of the older, 
more conservative Mahajans, Kapur Chand felt the unilateral 
decision-making of the younger men as a threat. Whereas the 
ritual and voluntary associations reaffirm and reinforce 
the leadership of the seths, the new association of indust­
rialists accord them a much less than central place in the
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organisation of activities, thus tacitly undermining their 
authority.
Briefly, then, the economic changes taking place in Mandi 
and its region have had reverberations outside the economic 
sphere. The ramifications of investment in oil mills also 
extend into ideology, as novel methods of making money 
confront traditional ideas about prestige and success.
Though industrial entrepreneurship might be denigrated by 
ultrasconservative Mahajans, nonetheless the sheer speed with 
which this has amassed considerable fortunes for certain 
families cannot be dismissed. In addition, though there 
are few merchants who would accord the oil mill owners the 
status of seth by virtue of money-making ability alone, 
there are also few who would not award them any prestigious 
status. Hence, we may say that two systems of status are 
emerging in Mandi, based on two sets of criteria regarding 
the meaning of success. As yet they are unreconciled and 
this is bringing about a re-interpretation or perhaps a 
re-evaluation of traditional business ideology as set out 
in the previous chapter..This has important implications 
for the nature of leadership in the town and hence for the 
nature of communal decision-making processes. In the final 
chapter, I shall pick up this point again. The following 
section deals with the interaction between business and 
politics, by which I mean the formal structure of municipal 
politics as opposed to the informal politicking which is 
integral part of any;-;small scale, 'face to face1 community.
BUSINESS AND POLITICS
Under the Jaipur State Municipalities Act, 1943, a Municipal 
Board was established at Mandi in the Chaturbhuj temple, 
situated in the main bazaar (Basrao, 1975, p. 16). Later 
the office was shifted to Madho Lai Kansaliwal's chobara,
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from where it moved in 1965 to a building owned by Deva Lai 
Todwal. Thus from the beginning Mahajans were involved in 
urban politics. At its inception, the board was nominated by 
the State. It consisted of the town Medical Officer, a 
Mahajan, Sri Durga Lai Todwal, and the tehsildar of the town 
was its ex-officio Chairman. Partial elections were held in 
1946. In 1951, for the first time, the board was fully elec­
ted and a Chairman chosen by the members from among them­
selves. In the.firstsphapter:).it was suggested that at the time 
of independence, Mahajans (and others) were unfamiliar with 
the processes of democracy. It was argued that this hindered 
the realisation of the potentialies of public office and 
that amongst the older generation of Mahajans an unfavourable 
evaluation of political processes continues. This cynicism 
of politicians' motives has hampered positive response to 
external authorities and to externally directed change.
Another important feature in political development has 
\ been the proportion of Jats in the demographic structure of 
region. The northern areas of Rajputana, especially the Jat 
States of Bharatpur and Dholpur, were the home of Jat leader­
ship in the Praja Mandal and Kisan Sabha movements,often 
operating within the nationalist movement, and of an agrarian 
radicalism which according to Schrader (1968, p. 234) hasinot,been 
relinquished. The Jat leaders1 revolutionary aims, class- 
oriented organisation and violent strategies, alienated 
Mahajans from participation in the nationalist movement.
After independence, the prolonged political crisis over ja- 
girdari tenure and the redistribution of lands reinforced 
Mahajans1 interpretation of politics as dangerous and alien 
to their interests. At the height of the struggle, in 1956, 
thousands were held under preventive detention in Rajasthani 
goals. The breakdown/:..; in law and order throughout the State 
was not resolved until 1958-59, when direct rule from Delhi 
was imposed.
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Thirdly, the Mahajan's mental association of Jats with 
the Congress Party was boosted by the agricultural bias of 
the first Five Year Plans and the essentially rural interests 
of the Jats themselves. Whilst benefits in terms of irriga­
tion and electrification schemes, changes in land tenure, and 
crop and animal improvement programmes were clear, these 
had little significance for Mahajans1 economic interests. 
Certain changes, such as the introduction of the co-operative 
banks and the takeover of the wheat trade constituted an 
attack on them, through the restrictions on trade. Gupta 
(1974, p. 32) comments "Everybody in trade has not only to 
master a plethera of laws, rules and regulations but .must 
maintain a constant vigil and be always on his toes to be 
on the safe side of the administration". This statement 
could have been made by any one of Mandi's merchants.
The decision of the Maharani of Jaipur to join the 
recently formed Swatantra Party in 196 2 and to campaign for 
election to the Lok Sabha in Delhi on the liberalisation 
of trade was thus fortuitous. It provided a political alter­
native to Congress, at a time when the industrial entrepre­
neurs in Mandi became aware of a need to establish connec­
tions with external political organisations. Probably more 
than anything else, this revolutionised politics in Mandi.
The MLA (Member of the Legislative Assembly) for represent­
ation of Mandi constituency at State level in Jaipur is 
reserved for the scheduled castes and tribes and therefore 
merchants are excluded from contesting these elections. 
However, they may contest municipal elections by political 
party and these have, in. consequence, an added importance.
As I shall show below, it became necessary for certain 
families to maintain a seat on the board, and contests 
became fierce throughout the next decade.
Since 1946 there have been eight elections in Mandi. Out 
of eight possible terms of office, two men have been elected
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six times, five four times, four three times, eight twice 
and 27 once. We can say that seven men are thus more likely 
than not to have been elected at any given time. They are 
professional politicians, in that municipal affairs are 
the principal focus of their attentions. All are business­
men and consist of four Mahajans, a Regur, a Muslim and a 
Jat. The number of Mahajansis immediately striking. Table 
6.2 summarises the changing caste composition of the Munici­
pal Board since 1946. Although 64 castes were recorded as 
living in the Notified Area, only eight have been represen­
ted on the board. Of the=se^ -, just three castes; Regur,
Sindhi and Mahajan have held more than one seat during 
any term of office. Except for the Board of 196 5-70, Mahajans 
have constantly held twice as many seats as their nearest 
rivals and taken half the seats available. Even during this 
period, Mahajans still were the majority category by caste, 
and took the offices of Chairman and Vice-Chairman. In fact, 
1974 was the first time that the Chairman had not been 
Mahajan since 1951, when the position was held by a Brahman.
TABLE 6.2
CASTE COMPOSITION OF THE MUNICIPAL BOARD 
THROUGH TIME
»M a h a — ’ ' 1 1 1  i i  i
YEAR J. |RegurISindhiIMuslimIJat|Brahman!MaliJKyasthJTotal
______ i 3^n ,_______i________i________ i____ i  i______i_______ i
1946 4 — —  *] 1 1 — 1 8
1951 4 - - 1 1 1 - 1 8
1954 4 1 1 1 1 - 8
1957 5 - 1 1 1 1 1 X 10*
1963 5 2 1 1 1 1 1 - 12*
1965 5 3 1 1 - 1 - 11*
1970 6 2 2 1 1 - - 12**
1974 7 • 3 3 ■ ■ 1 • 1 “ . 15**
* includes one co-opted lady
** includes two co-opted ladies 
t resigned from the Board
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This substantiates the assertion that, for Mahajans, a 
seat on the Municipal Board has become increasingly important. 
Competition for available seats has kept pace with their 
increase in number. However, the numerical spread of castes 
represented has been constant, remaining at fSizes except for 
1957-65. The increased proportion of Mahajan, Sindhi and 
Regur seats has been at the expense of the Brahman, Mali 
and Kyasth seats. The Muslim and Jat members, on the other 
hand have not fluctuated in number. In effect, political 
power has become concentrated in the hands of Mahajans.
This is especially noticeable for the period 1970-74.
Turning now to family dominance, nine families have 
been represented on the board for more than 50% of the time. 
One family has had an adult male elected seven times, two 
families six times, two five times and four four times. Of 
a total of 79 elected seats since 1946, these nine families 
have taken 45, or including co-opted ladies, 49 out of 86.
This is well over half. One Mahajan family even managed to 
manoevre two adult males onto the board for one three year 
period. Five of the nine families are Mahajans, the others 
being a Jat family, a Muslim and two Regurs. A total of 34 
families have held seats. Mahajans form nine of the 19 
families who have held a seat more than once, but only five 
of the 15 families who have taken just one seat. In other 
words, Mahajan families taken as a whole are more successful 
than non-Mahajans, which reflects their greater organisa­
tional capacities. Municipal politics is therefore very 
much a family affair. There are 'political families' just 
as there as 'business families'. Importantly, seven of 
the nine multi-represented families are industrialists.
What is the significance of this correlation?
In a state-directed economy, such as India has, there is 
a constant need for commodity licenses and quotas, exemption
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certificates and documentation of various sorts. The more 
complicated technologically an enterprise becomes, the more 
paper work is involved. This requires repeated trips to the 
state capital, Jaipur, or even to Delhi. One commission agent 
complained that he had to visit Jaipur more than 40 times 
before he obtained a license to trade in wheat. Much is 
left to the discretion of officials and even when permission 
is semi-automatic, it may require the coordination of several 
government departments. Two major consequences arise: people 
either circumvent the system by means of bakshish, that is, 
they give bribes; or they manipulate the system through 
'friends of friends'.
In this way, connections with political figures in high 
places become themselves a valuable commodity. Involvement in 
politics is a sort of by-product of entrepreneurial activity 
in South Asia (Erdman, 1975). It is not merely coincidental 
that all the big entrepreneurs in Mandi have served on the 
Municipal Board at some time, since this provides access 
to contacts with influence in the external political milieu. 
Influence, however, is not traded for nothing. It is exchanged 
for reciprocal favours like guaranteed votes for seats in the 
State Legislative Assembly or political support in a more 
general way. Having involved time and effort in canvassing 
for others, deciding to stand for muncipal elections requires 
little effort on the part of an entrepreneur. He thus gains 
easier access to influence-peddlars.
Disagreeable and dangerous though most Mahajans find 
these political connections, they become an offer which 
entrepreneurs cannot refuse. Almost against their will, it 
seems, certain Mahajans are forced into public office, thus 
challenging customary Mahajani ideas about prestige and 
status. Access to public office can only be achieved by 
wealthy individuals, but not all wealthy individuals wish
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to become public figures. Indeed most avoid the public 
status which their wealth could confer in this way, because 
of a horror of making themselves conspicuous and attracting 
too much attention. "To make a show of one's wealth is to 
invite others to take it away"7 said Ramesh Lai. However, 
preference for private obscurity does not mean that Mahajans 
are reluctant to use the services of those in the public eye 
or to give financial support to political parties, providing 
that it is done covertly.
There are, of course,other benefits. Control over property 
is, as we have seen, crucially important and a seat on the 
Municipal Board provides influence with the patWari and 
tehsildar, who adjudicate in local property disputes. Neither 
is subordinate to the board, but they would be foolish not to 
comply with Members* wishes. Because of the overlapping of the 
functions of patwari and tehsildar it is an easy matter to 
instigate litigation and counter-litigation of the kind which 
is most uncomfortable for civil servants. There are no accu­
rate records of town property ownership available for inspec­
tion in the Municipal Office, as is mandatory in Notified 
Areas, therefore house tax is not collected in a straight­
forward manner. The scope for rewarding followers and harass­
ing opponents is thus considerable. Again, the construction 
or destruction of property must be approved by the Municipal 
Board. Ultimately most projects are approved but the costs 
in terms of lost time, tied capital and wasted energy are 
clearly visible in the many half-completed houses and shops 
in the main bazaars.
The declaration of the State of Emergency in July 1975 
provided an opportunity for settling past scores. Under the 
urban cleanliness rubric of the ten point programme, 15 tea- 
stalls, 13 paan shops, two wine shops, two confectioners' 
shops and a cycle shop were demolished in a single morning 
becausie of alleged encroachment on the roads. The order was
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brought by a leading Mahajan politician (who was also a land­
lord) and the operation was supervised personally by the 
District Collector. Demolition was carried out by the State 
Police from Tonk. During the next week 27 further shops and 
stalls were demolished near the Bus Stand. The Municipal 
Board, in a public statement, said there were no plans to 
re-house the evicted businesses because "someone has bought 
the land by auction and he will be putting up new shops and 
houses and they can have those". It transpired that the land­
lord had made a closed bid for the 'auctioned1 land and the 
owners of the demolished shops and stalls were business 
rivals.
Not surprisingly, it is customary to accuse politicians 
of corrupt practices, such as awarding contracts for the 
construction of public works to their cronies and using 
unfair influence in property disputes. Another frequent 
criticism is that Members have diverted municipal funds to 
further their business interests. This has important impli­
cations for their business reputations. In the course of 
processing brokerage transactions Mahajans are inevitably 
holding money or goods on trust for others. The merest hint 
that muncipal money is being misappropriated suggests that 
Mahajan councillors may not be as particular as they should 
about accounting procedures.generally.
In the beginning, the Municipal Board was dominated by 
Mahajans by virtue of their superordinate position in town 
affairs generally. The type of person willing to assume 
public office at that time was a semi-retired malik, whose 
reward was community recognition of his leadership. In other 
words, being elected was an extension of a customary role.
The non-Mahajan board members were also derived from sections 
of local society who had traditionally provided leadership, 
though in different ways, such as Jats, Kyasths and certain 
Muslims. Whilst for Mahajans they could never equal the
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seths in authority, nonetheless their rights to leadership, 
based on such criteria as landownership, or as representa­
tives of landlords (for example, jagirdars and so on) was not 
challenged. This is a typical pattern of dominance in North 
India (see Mayer, 1960).
As changes in. electoral procedure filtered through,; •
Mahajans perception of modern politics became simultaneously' 
clarified and more rigid. This can be attributed to the entry 
of castes into politics whose customary specialist occupations 
did not include leadership. Association with them was thought 
to be dishonourable, degrading and dangerous. It is, there­
fore, scarcely remarkable that the seths began to absent them­
selves from town politics, though as late as 1957 a seth, 
Murari Lai, was prepared to accept the office of Chairman of 
the Municipal Board. Similarly the title of seth fell into 
abeyance concerning those Mahajans who continued to contest 
elections, despite the fact that their compliance with other 
criteria for 1sethood1 might have entitled them to this mode 
of address. The new men, are locally called uncha (risen up) 
in order to signify their parvenu, status. Thus the tentative 
steps towards involvement in modern political processes taken 
in the early days of independence were retracted and evalua­
tion of politics reverted to its former negative stance. In 
certain instances, of course, even these steps had not been 
taken and suspicion merely hardened into a certainty that 
politics and politicians should be avoided.
This trend coincided with the emergence of the business­
man politician, for whom involvement in politics became a 
vital adjunct to trade and commerce. Just as town politics 
in the formal sense became more, not less, negatively valued, 
so this opprobrium spilled over into distrust of the indust­
rialists as politicians, and also an innovators and entre­
preneurs. However, though the climate of opinion in Mandi 
might have turned against public political activity, the
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history of municipal politics has shown a persistent and 
growing interest by Mahajans, and particularly amongst the 
industrialist families, in the spoils of victory. This is 
especially discernible after the middle 1960's.
Contesting municipal elections has the principal bene­
fit of establishing external linkages outside Mandi with 
political figures on a variety of levels: local, regional 
and even national party organisers, political leaders and 
bureaucrats. The success of the industrialists as entrepre­
neurs and politicians depends upon their skill in manipu­
lating the different levels of political organisation within 
party politics in no small measure. Some have become power­
ful through their skill in doing this. Consequently the 
articulation of local politics with those of a wider world 
has become closer progressively up to the present day. Higher 
level officials are called upon to settle local disputes and 
to preside over festivities. So for example, the annual 
gauvashtama and annual general meeting of the gaushalla 
committee in 1974 was declared open by a well-known member 
of parliament from Delhi, supported by several MLA's from 
Jaipur.
This poses a challenge to the authority of the seths.
By the mid-seventies two patterns of leadership were emerg­
ing and showed every sign of intensifying. The economic 
and political power of the seths is dependent upon internal 
sanctions, founded in their nodal positions as landlords 
and bankers. That of the entrepreneurs is also routed in 
financial stability but is increasingly dependent upon 
external political connections. The uneasy situation which 
these parallel systems of leadership have created will be 
explored in the subsequent chapter, particularly as it 
affects the stategy of marriage choices.
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SUMMARY
In this chapter I have described the organisation of trade 
and commerce in Mandi, so that the relationship between 
ideological factors or 'cultural constructs' and actual 
behaviour might be estimated. It has been shown that cul­
tural form on the ideological plane and pragmatic consider­
ations are close, but that cultural patterns or models are 
not totally attainable in reality. Part of the purpose of 
the chapter has also been to demonstrate how the increasing 
complexity of social relations within the urban mercantile 
community relates to involvement in the formal political 
arena. Historically this has not been so, and industrial 
entrepreneurs (and others) must decide whether the oppor­
tunity cost in terms of reputation outweighs the advantages 
outlined above. For a sizeable proportion of the Mahajan 
population, politics is akin to speculative trading and 
therefore classified as nilam. Hence the Mahajan politicians 
have been unable to provide leadership in urban affairs. In 
contra-distinction to the seths, they are not the true leaders 
of the community. In the following chapter the need of the 
industrial entrepreneurs for wider linkages is related to 
changes in marriage patterns. I also point out the alter­
native relationalization of this by non-entrepreneurs, that 
the former are unmarriageable, because of their involvement 
in politics.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE MERCHANT FAMILY
INTRODUCTION
In chapter five, it was concluded that business ideology was-pre­
dominantly concerned with relationships, specifically the need 
for the family firm to invest in durable social and economic 
connections with other Mahajan families. The present chapter 
continues to explore the implications of the family as a 
basic unit in the organisation of the firm. Underlying much 
research into the family as a social institution has been 
the hypothesis that wherever a modern, capitalist economy is 
established the nuclear family will evolve, because it is 
functionally most appropriate. I shall attempt to show that, 
far from disintegrating under the pressures of modernising  ^
a traditional economy, the Mahajan family possesses some 
distinct advantages as an adaptive mechanism. Genealogical 
expansion or decline is the prime factor in the development 
of family businesses. This is interconnected with the efficacy 
of the family as an economic concern, and; its-role1 in.. structuring 
the hierarchy of management, training personnel/ inculcating 
values and implementing decisions. I conclude that a change 
taking place is in marriage patterns, revealing the needs of 
entrepreneurial families for increasingly wider linkages. 
Alternative and competing rationalisations of marriage choi- 
ces are emerging, which mirror the rethinking of prestige 
and success discussed in the preceding chapter.
THE HOUSE AND HOUSEHOLD
As indicated earlier, the joint family is the preferred form, 
Mayer's definition (1960, p. 181) of the joint family as a
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household wherein there are two or more adult males (males 
over 18 years old) being used as a basis for classification. 
197 families can be classified as 'joint' using this defini­
tion whilst merely 48 are non-joint families. The joint family 
would appear to be characteristic of the wealthier strata of 
South Asian society (Mandelbaum, 1970, p. 247) and an urban 
phenomenon (Dube, 1965, p. 197). Singer describes the joint 
family as found amongst merchants in Madras as "a complex, 
multi-dimensional thing including common residence and meals, 
common worship, common property, and the maintenance of kin 
ties even among separated households which no longer share 
any property" (Singer, 1968, p. 425).
From this perspective, the merchant family is usually 
a domestic group or household but this is not always the case 
and the term covers a variety of residential forms. For 
example, the household as a domestic group in Mandi may be 
the size and structure of a minor African patrilineage. The 
Todwal family, centred around Durga Lai as a patronymic 
head and.malik, consists of 29 individuals living together 
in one household. Like other Mahajan families it is patri­
lineal in descent, patri/viri-local in residence, patriarchal 
in authority and coparcenary amongst adult males related 
lineally over several generations. Households approximating 
this magnitude are rare, however, and this is, in fact the 
largest. Diagram 7.1 depicts the most complex joint families 
of each of the four Mahajan jatis resident in the Mahajan 
mohallas.
Specific forms of non-joint families vary from the nuclear 
to the extended, by which I mean that certain families are 
in residential terms morphologically heterogenous, nonethe­
less still reckoning themselves to be parivar (joint family)'". 
In terms of commensality and cooperation they continue to be
DIAGRAM 7.1 EXAMPLES OF COMPLEX HOUSEHOLDS
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internally integrated, even if co-habitation is not desir-
i
able or feasible. For example, the Tongya parivar centred 
around Gujar Mai as patronymic head, resides in three houses. 
Gujar Mai and his wife live with Tara Chand, their eldest
son, his wife and seven children in a house situated on the
Chaturbhuj Bazaar. In another house across the square live 
Rama Tongya and Mahendra Singh, his younger brothers. Rama 
is married but has no children whereas Mahendra also has 
seven. A few houses away, Gujar Mai's youngest son, Karmal 
lives with Raghuendra, the latter's wife, Vina, and Gujar 
Mai's widowed mother. All eat daily at Gujar Mai's house.
The expenditure on food, like other household expenses, 
is taken from the combined.gross profit of the Tongya
business concerns. These consist of a cloth shop, run by
Mahendra, a wholesale grocer's shop, run by Rama, and a 
grain brokerage business, run. by Tara Chand. Gujar Mai 
and Raghuendra, assisted by Karmal, manage the.family oil 
mill. In this system of family organised businesses house­
hold and business expenses are not distinguished, neither 
are business, profits from family savings. Business costs 
are met by the joint savings of the family, not taken out 
as an expense of the firm,and the financing of new enter­
prises is achieved by the diversion of capital from other 
'family' members. The Navendra Oil Mill was started with the 
help of financial assistance from Gujar Mai's father's 
brothers, Ghansi Lai and.Jivan Lai, now deceased, both of 
whom had previously separated their residence and business 
interests from him.
Here, whether a .particular group of persons constitutes 
a.joint family seems to depend on "whether the individuals 
within it are disposed to discharge towards one another the 
set of rights and duties specified in their specific code, 
scriptures and customary.usages" as Singer (1968, p. 427) 
expresses it. In the proceeding chapter I havelgiven. examples
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of business families which have set up subsidiary agencies 
in Jaipur that are run as an integral part of the family 
concerns. There are five of these,, at present. Though sons 
or brothers reside separately the joint family ideal is still 
strictly adhered to and indeed is given additional moral 
authority because of the superior volume of business trans­
acted. Such families operate as a single social entity des­
pite geographical dispersal. Where a brother or son has been 
delegated to move into a new territory or field, his success 
or failure is not just his or his nuclear family's alone but 
shared by the whole lineage. Hence it is wrong to see the 
dispersal of patrikin as uncontrovertibly implying the dis­
integration of the joint family. It is increasingly being 
arranged as a business expedient.
The presence or absence<of joint residence, joint property 
and a particular set of kin within the domestic group may or 
may not be relevant— from the insider’s' perspective at least. 
But where I differ from Singer is in stressing that commensal 
relations are crucial. We should expect this, given the social 
and ritual attention devoted to food in South Asian society. 
Thus the family as the basic unit.of Mahajan social organi­
sation is the "hearth group" (Mayer, 1960, p. 177) that is 
to say, it consists of those people who eat food cooked in 
a common kitchen, which has implications of common or shared 
budgeting. As he points out, the hearth group may share a 
dwelling with other, related hearth groups.. In general, 
however, the establishment of a separate cooking place 
within the larger household would seem to be the first step 
towards, separate budgeting and the eventual establishment 
of a separate dwelling place. Within the household, sharing 
is an assertive norm. Refusal to share is, therefore, an 
indication of actual or incipient severed relations, which 
may persist after partition for years. In the example noted 
earlier, whereby the four sons of Deva Lai Todwal decided
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to live apart, commensal relations mirrored the foundation 
of separate households. Each new household formed an 
exclusive gastronomic unit and refused to accept.food from 
the others. Years later, when the youngest son of Durga Lai 
was married, all the descendants of the four brothers were 
invited as a social gesture towards reconciliation. They 
attended, but Giri Raj's household refused to accept food. 
Though this was not entirely a surprise, Durga Lai still 
felt shocked that it should be demonstrated so publicly to 
the community that bad feeling had not been assuaged.
In this example, too, we see not nuclear families but 
smaller joint families evolving out of the former joint 
household (see also Karve, 1953, p. 12) whereas Madan 
envisages joint families alternating with nuclear family 
units in an evolutionary - cycle of domestic groups (Madan, 
1965). In. Mandi, the critical feature appears to be size, 
and linked to this the difficulty of co-ordinating increas­
ingly disparate.interests, especially the problem of cater­
ing for large numbers with basic technology. Just two meals 
per day for each of the 29 Todwals in Durga Lai's house 
means a total in excess of 20,000 meals per year to be 
cooked by a maximum of five women. Since meals are consumed 
solitarily, this adds to logistical difficulties and hence 
it is not surprising that women are prime agitators for 
separate residence.
Whilst men are generally able to adhere to the explicit 
ideology of the joint family economy, that what is good for 
one is good for all and Vice versa, women are known to resist 
it. Such resistance is frequently held to be the cause of 
discord within the joint household and its ultimate dissolu­
tion in Mandi. The fact that they are not successful high­
lights the efficacy of the joint family as a powerful norma­
tive symbol, invoking a whole complex of rights, duties and
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obligations, backed up by an appeal to the emotions. Quarr- 
els can and do occur within the joint family and relation­
ships become moribund between households as social inter­
action, or rather the need for social interaction 'diminishes. 
Brothers and cousins, sisters-in-law, and parents and child­
ren at times may hate each other. But equally the chances 
of reconciliation between kin resident in a single household 
are greater than between persons who have quarelled and: are not 
linked by kinship (and/or common residence) and do not have 
an interest in the viability of joint livelihood.
However, in view of the foregoing, the question arises 
of whether there is such a thing as the typical Mahajan 
household? With exceptions noted earlier, it can safely be 
asserted that the ideal form would consist of a father and 
three adult.sons, with their wives and children, altogether 
about 15-20 people living in a single household. It would 
have a joint capital of. about three lakhs (approximately 
£17,000) and an annual income of about Rs.40,000-Rs.50,000, 
from investments in property and brokerage, plus some finan­
cial dealings. It is not a .family which has close involvement 
with external political, processes, nor. does it belong to a 
lineage with historic connections with the courts and rajas 
of the former princely states. Neither is it involved in the 
entrepreneurial activities associated with the development 
of.modern industry, in the town. These characteristics are 
general enough, to apply to a wide range of Mahajan families 
in Mandi, and whilst.not. based, on a statistical sample, 
accord with what Mahajan informants asserted was the modal 
entity.
Because of their exceptional size alone Mahajans1 houses 
differ greatly from, other dwellings in the Notified Area.
They are built of stone plastered over with stucco and are 
often of several storeys. The financial disparity of individual
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families within the business community is reflected in the 
size and style of their houses. The dwellings of the very 
rich are, as mentioned above, called haveli: not quite a 
Enlace but rather more than a mere house. These are three 
to four storeys high,, With wide spacious apartments and 
separate accomodation for guests. These houses are construc­
ted in such a way that nothing inside can be seen from the 
street. They are particularly suited for,the maintenance 
of female seclusion since sanitary facilities are available 
inside the house and the women are saved from going to the 
fields to answer the calls of nature. Flush lavatories are 
limited in number and the latrines are cleaned daily by 
sweepers. Some large houses have wells in their interior 
countyards so that the women will not have to go to communal 
wells if the piped system fails. By contrast, the houses of 
poorer Mahajan families are single storeyed, containing two 
or three rooms in addition to the separate kitchen and bath­
room. The typical house would have two or three storeys and 
a roof terrace large enough to sleep the entire household 
during the summer months. This, would be partly roofed over 
with corrugated iron in case of sudden downpours.
Except for the very smallest, houses are constructed 
round, a central courtyard,.with staircases to the upper floors 
encased in the outer walls. The windows have no glass and 
are simple, barred frames with two sets of wooden shutters, 
which give a fortress-like atmosphere to the Mahajan mohalla. 
Tonk District is famous for its elaborately carved wooden 
gateways and doors, and Mandi has some of the best exhibits 
of these. The interior of the house contracts with the plain 
exterior. After the rains and before Diwali the richer people 
have their homes whitewashed or colour washed with lime in 
the auspicious colours of pink and green. On the walls are 
painted horsemen, elephants, flowers and so on. Poorer 
Mahajans are context to replaster the floor of the courtyard
259
with a mixture of red earth and cowdung. The women then 
paint white geometrical figures called mandalia, which rep­
resent the cosmos and are thought to be suspicious. This 
must be done at the appropriate time which is determined 
astrologically. Moving into a new house and commencing house 
construction must also start at an appointed time. A small 
ceremony is performed in which salt and a jar of Ganges 
water along with some sacred verses are placed under the 
threshold. Friends and relatives are invited to hear a 
purohit or pandit read from the puranas after which sweetened 
milk and sweetmeats.are distributed to the guests and money 
given to callers and beggars.
Like the shop, the house is imbued with ritual signifi­
cance and its layout reveals a pre-occupation with the catego­
risation of space. The interior of the house is equated with 
peace, safety and culture as opposed to the perceived bruti­
shness of the streets outside. In common with other social 
groups, the house also stands for the female world and its 
exterior with the male world. The house itself is divided 
into upper and lower portions, the upper being away from 
the ground and therefore removed from pollution, whereas
3
the lower are near the ground and hence liable to contagion.
On the ground floor, nearest the street, are the store rooms, 
bathroom and latrine. Hence the sweeper and low caste labour­
ers can perform their .tasks without being in contact with 
the rest of the house. Household members and visitors wash 
here to avoid bringing external, pollution into the house.
If the haveli is large enough there could be several bath­
rooms, one reserved for visitors. Mahajans believe that anyone 
from outside the household is.potentially polluting, even 
individuals from their own caste, though intimate friends 
and agnatic kin sometimes, disregard this.
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The kitchen is at the top of the house and so furthest 
away from extraneous pollution. If possible it is situated 
in the north west corner of the roof terrace (like the puja 
room in the shops) and in harmony with geomantric forces. 
These are impersonal cosmic forces in contrast to other 
supernatural powers. Fortunate forces are consciously sought 
out for the situation of the hearth and unfortunate forces 
avoided;, these are divined with the help of an astrologer. 
Houses which are overlooked locate their hearths in rooms 
leading off the roof terrace because of fear of the evil 
eye, which could spoil the food causing sickness to anyone 
who eats it. Great care.is taken to ensure the ritual purity 
of the kitchen by regular pujas. It is purified daily by 
throwing buckets.of water at.the walls and on the floor 
and the sacred symbols are renewed with vermilion paste. 
Women take turns to cook, squatting on the floor and using 
a wood or cowpot- burning Chula. This is a horse-shoe shape 
of sun-baked mud and cow dung. Menstruating women must not 
cook, touch the dishes.used by.others or take a bath and 
are confined to a small room set aside for the purpose 
since their impurity is dangerous.
During the day the women are always to be found at the 
top of the house, known as the zenana (women's place). Adult 
males should avoid, it so that women are saved the discomfort 
of veiling or withdrawing. At mealtimes men announce their 
arrival, by shouting. Each man bathes and changes his clothes 
before eating. The food is served by his wife, unless she 
is ritually impure due to menstruation, recent delivery of 
a child or death of a consanguineal relative. It is brought 
downstairs in little brass dishes upon a brass tray, care­
fully covered. Men and women never eat together, unless they 
are brother and sister, which underlines the wife's role as 
an outsider and semi-visitor.
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Just as the men must avoid the women's place during 
daytime so the women must avoid the mandana (men's place), 
and watch each other for unwarranted trips downstairs. Young 
women do not talk to their, husbands alone during the day or 
visit the room where they sleep. For his part a young husband 
should never call out to.his wife by name since this flaunts 
the sexual side to their relationship. The force of the pro­
hibition is stressed.by teasing the newly arrived bride. 
Sisters-in-law find endless errands for her to the storeroom, 
in the hope that she may accidentally meet her husband, where­
upon they accuse her of engineering the encounter. Her embara- 
ssment reinforces their own inhibitions and re-emphasises 
the necessity for strictly regulated behaviour in large 
households.
The separation of. men's lives from women's means that they 
do not share acquaintances. Male visitors go to sit with the 
men in the mandana.and female visitors with the women in the 
zenana. Bigger, houses have two.guest rooms.on different storeys. 
These are decorated with.Vaishnava or Jain themes in the form 
of pictures or. cheap calendars and in the men's guest room 
photographs of male ancestors and framed examination certi- • 
ficates are displayed. These are garlanded with tinsel, col­
oured paper or plastic flowers. The more religiously inclined 
burn little cones of incense or joss sticks before them. 'Sofa 
sets'":i.e. western-style suites of furniture are found in the 
houses of a few rich families. Otherwise, apart from a floor 
covering and bolsters against the.walls, furniture is scanty. 
Though the town was electrified .in 1954, many houses still 
depend on hurricane .lanterns or small painted oil-lamps 
locally called chimnia. (chimneys), which are displayed in 
the guest room. Except for. visiting business acquaintances 
from distant places who require board and lodging, however, 
much of men's intervisiting takes place in the shops. People 
of different jatis do not attend each other's private func-
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tions, except for weddings, or visit each other’s homes 
unless for a specific purpose. Intervisiting does occur 
amongst the super-rich and. sometimes between men who parti­
cipate in the wider economy, but hospitality in general is 
restricted.
In the concluding section of this chapter I shall return 
again to the question of intervisiting. What I am trying to 
indicate here is that the house is rather more than just the 
place where the Mahajan family lives. It demonstrates again 
the concern with the social and ritual use of space noted 
earlier and its boundaries or spatial dimensions correspond 
to the essential unit of trust. Hence it may be concluded 
that although the household and the family are analytically 
distinct, the household is to.all intents and purposes the 
basic unit of Mahajan social and economic organisation and 
in most cases is. coterminous with, the ’family' ,though with 
exceptions noted earlier. The interior of the house is, if 
not pure, then relatively unpolluted as compared with the 
exterior world. Here, too, is a repetition of the concern 
with temporal continuity, the house representing the achieve­
ments of the inhabitants up to date. A family can be impover­
ished and live in a haveli, making deductions about Its 
wealth and status hazardous in certain instances, but gener­
ally speaking, property is the means by which relative wealth 
and status in the business community, are judged locally. The 
building of a new house is the occasion for community congra­
tulations. It is also a n .indication, of commitment to the town 
since property owners.are unlikely to abscond without paying 
their debts. Without owning at least some property, as sugg­
ested above, it is unlikely that a malik will be recognised 
as a seth. Finally, the household represents a distinct 
socio-economic unit, with a division of labour, a set of 
economic objectives and internal social and exchange relations 
which in Sahlins' words "make the 'economic' modality of the
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intimate" (1974, p. 77)..Any economic decision is perforce 
a domestic decision, taken with regard to the family's well- 
being and livelihood. It is the relationship between business 
and household which must now be discussed.
THE FAMILY IN BUSINESS
The following section is organised into two parts. In the 
first, I describe in general terms the relationship between 
social structure and economic behaviour amongst Mahajan 
families. In the second, I use the example of a single patri- 
lineage to show, how merchants use kinship for. their specific 
economic needs and in turn are constrained by the exigencies 
of kinship in the organisation of their business activities.
Hazlehurst (1966), Fox (1 969) and Mines (1972) have all 
concluded that family businesses are the most characteristic 
type of South Asian commercial.enterprise. Because of the 
secrecy surrounding business organisation it is difficult 
to assess how much business in Mandi is supra-familial but 
it must be insignificant. Although some firms are registered 
as partnerships, the partners in the majority of cases belong 
to the same household; .Fox.(1969, p. 171) calls these concerns 
"pseudo-partnerships". Similar to pseudo-partnerships are 
"pseudo-firms", legally separated enterprises within the 
same family-management structure, and sometimes the two are 
found together. For example, the Choraria khandan organises 
its cloth business around three firms and six shops, the 
partners of each of which are agnatic kin residing in a 
common household. More detailed examples will be given below. 
Mostly, however, things are less complicated and household 
and. business are not regarded as separate economic units.
The reason for. this type of family ownership was implicit 
in the discussion of employer-employee relations described in
264
chapter three, that noone outside the household can be 
expected to suppress self-interest or be trusted. "Where 
there is money there is bound to be trouble. Only relatives 
can be trusted, a nd.even then only people of the house and 
sometimes not them either", said Kesar Lai. Joint shares in 
the family property predispose individual members of the 
household, to balance short-term, personal interests and 
work together for the good of the whole. "Mahajan families 
are by their nature.peace-loving and love and affection 
amongst relatives generally make businesses go better. If 
there is a problem they will sit down together and easily 
sort things out", said.Phool Chand. Partnerships with caste 
mates outside the household tend to be formed with close 
agnates or affines. These are short term ventures, formed 
out of financial necessity.. Mahajans feel that such enter­
prises are doomed to failure and that the partners commit 
themselves to much strife. There are no out-of-caste partner­
ships. Berna (1960, p. 48) asserts that partnerships are 
more common in small industries than in business. Thus a 
financier without technical knowledge may take a technician 
as a partner, but even in industry partners do not trust each 
other.
Table 7.1 shows that the majority of business families 
operate a single business though 74 (29.6%) operate more than 
one. Joint families are not only more preponderant than non­
joint families overall in. business but also, predominant in 
multi-businesses. Out.of 171 single businesses.sampled, no 
less than 136 were run by, or 'employed' in a managerial 
capacity, two or more agnatically related males who lived 
with their wives.and. children in a common household. Roughly 
the same proportion of joint and non-joint families own more 
than one business.. The figure to note.here is the 13 non­
joint households who assert that the family runs more than 
one concern but is no longer, co-residential. These are the
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extended families mentioned above/ the remnants of legally 
partitioned Mahajan households, continuing to run business 
concerns as a common enterprise yet residing separately 
for various reasons.
TABLE 7.1
JOINT FAMILIES AND MULTI-BUSINESSES
(MORE THAN ONE BUSINESS?)
Yes . .. . .No . Total
Joint Families 61 (31%) 136 (65%) 197
Non-Joint Families 13 (27%) 35 (73%) 48
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Mahajan informants habitually minimised the extent of 
their own business concerns in the bazaars and were suspi­
cious of detailed questions . (whilst manifesting a marked 
interest in and knowledge of the affairs of others). There­
fore the most interesting feature of Table 7.2 is which 
families were prepared to declare their business interests. 
Three Sindhi families would thus apparently account for 
approximately 20% of all multi-businesses recorded. The 
first gave the names of all five firms without waiting to 
be asked. By contrast, in the case of one Khandelwal family 
which admitted to two businesses,, subsequent questioning 
revealed that they had no less than five other-concerns *
To say that half the multi-businesses are run by Mahajans 
is, therefore, an underestimation. Nonetheless, when compared 
with the next highest figure by caste it does show Mahajans1 
controlling interest in the most complex businesses. This 
is made possible by the comparatively greater size of their
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families.
TABLE 7.2
MULTI-BUSINESS FAMILIES BY CASTE
Number of 
concerns
\ N o . of 
J families
; Total ; 
Businesses j , .Caste
5 1 5 Sindhi
4 2 8 Sindhi (1) 
Mahajan (1)
3 4 12 Mahajan (4)
2 14 28 Mahajan (6) 
Brahman (4) 
Muslim (3) 
Sindhi (1)
TOTAL .... 21 .... 5 3 ..........
The complexity of familial business organisation is 
encouraged by two further factors: a) the significantly 
higher tax examptions that partnerships receive as compared 
with single, family businesses (Fox, 1969, p. 169) and b) the 
traditional patterns of business expansion (Mines, 1972, 
p. 72). Firstly, legally organising and registering its 
concerns as partnerships, the khandan avoids paying income 
tax, which is levied on any individual earning more than 
Rs.3,000 per annum or any joint family exceeding Rs.6,000 
per annum. As the total income from business profits is thus 
divided into a number of separate shares, each of these con­
sequently falls into.a lower income tax bracket. Such a
measure saves the household from fairly high taxation, about
4Rs.78,000 per lakh. "The reason why our businesses are run 
in such a complicated way is entirely due to taxes",said
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Mahavir Prasad.
Secondly, family businesses expand by buying property 
and opening new shops, which may, in fact, be mortgaged 
immediately to provide further capital for more shops. In 
addition, merchants diversify their businesses to decrease 
risk, which is achieved by increasing the number of outlets 
for goods and.services and by spreading the risk factor over 
many lines of business. The multi-businesses of the Tongyas 
were noted above. Similarly, Giri Raj Todwal is the malik 
of three businesses: a commission agency, a'bangle shop, and an 
electrical goods shop; and he^  is’..thinking of opening a "high 
class" vegetarian restaurant near the Bus Stand "since Mandi 
doesn't have one, only dhabbas and kokas". Kapoor Chand is 
the malik of Vinod Oil Mill, the sole petrol pump of the 
bazaars and a brokerage business, but his son runs a plastic 
bag factory in Jaipur, which is also financed.', and managed as 
part of the family businesses.. Kesar Lai, malik of Kesar Lal- 
Phool Chand, on the other hand, owns, six shops. One is a cloth 
shop rented by Gambhir Mal-Rattan Lai, and the profit from 
this goes to the New Jain.Temple Committee. Two others are 
cloth shops, each run by two of his sons. The fourth is yet 
another cloth shop, run by Kesar Lai and his youngest son.
The fifth is rented out to Rameshwar Lai, a grain broker, 
and the last houses the telephone exchange. Many similar 
examples could be cited.
Since only relatives can be trusted, the joint family 
is ideal for meeting the management needs inherent in this 
type of business expansion. Conversely, Mahajan business 
ideology works off the principle, that business expansion 
is not simply for the sake of. increased trade but is: a means of 
enabling all the brothers to.have a share in the management 
of some aspect of the joint family, ventures. The eldest 
agnate acts as general.manager for all the concerns and
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younger agnates act as managers for individual enterprises 
(Mines, 1972, p. 73). The organisational hierarchy of the 
firm thus corresponds to the interpersonal hierarchy within 
the household o r .patronymic group. Each household has a 
recognised pattern,of authority, major decisions being taken 
by the head of the household who is usually the eldest male 
of the minimal patrilineage. A malik who is reasonably succe­
ssful in business, continues as head of the family and the 
family firm until he dies or- becomes incapacitated, where­
upon he is usually— but not always— succeeded by the next 
senior male agnate. Thus Bajrang Lai is the malik of Narayan 
Lal-Bajrang Lai in place of his elder brother, who is commonly 
recognised as being less astute. On the other hand, Narayan 
Lai's willingness to.take a subordinate role in family aff­
airs has freed Bajrang Lai from the shops to pursue the poli­
tical career which has brought other benefits to the family.
Decisions are taken in a rational way and the needs of 
individual family members are balanced, against.the needs of 
the whole. Thus if any person needs extra help in one year 
(for a wedding, or buying a house etc.) he will be reminded 
not to expect further help in the next year. Even in the most 
authoritarian.family businesses, subordinates have a certain 
amount of influence, simply by their ability to bring things 
to the attention of the malik or to hide things from him. The 
idea that experience should determine influence in family 
decision-making, experience being perceived.as dependent 
upon age, allocates the amount of 'say1 available to each 
brother or son..In this.way potentially disruptive disagree­
ments can be avoided or minimised, without stifling contrary 
opinions. In general, then the elder person in a family busi­
ness, is the senior partner, but little attempt is made to 
separate the roles of 'kinship* and 'business'. Relationships 
within the.family are to. all intents and purposes, relation­
ships within the firm.
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Coren, (1967, p. 321) assuming that differences between 
business and family organisation in degree of 'traditional­
ness 1 would be at the root of any conflict between the two 
organisations, found that in one Marwari family firm of 
Gujerat which he studied: "Though both the Birla brothers 
believed that family relationships should be kept separate 
from business, the values of each were similar enough and 
overlapped sufficiently that there was no interdle (sic) 
conflict in the company". Similarly in Mandi, traditional 
businessmen do not, cannot, or will not separate their rela­
tionship towards a relative from their professional relation­
ship towards him as a business colleague.
Mahajan women are excluded from business decision-making 
and have little role in family budgeting. It is thought shame­
ful for women to work in.the shops (though a minority do) 
and they are not believed.to have a head for business. How­
ever, the secret commercial activities of several Mahajan 
women provides.evidence for an opposite point of view. Some 
women accept jewellery on pawn, lending money at one third 
of its estimated.value and taking an.interest of Rs.1.15 
per month (15% per annum). If repayments are defaulted for 
two consecutive months,, the jewellery.is seized and sold.
The money accumulated in this way is sometimes lent to re­
tailers, usually cloth merchants, whose trade is very seaso­
nal, at 2% or even 3% per. month. Others sell off dry goods 
from their family store (purchased, in bulk once per year) 
in small quantities or commodities unavailable except on 
ration. All business is transacted without overt knowledge 
of their husbands and in conditions of the utmost secrecy.
The fact that Mahajan..women.keep purdha adds further to the 
chicanery of these transactions a n d ,, ■although many can read 
and write, no records are kept. Earnings are concealed some­
where in the house, even the banks being mistrusted, and 
at a convenient time are transformed into ■ gold or silver
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jewellery. The reason women give for this clandestine trad­
ing is usually along the lines of "It gives me something to 
do; it gives me an interest in life". All of which substan­
tiates Fox’s assertion that "Other castes do business because 
they have to but Banias^do business because they like it"
(Fox, 1969, p. 131).
"Shopkeepers breed shopkeepers" comments,Mines (1972, p. 83)
and to this end fathers take a special interest in the.upbring-
A ing;1 their:,sons>who will have, been regular visitors in the shop
since babyhood. As early as three or four years old small
children have learned to sit quietly for hours. They do not
fidget or fuss and work.steadily at the small tasks allotted
to them, such as sorting food grains, sequins and beads or
coins. When children attain five or six years, their fathers
start to teach the Marwari script and figures and simple
accounts. Children of both sexes are also sent to the temple
schools to learn to. read and.write, do arithmetic and receive
5
religious instruction. Teaching the children is regarded as 
a meritorious occupation for older men who are in semi- 
retirement. By about eight or nine years the boys are skilled 
enough to be useful, and familiar with the principals of busi­
ness practice. Small boys, aged nine or ten at the most, are 
capable of taking charge of a jewellery businesses for the 
afternoon whilst their father is away, and negotiating sales 
of several hundred rupees. This coincides roughly with the 
time they are invested with the sacred thread. Thereafter
they should try to behave like adults, neither laughing,
crying, nor 'mad.e/ angry easily.
Hazlehurst (1963, p. 60) remarks that he was once asked 
to evaluate the abilities of four sons of a Punjabi merchant. 
His choice was viewed as incorrect, and the merchant explained 
that the most able was' the one who had learned the value of
money. It is worth quoting his reasons in full: "If all my
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sons were given Rs.5 each,to spend as they saw fit, my nine 
year old son would come back from the bazaar with more goods, 
of better quality, than any other of my sons. He knows the 
tricks of every shopkeeper, and every shop in the bazaar.
It is impossible to deceive him11. If Mahajan children envy 
the little luxuries enjoyed by children of other castes they 
are told that the consequences of free spending are debt and 
ruin. Piyush Lai, a young man in his early twenties, recoun­
ted how his mother used to send him secretly to buy soft 
drinks and sweets. He blamed this habit of self-indulgence 
for his lack of self-confidence and consistent failure in 
business. He explained that boys take advantage of the 
transit trade at.the Bus.Stand to earn money by fetching 
cigarettes and soft drinks for passengers. Instead of saving 
the tips, which might amount to three or four rupees, the 
equivalent of a day's wages for an adult casual labourer,
he spent the money on. sweets "and so never learned to be
« ■ - 6serious .
These basic patterns, lack of trust, self-restraint in 
all things, and thrift make Mahajan children appear very old 
for their years. They quickly master a superficial show of 
cordiality and. politeness, which, masks an underlying indi­
fference and unsociability..From a very early age they are 
brought up to believe that success depends on hard work and 
frugal habits. They are taught to be purposive in their 
actions and flexible in personality. Boys learn to copy 
their fathers in listening patiently to clients and customers, 
and to avoid being provoked into anger. During altercations 
they merely place their.hands together, incline their heads 
slightly, and withdraw, either mentally or bodily, pursuing 
their own advantage later, when, tempers are cooled.
In the past, boys were educated principally though experi­
ence of doing business, and taking responsibility. Today,
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Mahajan boys are in the majority at the higher secondary 
school, though they continue to sit in the shop after classes. 
Two girls have attended the nearby Banasthalli Vidhyapith, 
an independent residential institution which organises pro­
gressive educational programmes for girls through to college 
level. This is, however, expensive, and controversial in a 
community practising seclusion of women so is the preserve 
of the wealthiest and.most.modernised families. Knowledge 
is valued, particularly scriptural knowledge, although 
education is not visualised as a means to economic advance­
ment but as a source of.prestige. Thus Murlidhar Somani, a 
seth who has published, a pamphlet on palmistry, is accorded 
a higher status on account of his learning than the four 
young men who have received university degrees and the four 
presently studying in college. Their courses of study vary 
from engineering, through commerce and law to English litera­
ture, the later, being a Masters1 degree. Moreover, some 
Mahajans claim.to be suspicious of University life and the 
attractions of meat-eating, alcohol and promiscuity for their 
sons in the cities.. Everyone claims to know someone whose 
relative went abroad for higher studies and. became involved 
in these activities. How much of this is accurate is diffi­
cult to assess. It does, however, bring to the fore again 
the competition of rationalisations noted earlier and I shall 
return to this theme again.
Mines (1972, p^ . 101) finds Muslim merchants' attitudes 
towards education to be a manifestation of asceticism but he 
fails to substantiate this point. More convincing are his 
suggestions that young merchants gain experience practically 
and value shopkeeping higher than other sources of livelihood, 
hence ignore the possibilities of further education for alter­
native professional qualifications. Undoubtedly as he, Singer 
(1968, p. 138 ff.) and Berna (1960, pp. 138 ff.) suggest, 
specialised education and technical expertise are beneficial
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to the industrialist. However, as I shall show in. the next 
chapter, not everyone wishes to become an industrialist.
To illustrate some of the above points, I shall show 
how kinship operates within the business community from the 
perspective of an individual lineage. I am not trying to 
suggest that the particular kin-related difficulties of the 
Patni khandan are usual, or indeed typical. However, they 
do illustrate in a nutshell the implications of the familial 
organisations of business, some if not all of which affect 
very many business families.
A business ;.famiiy ;^ .
The Patni family came to Mandi from Jodhpur district about 
30 years ago. By jati they are Khandelwal Jains. The malik, 
Dan Mai, had read newspaper reports concerning the develop­
ment of business in Mandi and.decided to move to a more 
promising economic location. The kha!ndan now owns a large 
mansion behind the Vegetable Market with its own well. Other 
property includes all the land between the Vegetable Market 
and the Ramlila Ground and the shops, warehouses and resi­
dential accomodation sited on it. When they first came to 
Mandi, however, the whole family lived in two rented rooms 
above a rented shop in the Chaturbhuj bazaar, owned by 
Gujar Mai's father, GPri Lai, for which they paid Rs.50 per 
quarter year.
The total number of individuals resident in the haveli 
is 20, not specially large by Mahajan families. It is not 
the size but the complexity of the relationships which is of 
interest (see diagram 7.2). Dan Mai had three sons, Mangal 
Chand, Bal Chand, and Hira Lai. Only the middle son, Bal 
Chand, had children, consisting of two sons and four daugh­
ters. The younger son/Mahender, was adopted by Mangal Chand, 
the eldest of the three brothers, and Hira Lai adopted his
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wife's brother's ’/wife's sister's son Hemant.
In 1974/75 Rajender, the elder son of Bal Chand, was 
married with an infant son and two daughters. Mahender was 
married with no children and Hemant had been recently married. 
The deaths of Dan Mai and Mangal Chand in rapid succession 
posed problems for Bal Chand, the new malik. In his own 
words,.this was "a house full of women and babies". As well 
as Dan Mai and Mangal Chand's widows, there were also his 
own widowed sister, his wife and four unmarried daughters, 
and two sons too young, to sit in the shop. Fortunately, Bal 
Chand was able to arrange the marriage of his oldest daugh­
ter to Prem Chand, son of Nath Mai Sogani, a Mahajan of 
Jodhpur, with whom the Patnis had business connections. As 
it happened, Nath Mai also experienced family problems. The 
only son of an only son, he found it difficult to expand his 
business sufficiently to meet the burgeoning needs of three 
adolescent sons and three daughters. The problem of provid­
ing for his sons' livelihoods and daughters' dowries en­
couraged Nath Mai to permit Prem Chand, his oldest son, to 
join Bal Chand in Mandi as son-in-law and business partner. 
Although, strictly speaking, Prem Chand Sogani, his wife,, 
and seven children now form a separate patronymic group 
living in an independent household, the interlocking nature 
of business ties means that other Mahajans interact with 
them as if they were part of the Patni khandan.
Mention must be made at this point of the significance 
of two other sets of affines, the Dalmias and Kesarvanis.
Rajender's wife's khandan is Dalmia and her brother's son's 
wife is Roop Chand Kesarvani's daughter. Surender Dalmia 
was orphaned shortly after his sister’s marriage and Bal 
Chand, eager for new male recruits to the household, took 
the unusual step of inviting him to live with them. Surender, 
his wife and mother . . also share the Patni haveli. The
7nb
closeness of affinal ties has made feasible the financial
involvement of Roop Chand Kesarvani and his son <irr icertaih of
the Patni family businesses. However, they are not generally
included in the Patni khandan though the Dalmias, like the
Soganis, have been absorbed into the patrilineage and no
7
longer use their own lineage name.
The business affairs of.the-khandan are arranged around 
a series of five partnerships, known in Mandi as the panch- 
dukaan (five firms) . These are, in order 0.15 seniority: Dan 
Mal-Hira Lai; Baktaver-Mangal Chand; Bal Chand-Rajender Kumar; 
Naresh Kumar-Suresh Kumar; and Hemant Oil Mill. Bal Chand- 
Rajender Kumar is effectively the head office. The dukaan 
of this firm is located in a quiet street off the Chauhati 
Bazaar, and is not. visible from the main bazaar. The build­
ings around the courtyard*, are. owned by Prem Chand Sogani 
and consist of warehouses and tenements. Only the weighing 
machine and the Ganesh sign above the doorway reveal that 
a brokerage business is transacted from the courtyard. The 
shop has no windows and light is admitted through double 
doors which are bolted at sundown. The ledgers of all five 
firms are kept there, going back to Jodhpur days, and amount­
ing to 56 for the year 1974-75. These are kept by the head 
Munim..'; of the five firms, Nanak Ram.
This firm is one of the largest and most sophisticated 
family businesses in Mandi. It is not only a pseudo-partner- 
-ship butvalso a pseudo-firm, that is, it is registered as 
a business under separate names from the other four firms, 
even though all five are owned by one khandan and with 
members of that khandan as partners in each. The partners 
are registered as Bal Chand, Rajender Kumar, Prem Chand and 
Mahender Kumar, with Bal Chand as majority shareholder. How­
ever, the malik is Prem Chand, who runs it with Nanak Ram, 
a Gujerati Brahman from Porbander. He was recruited with
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the help of Giri Raj Todwal, whose daughter was married into 
a Khandelwal Vaishnava family in that city.
The relationship between Prem Chand and Giri Raj dates 
back to the dissolution.of the Todwal household, shortly 
after Prem Chand arrived in Mandi. As described earlier,
Giri Raj did not have adequate capital, credit and contacts 
to finance the commission agency which he wanted to estab­
lish. Prem Chand, a newcomer, needed allies, in the locality. 
Mutual interest has developed the relationship into a steady 
association, and the two often collaborate in financial tran­
sactions. Prem Chand persuaded Bal Chand to appoint Giri 
Raj's protege, on the grounds that he would be in a position 
of absolute dependency. As a Brahman.and a stranger, he could 
not manipulate their relative weakness in Management, while 
a Mahajan munim recruited.from Mandi. Nanak Ram lodges in 
Prem Chand's house and takes his meals there, therefore 
his primary identification is with that household. Conse­
quently, although Bal. Chand.is officially the malik of the 
five firms, through his.access to and control over the keep­
ing of accounts.Prem Chand is effectively the master. Many 
farmers, in fact, call him "Masterji".
Prem Chand's ability to turn adverse circumstances into 
personal advantage is underlined by the fact that, under his 
guidance, the firm Bal Chand-Rajender Kumar has become the 
sole firm capable.of dealing in commodities on its own account, 
as well as broking on a commission basis for city dealers.
Prem Chand works hard.at establishing, consolidating and 
maintaining his network of contacts. In particular, his 
contacts with farmers.are.good. Prem Chand has a close busi­
ness relationship, with the Chairman .of the panchayat samiti, 
a Jat farmer, whose business he helped to establish about 
five years ago. by providing confirming and insurance facili­
ties when other Mahajans would not. Though criticised at the
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time for cultivating unorthodox business acquaintances, 
the social investment has paid dividends. The Jat leader has 
been instrumental in preventing farmer clients from being 
poached during Prem Chand1s frequent absences on business 
trips, and in promoting..his political interests within the 
Notified Area. As an outsider, social networks in Mandi were 
an initial problem,, but he has managed to build up a resource 
group for mercantile credit. This, consists of the maliks of 
the firms of Banwari Lal-Gyan Chand, Birdhi Chand-Janaki Lai 
and Bhunan Lal-Kapoor Chand, and sometimes Gori Lal-Gujar Mai. 
With these backers, Bal Chand-Rajender. Kumar is able to deal 
in the most important commodity.marts of North India— Lucknow, 
Kanpur, Delhi and Agra— and, unusually for Mandi, in the cos­
mopolitan marts of Bombay and Calcutta.
The firm has a reputation for fair dealing which is linked 
closely to the personality of the malik. During fieldwork,
"when the market for spices, slumped, Prem Chand reimbursed the 
losers on his transactions though, many firms did not. Such 
a reputation has made the firm stable and profitable and 
earnings are, on average, about a lakh per, annum before taxes 
and the family's drawings. Principally it deals in cumin seed 
and coriander, both.of which are risky though profitable 
because of their acute dependency on the timing of the mon^ 
soon. The involvement of newcomer businesses in risky commo­
dities was mentioned in the last chapter as a typical modus 
Vivendi.
The other firms, with the exception of Hemant Oil Mill, 
are less profitable, taking around Rs.50,000 to Rs.100,000 
before deductions per annum. Nonetheless they-, are still amongst 
the biggest firms in the bazaars. The involvement of three of 
the five firms in the grain, oil seed and spice trade means 
that overall profitability fluctuates. The unusually wet 
weather in September 1975, for example, caused Dan Mal-Hira
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Lai to register a complete loss for the trade in red chillies. 
Prem Chand estimated that the average annual turnover for any 
given year could be in the region of three lakhs, for the 
five firms combined.
The organisation of the other firms is similar to that of 
Bal Chand-Rahender Kumar, except that the accounting is less 
elaborate. Baktaver-Mangal Chand and Dan Mal-Hira Lai share 
a munim. This poses few problems since the dukaans are situa­
ted within a few yards of each other on the Chaturbhuj Bazaar, 
and deal in similar commodities. Dan Mal-Hira Lai deals in 
food grains (wheat, barley, rye, and some millet) and semi­
refined sugar, plus local spices such as fennel, fenugreek 
and dried red chillies. These are not as profitable as cumin 
but are much steadier sources of income. Baktaver-Mangal Chand 
also deals in spices but imports them from outside the region, 
principal lines of trade being saffron, tumeric, ginger, 
cinnamon and cloves. All of these are extremely costly and 
their profitability is high. Both Dan Mal-Hira Lai and 
Baktaver-Mangal Chand are well-established and require less 
effort, as going concerns, than either the Hemant Oil Mill 
or Bal Chand-Rajender Kumar. This is shown by the fact that, 
although the partners are registered as Mangal Chand and 
Mahender Kumar in the first instance and as the brothers 
Dan Mai and Hira Lai in the second, both Mangal Chand and 
Dal Mai are deceased and the respective firms are run single- 
handedly by their survivors.
The most elaborate partnership is the Hemant Oil Mill, 
which has Hemant Patni, Chand Mai, Roop Chand and Surender 
registered as partners. The capital investment required for 
an oil mill is so high (approximately two lakhs) and the 
return on investment so great that both families were per­
suaded into the transaction. At times, however, one had the
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impression that the decision had been taken against their 
better judgement. Chand Mai resents the prominence given to 
Hemant, a younger man, if only in the name of the firm. The 
Kesarvanis resent their exclusion from decision-making since, 
despite the family connection, they are not "of the house". 
The Patnis dislike their reliance on outsiders. "Never mix 
family business with other.concerns" said Hira Lai ruefully. 
It is doubtful whether.the.arrangement could be permanent, 
in view of this conflict of interests.
The last partnership is registered in the names of Frem'.. l 
Chand's sons, Naresh Kumar and Suresh Kumar, hut is runcty 
^•j^Metcand iSTOeiidex. Like Hemant Oil Mill, this firm has 
its own munim (making a total of. four) . but in this instance 
the accountant is also a manager, since the boys are too 
young yet to take full responsibility. Naresh Kumar-Suresh 
Kumar deals in oil seeds, predominantly ground nuts, rape 
seed and mustard seed, and is a sideline to the oil mill at 
present. Moreover,'. when Prem Chand's sons come of age it 
seems likely that they will take over the management of the 
firm. A livelihood must be.provided for these five brothers, 
and Prem Chand can be expected to take an increasing interest 
in a firm of which he is proprietor.
Just as Dan Mal-Hira Lai reflects the older generation 
and traditional mercantile interests, so Hemant Oil Mill and 
Naresh Kumar-Suresh Kumar are the preserve of the younger 
generation and.modern commercial concerns. More pertinent 
to the point at issue here, the Patni khandan illustrates 
the consequences of the.dependency of the traditional family 
business upon its own. manpower which is simultaneously a 
source of strength and.of weakness. "A firm must grow or it 
will be suffocated by the others" Bal Chand asserted, but 
growth is only possible., where there are sufficient males 
in the patrilineage. If the khandan cannot reproduce itself,
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the business activities of the firm will experience serious 
organisational difficulties. As indicated earlier, despite 
the fact that the trading houses as a whole employ more 
extra-household members than other types of firm, there is 
reluctance to place them in positions of trust. Thus Bal 
Chand, the malik, has been forced to rely upon surrogate 
sons in the persons of Prem Chand Sogani and Surender Dalmia, 
as well as adopting Mahender Kumar and Hemant Patni.
Where there are no sons, unless.a daughter's husband 
can be persuaded to take over the running of the business 
and incur the ignominy of being a gher jawai <son-in-law-of- 
-the-house) the business will fold up completely. This label 
has a real sting: Prem Chand Sogani is mockingly called 
1jijaji' (brother-in-law) by everyone in Mandi. Resentment 
of the role reversal, of being regarded as rather less than 
a man ,must undermine loyalty to the affinal, khandan in the 
long run. The foundation of the firm of Naresh Kumar-Suresh 
Kumar is already an indicator of potential problems. It 
seems only a matter of time before relations are severed 
between the Patnis and the Soganis because of their competing 
interests.
Other predictions can be made from family structure. If 
Mahender has no male children, which seems probable given 
the bilogical record.of the khandan, then either he will be 
forced to adopt, in which case the cycle will repeat itself, 
or Baktaver-Mangal Chand will collapse and its concerns amal­
gamate with Dan Mal-Hira Lai. Without Prem Chand's energetic 
leadership Bal Chand-Rajender Kumar seems likely to lose 
impetus. In such circumstances the amalgamation of the latter 
firm, too;,., with Dan Mal-Hira Lai, in order to trade upon its 
longer established name and reputation, is also a possibility. 
A final point is that although the Patni family have amassed 
a fortune of many lakhs, because there are more daughters than
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sons over the last two generations large amounts of capital 
have been or will be expended as dowry without incoming dowry 
to offset the loss. The relationship between marriage and 
business will be discussed in the following section.
STRATEGIES OF MARRIAGE
Marriage dominates the' conversation of Mahajans when they 
are not talking about, making money. To a great extent they 
are interconnected since marriages may be used for streng-
o
thening already existing alliances or creating new ones.
When marriage negotiations are completed, people say "we
have made a rishta (relationship)". Marriages are arranged
by the parents of the bride and groom or other senior members
9of the family or lineage. According to both the traditions 
of Brahmanical Hinduism and local belief a man must marry in 
order to beget at least one legitimate son, who will perform 
funerary rites, remember.his ancestors at Diwali and remem­
ber death anniversaries, without which moksha is unlikely. 
Nonetheless proposals are initiated from the bride's side. 
Mahajans say that there is.a dearth of educated and prosp­
erous males and hence a competition for eligible grooms. 
However, in Rajasthan, as elsewhere in North India, the 
idea that the honour, and status of men is dependent upon 
the conduct, especially the chastity of their womenfolk-, 
and threatened by their.behaviour is pervasive. The sexua­
lity of women threatens the honour of the lineage and there­
fore.must be guarded and controlled, permitted expression 
only in the socially sanctioned medium of marriage. The per­
formance of wedding rituals transfers, the problem of female- 
linked honour to the husband's lineage. Thus the onus lies 
with the bride's parents to induce the groom's parents to 
consent to the match, and the earlier the better.
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Historically 'child marriage' (arranging a match between 
infants) was usual and even today the idea that girls should 
be married before first menstruation, or as soon as possible 
thereafter, continues to exert an influence. According to 
the Hindu Marriage Act of 1954 (which also applies to Jains) 
the minimum ages prescribed by law are 16 years for girls 
and 18 years for boys. However, data collected on 34 house­
holds revealed that within the last 10 years 8 males and 
14 females had been married before attaining 15 years. One 
Mahajan girl aged four years was married during fieldwork 
and would join her husband's household on attaining puberty. 
Widow remarriage and divorce were also permitted by the same 
act, and polgynous marriages declared a criminal offence, 
with the exception of Muslims who are legally, permitted to 
have up to four wives. It is interesting to juxtapose the 
statement of the Gazetteer (Lyall, \1879;.p. 111) that
"statistics show that polygamy (sic) is far more common among 
the Jains, Hindus and.animists than among the Musalmans, and 
that it is most prevalent in the western states". Due to 
awareness of the unacceptibildLty of this practice in the 
wider political context, data on this aspect of marriage 
were not forthcoming, though two polygynous marriages were 
discovered among the senior most generation of these 34 house­
holds. Both consisted of two wives, in one case sisters, and 
involved Agrawal Jains. No cases of divorce were recorded, 
nor were there any instances of widow re-marriage. I mention 
this because again it pinpoints the conservativeness of the 
traditional merchant castes. It also links into the theme 
of the naWabi lifestyle, model mentioned in chapter five.
In chapter four it was noted that marriage rules differ 
between jatis, particularly with.regard to consanguineal 
exogamy. Superimposed upon the principle o f .jati endogamy, 
the Khandelwals have strictly exogamous patrilineal clans.
They also exclude for marriage purposes any person of the
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mother's natal lineage with whom kinship can be traced up 
to seven generations, and forbid marriage into the maternal 
and paternal grandmothers' lineages. This is sometimes 
called the four gotra.rule. Whilst it is considered desir­
able to arrange a marriage for one's child with someone whose 
family background,.character, and economic circumstances are 
known, avoidance o f .repetitive alliances is preferred. Sister 
exchange (watta satta) is reviled as a low caste practice, 
as is marriage of two or more sisters to two or more brothers. 
Similarly, because fictive kin ties tend to be established 
between acquainted households, marriage between persons who 
are familiar with each other is also disapproved. Such a 
system of marriage rules implies a wide spread of affinal 
ties. Whilst marriages within Mandi are not prohibited, 
encouragement is given to finding suitable spouses outside the 
town. This ambiguity is important, as I shall show below.
By contrast, Agrawals need only avoid one gotra (descent 
line) which is their father's.. Clans are exogamous, and the 
only other marriage rule states that one cannot.marry a con­
sanguine. less than four generations distant, though marriage 
into the mother's natal lineage is discouraged. Amongst Oswals 
and Maheshwaris, too, there is no four gotra rule and, more­
over, sister exchange is permitted. . This eliminates the rigid 
distinction between wife-giving and wife-receiving lineages 
which exists in the other Mahajan jatis. It also creates an 
interlocking complexity of kin relations between lineages 
which is unusual in north.Indian castes. According to Maureen 
Michaelson (1977, personal communication) repetitive marriage 
alliances amongst Gujerati Oswal. Mahajans are positively valued 
and there is a firm belief .that,, once a connection between 
families has been established, through marriage, further alli­
ances should be forged to strengthen it. However, in practice, 
there are so few Maheshwari and Oswal families (three of each) 
living in the.town that here, also, suitable spouses must be
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sought outside it. Here, again, there is ambiguity.
Amongst Agrawals, wife-givers to the first generation 
become the consanguines of the second generation and can 
again become the affines of the third, since from the pers­
pective of a male ego, marriage with a matrilateral cross 
second cousin is feasible. This perpetuates status differen­
tiation between exogamous lineages. Apart from these instances, 
the patrilineal bias remains in kinship terminology and modes • 
of address. Distinction between agnates and maternal kin on 
the one hand and between wife-giving a n d .wife-taking affines 
on the other is a critical feature of Mahajani kinship termi­
nology. There are no relations, between equals, except in the 
specialised circumstances of ritual exchange between brother 
and sister, or fictive siblings, such as at Rakshabandhan 
and Bhaiyadhuj. The ambiguity between normative and actual 
kinship terms and behaviour leads to a constant inventiveness 
in terms of address noted earlier (in chapter two). Strate­
gic selection of terms of address is instrumental in managing 
expected behaviour and the chance to demonstrate superior 
status or to minimise status differentiation, according to 
the self-interest.of the individual, concerned,■ is never 
missed in social interaction between kin.
Though as described in chapter five, the gift of a virgin 
daughter in marriage.is ideally an act of religious merit, 
providing that no tangible benefit is anticipated, nonethe­
less it is interesting to.compare the advantages which the 
parents of the girl and boy concerned do expect from the 
marriage alliance. The bride's, parents hope amongst other 
things to secure a connection, with a lineage of high social 
standing. Hence they gain prestige vis-a-vis those families 
of their jati who cannot contract such good alliances. How­
ever, the bride's family must be prepared to bear what 
Das (1975, p. 74) has called the social costs of the marriage,
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in addition to the economic costs of funding the festivi­
ties and providing dowry. The social costs consist of the 
systematic status differentiation between the wife-givers 
and the wife-receivers described above, and which has received 
such wide attention.in the literature (most recently Parry, 
1979). Amongst Khandelwals especially it results in humilia­
ting inferiority for the wife's kin. The bride and her line­
age are explicitly regarded as belonging to a lower status 
category and constantly reminded of her 'small1 amount of
/i 10dowry.
The groom's family, hope to secure money-o^cgetfera-rised 
economic advantage,or political support,or all of these. The 
usefulness ofuxorial affines in Jamnagar for one oil mill- 
owning family will be discussed in the subsequent chapter. 
Alliances between cloth.merchants and textile factory owners 
in Indore and Gwalior follow similar principles— ensuring 
a regular supply of a government-regulated commodity on the 
one hand and a steady outlet for goods on the other. So do 
marriage alliances between a. town malik and village Mahajan, 
where a typical transaction.could be the exchange of rural 
debt collection favours for influence with the Tax Inspec­
torate, or simply a reliable source of credit.
Nonetheless, despite inequality of relative standing 
after marriage, there is often a close correspondence between 
the way in which marriages are made and the convergence of 
interests at the time a marriage is arranged (Barth, 1959, 
p. 93). Marriage is an important method of cementing valued 
relationships between business families and expresses primary 
social orientation, whether predominantly intra or extra 
bazaar. All of the oil-mill owning families have made pro­
gressively more distant alliances as their prosperity has 
increased: in Indore and Gwalior. (Madhya Pradesh) Jamnagar 
and Porbander (Gujerat) and in Delhi. Other wealthy families
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arrange marriages for their children within Mandi itself 
or in neighbouring villages or in Jaipur. Two opposing stra­
tegies are at work here. The first is to spread out the web 
of significant contacts and the second to consolidate link­
ages, intensifying rather than extending the social network. 
The need for wider and wider linkages in industrial entre­
preneurial families.can be seen in the following example, 
(Table 7.3) in which the origins and.destinations of marriage 
connections and their change through time are tabulated. This 
may be compared with Table 7.4 f which gives an example from 
non-industrialist merchant families, in this case a provi- 
sioner's business.
TABLE 7.3
SUCCESSIVE MARRIAGE ALLIANCES IN AN 
INDUSTRIALIST FAMILY
Daughters- in-law J Daughters
Origins j Distance 
J (miles)
| Destinations.|
i i i i
Distance
(Miles)
1. Lalset 4 1. Sanganer 35
2. Vatika 8 2. Jaipur 40
3. Dausa 40 3. Jamnagar 400
4. Sanganer 35
5. Tonk 20
6. Ahmedabad 200
By way of providing some kind of base lines for compari-
son, on average, the marriage network of higher castes, like 
Brahmans or Rajputs, would spread no more than 30.miles from 
the village. For lower castes, like the Chamars, the marriage 
network would not be so wide, no more than 15 miles around 
the village. Tonk is a large town, population 25,000, and
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therefore more prestigious than Dausa and Sanganer. These 
two towns are approximately the same size, population 5,000f 
but Sanganer is more prosperous. Lalset and Vatika are small 
villages, therefore least prestigious in terms of connections 
Todaraisingh and Malpura are market towns similar to Mandi, 
with populations at 11,000 and 13,000 respectively.
TABLE 7.4
SUCCESSIVE MARRIAGE ALLIANCES IN A 
NON-INDUSTRIALIST FAMILY
Daughters--in-law J Daughters
Origins J Distance 
J (miles)
| Destinations J Distance 
; | (miles)
1. Jaipur 40 1. Jaipur 40
2. Todaraisingh 20 2. Jaipur 40
3. Malpura 15
4. Mandi
A whole and quite complex theory has been constructed in 
Mandi to explain patterns of marriage choices. Those who 
have made supra-regional marriage connections feel they are 
implying that an alliance with local Mahajans would have been 
less than satisfactory. In the case of girls, this would mean 
that the dowry was insufficient. In return, those who have 
made local or intra-regional marriage connections assert 
that the former are forced to.look outside the familiar 
network because they cannot find a local family prepared to 
intermarry with them because of their involvement in politics 
The process of arranging a marriage, always frought with un­
certainty and difficulty in northern India, can have unplea­
sant consequences, as lineages struggle to assert their
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social superiority over each other-
For example, Lai Chand, the malik of the Choraria 
khandan and a wealthy general merchant, tried to negotiate 
a marriage between his daughter and Hemant, the adopted son 
of Hira Lai Patni. This proposed alliance between two of the 
wealthiest Khandelwal Jain families in Mandi was rejected.
Hira Lai implied that.Ila was a poor match for Hemant, and 
made unkind jokes about her alleged, plain features and lack 
of sophistication, as well as insufficient dowry. Later, Lai 
Chand took revenge for the insult by arranging for the abduc­
tion of Hira Lai's daughter, on. her way home from visiting 
the Sogani household. It was fixed beforehand that his sons 
should rescue her ’by chance' from the dacoits and thus witness 
the lineage's shame. When she was married into a merchant house 
in Bikaner, some months afterwards, Lai Chand ensured that the 
story should reach there that she had eloped with an actor.
He openly, asserted in Mandi that she was pregnant at the time 
of her wedding and that this was only to be expected from the 
newly rich. Hira Lai could do.nothing and decided that the 
wisest.policy was to live down the incident, retaliating 
at an appropriate time in the future.
Few marriage negotiations have such violent outcomes, but 
many are acrimonious. Competition for good connections is no 
less, acute because of.failure to agree on. how these are defined. 
Status ambiguity within the caste category, an inherent feature 
of Mahajan social,.structure, has been exacerbated by the mig­
ration process and as a result of new sources of wealth. It 
manifests itself in confused patterns of marriage alliances 
and competing explanations of what is and ought to be happen­
ing. In 197.4-75 there were rumours that "in England" Khandel- 
wals and Agrawals were intermarrying. Other.rumours asserted 
that "in Gwalior and Indore" Khandelwal Vaishnavas and Khan­
delwal Jains ha^d recently contracted marriage alliances.
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Working on the principle that nothing concentrates the mind 
so much as a fait accompli, this could be the hint of a 
future resolve in the making. Perhaps it is not too fanci­
ful to speculate that a new endogamous unit of the super 
rich may emerge? However,.the point is that people were seek­
ing to explain a complex.situation, and to make their own 
definitions of what is an appropriate marriage choice for 
their children prevail over the explanations of others.
As Bailey puts it,"In this process, 'economic' considerations 
(selecting efficient means to achieve some given end) mingle 
with politics, the competition to define both the moral worth 
of means and select those ends which are agreed to be moral 
and social imperatives". Thus while most marriages in Mandi 
have little to do. with politics,, marriage has become a poli­
tical issue, in the sense.that alternative rationalisations 
of categorical imperatives, are in conflict.
Marriage confusion is status confusion. In the final 
section of this chapter, I discuss briefly the implications 
of status ambiguity, as expressed in terms of the social 
relations between Mahajan households. The next chapter 
analyses reasons for the failure of the-.small'-sCale^ itidustries’ 
programme and continues this theme, which is significant in 
the context of leadership especially.
SOCIAL RELATIONS BETWEEN HOUSEHOLDS
Social relations between households are marked by wariness, 
cynicism and restraint. This aspect has also been noted by 
Fox (1969, p. 129) who speaks'of the "conservative, mutually 
mistrustful Banias". Whilst It is feasible to describe the 
social institutions which bring merchants from different 
households together, it is not true that all Mahajans know 
each other, or of each other, or wish to become acquainted. 
Mahajans of the same jati might live in the same mohalla
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for years without knowing it, or be aware of the fact without 
feeling the need to greet or visit each other. Unless some 
kind of connection can be established, through the ties of 
kinship, business acquaintances, caste associations, temple 
committees, and so on, social relations are unlikely to be 
cemented. The special interests involved in these culturally 
defined contexts make voluntary interaction difficult and 
inhibit friendship. Carstairs (1961, p. 68) points out the 
contradictions and ambivalences of social life in a Rajasthani 
village. Everyone hopes to find the one 'true' friend, with 
whom one has a frank and sincere relationship, entered into 
freely. But it is simultaneously realised that the ideal is 
unattainable, and none can be fully trusted. This observation 
is entirely applicable to Mandi.
In general, then, customary patterns of interaction between 
households preclude association outside of pre-defined social 
categories and make informal inter-visiting in each other's 
homes possible only between kin. Visiting is mostly done by 
women, who meet frequently if their houses are nearby or 
adjacent. More distant houses require an expedition of two 
or three women, heavily veiled. These visits are, therefore, 
less informal and are undertaken for some ostensible purpose, 
as well as to transfer items of news and gossip. House calls 
by acquaintances who are not kin are made for a definite 
reason. For example, a girl or boy is brought round to be 
'shown1 so that a suitable spouse might be suggested, or an 
experienced, older person could be asked for advice on family 
problems. Visits are brief and last no more than 20-30 minutes. 
Though refreshments are offered, they are invariably refused.
Restraints on social interaction extend to children's 
behaviour. They are dissuaded from going too often to a class 
fellow's house and beaten for taking food outside the house­
hold or extended family. Even very young children know that 
they should not play with children from other castes. They
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are taught that the bazaars are evil places and that out­
siders, that is people not 'of the house1 require caution. 
Avoidance rules mirror this, especially injunctions to avoid 
drawing attention to oneself by behaving conspicuously. Two 
axioms are heard constantly in Mahajan households: "If a 
crow speaks, it talks rubbish" (warning against voicing 
unwanted opinions) and "Feed a snake, it still bites you" 
(warning against injudicious friendships). And yet, though 
the majority of social relations are marred by suspicion, this 
is not permitted to emerge in open hostility. A father will 
beat his son for fighting. He will beat him twice as hard 
if he wins.
It is in this sort of atmosphere that the evil eye (nazar) 
flourishes. As a social phenomenon, the evil eye rests on the 
belief that the gaze of certain persons can cause actual harm, 
either bodily or mentally. As Pocock (1973, p. 27) argues, 
the evil eye is the eye of jealousy and envy. Since everyone 
knows someone whose plight is in some respect worse, noone 
is immune to its effects. Harm may be unintended, as in the 
casual envy of good fortune, or intended, such as conscious 
and malevolent wishes. In this way, beliefs in the evil eye 
merge with beliefs in witchcraft, the conscious manipulation 
of psychic energy for malicious ends. As suggested in chapter 
five, anyone who achieves suppression of the self through 
austerity and renunciation can achieve supernatural powers. 
Therefore, any stranger, business acquaintance or even family 
friend is a potential source of danger, on a variety of levels 
of mystical attack.
Superficially, adult Mahajan males disclaim that nazar 
exists and characterise such beliefs as typical of the foolish­
ness of women. Nonetheless, most merchants wear amulets of 
iron or brass, to guard against spirits and ghosts as well 
as the^vil eye, and keep cockle shells in their cash boxes to
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divert the gaze of malevolent customers. Many shops have „ 
taviz (written charms) affixed to doorways. These are written 
by Muslim ritual specialists. Older maliks sometimes wear 
gold earings to prevent others' evil thoughts from damaging 
their concentration. The focussed ill-will of competitors 
can cause the malik to make bad decisions or become insane, 
temporarily or permanently.
Consequently Mahajans fear the envy and jealousy of each 
other. They do not worry that competitors from other castes 
who have taken to business with less success, will "throw a 
look". Envy, here, is more likely to result in assault or 
litigation. However, where competition between business is 
competition between households who are affines, or worse 
agnates, the situation becomes tricky. Although together they 
form the largest, wealthiest, and most influential social 
category, individual households vary substantially in their 
specific social and economic circumstances. Poor merchants 
are allocated to the prestigious Mahajan category solely by 
virtue of their known connection, through kinship or otherwise, 
with more prosperous caste fellows, who endeavour to deny any 
relationship with them.
Moreover, the malik of a household which has attained 
extraordinary riches is not deluded that less successful kin 
and acquaintances are delighted on his behalf, for within 
each jati self-improvement is relative. To admit that someone 
else is a better businessman is to denigrate, implicitly, 
one's own moral character, for the rich are blessed by God. 
Conversely, the moral revulsion in which the poor are regarded 
over-rides the obligation to support, kin and thus become asso­
ciated with them. However, just as explanations of one's own 
misfortune shift in emphasis towards nazar, particularly where 
random factors such as no sons, too many daughters and unlucky 
accidents affect prosperity, so explanations of others' success 
tend to stress involvement in speculation, black-marketeering
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and shady transactions generally. Thus explanations of good 
and bad fortune vary and again compete, merging into the 
manipulative social ploys of gossip and scandal.
Taken to logical extremes, this means that hardly any 
family can escape nazar, or enjoys the good fortune which 
business acumen brings whole-heartedly. It is part of the 
experience of every Mahajan child to be taken to see the 
bhopa (witchfinder) since disease, envy and mystical attack 
are synonymous. Whilst it would be rash to assert that fear 
of jealousy and its concomitants, gossip, scandal and the 
evil eye, prevent the accumulation of wealth, there can be 
no doubt that concealment is encouraged. Thus rich families 
do not make a show of their good fortune, except in socially 
approved ways and take care to avoid drawing attention to it 
otherwise. Perhaps this is another reason why social relations 
between Mahajan households feature separation and exclusivity; 
that is, to minimise the friction caused by differential 
success where ideology stresses equivalence within the caste 
category.
SUMMARY
Evidence from Mandi suggests that the joint family system is 
not incompatible with the development of modern industry. On 
the contrary, it exhibits features which are useful for the 
organisation of both industrial and commercial enterprises.
The centrality of the family in the organisation of the tradi­
tional firm appears to be acquiring more, not less, signifi­
cance as business becomes more complex. This is seen parti­
cularly in those former households which are now separate 
residential units but continue to coordinate their business 
interests. The greatest change taking place concerns patterns 
of marriage. This is related to competing strategies of pres­
tige and status deriving from economic changes in the town 
over the last decades.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND PRIVATE 
GAIN— AN ANALYSIS
INTRODUCTION
Since independence the economy of Mandi and its region has 
changed greatly. There has been a switch from the simple 
wholesaling and retailing of commodities, when the bazaar 
functioned principally as a distributive centre, to commission 
agencies (brokerage businesses) whereby Mandi functions as a 
collecting point. More recently, the growth of small-scale 
industry has added yet another function. There are now 13 
oil mills which process oil seeds into dalda (vegetable oil 
for cooking) four flour mills, a soap and candle factory, 
and an ice factory which are operated by local families.
Mandi is regarded as a progressive place in a generally 
backward state and the private sector of the economy is flour­
ishing. This is one of the principal reasons why the Rajas­
than Development Corporation became interested in Mandi, with 
the aim of encouraging further industrial development. How­
ever, progressive though they may be, Mahajans have shown 
little interest in the projected scheme of development and 
plans for setting up an industrial area on the outskirts of 
the market town have been unsuccessful.
The development programme involved attending meetings, 
agreeing on schedules and negotiating with external political 
processes for sizeable state grants to industry. For the sake 
of convenience these decisions and actions were called the 
public sector, distinguishing them from purely familial deci­
sions on investment and the use of capital, which were called
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the private sector. The coming chapter will attempt to expl­
ain why Mahajans are innovating successfully in the private 
sector whilst the public sector has experienced difficulties. 
There will be particular reference to the role of the family 
and its central place in Mahajani thinking which relates to 
the problem of leadership.
INNOVATION IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR
Somewhere between 15 and 20 years ago Gujar Mai decided to 
startxaivegetable oil mill. As a broker of groundnuts and other 
commodities from which vegetable oil is extracted— such as 
mustard:'seed, rape seed, linseed and cumin seed— he heard of 
the very good profits to be made in vegetable oil from the 
buyers of these commodities, all destined for oil extraction 
plants. Interested, he obtained names of businessmen in Jaipur 
who could handle the processed vegetable oils, supply contain­
ers, and provide transport. He visited several oil mills in 
Jaipur, run by Khandelwals like himself, through the inter­
vention . of the Khandelwal Mahasabha, and thus acquired infor­
mation about the machinery required to process the vegetable 
oil, the names of suppliers, and suitable buildings for hous­
ing the machinery. He decided to take the risk and using 
capital from his family firm of commission agents and 
'several lakhs' borrowed from business acquaintances in Mandi, 
commissioned a firm of building contractors from Jaipur (also 
Khandelwals) to build Mandi1s first ever factory. He is now 
a .lakhpatti, a member of the Municipal Board, and reputed 
to be the. richest and most influential man in Mandi. It 
could be true. During fieldwork his son married the daughter 
of reputedly the wealthiest silver broker in Indore. The 
silver market was closed for a week in deference to the 
wedding and the couple honeymooned at Kovalam beach in Kerala, 
an internationally famous, holiday resort. The bride's trouss­
eau was lavish, and included a profusion of diamond jewellery 
which impressed the usually unimpressed Mahajans.
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Encouraged by his success, in the succeeding years 13 
oil mills were built. Sital Prasad explains his family’s 
decision like this: "Three years ago we started an oil mill.
We got sick of waiting for the money after we had negotiated 
a sale. There is no time limit for payment here unlike other 
markets. The commission is only Rs.1.25 per Rs.100 here any­
way; they get 10-15% in Delhi or Bombay/ so it's hardly worth 
the bother of waiting for so little and taking all the risk 
in between. So we thought, why not do it ourselves? Why let 
the millowners take all the profit?" Durga Oil Products, 
the family’s oil mill, processes about 36,000 barrels per 
year at a profit of about Rs.11 per barrel. The waste is sent 
to his sister's husband's cattle cake factory in Jamnagar, 
Gujerat, which exports to the UK, USA and Japan. Again, no 
hard and fast details are available on income, but the 
family is thought to be 'worth lakhs1. Some indication of 
their wealth may be obtained from the fact that they spent 
Rs. 20,000 on the wedding of their youngest son, Rs. 3,000 alone 
being spent on the band from Jaipur which paraded him around 
the bazaars to the accompaniment of music from the films 
before the wedding party set off to collect the bride. In 
another social statement regarding the family's modern out­
look, his mother is also a member of the Muncipal Board and 
was the first lady to contest openly in the elections. Pre­
viously women were co-opted onto their two reserved seats 
on the Board.
The latest and in the opinion of some, the most impressive 
enterprise in Mandi is the Mahajan Ice Factory, the inspira­
tion of a gifted engineering graduate, Padam Chand. He deci­
ded at Jaipur University that the best way of using his tech­
nical knowledge and recompensing the family for an expensively 
acquired education was starting an. industrial/manufacturing 
concern.. He and his father, Bajrang Lai, another very success­
ful. businessman and politician, studied the market very cre- 
fully and came to the conclusion that an ice factory gave
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the best returns on an initial investment, requiring almost 
no running capital and no skilled labour. Bajrang Lai had 
business contacts in Jaipur and is a close friend of the 
owner of the Ice Kandy plant in the city, who provided 
much useful advice on the technical aspects. He also brought 
to their attention the possibilities being introduced by the 
opening up of the newly expanded tourist industry in Jaipur, 
one of the most beautiful cities of India.
The Mahajan Ice Factory was accordingly sited on land 
purchased on the approaches to Mandi Railway Station, facili­
tating rapid delivery of the ice to Jaipur which is next stop 
on the line. In the three years Since work commenced, Bajrang 
Lai secured through his Congress Party connections an exclu­
sive contract to supply ice to the Government-operated fish 
farm at Sawai Madhopur on the same railway line. The capture 
of this monopoly assured the continued success of the infant 
enterprise which was officially opened with the celebration 
which normally attends the birth of a first-born son.
All the industrial entrepreneurs, in Mandi today share 
similar histories and little point would be served by re­
capitulating them individually. Their connections with trade 
reach back into the bottomless depths of caste history. All 
have used, their family businesses as a springboard for 
industrial innovation but commitment to industry is both 
recent and partial. With the exception of Padam Chand, none 
has had technical or. vocational training outside the domain 
of day to day business experience. All have carried on with 
their original family businesses of commission agencies, 
food wholesaling, cloth retailing etc. side by side with 
their recent expansion into industry. All, too, have emerged 
from the ranks of the wealthier families of the Mahajans and 
all of them (or some member of their household) have served 
on the Municipal Board at one time or another.
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THE AIM OF INNOVATION
The aim of innovation is to maintain the family. The prin­
cipal duty of parents is perceived as providing for their 
children, livelihood in the case of boys and a dowry in the 
case of daughters. A sizeable dowry has two effects: it 
enables a family to negotiate a good marriage with the son 
of a wealthy and influential family and stimulates a flow of 
marriage enquiries from other wealthy families for its own 
sons, thus enabling the patrilineage to maintain prestigi­
ous and honorific connections with other patrilineages over 
time.
In the past, the provision of a livelihood for boys has
been the most important factor behind the opening of new
shops in the market place. Wherever and whenever possible
Mahajans try to keep their sons in the vicinity "so that the
family can be together" and this is regarded as a prime
objective. Occasionally sons have had to leave home because
of lack of livelihood opportunities in which case they have
entered government service, as far back as anyone remembers,
to be clerks on. the railways, typically, in the days of
British India and before that.to be munims for the Rajput
2
and Moghul courts. The armed services were and are avoided 
because of religious prescriptions against violence. This 
contrasts sharply with the agriculturalists— Gujars and 
Jats— and the tribals, many, families of whom have a relative 
in the armed forces. (One Jat had served with Nehru's peace­
keeping force in the Congo and three others had fought against 
Japanese and more recently Chinese forces in NEFA).
In the main, today, sons of Mahajans who are residing 
outside Mandi are attending college or university. There are 
only four of these and they study exclusively business orien­
ted. subjects e.g. business administration, accountancy, and
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commercial law. However, some entirely new businesses have 
been established in Jaipur which are operated by sons or 
younger brothers. These are regarded as offshoots of the 
family business and the policies of the parent company and 
its offspring are closely integrated. For example Gujar Mai's 
son Narender runs a transport business in the capital which 
handles the shipments of grain, oil seeds and spices from 
the family brokerage business and.also the processed daIda 
from the oil mill. In addition, Narender manages the leasing 
of trucks and tankers to the general public, in effect the 
Mahajans of Mandi. Similarly Madan Gopal's brother, though a 
jeweller, is advantageously placed in the city to deal with 
the commodity licenses needed for the grocery business in 
Mandi.and any problems of lost goods or failed payments which 
arise at that end. Madan Gopal's eldest son has been appren­
ticed to the same uncle and will probably enter the jewellery 
trade himself when he comes of age. There is insufficient work 
to keep all three boys occupied.as adults with their own sons 
in one shop. Also, the expansion of the trade in gem-stones 
in Jaipur since the promotion of tourism presents great oppor­
tunities for merchants with capital, to spare. It is worth 
noting that the elder brother's .business was initially estab­
lished with capital diverted from, the family grocery business 
and he served his apprenticeship in.the house of his maternal 
uncle, a long established firm of jewellers in Johari Bazaar 
in Jaipur, the heart of the gem-stone business.
These offshoot companies are owned by the richer families 
of Mandi. This is because the wealthy families alone have the 
spare capital and hence risk-taking orientation to venture 
into business expansion extra-locally. If a business does 
not prosper as anticipated the shoots can be retracted and 
found occupation in the familiar environment where credit is 
good, ties established and business secure. In general, however, 
there is a strong correlation with the genealogical, expansion 
or decline of the family and a weaker correlation with external
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demand. Bajrang Lai's family is pre-dominant in the cloth 
trade today largely because he has an elder brother still 
living and four adult sons. Two sons work permanently in the 
cloth shop which the elder brother, Narayan Lai, supervises. 
This enables Bajrang Lai to pursue his political career as 
a member of the Municipal Board. Another son is in the 
Indian Administrative Service who can 'fix up licenses'(to 
quote Bajrang La3) ,and the fourth manages the Ice Factory.
By contrast Madan Gopal handles so much trade at the gro­
cery shop that he could profitably separate the wholesaling 
from the retailing side. However with, the oldest boy in 
Jaipur and the other two merely little children "who would 
do the work?" When Madan Gopal had a near fatal motorcycle 
accident Ramdas had to be recalled from Jaipur and his 
wife's brother's son Subhash employed to keep the business 
going. Now that he is well enough to sit in the shop again 
and supervise the youngest boys, Subhash has been returned 
to the Devalalr-Durgalal commission, agency. Although a rela­
tive, he is not close enough to be trusted completely. Where 
there are no sons,, the business will eventually collapse 
unless a son-in-law can be persuaded to incur the ignominy 
of being a gher jawai (son-in-law of the house) or unless 
male children are adopted. In chapter seven it was pointed 
out that the Patni patrilineage has had recourse to both 
these strategies to ensure the continuity of the family 
and firm.
These examples show that the decision to expand or 
contract business is dependent, on family structure. Family 
circumstances also determine, the likely time for such deci­
sions. The presence of several adolescent boys in the house­
hold acts as a spur to expansion, due to the necessity for 
considering their anticipated, wives and children and the 
means by which increased business may be managed. It is 
time for a hard look at the family, resources, especially
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with regard to the future exploitation of incoming dowry. 
Hence a periodic re-assessment of capital and re-organisation 
of business is a familiar process in.Mandi. It is an essen­
tial element in the developmental, cycle of Mahajan families.
RESOURCES
Capital for new enterprises is often raised by land sales 
or alternatively property is mortgaged to the bank or to 
other businessmen.. Because almost, every Mahajan family owns 
some property there is the feeling that every.family is 
potentially wealthy. It goes without saying that some 
families have been more successful than others and that 
success is based upon initial.surplus capital plus business 
acumen and also some degree of good fortune.
It is possible to break into.business; one man started 
a tea stall by the bus stand with an initial investment of 
only Rs.25 and is now the owner of his 'hotel' but to run 
large scale, more conventional businesses requires consider­
able capital. To give an example from the commission agents, 
Pradhan Ji, the only Gujar in business in Mandi, had to 
find an initial, outlay of Rs.10,000 to start in the broker­
age business 15 years ago. He bought the land outright, for 
Rs.4,000 and it cost another Rs.6,000 to put up his shop. 
Nowadays of course it would require at least five or six 
times that amount, which does not include running capital. 
Other examples were discussed above.
However, the material resources of the wealthiest fami­
lies have been accumulated and consolidated over generations, 
cash reserves being transformed into property, which in turn 
provides the capital for innovation. Although, practically 
speaking, property is held in the firm grip of the malik, 
it is felt to belong to the family in perpetuity. Because
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male members of the lineage share jointly in the family 
property, each individual is prepared to sacrifice his own 
interests and work for the good of the whole, even though 
he may not benefit tangibly in his own lifetime * Because 
family labour is 'unpaid1, the family as a business enter­
prise had the advantage that, during times of stress, out­
goings can be reduced quickly. Without this, it is doubtful
3
whether many of the smaller businesses could survive.
The fact that private business makes use of this parti­
cular economic input has another, important effect— without 
sons to take over the family business, not only is there no 
incentive to innovate, it is simply impossible. Each family, 
then, reacts individually to 'modernisation' because each has 
its own resources and requirements. A family with several 
sons and their future families to provide for will react 
differently from a family with no sons, or one with more 
daughters than sons. Property may be bought with surplus cash, 
when the market is favourable, to provide dowry when it is 
resold at a.future date; it may be mortgaged immediately 
to provide capital for business expansion; it may be left 
alone to provide a little nest egg for the future if, say, 
there is any 'difficulty' over sales tax. A large scale scheme 
of planned development, requiring many business families to 
expand large amounts of capital simultaneously runs contrary 
to this regime of family needs and resources.
LEADERSHIP. AND AUTHORITY
The family and the firm are regarded the Mahajans as synony­
mous. As Fox puts it "in Tezibazar there are 'business 
families^ not family businesses." by which he means that 
€h^ .BE'fiia^ oi? > traditional merchant castes) retain the majority 
of business concerns" (Fox, 1969, p. 143). Although many firms 
are legally organised and registered as partnerships as dis­
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cussed in chapter seven the constituent partners are usually 
from the same patrilineage and resident in the same house­
hold. A good example of this is the 'five firms' irftntby 
Erem.Chand Sogani.
Each family has a recognised, pattern of authority, major 
decisions being taken by the head of the household, who is 
usually the oldest living male member. He takes the title 
of malik which signifies his authority. His wife is known as 
the malkin and holds a similar position of authority over the 
women of the house. Mahajans assert, that women are ignorant 
and know nothing of business but nonetheless older women 
may wield quite considerable influence behind the scenes.
So, for example, when, the firm of Chirgan Lai— Gulab Chand 
showed signs of foundering due to a series of bad judgements 
by the malik, Chinni Chand, his wife took control of the 
purse strings. Through the sons she started a sari business 
semi-secretly at home in order to save his face and tide 4V\e- 
family over the crisis. Sons may also have considerable 
influence in family decisions, particularly those with 
college or university education, which is business-related. 
Frequently their opinions are taken into account as illust­
rated above but the malik1s decision is final.
A malik who is reasonably successful in business will 
continue as head of his household.or shop until he dies 
or becomes incapacitated. If however there is a serious comm­
ercial setback and his sons are mature and enterprising it 
often happens that the old firm is liquidated and a new 
concern in a slightly different line of business and some­
times a different name is established with a son at the head. 
This is a common way for new businesses to be started and 
is a technique for keeping the prestige of the patrilineage 
intact. In the Todwal family, Jagdish now holds the purse 
strings in lieu of his father Durga Lai who lost the ward 
seat to his younger brother Giri Raj. The honour of the
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household has been avenged.since Jagdish's mother subse­
quently defeated her husband's brother. But Durga Lai rarely 
sits in the brokerage business since the defeat, leaving all 
financial decisions to Jagdish, in consultation with Sital 
Prasad.
The rivalry between the two brothers of the senior genera­
tion shows that quarrels can and do occur. This was a cause 
celebre, however, and rivalries are usually contained within 
the family and not allowed to destroy it. Because a patri­
lineage shares a common reputation there is a common interest 
in presenting a united front against a critical community. 
Families which have divided their worldly goods down to the 
last teaspoon and live separately still tend to run their 
businesses jointly. The explanation for the split is always 
that the women of the house were constantly squabbling, but 
the fact that many households dissolve after the death of 
the malik would tend to refute this. Presumably because of 
the intensive stress on united action, independence is highly 
valued and the disintegration of households has taken place 
to achieve increased, independence of brothers from each other. 
It is therefore not surprising that private development, 
where a certain degree of independence is possible for each 
household, has had more success than public development, where 
a certain amount of independence, must be surrendered. This 
will be demonstrated in the second section of this chapter, 
which discusses the failure of.the public sector in economic 
development.
In short, private development has prospered because it 
centres around the family. The dynamism of business in Mandi 
can be explained almost wholly by the control of the family 
in this sector. The family possesses a good formal leader­
ship structure.and communication system. There is a strong 
incentive to resolve quarrels.rand a,vmoral obligation of working 
towards a common interest. The logic of seniority amongst
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brothers being attached to primogeniture and sequence of 
birth in a family provides for an established chain of 
command. At the same time as we have seen provision is made 
for incapacity to be managed in such a way as to minimise 
loss of prestige. Associated with this family structure 
of management, organisation, are a complex of behavioural 
traits, which maximise the.accumulation of capital.
The municipality is the arena of action in public 
development. Would-be industrial.entrepreneurs are required 
to come to meetings and agree on.decisions about the pro­
vision of roads and their layout and what services (water 
and electricity) are required and.how they should be disposed 
The development'of modern industry involves very large sums 
of money and external political connections. It is important 
that businessmen should agree on issues and priorities. Out­
side agencies deal, with Mandi as a unit through the local 
representative of the Tonk Industrial Development Association 
and there is a feeling by outsiders that Mahajans should act 
as a community. However, community action is difficult and, 
at the time of writing, externally sponsored economic develop 
ment seems to have failed. The reasons for the failure of 
planned economic change must be seen against the success of 
private enterprise. These, reasons can be analysed under the 
same framework as above.
INNOVATION IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
Brij Raj Kishore Pareek, commonly known as Anmol (meaning 
lucky) is generally recognised as the man behind industrial 
development in. Mandi. He left Jaipur University about five 
or six year ago, having gained an M.Sc. in Chemistry for 
research .into alternative ways of manufacturing candles, 
that did not depend upon imported oil-based constituents. 
Anmol was keen to put his ideas into practice and wanted to
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put up a factory in Jhotwara, an industrial development zone
just outside Jaipur where his parents live. The Director of
4the Rajasthan Development Corporation, a government body, 
advised him instead to go to Mandi as land and labour were 
cheap and plentiful. Also he could get government help in 
the form of financial loans since Mandi is considered to be 
a priority area for development.
Anmol took his advice and with help from his father 
founded Anmol-Lakh Chand-Vimal Kumar. The Soap and Candle 
Factory began with an initial investment of Rs.5,000, for 
half a ton of wax and some moulds with which to make candles. 
A year later Anmol felt confident enough to branch out into 
soap, which required a further Rs.8,000. Now his investment 
totals Rs.35,000 in the candle industry and one lakh 
(Rs.100,000) in soap. Anmol refused to give further details 
but the business is believed to be profitable. His success 
was noticed, and Anmol, philanthropist, tried to persuade the 
envious to fight for industrialisation. With Padam Chand 
(the graduate in engineering) he founded the Industrial 
Union of Mandi, which later grow into the Tonk District 
Industrial Development Association (TIDA). There are now 
five resident directors all of whom are graduates and one 
deputy director, one of the resident directors being elected 
as President and Anmol as Secretary.
Although registered.with the Government of Rajasthan,
TIDA is a private organisation. Knowing the suspicion with 
which anything to do with the Administration is viewed in 
Mandi, Anmol tried to avoid more Government involvement than 
necessary, to the point of declining the loan which the RDC 
was prepared to negotiate on his behalf from the Rajasthan 
Finance Corporation (RFC), in case this might be interpreted 
as a pay-off from the government. However, some degree of 
government involvement was unavoidable, if only through the
v
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provision of licences for manufacturing and commodity quotas. 
Accordingly, TIDA set itself the task of coordinating with 
the various Government Departments involved on behalf of 
would-be entrepreneurs who required information or advice.
The process snowballed and in September 1974 Mandi was decl­
ared an official Industrial Development Area, so that busi­
nessmen might readily take advantage of the Government help. 
TIDA, liaising constantly with the Block Development Officer 
of the panchayat samiti (the BDO) managed to streamline the 
procedure for applications to the Rajasthan Finance Corpora­
tion and State Aid to Industries (SAI) for loans. Because of 
the 'special neeeds1 of the area, RFC announced that it was ■ 
prepared to advance 75% on fixed capital and lower interest 
rates to 9%.per annum from 12%. SAI agreed to advance up to 
Rs.25,000 for small industries, instead of the previous ceil­
ing of Rs.5,000. The RDC was also primed to give help in the 
form of advice to entrepreneurs on suitable industries.
The inaugural meeting of TIDA was held in the panchayat 
samiti in mid-November 1974, its purpose being to consider 
applications for financial aid and to allocate plots of land. 
These had been purchased by the RDC under the auspices of the 
Municipal Board. The area in. question, previously common 
pasture land, lay between the bazaar and the railway line.
The meeting was chaired by the Collector of Tonk with the 
BDO as secretary. Anmol avoided the meeting, lest it be seen 
as a political line up. The President of the Association is 
a member of the. Jana Sangh (an extreme right wing party) and 
he was afraid that local businessmen might interpret his 
presence to mean that only Jana Sangh sympathisers need 
apply. 77 plots were available for allocation, but only 33 
were ear-marked by local businessmen, although there were 
55 prospective applicants at the meeting.
The problem was that many businessmen regarded the pro­
ceedings as a way of speculating in cheap land in anticipation
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of rising prices, and their plans were vague. The Collector 
of Tonk, however, thought that the procedures for availing 
themselves of financial assistance were still too complica­
ted. An entrepreneur had to register his industry with the 
State Registry of Industries, purchase and mortgage land 
as security, ask for a quotation on machinery and have his 
blueprint verified by an engineer before.applying for an. 
allotment. He felt that two months were perhaps not long 
enough for entrepreneurs to have.their plans ready and in 
consultation with the BDO, who was in more of a position to 
ascertain the situation, adjourned the meeting until 30th 
January, 1975.
In the meantime, work continued on levelling the land, 
constructing access roads and laying water and drainage 
pipes and electric cables. The work was undertaken by the 
Municipal Board, sub-contracted to local construction firms, 
and supervised by the Resident Engineer from the Public Works 
Department (PWD) and the Assistant Engineer of Tonk. Half 
the cost of the roads was. to be met with a grant from the 
PWD of the State, provided that the Municipal Board would 
find the remainder of the money.
The meeting to discuss finalised plans was held in Tonk 
on the agreed date. Only six businessmen attended the meeting 
all from industrialist families. Three of the applications 
were merely requests to shift existing industries to a better 
location nearer the railway line, (sodium silicate, soap and 
candles, oil-extraction). The remainder had not yet reached 
the blueprint stage (a smelter/foundry, ceramics, and dyeing) 
Basic raw materials for the foundry and ceramics would have 
to be imported. There is no tradition of skilled labour in 
the region for metalwork, making handglazed pottery and 
tiles or for hand-blocking textiles. Unskilled labour is 
also in short supply locally. In any event these industries
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would not be viable in this location because of skilled 
competition from Jaipur City, whose historic specialities 
include these self-same fabrications. It was clear that plans ' 
were ill-conceived, derivative, and lacking in essential 
groundwork.
Since then there has been.no further talk of industry 
coming to Mandi. In the late seventies a Punjabi Brahman 
graduate from Jaipur tried to start a carpet (durri) weaving 
factory but.it failed through falling world demand for 'ethnic' 
merchandise. He has now emigrated to America. Anmol disappea­
red shortly after the meeting to get married, stayed in Jai­
pur for a month and now devotes all his time to his own 
business. He is disappointed and.disillusioned and feels 
very bitter. "They prefer to stick to the old way of doing 
things", he complained. "They know how to take advantage of 
other people but they don't know how to take advantage of 
something when it is offered to them. They are too busy look­
ing for the catch. There is plenty of ability in Mandi but 
in the wrong direction".
At the time of writing TIDA1s grassroots development 
scheme seems to have failed. Far from jumping at the oppor­
tunity, the businessmen of Mandi seemed loathe to participate. 
Public opinion generally conceded that should any factories 
be erected it would not happen for many years and that the 
interested parties would be the same as before. I shall try 
to suggest a few reasons why this should be the case.
THE AIM OF INNOVATION
In the same way that family businesses innovate to maintain 
the family there is a general feeling amongst Mahajans- that 
the 'modernisation' of Mandi is laudable, worthwhile, and 
necessary. Although there is some sense of common purpose,
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however, this does not over-ride the first priority of 
merchants— their families. Local businessmen feel that large 
scale development might not necessarily be in their own 
interests and that someone else might benefit at their expense. 
Mahajans assume that everyone works out of self interest and 
thus the protagonists of a.policy must stand to benefit per­
sonally. As Bailey (1973, p. 17) suggests, the pattern of 
innovation in any community will be influenced by the arena 
in which the innovators seek their prizes. Mandi is a rela­
tively isolated place, geographically, and those families 
which play a leading part in modernisation still largely 
compete for prizes within the bazaar. This internalisation 
of competition has restricted economic development in the 
public sector.
Firstly, people living in, each other's pockets have many 
occasions for friction.. Though hostility tends not to emerge 
in violent conflict, it creeps out in the guise of gossip, 
fear of witchcraft and sorcery and the evil eye. In such 
situations harmony is maintained by a facade of politeness 
and feigned ignorance of each other's private views. When 
the same people meet repeatedly, though in different socio­
economic roles, the simplest.policy for a quiet life is to
avoid controversy, lest disagreements in one sphere overflow 
into others and make social life impossible. This is under­
lined by Mahajans' admonitions to "talk sweetly to your
neighbours", "live and let live" and so on.
A large-scale scheme of planned development is a challenge 
to traditional methods of- keeping the peace. Decisions are 
demanded and public decisions.bring private■animosities out 
into the open. As in all small communities, decisions are 
not, and indeed cannot, be made purely on the 'rationality* 
of the situation but on previous lines of friendship or 
enmity. Again, the plans of TIDA demand co-operation, but
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in Mandi friendly relations are not maintained by working 
out the bases of conflict but by minimising opportunities for 
disagreement and talking away disputes^—as discussed in chap­
ter four-^ — instead of solving. them. Community action is thus 
precluded.
Secondly, because business families compete with each 
other, they are jealous of each others' success. Conspicu­
ous accumulation of wealth, tends to be equated with dis­
honesty, because to attribute the success of another family 
to hard work and business acumen is to denigrate the capa­
bilities of one's own. Stories circulate that the wealthier 
businessmen, gained their, wealth through adulteration of 
goods, cheating over prices, moneylending, hoarding, black- 
marketeering and chicanery with.local government officials. 
Such accusations do not discourage the rapid acquisition of 
riches but they do lead to its concealment when accumulated.
Those involved in the development schemes are especially 
singled out for criticism. For one thing it is less easy 
to keep success secret, than in the private sector. To branch 
out into industry, even small-scale industry, requires the 
expenditure of capital and this has the side effect of 
advertising wealth. Because they are in the public eye and 
break customary patterns of.behaviour industrial entrepre­
neurs are highly susceptible to gossip and scandal. It is 
said that they visit prostitutes and non-vegetarian restau­
rants on their business trips and purchase illicit liquo-re* 
The truth of the stories is less important than the fact 
that they are believed. So,, there are few prizes to be gained 
by those who hazard their money, and.reputations on public 
development. Where, a malik is not. only responsible for his 
own past and present actions, but also those of his family 
firm, and embodies the honour of his kin, which in the 
case of certain patrilineages like the Todwals amounts to
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about 150 living individuals, as well as his ancestors; there 
is plenty of mud to sling.
In such a community, the best policy is to avoid attract­
ing attention unduly. It is not surprising that social inter­
action is limited to the household as much as possible and 
that the house and the shop are rigidly compartmentalised.
For this reason, too, potential industrialists are persuaded 
to limit their entrepreneurial activities to socially approved 
and legitimated avenues, in order to maintain stability. Flam­
boyance might bring criticism., envy, and perhaps the evil eye 
and worse and generally make life unbearable. Of course, there 
are exceptions: Gujar Mai is proud of his role as an innovator 
and does not dispute when accorded the.title of a leading 
malik. Having said this, it must.be added that he does not 
command the respect which.the Seths receive.
RESOURCES
As TIDA is a grassroots development scheme, depending upon 
self-directed motivation, entrepreneurs are expected to fur­
nish their own capital, supported by grants from the Rajas­
than Finance Corporation and State.Aid to Industries and 
with back-up from the Public Works Department in the case 
of roads and services. Most businessmen appeared to decline 
the offer of financial, assistance, however, saying that they 
preferred to finance operations, themselves or borrow from 
other businessmen. Part of the reason here is that financial 
help is given in a complicated manner, both the RFC and SAI 
requiring bank guarantees, two other, personal guarantors 
and property to be mortgaged as. security. The bank guaran­
tee is the stumbling block, since the bank must go through 
all the books of the family.firm in order to satisfy the 
concerned government departments and few Mahajans think this 
is a good idea. As. shown in chapter five most Mahajans keep
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two sets of books, one to keep track of their own transac­
tions and the other to show the concerned officials. On the 
whole, they avoid showing them all, since sales tax is compu­
ted from the total amount of annual sales which is recorded 
in one book. It is second nature for Mahajans to be secretive 
about their financial affairs and they are suspicious of 
anyone who shows an interest in what is in more ways than 
one their 'family business'.
Though Mahajans prefer to finance themselves, if possible, 
they are also afraid of tying their capital in what the more 
conservative businessmen regard as wildcat schemes. Roop 
Chand, who is a partner in the Hemant Oil Mill, expressed 
it this way: "What good is a textile factory when you are 
in a corner? All that can be done is to sell textile machinery 
to people who are trying to sell you theirs". That is, Mahajans 
prefer to keep their capital relatively fluid and invisible, 
investing in urban sites or property which can be rented out 
or or sold if necessary. There is typically more demand for 
property on lease than the market can supply in the main 
bazaars. To invest capital in a fixed investment which is 
peripherally located and not readily convertible into other 
uses is regarded as a financial strait-jacket.
The third possibility, obtaining credit from other busi­
nessmen is similarly problematic. Mahajans are unwilling to 
lend very large sums of money over long periods because this 
also limits their financial flexibility. Mortgages will only 
be underwritten if the two parties involved have collabora­
ted closely over time and in a multiplicity of contexts such 
as caste associations or religious and voluntary organisa­
tions. The wealthier Mahajans in Mandi as in Pallavaram 
(Mines, 1972, p. 58) are reticent about taking loans of this 
magnitude from their peers. Their prestige derives from a 
reputation for economic independence and large debts, even
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when economically valid, undermine their public image of 
solidity and stability, assuming that they become known. In 
addition,- since land registration has never been properly 
completed within the Notified Area, this inhibits the mort­
gaging of property between less than close associates because 
of the risk of long drawn out court cases to determine owner­
ship. Hence loans using property as collateral are discouraged, 
thus exacerbating the problem of raising capital, and serious­
ly limiting the choices of investment strategy.
LEADERSHIP AND AUTHORITY
Although the Municipal Board, is regarded as being in autho­
rity over municipal affairs by the State Administration, in 
Mandi its moral authority is a matter of dispute. Municipal 
elections are held approximately every five years. There are 
11 wards within the Notified Area which return one Board 
Member each, and two lady Members are co-opted unless elected. 
The Board Members elect the Chairman from.one of their number 
(though at one time he need not have been elected to the 
Board). During fieldwork the Chairman, a Chamar,. (shoemaker) 
was selected from the Swatantra. Party since it gained the 
majority of seats on the Board.
These 13 men and women control the annual budget of the 
Municipality which gives them a say in development decisions 
(the provision, of roads, water and electricity) . Their autho­
rity in this sphere is ostensibly increased because develop­
ment in a backward region is the concern of the State, which 
therefore deals with the entrepreneurs of Mandi through the 
official channels of local government. At State level the 
Board Members are expected to provide.liaison between local 
entrepreneurs and the Rajasthan. Development Corporation, 
Rajasthan Finance Corporation and State Aid to Industries 
via the. Block Development Officer and the Collector of Tonk,
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in consultation with TIDA.
However, at local level, all those who enter politics 
are thought to be dishonest. Mahajans believe that no one 
enters public affairs for the good of the community. Politi­
cians must be out to make a profit for themselves, other­
wise why spend so much money on the hustings? Success in 
elections requires the expenditure of huge sums of money.
Prem Chand makes no secret of the fact that he spent over 
Rs.30,000 only to "hose, which probably means that this is 
an underestimate. Councillors too are expected to forward 
the interest of their own factions or political parties at 
everyone else1s expense.
Public figures are basically suspect, therefore scandal 
is easily believed. By virtue of being Members of the Munici­
pal Board these men, and women, place their reputations in 
jeopardy and can easily be accused of political dishonesty 
and favouritism..Although the Mahajans are unable to agree 
on positive plans for development, they can easily unite 
together in opposition each with his own specific criticism 
or grievance. A shrewd politician, hence does nothing and it 
is hardly a coincidence that the Chairman, Narayan, who has 
taken no action on the development issue and made the baldest 
of public statements on the issues involved is considered to 
be an exemplary public figure.
It has been argued that council participation can remove 
many of the economic and social.risks accompanying development 
(UNICEF 1982, pp. 22-23). By its backing it indirectly enlar­
ges the area of structurally permissible behaviour since it 
is a reference group linking traditional life-styles with 
the modern.era. Group decision-making within socially recog­
nised bodies is nonetheless,as shown in chapter four, a 
culturally sanctioned technique for modifying and ameliorat-
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ing the actions of individuals who act without the sanction 
of local approval. Could not this be extended to cover the 
novel behaviour of the industrialists whose developmental 
activities are also classified as deviance?
The problem here is that, unlike some South Asian 
villages, there are no groups outside of the Mahajan house­
hold with sufficient solidarity, outlook, leadership or 
communication systems to push through development schemes.
The Municipal Board cannot.fulfill this function. Panchayats 
are called to mediate in problems which have arisen rather 
than to take concrete, forward-planning measures. The famil­
ial organisation and capitalisation of commercial concerns 
restricts the activities of trade organisations. Business 
associations meet sometimes to discuss common problems and 
to regulate business practices but decisions are not recor­
ded. Meetings are arranged by invitation and the most res­
pected person present 'takes the chair'. However, regular 
meetings are not necessary and they are called to resolve 
difficulties which have arisen rather than to plan and take 
decisions with a forward time perspective. Caste associations 
and religious and voluntary organisations similarly take a 
different focus, in their goal-orientations towards social 
and religious welfare.
It is possible to discern class groups emerging, in the 
formation of an elite class of industrialist innovators. Their 
status in the eyes of the community is founded on prosperity 
and their nation-oriented transactions and social networks. 
Every family would like to emulate their wealth and it is 
the sheer speed of accumulation which is so impressive to 
other households. But although the status and power of the 
innovator have been considered by many writers to be a 
necessary precondition for the acceptance of an innovation, 
the activities of the entrepreneurs have affected most members
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of the Mahajan community without leading others to follow 
them.
The reason for this is the Mahajani attitude to familial 
prestige and status. Prestige and status have their roots 
firmly in wealth but all wealthy individuals do not wish 
to become public figures. This is a common attribute amongst 
merchants and traders and is so characteristic that it must 
be a cultural'stereotype. Indeed they avoid the public status 
which their wealth could confer by, for.example, putting up 
a factory or entering public life. Many Mahajans perceive 
greater advantage in standing in the sidelines, purchasing 
the power and influence of others rather than entering the 
lists themselves. During fieldwork I was introduced to half 
a dozen men, all described as "the wealthiest and most influ­
ential businessman in the community" none of whom had been 
characterised as important figures when I arrived. Unlike 
the Todwals, Tongyas, Jhalaunas and so on their names would 
mean nothing to non-Banias. Their status amongst Mahajans 
exists quite outside the general ranking system usually pro­
fessed. None of them have served on the Municipal Board and 
none of them as far as I am aware would wish to do so.
What, is the nature of this sort of prestige? Partly it 
consists of the 'simple' prestige of owning shops and houses 
and being rich. It also consists .of.conformity with valued 
patterns of behaviour as described, in chapter four. Of course, 
some rich Mahajans have become less content with amassing 
capital and seek public acclaim. Padam Chand complained that 
his father had spent two lakhs (Rs.200,000) on the ice factory 
where one lakh would have been sufficient, because he wanted 
an impressive building to help the election campaign. Appa­
rently he can afford to risk his prestige amongst the Mahajan 
community because he is playing for higher stakes and before 
a wider audience. And indeed this is a very.real risk. Maha­
jans who take an interest in politics are nicknamed dadaji
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by other Mahajans. It means 'grandfather' but has all the 
overtones of a 'godfather' in the Mafia. Less wealthy indi­
viduals prefer to play safe. If there is a bad year and a 
malik suffers a grave loss he can nearly always get financial 
help from friends and neighbours, provided that he has banked 
enough social credit with the Mahajan community. This is not 
the case with a wealthy man without prestige. Thus the pres­
tige which is rated s o .highly amongst Mahajans is forfeited 
by becoming an uncha or 'bigshot' .
Though an.elite may be discerned, it in no way functions 
as a group, being deeply scored across by family interests.
Nor is any single family/firm large enough to dominate events. 
Only one group draws members from,different families and meets 
regularly, composed of the adolescent boys and young married 
men who form the ad-lloc - Rami ila. Committee.. They gather 
together in the evenings in the dhabbas by the Bus Stand, 
occasionally making an excursion to the cinema at Tonk. This 
group is less open to criticism.than others because young men 
are expected to be modern in outlook.. Although they are in a 
favourable position.to contact new ideas, they do not have 
the authority or control over resources to bring ’modernisa­
tion' about. In a word, they are too young to provide leader­
ship in a community which is essentially gerontocratic. Nor 
are they specially interested in the issues involved in 
development,.being primarily a leisure group.
SUMMARY
In this chapter, I have attempted to compare the vitality 
of private gain with the sluggishness of economic development 
which is externally directed (in part). In short, concerted, 
community decision-making is precluded because the interest 
and independence of the family is felt to be endangered. Large 
scale, planned development is impeded by the wariness of
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others' motives, jealousy of other families' socio-economic 
success, gossip and scandal mongering which characterise 
relations between local family firms. It is also hindered 
by the suspicion of politicians and everything to do with 
politics, almost at times amounting to paranoia, which is a 
social reflex of the mutually mistrustful Mahajans. Few 
families are prepared to provide leadership, except by un­
willing example, and there is a lack of accepted authority 
or leadership structures which might remove many of the 
perceived risks, both economic and social, tangential to 
proposed development programmes. Conspicuous success is 
harshly criticised as self-assertiveness and those who have 
made what is regarded as too great a show of wealth— espe­
cially newly acquired wealth'— are thought to be deviant or 
dangerous.
By contrast, the reasons for the success of modernisation 
in the private sector centre around the efficiency of the 
family as an economic organisation. The family shares pro­
perty jointly and hence has the incentive to keep quarrels 
under control, and to work together purposefully towards 
jointly agreed goals. Property provides the capital and 
security to start new ventures and because each manages its 
own resources, families can react individually to change, 
investing, according to their individual needs. Lastly, the 
family uses cheap labour, its own members, which results 
in managerial flexibility and a high rate.of savings, and 
its genealogical, expansion .or decline, provide,c the stimulus 
or deterrent to new endeavours.
How much stress should be placed on the fear of becoming 
entan.gLe.d-. in bureaucratic procedures, government regulations 
and external interference, that is to say extrinsic factors, 
and how much on Mahajan family pressures is a difficult ques­
tion to tackle. Anticipated loss of independence, more than
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anything else, would seem to make Mahajans hesitant to become 
involved with external political processes. Doing business 
is valued above all other occupations because it permits 
maliks to be their own boss. An important reason for their 
attachment to business is therefore the independence it gives. 
As one of the Muslim merchants of Pallavaram says "a shopkeeper 
does not have to battle seniority and the whims of his employ­
er for a raise" (Mines, 1972, p. 107). It is worth reitera­
ting Bajrang Lai's remark that "This is a kingly job. One 
can sit and do one's own work without needing to ask anyone 
anything". Allied to this consideration is the possibility 
that industry on a public scale could lead to greater impor­
tance being given to educated/modern/trained younger men in 
town affairs. Though this, as yet, is implicit rather than 
explicit, there can be little doubt that elders fear the 
loss of initiative in leadership to them.
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CONCLUSION
In this thesis I have endeavoured to organise ethnographic 
data concerning the traditional merchant castes of Rajas­
than in such a way as to make intelligible the negative 
response to planned economic development in a Rajasthani 
bazaar town. Since my aim has been the translation of cul­
ture, in the sense that a key focus has been to show how 
certain concepts function in stimulating or hindering 
change according to context, sociological jargon has been 
kept to a minimum. It Is contradictory to assert that the 
goal of the field researcher in anthropology is cross 
cultural understanding, if the results of subsequent re­
search are incomprehensible except to area experts. This 
consideration takes on an added impetus when research 
is undertaken on a topic which may possibly have relevance 
for scholars and others who are interested in the process
of economic development and social change.
On the whole I have reversed the economists' usual 
techniques and have tended to underplay the quantification 
of costs and benefits in order to bring social and cultural 
constraints upon planned change to the forefront. Becker 
(1976, p. 5) asserts that "The combined assumptions of 
maximising behaviour, market equilibrium, and stable 
preferences, used relentlessly and unflinchingly, form 
the heart of the economic approach as I see it" and he is 
not alone in looking towards social anthropology to suppliy 
data on what the stable preferences in a cultural context
are and how they are likely to change.
In the introductory chapter, the question was posed of 
whether socially sustained concepts (and therefore, by 
implication, steady as opposed to static preferences?) control
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innovation and inhibit perception. It was suggested that 
concepts are as likely to hide reality as to reveal it and 
that masking it may be part of their social function. There­
fore there is a need to interpret concepts against the back­
ground of a known social context. Accordingly, by way of 
making a beginning, the general ecological features of Mandi 
and its region were discussed. It was shown that trade and 
commerce were essential to the development of the settlement. 
The natural possibilities of the environment have encouraged 
long distance trading in food grains and spices. In the 
last decades, commercial functions have been augmented by 
the growth of small-scale industry in the form of vegetable 
oil mills, subsequent to the introduction of groundnut cul­
tivation. Another consequence of the town's specific loca­
tional characteristics has been a disturbed political history 
and unfamiliarity with modern electoral processes at the time 
of independence. It was argued that uncertainty about the 
role of politics and politicians, coupled with a perception 
of governmental functions as dangerous, have been responsi­
ble for a negative evaluation of external administrative 
agencies.
The following chapter discussed the demographic features 
of the town. The rapid growth of population, which has more 
than doubled in the last thirty years due to incoming migra­
tion, was indicated. This has resulted in the proliferation 
of caste and ethnic groups and of religious and linguistic 
affiliations, the Mahajans or traditional merchant castes 
forming the dominant social category. The urban caste frame­
work was delineated and its implications for the' customary 
patterns of patron-client relations (the jajitiani system) 
described. It was suggested that the increasing heterogen­
eity of the urban population has resulted in the commercia­
lisation of traditional occupations and impersonalisation 
of social life which is locally portrayed as related to the 
Mahajans1 dominance in municipal affairs. An outline of the
334
economic organisation of the bazaars substantiated the theme 
of Mahajani dominance. Their concentration in the most luc­
rative business enterprises and control over town property, 
particularly in the prestigious central area, were demons­
trated. Mahajans are not only the biggest employers of 
labour but even as employees have access to better economic 
opportunities as accountants and managers. Moreover, not all 
newcomers have prospered equally and success in business 
was linked to the degree of connectedness with the network 
of credit relations in the bazaar, controlled by Mahajans.
The fourth chapter discussed the processes of community 
formation amongst the traditional, merchant castes. It was 
argued that the structure of caste and kinship organisation 
provide a blueprint for the integration of migrant Mahajan 
households and participation in the activities of the ritual 
and voluntary associations makes this operational. Thus a 
category of disparate though similar castes becomes trans­
formed into a moral community, taking its identity from 
shared cultural traits, such as language, diet and dress, 
and norms of behaviour characterised by sobriety and frug­
ality, including the willingness to be guided by the moral 
authority of the seths, or elders.
Through their mediation in local disputes they demonst­
rate leadership. The seths1 authority derives in part from 
their extreme wealthiness, which is believed to be the God- 
given reward for meritorious behaviour. Two key concepts 
were analysed, specifically labh and dharma, and these 
were used to construct a model of righteous action which 
finds its apotheosis in the image of the seth. In the fifth 
chapter it was concluded that the seth, as a concept, stands 
midway between two historically sustained models of mercan­
tile behaviour, each logically presupposing the existence 
of the other. These consist of the kanju (miser) and the
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nawab (profligate). The aspiration of Mahajan families is 
to avoid these two extremes, endeavouring instead to estab­
lish and maintain connections with other Mahajan families 
which will persist through time and be mutually beneficial. 
In this way fiscal advantage is transformed into social and 
economic credit and, ultimately, religious merit.
The degree of fit between indigenous business ideology 
and the actual organisation of business was discussed in the 
sixth chapter. It was argued that correspondence was not 
total and that industrial entrpreneurship, taking the form 
of investment in oil mills, posed a challenge to the autho­
rity and leadership of the Seths. Other families, while 
respecting them for 'making good1, are suspicious of the 
industrial entrepreneurs on account of their wider social 
and economic ties and involvement in politics. In a society 
which equates wealth with merit acquired through morally 
consistent behaviour, their wealth can be alternatively 
represented as speculation, which is negatively valued 
because of its instability. Therefore, although the indus­
trial entrepreneurs are accorded some status, the prestige 
accruing to them is of a different kind from the seths.
This is symbolised in the designation of entrepreneur- 
politicians as halki, meaning lightweight or flimsy, as 
opposed to asli, implying the genuine article or ’real 
thing'.
In the seventh chapter, the need of the industrial entre­
preneurs for increasingly wider connections was shown to be 
manifested in changing patterns of marriage. It was argued 
that, in a situation of ambiguity concerning the arrange­
ment of marriages, related to status ambivalence, Mahajans 
are competing to make their own justifications for making 
choices prevail over each others' definitions. Further con­
sequences of the familial organisation of business were
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shown to be the fact that genealogical expansion or decline 
is the prime factor in the development of the firm and that 
a particular pattern of social relations prevails between 
households, which precludes interaction outside predefined 
social contexts.
Negative response to externally proposed development 
plans was contrasted in the final chapter, with the vitality 
of self-generated private enterprise, thus permitting an 
evaluation of the validity of socially sustained concepts 
as explanations for the acceptance or rejection of change.
It was shown that the cultural constraints on receptiveness 
to further industrial development, centred on the town in 
the public sector, acted as positive incentives towards 
development in the private sector, and therefore the need to 
interpret concepts in a specific context, where the attitudes 
of people can be assessed and compared with actual behaviour. 
I conclude with reference to a remark made by Dumont (1970, 
p. 2 0): "Man does not only think, he acts. He has not only 
ideas, but values. To adopt a value is to introduce a hierar­
chy and a certain hierarchy of things, ideas and people is 
indispensible to social life".
To put that another way, when something new comes along, 
people make guesses about its meaning by setting it into 
an already existing matrix of concepts, attitudes, values 
and beliefs. Taken at face value, this seems to be an 
assumption that ideologies are eternal, that they are not 
subject to modification by experience. It would clearly be 
a mistake to get stuck in that rut again, so we need to 
think about the way in which concepts might change. It 
seems clear that to understand response to situations of 
change we need to know not only what hierarchy of values 
links the concepts in question, but also the nature of the 
encapsulating milieu, making one interpretation more
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important than another at any point in time. As Bailey 
(1974, p. 56) points out, cultural items are differently 
vzlued at different levels in the hierarchy, each higher level 
apparently superseding the one below until one reaches 'God's 
will' or 'business is business' or 'my family against the 
world'^— whatever happens to be the trump card in that parti­
cular culture. However, all of these, including sometimes 
what had appeared to be fundamental moral imperatives may 
be subject to trading-off calculations as people sort out 
their preferences. The process of redefining ideology must 
nonetheless be a lengthy one, the outcome not just of experi­
ence but also of social conflict, as people compete to impose 
on one another their own definitions of what is happening and 
what ought to be happening.
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FOOTNOTES
INTRODUCTION
1,. Recently the economic approach has become even more
abrasive particularly in the Chicago School: "Prices 
and other market instruments allocate the scarce re­
sources within a society and thereby constrain the 
desires of participants and co-ordinate their actions. 
In the economic approach these market instruments 
perform most, if not all, of the functions assigned 
to 'structure' in sociological theories".
(Becker, 1976, p. 5).
2. Though, to be fair, "No doubt it is easy to criti­
cise the blinkered approach that so many economists 
and planners still display towards economic develop­
ment. It is, however, much more difficult to work 
out a reasonable multi-dimensional approach".
(Epstein, in Epstein and Penny, 1973, p. 244).
3. In economic theory however, entrepreneur is the name 
given to the owner-manager of a firm. The functions of 
the entrepreneur are to: (a) supply the capital of a 
firm; (b) organize production by buying and combining 
inputs; (c) decide on the rate of output, in the light 
of his expectations about demand; and (d) bear the 
risk involved in these activities, risks which in­
evitably arise out of the fact that resources must
be committed to production before the output can be 
sold. Profits constitute the income of the entrepre­
neur. Like the firm itself in economic theory, the 
entrepreneur is a theoretical abstraction, although 
he does have an empirical counterpart in the many 
small firms in the economy (Bannock, Baxter and 
Rees:,; 1972, p. 141).
4. Throughout Northern India, there are many versions 
of this, but in Eastern Rajasthan it is told with 
specific reference to the trading community of Mandi. 
The local version is this:
Once there was a; merchant called Lallaji 
who was caught red-handed at -cheating and 
taken before the magistrate. He was found 
guilty, but the magistrate was merciful 
and asked him if he would prefer to be 
hanged or executed by firing squad. The 
merchant replied: "Just a minute, I'will 
ask my accountant".
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5. The terms public' and 'private' are relative. In an 
almost completely free-market economy, such as India, 
the term 'public' popularly means anything that the 
government has a hand in. In a mixed economy, such
as Britain, the 'public' sector consists of those 
enterprises which the government actually runs e.g. 
the National Coal Board and British Steel Corpora­
tion. Thus while British Petroleum, which is 48.1% 
owned by the British Government, it is not regarded 
as being 'public sector' in Britain, in Mandi it 
would be a public enterprise. Concomitant with these 
standpoints, in Britain, a certain amount of govern­
ment concern with the conduct of business (e.g. 
conforming with food and drugs acts or weights and 
measures regulations) is regarded as not only un­
avoidable but positively beneficial. In Mandi any 
form of government interference is regarded as 
unnecessary.
6. Put simply, the central objective of economic 
development is to raise the living standard and 
general well-being of the people. This has several 
ingredients^increasing the importance of industrial 
as opposed to agricultural activity, migration of 
labour from rural to industrial urban areas, lessen­
ing dependence upon imports of producer and consumer 
goods and as agricultural and industrial raw materials 
as exports, decreasing reliance upon aid to provide 
funds for investment. Another group of ingredients 
consists.of social and political reforms— revision
of land tenure system, greater democratisation of 
political systems and so on, though these are by 
no means inevitable.
7. The scope of perspectives on entrepreneurs ranges 
far beyond the economic realm, and under the wider 
context of the term is included a whole gamut of 
interpretations, which shade off into political 
anthropology— action sets, quasi-groups and networks, 
patrons and brokers, and so on. This is implicit of 
course in the transactionalist approach but limita­
tions of time and space preclude any more than a 
mere mention of it. The same holds true for the 
large body of literature on redistributional 
entrepreneurs and 'big men' in Oceania.
8. Rational behaviour, from the economists perspective, 
is a certain type of learned behaviour which approxi­
mates closely to maximising, a function in which a 
limited number of quantities and prices are the 
variables. The economic agent or actor has learned
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to adjust the quantities he consumes or.produces 
in accordance with the change of relative prices 
and of his own aggregate or anticipated income.
How he actually achieves this provided that he 
does, is not actually relevant to the economists 
enquiry. The fact that many primitive (and not so 
primitive) people fail to do this has occasioned 
the formalist/substantivist controversy concerning 
the transferability of economic analysis to non­
western situations. Economists these days are widen­
ing their analyses to include human behaviour quite 
outside their traditional fields, for example, "the: 
quantity and quality of children". See Becker, 1976 
for a summary of recent approaches.
9. The word 'ideology' tends to have two senses in 
the social sciences. The first set of meanings 
relates to a more or less social set of ideas and 
values, beliefs and attitudes. Therefore, it, is 
possible to speak of the ideology of a social system 
or of the ideology of just one aspect of a social 
system such as religion or kinship. The second set 
of meanings relates to a manner of thinking charac­
teristic of a social class, representative of their 
partisan interests. Hence this is related to the 
ideas of politico-economic theory. The third set, 
the Science of ideas, particularly of ideas at the 
basis of some economic or political system has fallen 
into abeyance. The rationality of Calvinism as an 
ideology properly belongs to this last set. For a 
fuller examination of current terminological slants 
see Dumont (1972, pp. 73-76 and 311-312) who observes 
in passing that "the fact is universal: if it reflec^- 
ted only the data, and reflected it completely, the 
system of ideas and values would cease to be capable 
of orienting action, it would cease to be itself". 
(Dimprit, v1972p;p. 75).
10. R...H, Tawney in Max Weber's The Protestant Ethic 
and the Spirit, of Capitalism (trans., Talcott 
Parsons), foreward pp. 1-3.
11. Harris comments acidulously: "What now passes for 
wisdom amongst my colleagues is that science is a 
western disease; that alternative ways of knowing 
should never be compared; that Carlos Casteneda's 
hundred foot gnats are as real as anything else;
that all descriptions of social life are fabrications; 
that it is useless to search for objective truth; that 
empirical research is nothing but a dirty bourgeois 
trick". Harris, New York Times, November 26, 1978.
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Harris makes the same point though less acerbically 
in Cows, Pigs, Wars and Witches: The Riddles of 
Culture -'"why many customs and institutions seem 
so mysterious is that we have been taught to value 
elaborate 'spiritualized' explanations of cultural 
phenomena more than down-to-earth material ones". 
(Harris, 1977, p. 12). The fact that this book is 
aimed at the popular market does not detract from 
the validity of his criticism.
12. Very much more (and possibly more informative) 
work has been instituted by historians or completed 
with an historical perspective, notably Timberg 
(1971, 1973, 1978), Kling (1966, 1969), Bayly 
(1973, 1975). Mention should also be made of Lamb's 
studies of merchants in Bombay (1955, 1959) and 
also of Gadgil (1959), Moreland (1920, 1923),
Anstey (1929), Jain (1929). and Buchanan (1934). 
Millman (1954) and Coren (1967) to my knowledge 
have never published any part of their disser­
tations .
13. Moris (1981) has itemised no less than twenty
of the problematic attributes of Third and Fourth 
World administrative subcultures which various 
writers have mentioned as systemic weaknesses.
Moris notes however, that in stressing the greater 
efficiency of western management there is a tendency 
to overlook inconvenient examples, like the Cosa 
Nostra (deviant but highly effective) and whole 
bureaucracies which embody what would otherwise 
be judged as non-western concepts. See also Luigi 
Barzini's The Italians for a fascinating review 
of the Italian case.
14. See for example Coren (1967), Benedict (1968),
Fox (1969), Geertz (1963), Hazlehurst (1968) et al, 
the usual point at issue being the problem of 
effective decision-making and authority structures. 
Gupta 1976 and Agarwal 1975 however suggest that 
the family has a greater incentive to solve 
personality difficulties and to keep quarrels to 
a minimum since the family shares property jointly. 
There is a definite tendency to assume that the 
family firm will wither away as economic develop­
ment proceeds, to be replaced by more 'rational', 
bureaucratic organisations. This has been challenged 
by Cameron (1977): "Turning an organisation man 
into an entrepeneur". It is a pity that her interest­
ing ideas on family business have been confined to 
a review article on the "Small Firms Management
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Service at Sheffield Polytechnic" published in 
The Financial Times, 14.11.1977.
15. So far I have avoided using the word 'caste' which 
may perhaps seem strange in the context of a social 
anthropological study dealing with South Asia. The 
omission is deliberate, as this is emphatically 
not intended to be yet another study of the caste 
system. To introduce the issue of caste at this 
stage would be to raise a number of 'red herrings' 
which will be better dealt"., with in chapter two, 
which deals with the social context of the study.
CHAPTER ONE
1. See Schrader, 1968 for further details on the comp­
licated process whereby Rajputana became Rajasthan. 
Rajasthan means 'land of the kings' and Rajputana 
'land of the kings’ sons'. The Rajputs are the prince­
ly caste and are divided into ranked clans and line­
ages. Thus the royal Rajput clans rank higher than 
the commoner and among the former the lineagescof 
eldest sons rank higher than those of younger sons— or 
cadet branches. As a consequence of status differen­
tiation based on descent lines, the Rajputs also 
developed marked territorial gradations, with the 
royal Rajputs concentrated in the state capitals and 
the junior lineages dispersed to the periphery. Hence 
the autonomous princely states were subdivided into
an even greater number of semi-independent prince­
doms and-within.these an even greater category of 
Rajput jagirdars (landlords) who were given guaran­
teed estates with some governmental powers. Chief 
among these were the right to collect tax revenue 
from his jagir in return for payment of a set fee 
and/or services, such as mustering an army.
2. I have avoided being specific in the possible 
forlorn hope that the identity of informants might 
be protected. Clearly this is more difficult to 
effect in the case of a small town than a village, 
for there are only six urban centres in Tonk District. 
Some merchants asked me to mask their identity. It 
has also become an anthropological tradition to do 
so. Moreover, the use of a pseudonym underscores my 
contention that the events of the mid-seventies in 
Mandi might very well have taken place in other 
small towns in India, though with appropriate adjust­
ments for local ecological determinants.'Mandi' means
a market or market town.
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3. The desert areas of the world are characterised 
by specific types of economy and society centred 
upon long distance trade, dependent upon the fact 
that the 'Hot Deserts' separate different cosmic 
ecological zones (Cohen, 1969b, pp. 5-7, 17-20). 
Surrounding these deserts, the great cities of 
history grew in response to the risky and therefore 
profitable trade engendered by the exchange of com­
modities between the tropical and temperate worlds. 
Their location and situation was determined by 
caravan routes through the deserts, the exact 
demarcation of which depended on water.
4. Thus Pettigrew has argued that the Punjab has more 
in common with Pakistan and the Middle East than 
other parts of South. Asia and with certain reser­
vations I feel this may cover Rajasthan as well 
(Pettigrew, 1975). Rajasthan looks west, rather than 
south or east in its primary cultural orientation, 
especially since the closure of the border with 
Pakistan— which has made smuggling even more att­
ractive a proposition. Rameshwar comments "murderers, 
kidnappers and smugglers moved with impunity across 
its sandy wastes" (Rameshwar, 1962, p. 124). See 
also Pehrson (1966) and Ahmed (1980) for a dis­
cussion o f .the.patron-client relationship between 
naik and haitisaya (tribal protector and dependent 
trader, usually Hindu or, Sikh) in the NWFP and 
Baluchistan.
5. Sleeman's phrsuit of the thuggees (religiously 
inspired robbers and murderers) were concentrated
in the Jaipur (Jypore) area and he specifically men­
tions the vicinity of Mandi as a centre of thug 
operations (Sleeman,. 1933, pp. 54-55, 109-11 ’& *154) . 
Judging from operations elsewhere it seems feasible 
to speculate that merchants in the unit of study 
advanced money for thug expeditions and act as 
receivers for stolen goods, occasionally providing 
shelter and protection. Although the thugs were 
rounded up over 100 years ago, dacoits continue to 
be a problem. During fieldwork, the town was raided 
twice by armed robber gangs.
6. Over the years'Marwar'has acquired a variety of 
meanings. The first is that of language. G.A. Grierson 
asserts: "The western dialect (of Rajasthani) Marwari, 
is by far the most important. It is the vernacular
of Marwar, Mewar, Bikaner, and Jaisalmer and its 
speakers, who are enterprising merchants and bankers, 
have carried it all over India. It is the most typi­
cal of the Rajasthani.dialects and has a copious
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literature, written in a peculiar character, the 
aspect of which is familiar to every official who 
has had occasion to inspect the accounts of native 
bankers" (Grierson, 1909, pp. 367-68). Implicit in 
this statement is the geographic connotation whefdby 
everyone whose family originates from Marwar is 
called Marwari, regardless of caste. Since the 
middle of the last century however, Marwari has 
come to be applied to not only members of a 
restricted group of merchant castes, who are native 
to Marwar (Mahajans) but also to any trader (Bania) 
from Rajasthan and, in some cases, whose descendants 
are native to the entire area which was once contro­
lled by the Rajputs— Punjabi, Gujerati or even Uttar 
Pradeshi Banias may be called Marwari or Maru (See 
Millman, 1954, pp. 3-7).
7. This may be one reason why Rajasthan has been almost 
completely neglected by western anthropologists, with 
the sole exceptions of Carstairs (1961) and Stern 
(1977). The few Indian anthropologists who have con­
ducted fieldwork in the region have all concentrated 
on Southern Rajasthan. All of these (except for Stern) 
are.natives to the south: Carstairs, Chauhan (1967) 
and Atal (1968) from the vicinity of Udaipur and 
Gupta (1974) from Kotah.
8. These people are known locally under the generalised 
caste name of Gujar but include a number of other 
nomadic and semi-nomadic communities like Banjaras 
and Gaduliya Lohars. The Gujars originate from Kashmir 
and prior to independence and partition used to prac­
tise transhumande between the hill regions of Pakistan 
and Punjab. In Western India they are closely associ­
ated with the Rajputs and usually claim descent from 
them. Though in sadly reduced circumstances, they 
have now settled in the region and have mostly aban­
doned their pastoralist culture. Nonetheless, enough 
animals are still kept to make disputes between farmers 
and herders a regular feature of panchayat samitis.
9. Millman comments that the early history of Marwar
is obscure but "from.the time, of Chandra, AD 1382, the 
actual conquest of Marwar by the Rahtors, (sic) a clan 
of Rajputs may be dated" (Millman, 1954, p. 3; see 
also Rajputana Gazetteer, II, p. 230). Briefly, we 
may say that Mandi's historical experience is typi­
cal of the region as a whole, one of conquest and re- 
conquent.
10. The present organisation of local government in India 
stems from several approaches to revenue collection.
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It is only in the last 30 years that local govern­
ment in Rajasthan has meant any more than the imposi­
tion of taxes by a remote political - power. Moreover, 
the superimposition of local decision-making machi­
nery and modern nation-wide democratic processes 
upon the revenue hierarchy has engendered ambiguity. 
Mandi possesses the parapheranalia of both rural and 
urban governmental sectors.
11. Judging from literature on comparable market towns, 
Mandi must be divided into at least two itiauzas but 
it was not possible to get any details concerning 
this from the patwari. Nor was detailed information 
available concerning taxable houses or property as 
the records were not available for scrutiny (See 
Fox, 1969; Carter, 1974).
12. Executed at local level by the Rajasthan Panchayat 
Samiti and Zilla Parishad Bill, August/September,
1959; Amending Bill March, 1961.
13. See B. Maheshwari "Two years of panchayati raj in 
Rajasthan" in Economic Weekly, May 26, 1962, p. 848
14. And also contraband of various sorts no doubt. Lin­
guistic problems were compounded by an unwillingness 
to cooperate, hence no further data is available on 
this type of long distance trade.
15. Why the traditional merchant community should be so 
successful in business is a difficult question to 
tackle. Fox asserts that an important factor is the 
attitude of other castes towards business, which 
they consider to be anti-social, degrading and para­
sitic. The Banias of Tezibazar say that it is in 
their blood. He comments: "Other castes do business 
because they have to, but Banias do business because 
they like it" (Fox, 1969, p. 57).
16. However, the fact that there are 13 elected municipal 
board members has caused some confusion. During field­
work a writ was served on the Executive Officer, the 
Collector.of Tonk, the District Magistrate and the 
patwari for allegedly altering the ward boundaries 
illegally. During the Emergency the writ was shelved 
and apparently the case has still not been heard.
CHAPTER TWO
1. Basic statistical data from which the tables and 
figures in this section derive can be found in the 
Town Handbooks of the Rajasthan District Gazetteers 
(New Series). The tabulation and arithmetical cal­
culations are, unless acknowledged otherwise, my 
own.
2. No figures are available before the turn of the 
century, however, the Imperial Gazetteer (1908) 
mentions a series of disastrous famines and fevers 
in the last decade of the previous century which 
encouraged the emigration from Rajputana in excess 
of 100,000 people (enumerated elsewhere in India).
In addition, there were 31,980 deaths from bubonic 
plague in Jaipur State alone between October 1896 
and March 1905 linked to the recurrent famine. A 
Marwari proverb tells us to expect one lean year
in three, one famine year in eight. Informants said 
that in 1899 there was nothing left to sell in Mandi 
except shrouds for the dead. Set against this back­
ground of recurrent disaster the recent prosperity 
of the town takes on an added significance.
3. Ahimsa is linked to the doctrine of transmigration 
of souls and retribution for actions, in which Jains 
explicitly believe. So, for example, they must strain 
the water with which fruit and vegetables are washed 
before cooking because water contains living things 
and to consume them is murder. The implications of 
these doctrines (transmigration of souls, irrevocable 
consequences of actions and the third component: the 
nature of right action) are discussed in detail in 
chapter five.
4. This assertion clearly derives from the Imperial
Gazetteer references to Jaipur and Tonk States. Since
1931 figures on caste affiliation have not been collec 
ted in India except for the Scheduled Castes and Tribe 
There seems no reason to disagree with the prominence 
given to Mahajans in contemporary times, since the 
growth of business is inexorably linked to Mahajan 
dominance in the bazaar area, as will be shown in 
o’hapter three.
5. This is applicable to Jains and Muslims as well as
Hindus, though bathing in sacred rivers and at holy
places is particularly associated with the latter, 
for whom it is the most efficacious means of removing 
the strongest pollution e.g. death. For all, bathing 
in running water is a widespread technique for alle-
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viating impurity, and should be performed fully 
• clothed, accompanied by shaving (for men) and
removal of body hair (for women). The nose, mouth, 
ears and eyes are sluiced with water and the tongue 
cleaned with a silver scraper, before embarking upon 
appropriate hymns and prayers. Bathing is also a forti­
fication against future pollution at the place of work, 
or in the market place, and a precaution against po­
llution unknowingly contracted outside the home, to 
be taken immediately upon return. The compartmenta- 
lisation of house and work is especially marked amongst 
Jains and Vaishnavas and this will be discussed further 
in chapter seven.
6. Several land reforms have been attempted since the
formation of Rajasthan. Among the most important acts 
are the Rajasthan Protection of Tenants Ordinance,
1949, later repealed by the Rajasthan Tenancy Act,
1955, the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of 
Jagirs Act 1952, Rajasthan Land Utilisation Act 1954, 
Rajasthan Agricultural.Loan Act 1956, Rajasthan Land 
Revenue Act 1956, Discontinuation of Cesses Act 1969 
and the Rajasthan Removal of Trees (Regulation) Ordi­
nance 1949 with various amendments. The purpose of 
these acts has been to attempt to improve the condi­
tions of low caste cultivators and to release land for 
cultivation as part of the Grow More Food Campaign. 
These rural uplift schemes have naturally been cont­
roversial .
CHAPTER THREE
1. What constitutes the typical business family will be 
discussed in detail in chapter seven. Mahajan families 
are patrilineal in descent, patrilocal in residence, 
and ideally organised in a joint family system: a 
household wherein there are two or more adult males 
(i.e. males over 18 years old) but this is a very 
minimal form of jointness. Some of these joint or 
extended families are sizeable, consisting of more 
than two dozen kin living in the same household. Indi­
viduals residing outside the household may also be 
considered joint family members in certain circumstan­
ces .
2. Though it is as illegal in India as it is in the 
West for a group of firms to constitute a cartel and 
prices, governments are powerless to tackle indirect 
economic barriers. They are erected by tacit consent 
and it is possible then no telephone call or note 
may even mention the subject. The mechanism works by 
anticipation of others1 reactions to a joint threat.
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For example, in the 'brand war', as Lipsey says: 
'Product differentiation and brand advertising create 
substantial barriers where technological ones are 
weak and they allow existing firms to move in the 
direction of joint profit-maximisation, without fear 
of a flood of new entrants attracted by the high pro­
fits' (Lipsey, 1971, p. 288), A new entrant on the 
market has a small proportion of the total sales.
If the number of products is increased, the share 
of the new entrant will correspondingly decline, es­
pecially if the increase is accompanied by heavy 
advertising campaigns on behalf of the established 
firms. Product differentiation, accompanied by adver­
tising, can proliferate until the new entrant is for­
ced out of business.
3. Thus it would be wrong to assume that newcomers are 
excluded and as in western industrial societies, the 
economic system encourages the newcomer as much as 
it discourages him. For the true entrepreneur, hard 
times can, in fact, create new opportunities. For 
example, whilst the giant cigarette companies have 
been wilting under the impact of successive duty 
increases and lower real spending power in recent 
years, one company, Rizla-, has been doing better 
than ever. Rizla manufactures cigarette paper and 
cigarette rollers, thus permitting smokers to half 
their bills. Rizla's 1973 figures show that profits 
totalled £1.1 million, return on sales 40% and return 
on shareholders funds 45%, an amazing record for any 
company and particularly for a small company (The 
Economist, 1.3.1976).
4. See also Bayly, 1975, p. 5) for a similar story.
5. Mutual interdependence emerges with a small number 
of firms. If the number were large, i.e. the market 
were highly competitive, each could, suppose it had 
no influence on any other, so that no reactions need 
be considered. At the other extreme, a monopolist 
need not consider reactions since there are no other 
firms to react. Viewed against this perspective 
Mandi*s businesses resemble the multinational cor­
porations of the west rather than western family 
businesses for both operate in oligopolistic markets. 
Thus, the British soap and detergent market is domi­
nated by (a) Lever Brothers and (b) Procter and Gamble. 
Between them they manufacture virtually all the soap 
and detergent brands in U.K. In the same way, the 
Mahajan caste category dominate the markets for cer­
tain commodities in Mandi, as indicated in Table 3.6 
T.he principle remains the same.
CHAPTER FOUR
1. Mandelbaum (1970) uses the term 'caste category1 
however as a translation of the Sanskrit term 
varna. This is rarely used in the local context 
except by educated and wealthy people who are end­
eavouring to demonstrate.their familiarity with 
the ancient 'Great Traditon'; Marriott (1955) by 
which is meant the texts and tenets of orthodox 
Hinduism. Thus merchants should be allocated to 
the Vaisya varna since this estate covers.the tra­
ditional occupational calling of trade— vanij— hence 
the word Bania or its regional variants Baniya,
Wani etc.
2. Millman (1954, p. 16) has compiled a list using 
published material and informants' statements of 
the 14 Marwari.jatis classified as belonging to
the Vaisya varna. These are as follows: Agrawal Vaish 
navite, Agrawal Jain, Oswal Vaishnavite, Oswal Jain, 
Maheshwari (all Vaishnavite), Khandelwal Vaishnavite, 
Khandelwal Jain (Seroagi— Degambir Jains), Vijay 
Vargia (all Vaishnavite), Tikkewal. (all Vaishnavite) 
Jaiswal, Paliwal, Porwal., Sreemal, Shreshshreemal 
(all Jains). Informants in Mandi confirmed his asser­
tion that there are 12£ castes amongst the Marwaris 
and that 'no single Marwari was found who knew all 
the Vaisya castes which could be classified as 
Marwari' (Millman, 1954, p..16). This peculiar charac 
teristic of classification (i.e. half a caste) is 
repeated amongst the gotras of Agrawals, which in­
formants said totalled 17£. Presumably, this haziness 
of classificatory categories is functional in that 
it; (a) implies that the taxonomy is finite whilst.
(b) permits negotiation of unclear rankings.
3. Biradari literally means brotherhood. As Alavi (1972) 
has shown, the term has three connotations in actual 
usage: a collection of related households, between 
whom actual links of common descent can be traced 
patrilineally; secondly fraternal solidarity between 
such households as demonstrated by gift exchange on 
ceremonial occasions;, thirdly an endogamous group 
based on the limits of kindred recognition. Zat
(°r jati) by contrast is an endogamous, hereditary, 
social group which.has a name and is commensally 
restricted. Each jati has a fixed position in the 
caste hierarchy, this being determined according 
to concepts underpinned by Hinduism regarding the 
purity or impurity of its traditional occupational 
specialization.
350
4. See for example Harriott's famous article (1959) 
’Interactional and Attributional Theories of Caste 
Ranking1 and Mayer (196 0) which attempt to deter­
mine customarily regulated practices concerning
the scale of pollution (or relative impurity) and to 
construct a ranking of castes according to the struc­
ture of interaction among them. Criteria chosen by 
these and other writers to act as indices of rela­
tive interaction include acceptance of food and 
water by one caste from the hands of another, 
sharing a water pipe, and the giving and receiving 
of goods and services at ritual occasions. However, 
as Dumont acidly comments "it is not so much the 
people concerned as the investigators who try to 
attach the various aspects of the system to one 
given level" (Dumont, 1972, p. 190).
5. Pace of course Meillassoux (1973) who finds that 
indianists use the notion of caste tautologically, 
giving pre-eminence to religious power over the 
political power, and hence fail to penetrate the 
dominant ideology: "The attempt we see today to 
give it a structuralist coherence seems more like 
an ideological patching-up operation than a scien­
tific enterprise"(Meillassoux, 1973, p. 108). Pre­
dictably, Meillassoux finds that caste is an ideolo­
gical screen which prevents classes from recogniz­
ing themselves as such. This approach is, however,
a welcome breath of fresh air on a theoretical 
perspective which had-shown signs of being impossi­
bly reified.
6. The situation regarding Jain pandits1 ritual duties 
was not at all clear in Mandi, due in part to reli­
gious prohibitions upon revealing details of the 
faith to outsiders. One elderly woman from a leading 
Khandelwal Jain family in Mandi was acclaimed as a 
guru, but in view of her vow of silence interviews 
were impossible. Jains do not wear the sacred thread 
(janoi) as do Vaishnavas, but all other major stages 
of life are marked in a. similar manner.
7. Working with one’s hands is demeaning for the dvija 
(twice born)— i.e. members of the upper three varnas 
who are entitled to wear the sacred thread, thus 
signalling social initiation or a ’second birth’.
A second consideration is that ploughing the land 
runs the risk of accidentally taking life. For both 
Jains and Vaishnavas this is the supreme sin.
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8. Jain monks were perhaps the most aasce'tically 
organised of all the renunciatory sects to the 
extent that the Buddha himself rebuked them 
(Dumont, 1973, p. 193). It appears that the extreme 
nature of monachistic practices centring around the 
concept of ahimsa have contributed remarkably to 
lay thinking and life-style. The elaboration of 
taxonomic orders regulating the conduct of the 
Jain monks life are truly remarkable: for example 
he should sweep the path as he walks in order to 
avoid minute (microscopic) living things being 
crushed underfoot, breathe through a gauze mask, 
drink water which someone else has boiled etc.
See Stevenson (1915) for further details. In 
addition, the avoidance of attachment, which is 
central to these taxonomies, is also paralleled—  
though to a much lesser extent— by the detachment 
from social life characteristic of merchants gen­
erally. As Fox puts it: "In many ways the Bania 
stands apart from society, partially by his own 
choice, partially by the distaste by him for other 
castes, so that his social life, other than busi­
ness dealings, is relatively unknown to the general 
populace" (Fox, 1969, p. 43). This is vital for a 
profession where every social or ritual entangle­
ment may hinder 'using1 other people in a business 
context.
CHAPTER FIVE
1. E.g. Bernier (1830) and Dubois (1906) et al.. The 
general portrayal of the traditional merchant castes 
as cowardly, exploitative, and over-concerned with 
religious duty perhaps explains two contradictory 
prejudices about Banias1 behaviour (a) that as
a moneylending class, greedy for money, they siphon 
off wealth, causing widespread rural indebtedness 
(Darling, 1947) and (b) their other-worldly orienta­
tion and religiosity, preclude their entry into profit­
able economic activity. Dogma and reality are of 
course not equivalent.
2. Luigi Barzini (1964) has explored this difference 
with reference to the Italian Problema del Mezzogiorno. 
He points out that both.northerners and southerners 
alike want to protect.themselves from the envy, hatred, 
ill-will, greed and treachery of the outside world; 
the state, society, law and the mighty. But there
the resemblance stops..The northerner thinks that there 
is only one way to achieve their common aims: the acqui­
sition of la richezza. He is prepared to undergo any 
sacrifice to gain the advantages which wealth can
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confer. He is very close to being homo economicus.
The southerner, on the other hand, thinks that only 
power, prestige and authority will do the job. He 
cultivates the gratitude of powerful friends and 
relatives,, the fear of his enemies and the respect 
of everybody, acquiring not true wealth but the 
appearance of wealth. Barzini concludes with the 
paradox that whereas southerners seek money through 
honour, northerners seek honour through money. It 
is this sort of distinction which Bayly is trying 
to draw between the traditional, merchants of Bena­
res and the entrepreneur of classical economic 
theory.
3. Timberg, incidentally, argues.that it is lack of
a time perspective which leads to this conclusion..
The longer-range view of the historical approach 
allows greater appreciation of the gestation period 
needed for industrial enterprise to become estab­
lished. I do not.wish to argue the supremacy of 
the diachronic over the synchronic, but '.his point 
is worth noting.
4. For instance, Salisbury (1962) has shown that the 
introduction of. new technology— steel axes for stone—  
shortened the period of necessary work in one Melan­
esian society; economic gain being expressed in 
terms of expanding leisure time rather than output.
As indicated earlier, rational, behaviour approxi­
mates to maximising i.e. realising the greatest 
possible returns. However where production is for 
livelihood, productive capacity is geared to the 
needs of the domestic group and therefore by its 
nature limited to their objectives. Once liveli­
hood is assured, work tends.to cease accordingly, 
hence the intermittent character of production in 
traditional societies., even when harnessed to the 
market.
5. This may be compared with Derrett's interpreta­
tion (1976, personal communication). Thus dharma 
can. mean: a) the inherent nature of something;
b) an injunction to do something; c) the way of 
life of somebody; d) piety, shading into punya: 
merit and sukke: bliss; e) rriglabeousness-:— espe­
cially by following the fivefold path of satya, 
ahimsa etc; f) sacrifice and the supersensory 
eff ects . thus . achieved. Of these six interpreta­
tions, only the last seems to have no local usage, 
but only the first three are.common.
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6. Again, Dumont makes the point that "the theory
of the gift to the Brahmans, a pre-eminently meri­
torious action, can be regarded as establishing a 
means of transforming.material goods into (ritual) 
values" (1972, p. 30). However local Mahajan 
informants.asserted.that all dan is bad except 
guptadan (secret gifts) and gifts to Brahmans 
could even be sinful. The fact that a Brahman 
accepts dan indicates bad character, especially 
if the amounts concerned are large, and any sins 
committed with the money rebounded upon the donor, 
whether he is aware of them or not.
7. It is significant that Benares, Agra, Allahabad 
and Delhi are better situated with regard to the 
customary disposal of the dead as they are all river 
cities. Hence, as outsiders, Mahajans from Mandi must 
use tirath-purohits (pilgrimage priests) for mortu­
ary rituals in Hardwar presumably? Unfortunately
I have no data on this.
8. Of relevance here, too, is the approved method of 
disposing of.an old Quran (or the other recognised 
holy books for Muslims): the pages if loose should 
be gathered together carefully and placed in clean 
running water, such as a stream, until the ink has 
been washed away, then the remaining' paper, if any, 
collected and buried. As one informant puts it:
"It's the ink that makes the pages special and 
after that's gone the paper can be put underfoot 
or anywhere".
9. In 1910 and 1943 reforms were introduced to circum­
scribe the limits of loans.to the jagirdars, parti­
cularly to reduce the high rate of indebtedness 
through heavy loans taken for the payment of armies 
or maintenance of government. Under the new laws,
no Mahajan could lend a jagirdar more than a month's 
income. The most recent regulation of moneylending 
is the Rajasthan Moneyleaders' Act (I of 1964).
CHAPTER SIX
*
1. Fox (1969, p. 143) has suggested that caste-based
values direct the highly developed profit motive of 
the Banias "not into large scale entrepreneurial 
channels but into less risky but equally profitable 
realms of adulteration, cheating and black-marketeering". 
Later, he comments that dishonest trading practices 
are due to "an impoverished consumer class not willing 
to accept the necessity for a merchant's profit" (Fox, 
1969, p. 161). This would imply that indigenous busi­
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ness 'style' is more closely integrated with regional 
economic conditions than traditional mentality. I 
shall return to this point again.
2. Gupta remarks that "the co-operative banks and money­
ed agriculturalists who replaced the Aggarwals as
bankers and moneylenders operate only for the bene­
fit of the upper few, leaving the vast majority of 
the middle and lower rung cultivators resourceless" 
(Gupta, 1974, p. 5). He goes on to say that not only 
do the co-operative banks have built-in defects, 
which limit their functioning, but they are corrupt. 
The difficulties faced by villagers1 in getting loans 
from the cojioperative societies and the three commer­
cial banks in Mandi are a reminder that the rural 
credit problem is complex.
3. The large general shop, for example, has many of
the advantages of large scale manufacturing: by
extending its market overheads are spread, hence 
costs are proportionately less and so it gives better 
value for money. The malik is likely to have a good 
knowledge of suppliers and where to locate goods in 
demand. The size of trade is such that a variety
of goods can be stocked, beyond the resources of 
most small unit shops. Lastly it can get rid of 
goods at bargain prices or even at a loss, in the 
expectation that customers will make secondary 
purchases.
4. A maund is a local unit of measurement, equivalent 
to approximately 4 2 kilos.
5. Discussing the activities of commission agents in 
Ibadan, Cohen (196 9b, p. 80): "as in the cattle trade, 
in this case, too, a kola landlord cannot concentrate 
on his own dealings without adversely affecting his 
own interests as a kola landlord". It seems clear 
that the various pressures which inhibit a commission 
agent from becoming a trader are structured into the 
organisation of long distance trade in developing 
countries.
6- Hundis have a long and interesting history. Examples 
have been found dating back to the thirteenth and 
fourteenth centuries (AD) and recovered from China 
and Persia..For.a detailed account see Jain (1929) 
Indigenous banking in India.
'Seth'was more than an honorific title traditionally. 
'r i^e seth had responsibility in town administration.
As residues from an earlier period there are, at
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present, some cities, such as Allahabad, with here­
ditary elders (schresths) corresponding to the occiden­
tal mayor (Weber, 1962, p. 84). The schresths were 
the headmen of sreni, approximately equivalent to 
mediaeval guilds, and some were composed exclusively 
of merchants and bankers (Millman, 1954, p. 66). The 
mercantile srenis were engaged in extensive banking 
operations and often acted as quartermasters for the 
princely states of western India,.for example, supply­
ing elephants. The schresths, or as Millman calls 
them, sresthi, would appear to be the fore-runner 
of the modern Seth, an honorific name now used in 
addressing a respected merchant.
8. Female labour is traditional in, for example, 
construction and agricultural work, however.
CHAPTER SEVEN
1. Shah (1974, p. 23) argues, however, that the joint 
family is a residential rather than a property-sharing 
unit, which poses problems in classifying families 
where members from one household regularly collabo­
rate with consanguineal kin from the others in collec­
tive projects of an economic nature or otherwise, most 
notably sharing the death pollution of agnates. His 
criticism of the coparcenary approach— that if shared 
property rights are taken as the key, then two males 
alone could form a joint family— is a valid one. The 
principal issue seems to be the nature and degree
of integrated interests.
2. The problem here is, of course, that if a family is 
joint when it 'feels joint', surely it could be classi­
fied as joint without any of the criteria given as to 
property, residence etc? Therefore, although the house­
hold and the joint family can be seen as separate en­
tities the tendency is to take them together. The point 
must foe that, despite the separation of residence, the 
influence of the joint family is reflected in combined 
enterprises and especially in the management structures 
of traditional businesses.
3. Carstairs (1961) deals at length with the symbolic ref­
erents of 'upper' and 'lower' from the psychological 
perspective. Thus in personal terms, the head is purer 
than the shoulders, the shoulders than the waist and 
so on, the most impure being the feet. The hierarchy 
of states of purity— -or. relative impurity— has been 
notes several times above. I mention this again since 
it indicates how hierarchy manifests itself as exclu-
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sivity amongst the merchant castes: everything out­
side the house is polluting and dangerous and the 
nearer the outside world, the less pure is the 
interior.
4. See also Fox, 1969, p. 171 (footnote). Official/ 
legal recognition of a family business comes from 
paying sales tax or from income tax. However, 
instead of declaring his income, a merchant in India 
is asked the amount of his total sales and the income 
tax officer calculates the tax to be deducted from 
this figure. This contributes to the lack of separa­
tion of household from business.
5. The Hindi alphabet, as taught in the temple schools 
begins with four letters: K, KH,Gc-and GH. Children 
are taught that K represents kaam (work); KH repre­
sents khana (food); G stands for gamana (jewellery); 
and GH stands for gher (house). It is explained to 
them that work produces food, wealth, and a home 
for the family. The fundamentals of Mahajan business 
ideology are thus instilled from the beginning. (See 
aslo Bayly, 1975, p. 7 who develops this theme 
further).
6. Addiction to sweets is associated with unreliability 
and is believed to be a family trait particularly 
transmitted through women. See Ved Prakash Vatuk and 
Sylvia Vatuk, "Chatorpan: a culturally conditioned 
form of addiction in India" in The International 
Journal of the Addictions, 2, 1967, pp. 103-113.
7. Parry (1979, pp. 274-282) argues that lineage names 
themselves permit ambiguity of interpretation which 
are useful in the context of status-building, parti­
cularly those which derive from a locality. Thus he 
argues "there seems to be no logical limit to the 
process of fragmentation of the status group" (p1. 277) 
and, I would add, equally no limit to the reformula­
tion of status groups, especially in situations of 
demographic change as in Mandi. This is of special 
relevance in terms of the redefinition of the rules 
of vaniakapta, which I discuss below.
8. Dumont defines the marriage alliance as "an extended 
and permanent affinity" (1972, p. 154) with reference 
to south Indian kinship systems, wherein mother's 
brother-sister's daughter marriage forms a central 
institution. This has the effect of perpetuating 
counter-balancing affinal/consanguineal relations 
over time. But it is not found in the north, however, 
and I would argue that here we should rather look at 
marital institutions in the less restrictive usage
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of 'alliance', that is, the joining together in 
pursuit of common interests. As a connection of kin­
ship between lineages, marriage is not necessarily 
a permanent kinship bond in effect, even though the 
marriage alliance is indissoluble, and frequently 
forms the extrinsic pretext for interaction of 
rather different kinds (see Pettigrew, 19$5 ) .
9. Marriages are performed with elaborate ceremonies 
and festivities. Among Vaishnavas and Jains the 
rites are similar. For a detailed account of these 
see Gupta (1976) and Hazlehurst (1968).
10. Das (1975, p. 77) suggests that the high rate of 
female suicide in regions like> Saurashtra and the 
fact that this is usually attributed to oppression 
b y 'in-laws'lends support to her hypothesis that 
hypergamy and suicide are inter-connected, though 
not exclusively. Certainly, the greater the ease 
with which a woman is incorporated into her husband's 
kin group, the greater the possibility that, whatever 
the formal rules of social interaction between wife- 
givers and wife-receivers, her position will not be 
one of total dependency.
CHAPTER EIGHT
1. The inspiration for the layout of this chapter derive 
from Hutson (1974, p. 17) whose discussion of "why, today, 
villagers (in Valloire) are innovating successfully
in the private sphere whilst the public sphere is 
dogged by troubles and appears conservative" is very 
clearly most pertinent. Hutson uses a single frame­
work of questions to analyse the differences between 
family enterprise and village enterprise and also 
between the traditional rich and-the modern tradesmen.
In Mandi the traditional rich are the modern tradesmen 
from whom the industrial entrepreneurs are drawn. A 
second, difference in approach is that Hutson analyses 
the social structure of the village as a major compo­
nent in the development, of a mentalite which restricts 
the innovators. My argument is that the centrality of 
the. family in Mahajani business ideology promotes 
private gain whilst inhibiting externally directed 
economic change. Therefore, as outlined in the intro­
ductory chapter to this thesis, the stress on contex­
tually understanding the operation of ideological compo­
nents, and in particular the nature of encapsulating 
systems.
2. As discussed in chapter,two Marwaris have been famous 
throughout India since the latter half of last century 
for their migrations. The process of migration emptied
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some parts of Rajasthan of their indigenous merchant 
castes. Mandi itself has had its share of adventu­
rers: the first Marwari to open shop in Dacca (now 
Bangladesh) in the 1850's was reputedly from Mandi, 
then a village. For details of the migratory process 
see Timberg (1978).
3. Fox (1969) uses this argument to further his theme 
that Baniyas of Texibazar are subsistence-oriented 
in their business organisation. Whilst the main aim 
of Banias/Mahajans is to maintain the family this 
does not preclude manipulating other people and 
resources in pursuit of discernible profit, surely?
The stagnation of Tezibazar's economy seems more 
likely to be related to the fact that Eastern Uttar 
Pradesh, in his own words "is sorely behind the 
central, and particularly, the western regions"
(p. 8). Bayly's study of Kara near Allahabad in 
Eastern UP stands as a paradigm for "progressive 
de-urbanisation" (1980, p. 39) based on commercial 
decline in the region generally, related to the 
coming of the railways and the loss of superior ad­
ministrative functions. Comparisons would be re­
warding but regrettably lie beyond the scope of this 
study.
4. The names of these governmental and guasi-governmental 
institutions have been changed and simplified where 
appropriate in order to shield several helpful indi­
vidual from the civil servants' bugbear: publicity. 
Nonetheless thanks are due; it is a pity that they 
must remain nameless.
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